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Abstract. Ethnicity and religious confession are concepts around which discussion 
and controversy arise, generating emotions and feelings of extreme intensity. Each of us belongs 
to such communities. By default, there is a strong pressure on us to be subjective. Intercultural 
dialogue can be successfully provided where a community that is aware of the others comes to 
communicate, to cooperate, and to build the structure of a multicultural society. Studies have 
shown that ethnic and religious diversity is poor when missing openness to other communities. 
On the other hand, this diversity, as it is the case throughout Central and South-Eastern 
Europe, reveals the less desirable realities. Today we are talking about discrimination, 
marginalization, low-status minorities, peripheral societies, inequitable distribution of 
resources; therefore, we can conclude that the majority-minority relations management highlights 
the demographic aspect (quantity) and the sociological aspect, i.e. the distribution of authority 
and power. 
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realities. Today we are talking about discrimination, marginalization, low-status 
minorities, peripheral societies, inequitable distribution of resources; therefore, 
we can conclude that the majority-minority relations management highlights the 
demographic aspect (quantity) and the sociological aspect, i.e. the distribution 
of authority and power. 
The current context of crisis, which is not only a financial and economic 
crisis, but also a political, social, mental, and even ideological crisis, shows a 
throw at the forefront of discussions, on the one hand, of the need to 
strengthen the dialogue and on the other hand, the trends to return to certain 
forms of nationalism and cultural cleavage. Without advocating for one or 
other of these trends we see that Europe is at a crossroads. The old forms of 
social-political and economic life are redefined. Even relations between people 
and between communities resettle on new organization and relational forms. In 
a Europe without borders, more and more types of borders appear; on another 
occasion we called them “symbolic and ideological frontiers” (Brie and Horga, 2009: 
15-31, Brie, 2010: 79-92; Horga and Brie, 2010 [2]: 63-86). We refer to them as 
symbolic and ideological frontiers as they, most often, are not tangible. From 
Europeanism to nationalism, from ethno-religious identity to cultural identity, 
and to social cleavages, the wide range of approaches of these borders could 
continue in the context of implementation of an effective European 
Neighbourhood Policy. The physical border of the European Union's external 
limit can "open" in time, but new types of frontiers can occur between people 
and communities. Immigrants, for instance, live in the European Union 
maintaining their own identity, thus creating a world that "refuses integration" 
by the specificity that it develops; we are able to identify a cleavage between this 
kind of community and the majority, a cleavage that can take the form of 
symbolic cultural borders that sometimes turns into an "external" border. 
In the current context, many European societies develop a strong sense 
of "self-protection", which takes not only a form of economic nature, but also 
one of preservation of their identity and culture. Moments of crisis or 
excitement can easily lead to the emergence of nationalist sentiments that dilute 
the "Europeanist" perception of the border. Such a dilution occurs in parallel 
with the strengthening of identitary-community cohesion, of the spirit of 
ethno-cultural belonging to nation. It is a time when many European nations 
reaffirmed, "they regain identity" by returning to the national, that despite the 
"unity" and solidarity affirmed at the level of European institutions through 
officials of Member States. National borders, created in different periods and 
historical and political contexts have contributed to national economic 
integration and cultural periphery. In the current context, with the EU 
accession of the Central and Eastern Europe states, there was a reverse 
phenomenon: the disintegration of the national market and the administrative 
decentralization have led to integration of peripheries in the national systems, 
Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue in the European Border Space 
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including the cultural one. Powerful currents are currently channeled in the 
direction of cross-border cooperation, erodig the idea of the national bloc, 
compact and relatively isolated (Muller and Schultz, 2002: 205). In terms of 
cultural relations it is obvious that we are dealing nowadays with a streamlining 
of trades, without being able to talk about a loss of national, regional or local 
specificity. The cultural specificity brings into question the cultural border. It 
separates the areas of own cultural identity, building what we call the European 
cultural space of the cultures. 
The cultural diversity records the plurality of ideas, images, values and 
expressions. All this is possible through a great variety of expression and 
through the presence of a large number of parallel national, ethnic, regional, 
local, etc. cultures. Moreover, in this context, some authors talk about the 
"revenge identity" and the "feeling of return to historical, national and cultural 
identity" especially in an area such as the Central and Eastern Europe, and a 
historical time in which the specificity and the national identity are bound to 
redefine themselves through opening to new geo-political, historical, cultural 
configurations (David and Florea, 2007: 645-646). 
In the approach, surely an important element of reference is given: sub-
or multinational, local or diaspora, not least by the European and international 
context (Bennett, 2001: 29-32). Beyond any approach, the image of European 
culture has been given by associating concepts of people-culture-history and 
territory that give a certain local specificity. Under this report, we identify, 
beyond a European culture, a cultural space with national, regional and local 
specificities. Therefore we identify at least two European cultural identity 
constructions: a culture of cultures, namely a cultural space with a strong 
identity at individual, local, regional, and national levels, or a cultural 
archipelago, namely a common cultural space interrupted by discontinuities. 
Whatever the perspective, the existence of a European cultural area is not 
denied, even if it is either the diversity or the "continuity interrupted" (Horga 
and Brie, 2010 [1]: 157). 
But we increasingly find that Europe is at a turning point, in terms of 
more than ideology. The association of state-nation-territory-border involves 
some nuances. In the current geopolitical context, we could say that the era of 
nation states, as known to date, is redefined, reshaping it in a different sense. 
―Borders‖ between communities have been increasingly occurring within states. 
Unintegrated immigrants (unwanted by the majority!) are increasingly 
numerous. Discrimination and marginalization are forcing them to isolate and 
to respond sometimes as parallel "existential forms" to the state in which they 
live. 
Our approach could be too simplistic if we remain only to debate about 
classic immigrants or national minorities. Introducing the concept of 
extraterritoriality in the approach of ethnicity and intercultural dialogue seems 
Mircea BRIE 
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mandatory for a proper understanding of European realities in this field. A 
subject that has been intensively debated at European level is the Roma, the 
Gypsies. Comments relating to the expulsion of Roma from France and their 
forced repatriation to Romania and Bulgaria have filled the pages of the 
European newspapers. Events in mid September 2011 in Bulgaria relating to 
the "revolt" brought against the Roma in many cities of the country south of 
the Danube have exposed a cruel reality that needs to be on the agenda of all 
institutions of Europe. Extremist groups in Bulgaria gathered important masses 
of people who were not limited to racial chanting, but they also became violent 
and destroyed Roma properties. Shocking was the extremist calling for chasing 
the Roma from Bulgaria. France repatriates them in Bulgaria and Bulgarians 
banishes them from the country. Where? Roma are members of a great people 
living in many European countries, but a people without its own a territory and 
without its own state. Tackling the Roma in Europe is therefore a problem of 
Europe and not of a certain state, not even of the South Central-Eastern 
Europe, as it is the very wrong impression of the West. Etra-teritoriality, both 
as a concept and as a starting point in managing the problems of an ethnic 
minority (but not national!), becomes therefore a reality that invokes new 
clarifications and rethinking of European policies. 
Another example, which falls somewhat in the same category of 
discussions on "non-traditional minority" is in Central and Eastern Europe; 
there are issues related to granting dual citizenship to members of ethnic 
groups. The most present in the mass-media were the granting of dual 
citizenship for the Romanian ethnics in Moldova and granting the dual 
citizenship for the Hungarian ethnics from countries around Hungary (during 
public debates, a strong emphasis has been put on the pros and cons in the 
disputes from Slovakia and Romania, where Hungarian communities are more 
numerous) . The topic has gained special importance by the fact that this dual 
citizenship, even if individually granted, peaked so high that is sent the message 
that dual citizenship was granted in mass to a group, to a community. Hence 
the hope or the fear for the possible creation of "Little Hungaries" in southern 
Slovakia and in central Romania. 
Cultural diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism are specific elements 
of the European space. European integration is complex and it does not 
require, nor is it conditioned by the idea of cultural unity, or by the existence of 
a common culture to include all Europeans. Specificity and diversity belong to 
the realm of intercultural dialogue, prerogatives of the European peoples. Each of 
the European societies must find its own integrated solutions, depending on the 
specific traditions and its institutions. European societies and cultures do not 
repel each other in the European construction equation. It is time that everyone 
learns from the experience and the expertise of others. Central and Eastern 
European countries issued by the communist authoritarian regimes have 
Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue in the European Border Space 
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experimented in the post-1990 a transition to a democratic model. This 
democratic model assumes, however, the acceptance of diversity, including 
those claims that had acknowledged the minorities. In some cases, the 
opportunities for cultural expression and political responses to these claims 
were not really the desired ones and thus, unfortunately, military settlements 
were sought. 
Over a long period of time, the minorities in Western Europe have 
gradually won self-recognition and equity in distribution of national resources 
(sudden changes were recorded in the central-eastern continent that manifested 
with a much higher intensity, both through the minority claims and the 
resistance of the majority). Not the same situation can be found in minority 
rights from the old European colonies. Their proposals raised issues related to 
the question of social status, financial resources and, finally, the relations 
between European cultures and those from the world where these populations 
originate (La culture au cœur, 1998: 69). 
The problem of immigrants, their access and integration, is another 
sensitive and important issue from the perspective of inter-ethnic or inter-
religious relations. Diversity is not only ethno-religious, it is also cultural and 
mental. The attitudes of Europeans towards immigrants have not remained 
constant over time. If in the ‗70s the European countries were favourable to 
immigration, and in some cases such as West Germany and Switzerland, 
immigration was encouraged, as it addressed employment, then things have 
changed. In the late ‗80s, because of the overwhelming number of immigrants 
and their "non-European" character, the old continent proved to be less 
welcoming. Yet Europe has tried to cultivate a climate of openness and 
generosity." It is fundamental to create a welcoming society and to recognize 
that immigration is a two-way process involving both immigrants being adapted 
to the society, and the society that assimilates them. Europe is by nature a 
pluralist society, rich in cultural and social traditions that will further 
diversify"(Tandonnet, 2007: 50). Is it just a utopia this European optimism that 
Maxime Tandonnet identified? The presence of Islam in Europe is a certainty, 
but its Europeanization remains a contentious issue. As the French academician 
Gilles Kepel noted "neither the bloodshed of the Muslims in North Africa, 
fighting in French uniforms during both world wars, nor the toil of the 
immigrant workers, living in deplorable conditions, who rebuilt France (and 
Europe) for nothing after 1945, did not tranform their children in ... European 
citizens in the true sense of the word" (Leiken, 2005: 1). If Europeans are able 
to assimilate Muslim immigrants, or if there will be a conflict of values remains 
an open issue. Stanley Hoffman observed that more and more Westerners are 
afraid of "being invaded not by armies and tanks, but by the immigrants who 
speak other languages and worship other gods from other cultures and will take 
Mircea BRIE 
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their jobs, will occupy their land, will live far from the prosperity system and 
will threaten their way of life" (Stanley, 1991: 30, Huntington, 1998: 292). 
Alternating negotiation and conflict, communication and doubt, the 
Muslims are building step by step an individual and collective identity "that is 
likely to be both pure and hybrid, local and transnational" (Saint-Blanc, 2008: 
42). The multiplication of identity vectors contributes to a fluidity of symbolic 
borders and to an individuality of communities from diaspora. A cleavage is 
identified around the Islamic community, by comparison to the wider 
community. This cleavage sometimes takes the form of internal and external 
borders, all at the same time. Such a reality is amplified by the creation of 
community models in which identity features are transferred from the sphere of 
ethnic or national (Turkey, Maghreb, Arabs) to the religion, i.e. Muslim, Islamic 
(Saint-Blanc, 2008: 44). In this model of behavior we can observe the numerous 
behavioral reactions of Islamic communities that achieve a solidarity going 
slightly beyond ethnic or national differences. Such a reality is determined by 
the discriminatory attitude of the majority. Many stereotypes not only lead to a 
generalized stereotyped immage, but also to a solidarity around Islamic values 
even of those who are not into religious practices, maybe even atheists. The 
phenomenon can be reversed: leaving from Islamic solidarity can lead to ethnic 
solidarity. This is the case of the Pakistani Muslim community in the UK 
(approximately 750,000 people) who have regrouped ethnically (ethnic border) 
on the basis of religious support (Pędziwiatr, 2002: 159). 
Here we are, the difficulties of integration are obvious. Between 
different ethnic groups or cultures there are often communication barriers that 
not infrequently lead to cleavages, engaging discriminatory reactions and 
conflictual situations. On the other hand, these cleavages are only expressions 
of the elitist political current, being difficult to spot in everyday life. Under this 
report, the ethnic boundaries are from one point of view mutual spaces of 
understanding and inclusion, and from another point of view spaces of 
divergence and exclusion (Tătar, 2003: 159). 
The political events of 1989 particularly marked by the fall of 
communism outlined the possibility of building the new Europe soon. The 
border imposed by the Iron Curtain fell and therefore, the gap between Eastern 
and Western Europe began to fill. Under the strong influence of globalization, 
which has made the world a small global village, the European Union came into 
being, a body which in the future will include all European countries. 
The new Europe brings together a multitude of ethnicities, beliefs, 
traditions, cultures and religions. The European integration process has profound 
implications not only of political, economic and social natures, but also of 
religious nature. A political structure "cannot live without religious consensus" 
(Moşoiu, 2006: 312). But what kind of religious consensus is required today? And 
what kind of religious identity will be there in the New Europe? These questions 
Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue in the European Border Space 
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must be seen in the context of postmodernism and secularization. The 
Europeans have been showing a decreasing interest in the Church and in religion, 
in general. René Rémond talks about an abandonment of Christianity in Europe. 
In England and the Scandinavian countries, the proportion of believers who 
regularly attend services is 1-2% (Rémond, 2003: 10). 
On the other hand, one can observe an ideological and religious 
division between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. The West 
accommodates the Catholic and Protestant populations, while the East 
accommodates mainly the Orthodox. Moreover, if Europe was once considered 
a Christian continent, today we cannot say the same. On the European 
continent live alongside Christians, millions of Muslims, only in Britain, 
Germany and France there are more than twelve million Muslims (Rémond, 
2003: 217). To this a substantial segment Jewish population and eastern 
religions are added. 
In this context, the construction of the new Europe requires a 
consistent and coherent intercultural dialogue. Moreover, the issue of the 
importance of Christianity in the formation of the "European identity" has 
been highlighted, being even put in relation with the pressing institutional crisis, 
and with the much debated European Constitution rejected by the French and 
Dutch referendums (Kalinowski, 2008: 297-298). The continuation of the 
process of European construction itself requires significant progress towards 
achieving intercultural dialogue, involving also the realization of a bridge 
between religions and religious movements at European level. 
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Abstract. Our initiative first aims at introducing the topics on ethnicity, religion and 
intercultural dialogue in the Curricula of European Studies in 12 European Union Member 
States (Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Italy, Romania, Great Britain, 
Belgium, Germany, France and Denmark). Although the number of courses approaching topics 
relating to culture, social realities and historical experiences is low (only 4.5% out of the total 
number of inventoried courses), there is a great variety of such courses. Second, our initiative is 
an attempt to settle the trends in the evolution of the curricula in the field. 
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In a world where cultural and religious interdependencies get deeper 
due to economic, political and cultural globalization on the one hand, and 
isolationist outbursts meant to separate cultures, religions and communities on 
the other hand, one seems to question humanity trends for harmony of 
interdependences as an expression of diversity where multiculturalism is 
contested by both rational political voices and irrational anarchic actions. We 
consider that the fight for religious and ethnic diversity and intercultural 
dialogue is both justified and morally necessary. On the one hand, intercultural 
education contributes to establishing a set of values due to which students pass 
from the level of understanding and affirmation of their own culture to the 
level ―where spatial and cultural borders are becoming ever more permeable‖ 
(Checkel, J.T & Katzenstein P.J, 2010: 2). On the other hand, intercultural 
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education contributes to affirming diversity in a joint cultural space of 
democratic values, which could turn into a real European citizenship policy 
(Howard M. M, 2009). 
From this point of view, this event is not only a scientific initiative, but 
also a civic enterprise meant to seize, explain, and draw people‘s attention. Our 
endeavour referring to topics focusing on ethnicity, religion and intercultural 
dialogue in the Curricula of European Studies is meant to respond to these three 
objectives. 
 
1. Fields with courses contributing to intercultural education 
 
Our endeavour is based on data collected in 2008 – 2010 under the 
Erasmus Thematic Network project referring to the curricula on European 
Studies in 12 European countries: Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, 
Italy, Romania, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, France and Denmark1.  Out 
of the nine operational fields in which we have divided the courses selected2, in 
five we can find a greater number of courses relaying information referring to 
the topic of our paper to the students.  
 
EU Political and 
Administrative 
Studies 
EU 
Historical 
Studies 
EU 
Interdisciplinary 
Studies 
EU 
Intercultural 
Dialogue 
Studies 
EU 
Communication 
and Information 
Studies 
Other 
102 115 89 130 46 9 
 
The EU Intercultural Dialogue Studies is the richest field for these types of 
courses both as absolute value and as average out of the total number of 
courses we have identified in our database3 (130 courses out of a total of 331, 
i.e. 0.3 courses). It comprises a large diversity of courses that belong to this 
field, especially at the BA and MA levels. We have identified three major 
subfields where we can insert the following courses: Islam and Europe, 
Europeanization and cultural diversity and European dialogue with other geo-cultural spaces. 
                                                          
1 Parts of this survey belong to the chapter entitled ―Current Problems in the 
Development of the European and/or EU Studies Curriculum‖, in print. It will be 
published in the volume entitled Teaching European Studies Curricula and Teaching 
Methods, edited by Stephania Baroncelli, Ioan Horga, Sophie Vanhoonakar, Roberto 
Farneti, Springer Editions 
2EU Political and Administrative Studies, EU Legal Studies, EU Historical Studies, EU 
Economic Studies, EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, EU Intercultural 
Dialogue Studies, EU Communication and Information Studies, EU and Comparative 
Regionalism Studies, EU Interdisciplinary Studies  - 
3 www.iser.rdsor.ro 
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 At the BA level, within the Islam and Europe group, we have noticed that 
this issue is becoming more active in the quest for a clear European identity, 
addressed to other cultures as a consequence of the ―traditional ethnic 
immigration of the non-European‖ (Favell, A. 2010; 167). Religion, culture and 
language are the three variables that affect the curricula. Within the EU 
universities, specific courses are investigating Pluralism and Religious Minorities in 
the European Union, Religious Plurality and Religious Conflict in Modern Europe (Spain), 
Identities in Contemporary Europe (UK), Sociology of Religions in Europe (France), Islam 
in Europe (Lithuania). As we can notice, these courses belong to the paradigm of 
the ―religious border in decomposition‖4 (Antes, P., 2008) phenomenon. Even 
if the issue of Islam is not necessarily specified within the name of the courses, 
the religious and cultural differentiations often arise, thus contributing to the 
―identification with Europe‘s internal diversity‖ (Kaelble, H. 2010: 201) and 
integration is becoming ―more flexible and fragmented‖ (Moravcisk, A, 1998: 5). 
 The subfield of Europeanization and cultural diversity holds a core place 
within the European universities. There is a large number of courses that are 
gathered within this category. Therefore, there is a series of common courses 
investigating social and cultural aspects of European integration, European 
cultural heritage, Religion and cultural bases of European civilization, European 
identity, Cultural identities in Europe, etc. The concept of cultural diversity used 
here is in accordance with two types of European multicultural approach: a 
western traditional one and an eastern dynamic one (Horga, I & Brie, M, 2010). 
From this perspective, it is very important to mention that in each 
country, within the category of Europeanization and cultural diversity there are 
courses aiming to integrate local, national, and regional culture to the European 
identity (Checkel, J.T & Katzenstein P.J, 2010: 9). For example, there are 
courses on Slovenian culture in European context, Slovak Cultural Heritage in European 
Context or Poland in Europe. The integrative cultural and intercultural approaches 
became part of rediscovering and strengthening the European dimension of the 
national ―symbols and rituals of power‖ (Donnan, H & Wilson Th. M., 1999: 
63-86). A curriculum with European touch has to reflect the voices, hopes, and 
dreams of the students from diverse ethnic and social-class group contributing 
to shaping the European identity (Fligstein, N. 2010: 136). 
 The other group dealing with intercultural dialogue - European dialogue 
with other geo-cultural spaces – becomes a subject of most recent teaching and 
investigation efforts as a consequence of cultural influences of globalization and 
the EU new borders (Anderson, M., 2004: 178-192; Howard M. M, 2009: 169-
193). One of the objectives of intercultural education is to help students learn 
how they could cross their cultural borders and establish intercultural dialogue 
and action. The study of the Other and the Outside has increased in importance 
                                                          
4 Most studies on the matter were published in issue 5/2008 of Eurolimes journal. 
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within the academic curricula. We have identified courses that specifically 
questioned these matters: Dominant Religions of Europe & Middle East; Euro-
American Relations (Slovakia); Extra-European Worlds; International and European 
Culture; Extra-European Influences, Extra-European Civilizations (France); Intercultural 
Euro-Asian Relations (Portugal), etc. 
 On the MA level, the EU Intercultural Dialogue Studies are subject to the 
same interest where the curriculum has developed on more strictly basis 
focusing more on specific matters. There is no obvious direct interest for the 
Islam, with some exceptions addressed to Mediterranean space and Muslim 
influences (for instance, in France there are course Turkey and European political 
Debate or Euro-Maghreb culture). This can be explained by the increasing need for 
understanding intercultural approaches where religious aspects are addressed in 
a comparative and integrative manner among Christianity, Judaism and Islam 
(Santagostino, A., 2008; Brie M. &Brie, I, 2008). A more comprehensive 
approach is dedicated to the Europeanization and cultural diversity. There is much 
more interest on the MA level for teaching and research of intercultural 
dialogue. The most covered issues are gathered within courses such as: European 
cultures and identities; European culture and civilization; Identity, Heritage and Cultural 
Diversity in Europe. There might be a distinction on two different approaches of 
intercultural dialogue in Europe: first, there is a comprehensive approach that 
tries to have a general European view (Horga, I. & all, 2009) and second, there 
is an approach with different national or particular cultural character (such as 
language, literature, theatre or cinema). With reference to European dialogue with 
other geo-cultural spaces (Contogeorgis, G, 2010) on the MA level the same interest 
is maintained for curricula development, especially in the context of a deeper 
multidisciplinary approach.  
 The PhD level that covers intercultural issues in Europe is subject to 
interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary pursuits that make it difficult to set as a 
distinctive field because of its multiple specialized perspectives: sociology, 
anthropology, philosophy, languages and religious studies. From this 
perspective, the curriculum reflects the cultural learning styles of the students 
within the university community. 
 The EU Historical Studies come in second in the field of EU studies 
made up of courses particularly referring to ethnicity and confession. Yet the 
weigh of these courses is approximately 1/10. These topics mainly belong to 
general courses on European Cultural History and  European Religions History, but 
also to specific courses showing contemporary religious patterns (Kocsis, K., 
2008) in Central and Eastern European Countries, such as:  Ethnic minorities' 
political representation in Central and Eastern Europe; Political modernity‟s in South-East 
Europe; The Jewish Intellectuality in Central and Eastern Europe in universities like: 
University of Bucharest, Alexandru Ioan Cuza of Iasi, Western University of 
Timisoara; Rights and values of European History at  Universidad de Salamanca.  
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 An important aspect of this topic makes us underline the fact that 
within the newcomers to the EU there is a great interest for European Identity, 
which folds perfectly on their interest of identifying themselves with the public 
sphere and European Union‘s political identity (Medrano, J. D., 2010: 81-110). 
Belonging to the same logic of cultural, ethnic and religious realities of 
newcomers (Maron, F., 2007: 116-121), there is also an interest of academics 
belonging to ―old Europe‖ in courses such as: Central and Eastern Europe since 
1945, University of St Andrews, Civil society and the state in Central and Eastern 
Europe, An economic and social history of Eastern Europe 1918–89, University of 
Glasgow, Europe East and West, 1943-1991, Durham University, Where is East 
Europe, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen; The Decay of the Eastern Block – The 
end of Communist Systems in Central and Eastern Europe (1985-1991), Justus -Liebig-
Universität Gießen. 
From a quantitative point of view, the EU Political and Administrative 
Studies are the second within the field of EU studies. They can be considered as 
belonging to the topic of the paper. However, their weigh is barely 1/10 
courses.  
 These courses help the students develop their social participation skills and their 
decision-making abilities as the very strong association between political factors and citizenship 
liberalisation (Howard M. M, 2009: 53). These topics are approached in general 
courses on Elites and Power - Political Elites in Europe? (Technische Universität 
Darmstadt), Where does Europe end?  - Ukraine as a Border Region of the EU; Forms of 
Families and Gender Arrangements in European Comparison (Technische Universität 
Dresden); National Competition and/or European Social Model? (Technische 
Universität Carolo-Wilhelmina zu Braunschweig). 
They are also present in special courses, such as: Pluralism, freedom of belief 
and integration in Europe (University of Almeria); Consideration of public policy in the 
process of European economic integration (University of Carlos III de Madrid) 
The EU Interdisciplinary Studies is a highly complex field, where courses 
contributing to intercultural education provide not only an interdisciplinary 
perspective, but also a multidisciplinary one. If the BA curriculum of European 
Ethnology, another sub-domain of EU Interdisciplinary Studies lists only a few 
courses, they are varied in countries where they are offered. In Germany we 
have found several courses of European Ethnology: Times, Spaces, Cultures - 
Introduction to European Ethnology, Current Questions of European Ethnology 
(Katholische Universität Ingolstadt-Eichstätt), Introduction to European Ethnology 
(Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg), and in Romania - European Ethnology 
(Universitatea din Bucuresti). There are no such courses in the other countries 
that we have studied. However, we have found that all universities hold courses 
about European multilingualism. This proves, on the one hand, the interest of each 
EU Member State to develop such important area, and on the other hand, the 
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development of students‘ skills and competences to master foreign languages 
(Ugalde, E.G 2007: 124-133). 
Regarding Other studies on Europe sub-domain, most courses are in the 
field of Euroregional Studies or Studies of European Regions. This is the result of the 
fact that we included here the perspectives that go from the territory to the de-
territorialisation (Albert, M., 2002: 58-62), such as: Geography of Europe tour 
(Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia) in Spain, Territorial Studies- 
Europe (Univerzita Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici) in Slovakia, Geography of 
European Union (Universitatea Babes-Bolyai din Cluj-Napoca) in Romania, or 
Regional Geography: Europe (Otto-Friedrichs-Universität Bamberg) , Urban Europe 
(Technische Universität Chemnitz) in Germany. Within this sub-domain there 
are also several religion courses with various forms: Communication and 
Ecumenism in a Christian Europe (Universitatea „Ovidius‖ din Constanta), Religious 
relations of contemporary Europe (Uniwersytet w Białymstoku) in Poland, Deaconry in 
European and Ecumenical Context (Fachhochschule der Diakonie Bielefeld), 
Churches and Denominations in Europe (Technische Universität Darmstadt). All 
these courses are relatively balanced in all the countries that we have reviewed. 
Taking into consideration that this sub-domain is very wide and that the EU 
Interdisciplinary Studies include the largest range of courses, we will point out 
some of them that we have found most interesting, which we have considered 
necessary to integrate as European Studies as they refer to Europe through 
their very interdisciplinary nature: States, European Union and Marine (Universidad 
de Cadiz, in Spain), Food quality in the European Union (Uniwersytet Rzeszowski in 
Poland), Design of Eurocodes (Vilniaus Gedimino Technikos Universitetas in 
Lithuania), Famous European Fairy Tales (Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen in 
Germany), Opening to Europe (Université Lille 1). 
Regarding the courses about multilingualism, we can mention the 
following types of courses: Structures des langues européennes: phonologie lexique 
syntaxe (MA) and Intercompréhension: les 7 langues de l‟ouest européen (MA) at 
Université de Reims -Champagne-Ardenne, Areal Linguistics-Language Structures in 
Europe at Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, etc.  
The distinct approach of EU Communication and Information Studies as a 
New EU studies field has come to our attention due to its increasing importance 
and presence within the EU Studies curricula. Due to these courses, the 
students should develop cross- cultural communication skills, examining media 
of ethnic groups, clarifying ethnic and cultural attitudes and values. There are 
several factors that induced the emergence and development of these 
approaches (Banus, E, 2007: 134-140). First, the communication structures and 
technologies must be adapted to the EU‘s need for legitimacy. Second, 
communication and information are instruments to strengthen the European 
dialogue in the sense of enhancing both intercultural dialogue and European 
identity (Hoffman, M, 2008). To this end, the EU Communication and Information 
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Studies field represents one of the most challenging new visions within the EU 
studies. Our investigation has collected some data that emphasize this new 
approach. For a better understanding, we have split this new field in two 
secondary subfields: European Media Systems and Other forms of EU Communication 
and Information Studies.  
 At the BA level, the European Media Systems represents a group of 
courses that are trying to relate the EU messages with the European and 
national media forms of communication (Horga, I, 2007). There is no 
integrative approach for the study of the media at this level, only with few 
multidisciplinary (but notable) exceptions. In Germany, for example, there are 
specific courses on subjects such as: Democratic media discourse in Europe; Focusing 
European integration by media analysis; European Media Systems; Journalism and 
European public Spheres; EU integration as reflected in the Press. These courses are 
listed in different teaching programmes, addressing EU Studies, 
Communication and Journalism at the same time. Therefore, it seems plausible 
to associate these courses within an interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary 
framework of other study programmes. Other examples can be found in Spain 
(course Advertising in the EU; Communication policies in the EU), France (European 
communication); Poland (Contemporary media systems in Europe; European information) 
or Romania (Mass-Media and the challenges of EU). 
We have also noticed courses addressed to intra-communitarian 
communication, communicating cultures in Europe (Tavares Ribeiro, M.M., 2010), 
language policy in Europe or European identity sources. Within the perspective of 
this subfield, there are no clear standards to set the specific courses directly 
responding to the strengthening of this new field of EU studies. 
 The MA level comes with more specialized courses within the same 
multi, inter and trans-disciplinary approach.   
The EU Communication and Information Studies curriculum is adapted and 
responds to the most challenging current needs of the EU. Within the different 
programmes that might benefit from these courses we can single out public 
communication and journalism, in their quest to adapt the courses to the needs 
and particularities of the European communication environment.  
The analysis of the curricula in European Studies has shown that there 
is a variety of studies of cultures, social realities, historical experiences, and 
existential factors of ethnic and cultural group evolution. Certainly, at a closer 
look, we can see that the number of courses related to ethnicity, religion and 
intercultural dialogue is very small in the totality of the curricula of EU Studies, 
that is only 448 courses to 9929 courses inventoried (4.5%) 
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2. Where to the intercultural education in the Curricula of 
European Studies? 
 
A detailed analysis shows that there is an unbalance between the 
countries from the Old Europe and the New Europe. For instance, over 7.5% 
of the courses are in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Portugal and UK. 
Between 5-7.5% of courses are in France. Paradoxically, the lowest number of 
courses, between 0-5% of the courses are in Italy, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, 
and Slovakia. Even though we cannot make a definite approximation, we still 
have to mention that there is an interesting coincidence between a certain 
excess of ―intolerance‖ in certain countries (Moravkova, K., 2009) and the low 
number or absence of courses supporting students understand that persons 
from all ethnic groups have common characteristics and needs on the one hand 
and acquire the ability to interpret events and conflict situation from diverse 
ethnic and cultural perspectives on the other hand. 
We can also see that there are more courses at the Bachelor level than at 
the others levels. In New Europe, there are a few courses relating to Ethnicity, 
Religion and Intercultural Dialogue on Bachelor level. The biggest number 
is at on Master level. We assume that such a situation is mainly due to the idea 
that the topic is considered to be an area of expertise. In Old Europe, there are 
more courses related to Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue on 
Bachelor level and less on Master level. The civic side is more pronounced. 
There are a few courses at the Doctoral level in all countries, except for 
Germany and Spain.  
The impact of European Commission through Jean Monnet Action is 
low in supporting courses in the field. Only 49 courses out of the total number 
of 1215 (4%) are supported by the ―Jean Monnet‖ Action in countries on 
which our analysis has focused. Initiatives like the Year of Intercultural 
Dialogue (2008) who have stimulated the introduction of the courses and other 
projects (Horga, I. & all, 2009) related to Ethnicity, Religion and 
Intercultural Dialogue in the university curricula must be encouraged. For 
example, only in the period 2008-2010, 19 courses were introduced through 
Jean Monnet Action Projects (over 1/3 out of the total number of courses 
financed by this program in the countries assessed). 
 In conclusion, considering the ever more multicultural reality of 
European societies and the ceaselessly altering integrating area, the study of 
Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Education are highly important, in order to teach 
the students how they could  preserve cultural diversity in the European Union 
and to reinforce its cohesion and promote the respect for joint values. They 
allow Europe engage in partnership with neighbouring countries. The idea of 
intercultural dialogue in the curriculum on European Studies opens an 
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enriching topic leading to the respectful division of ideas and values and 
encouraging the communication of these ideas and values. 
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Abstract. The political integration of ethnic minorities is one of the most challenging 
tasks facing the countries of post-communist Europe. The roads to political representation in 
the mainstream political process are numerous and diverse. The results of the analysis support 
the paper's argument that electoral arrangements are important but no key to achieving 
meaningful political representation. Electoral arrangements thus seem to matter, but to mostly 
do so in situations where other factors of political mobilization seem to make representation 
uncertain.  The effect of electoral arrangements on the success of ethnic parties is clearly 
mitigated by the size and dynamics of the minority they represent. However, there seems to be 
some link between the presence of ethnic parties in the political system and the level of political 
participation of the ethnic minority. Both Lijphart and Norris point out the importance of 
proportional representation for that aim, as this electoral system allows the representation of 
all social groups. Or, in the other words: “Majority rule is dangerous in divided societies, 
because minorities that are continually denied access to political power will feel excluded and 
discriminated against by the regime”. Undoubtedly, electoral rules have an important effect on 
ethnic minority representation. 
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Introduction 
 
Institutional engineering is the art of providing for rules and institutions 
in order to pursue political goals – such as creating a functioning multi ethnic 
democracy (Sartori, 1968; Reilly, 2001; Grofman & Stockwell 2003, etc.). 
Electoral systems translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by 
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parties and candidates. The aim of most electoral systems is to be representative: 
to give a voice to minorities and to register dissent. Therefore, to treat people in a 
diverse society as equals requires more than a system based on ‗majority rules‘. 
We expect that the discussed electoral system might bring advantages to all ethnic 
groups in some aspects, while not favouring any of them. All members are 
elected on equal grounds, and the number of votes decides on the election, 
whereas the seat guarantee works as a backup to assure at least one seat for each 
constituent people. They would also gain it according to their vote share. 
Ethnic minorities are all numeric minorities in a country with an own 
ethnic identity. The term ―ethnicity‖ refers here to the self-definition or social 
definition of social groups that are considered to have common roots in history. 
Often, ethnic groups are distinguished by common characteristics such as 
religious believes, language, cultural habits or race, even if such characteristics are 
often socially constructed. Thus, I consider all numeric minorities that consider 
themselves to have their own ethnic identity, regardless of whether they are 
officially recognized, as ethnic minority, or not. Ethnic groups are identified 
based on data included in national censuses and alternative reports from human 
rights organizations and academia. 
The way ethnic minorities are included in the democratic process 
heavily affects interethnic relations. Electoral rules have a major impact on the 
inclusion of minorities in political life (Bochsler, 2010: 153). Even though 
electoral systems might seem at first quite similar across all the 20 democracies 
of Central and Eastern Europe—namely with a steady trend towards more-
proportional representation (PR)—they importantly differ with regards to the 
rules that allow or hinder the representation  of parties of ethnic minorities. 
Undoubtedly, electoral rules have an important effect on ethnic minority 
representation (Reilly, 2001: 53; Horowitz, 1985: 85; Toplak, 2001:62). Theory 
treats ―power sharing‖ institutions as a means to accommodate all social groups 
in the political system (Lijphart, 1994b). Proportional representation systems 
for the elections to parliaments are considered to be such an inclusive ―power 
sharing‖ institution, while plurality elections (―the winner takes all‖) are 
exclusive (Duverger, 1951; Taagepera, Shugart, 1989). 
But this ―classical‖ electoral system theory not be applied so 
straightforward to ethnic minority representation like some authors claim. In 
fact, most ethnic groups in Central-Eastern Europe are geographically 
concentrated. And this characteristic has an important impact on the 
functioning of electoral systems (cf. Friedman, 2005: 381f.). Rarely noticed 
literature on electoral systems and party systems shows that the electoral system 
effect is almost reverse for minority groups that live on a concentrated territory 
(cf. Riker, 1982; Barkan, 1995). In other words: in contrast with the common 
theory, geographically concentrated ethnic minorities in many cases should 
prefer plurality electoral systems: In their regional ―strongholds‖ they are able 
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to get even more than proportional seat share. On the other hand, minorities 
dispersed throughout the country prefer proportional representation (cf. 
OSCE, 2001). Furthermore, many Central and Eastern European states 
introduced different models of special electoral rules for ethnic minority parties 
(cf. Cesid, 2002; Jovanović, 2004). Yet, they may have unwanted consequences, 
promoting ethnic segregation instead of giving incentives to mixed ethnic 
political parties. 
 
1. The history of the ethnic representation in the Republic of 
Moldova 
 
In this paper, I investigate which electoral rules in Central-East Europe 
(particularly in the Republic of Moldova) are able to integrate which ethnic 
minorities into the national legislative bodies. I test if electoral systems are 
suited for ethnic minorities according to three aspects: Ethnic minorities are all 
numeric minorities in a country with an own ethnic identity. The term 
‗ethnicity‘ refers here to the self-definition or social definition of social groups 
that are considered to have common roots in history. Often, ethnic groups are 
distinguished by common characteristics such as religious believes, language, 
cultural habits or race, even if such characteristics are often socially constructed. 
Thus, I consider all numeric minorities that consider themselves to have their 
own ethnic identity, regardless of whether they are officially recognized, as 
ethnic minority, or not.  
The traditional approach of democratization includes the requirements 
for limiting or reducing to the minimum the ideological and institutional 
noncompliance of the old regime, autonomy from old powers, mobilization of 
civil society, and creation of a stable system of political parties. The new details 
about the consolidation concept imply a consideration of the cultural realities 
and traditional culture from the particular country. In this case, it is 
recommended to reform the administrative-territorial structures, develop the 
party system, different social-political movements, and the corporatism. The 
democratic transformations imply also the reformation of the political system 
within the society, including the establishment of a multiparty system.  
The political parties have the mission to concentrate and represent 
citizens‘ interests. The political parties have to crystallize the aspirations of 
individuals with the same tendencies and shape the positions from which 
population will have to choose during the elections. Nevertheless, although 
nobody denies the need for a multiparty system in transition countries, where 
the democratic principles only start to emerge, the political parties are not very 
popular. In 1993 more than twenty political parties and movements were 
registered in the Republic of Moldova. Until 1990 the Communist Party of 
Moldavia (CPM) was the dominant political force in the republic. It had 
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controlled the administrative, economic, and cultural affairs of the Moldavian 
SSR from its establishment until 1990. During that period, CPM officials 
monopolized virtually all politically significant government positions. However, 
once democratic elections were decided upon, the party's power disintegrated 
swiftly. The CPM was formally banned in August 1991, following the abortive 
August coup d'état against Soviet president Gorbachev, but former communists 
continue to participate actively in politics through their membership in a variety 
of successor organizations.  
In the wake of the 1990 elections, the Moldovan Popular Front, 
founded in 1989 and consisting of an association of independent cultural and 
political groups, moved into a commanding position in the country's political 
life. It emerged as an advocate of increased autonomy from the Soviet Union 
and of the rights of the Moldavian SSR's ethnic Romanian population. Popular 
Front delegates were able to dominate proceedings in the Supreme Soviet and 
to select a government made up of individuals who supported its agenda. The 
Popular Front was well organized nationally, with its strongest support in the 
capital and in areas of the country most heavily populated by ethnic Romanians. 
Once the organization was in power, however, internal disputes led to a sharp 
fall in popular support, and it fragmented into several competing factions by 
early 1993.  
In February 1993, the Popular Front was reformed as the Christian 
Democratic Popular Front (CDPF). Several other parties, primarily composed 
of ethnic Romanians, were organized after 1990. The largest and most 
influential of these ethnically based parties is the Democratic Agrarian Party of 
Moldova, which is a coalition of former communists and moderate to status-
quo supporters of Moldovan statehood and closer economic ties with Russia. 
The party's support comes mainly from the rural populace, economic 
conservatives, and ethnic minorities opposed to reunification with Romania. 
The Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova won a majority of the votes in the 
1994 parliamentary election.  
A much smaller but still influential political group is the Social 
Democratic Party of Moldova. Most of the Social Democrats' leaders originally 
participated in the Popular Front but later formed their own organization in 
response to what they perceived as the increasingly nationalistic position of that 
party (Botan, 2002). The Social Democrats are multiethnic, and their constituency 
consists mainly of educated professional and managerial groups. Their support is 
strongest in the republic's capital.  
Another independent formation committed to promoting a less 
nationalistic agenda for the republic, the Democratic Party for the Rebirth and 
Prosperity of Moldova (PDRPM), was formed in late 1990. The PDRPM draws 
its support primarily from among ethnic Romanian intellectuals and is active 
primarily in the capital. At the other extreme of the political spectrum is the 
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National Christian Party (NCP). The NCP is more expressly nationalistic than 
the Popular Front and its other competitors-- Congress of the Intelligentsia 
(which is a component of the Congress of Peasants and Intellectuals, a bloc in 
the 1994 elections), the Democratic Party, and the Democratic Labour Party- -
and it campaigned openly for reunification with Romania during the 1994 
election. Other parties active in the 1994 campaign for the Parliament were the 
Reform Party, the Yedinstvo/Socialist Bloc, the Republican Party, the 
Democratic Labour Party, the Green Alliance, the Women's Association of 
Moldova, and the Victims of Totalitarian Repression.  
In late 1993, former Prime Minister Valeriu Muravschi, along with 
several other leading members of Parliament unhappy with the direction of 
policy under the existing government, formed yet another party, the Socialist 
Workers' Party, in order to counter what they saw as the excessively 
conservative influence of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova.  
Non-Romanian ethnic communities have also formed political 
organizations representing their interests. In the early transition period, the 
most influential of these was the Yedinstvo-Unitatea Intermovement. 
Yedinstvo, whose members include not only Russians but also Ukrainians, 
Bulgarians, and other Russian-speaking residents of the republic, is politically 
conservative in its support of the pre-1990 status quo. Based primarily in 
Transdniestria, it is strongly pro-Russian. In Parliament, its positions are 
represented by the Conciliere legislative club. Yedinstvo emerged in 1988 from 
the mobilization of Russian-speaking workers responding to efforts to alter the 
republic's language laws and demote the status of the Russian language. During 
the transition period, Yedinstvo was the most effective and influential minority 
nationalist organization. Its representatives walked out of the first session of the 
democratically elected Moldavian Supreme Soviet in 1990. In local elections, its 
adherents won control over local and raion governments throughout 
Transdniestria (Anghel, 2002: 12).  
Gagauz Halkî (Gagauz People) is a second pivotal minority political 
group, formed to represent Moldova's population of approximately 153,000 
Gagauz. Like the Russian-speaking community in Transdniestria, with whom 
they had been close political allies, Gagauz nationalists gained control over local 
government in the five southern raioane, where their numbers continue to be 
concentrated. Like the Transdniestrians, the Gagauz declared themselves 
sovereign in 1990. The results of Public Opinion Barometer from Moldova 
show that the political parties are the least popular among social organizations 
of the country. Over the years the surveys showed that less than 30 per cent of 
respondents trusted political parties (The minimum (11 per cent) was registered 
in 2001 and the maximum (28 per cent) was registered in 2004-2005. This result 
is lower than the result registered for trade unions (14 -36 per cent) 
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nongovernmental organizations (20-36 per cent) and much lower than the one 
for mass media (47-62 per cent). 
 
2. The influence of the electoral system on ethnic representation 
 
The level of trust for political parties is the lowest if compared to other 
institutions and organizations from the country. The sceptical attitude towards 
political parties is dictated by the Soviet legacy and the times of denial of social 
and political life. This explains why the political parties find it difficult to affirm 
themselves in society. People believe that political parties represent the 
influential groups of power controlled by the elites, whose purpose is to 
manipulate the public opinion. There are no considerable differences between 
political parties and there is little interest in citizens on behalf of them. Some 
people believe that political platforms of different parties are quite similar and 
see no need for the existence of more parties. The Public Opinion Barometer 
from April 2002 also outlined this aspect of citizens‘ attitude towards political 
parties. The political parties are not deeply rooted in society, are unstable and 
sometimes provisional, and this explains largely the citizens‘ attitude towards 
political parties.  
In societies in transition, the rule of law is not established and political 
life is managed poorly, allowing the parties to commit abuses of authority and 
achieve their profit-driven trivial goals. In the conditions of a poor society, 
citizens are tempted to blame political parties for the poverty. The political 
parties are unevenly weak compared to the level of literacy of the population, a 
fact with a direct negative impact on the political sphere from the country. 
According to the Ethno barometer studies, the political parties are often listed 
among the organizations or institutions influencing interethnic relations (Rosca, 
2006: 69). For political parties contributing to the improvement of interethnic 
relations, the representatives of different ethnic groups listed the Communist 
Party from Moldova: 6 per cent of Moldovans and Bulgarians, 15 per cent of 
Ukrainians and 17 per cent of Russians. One per cent of the Gagauz also listed 
the mayor‘s offices. The respondents also mentioned other parties: Christian 
Democratic Party (2 per cent of Moldovans), ―Our Moldova‖ Bloc (2 per cent 
of Ukrainians and 8 per cent of Russians), and Social Democratic Party (2 per 
cent of Ukrainians and 5 per cent of Russians). For organizations the 
respondents mentioned United Nations (1 per cent of Moldovans), schools (1 
per cent of Gagauz), Parliament (1 per cent of Gagauz), Ministry of Culture (3 
per cent of Bulgarians), and the House of Nationalities (2 per cent of 
Bulgarians). The Christian Democratic Party was listed exclusively among the 
organizations contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova: 
5 per cent of Moldovans, 1 per cent of Gagauz, 16 per cent of Ukrainians, 20 
per cent of Russians and 8 per cent of Bulgarians. The Communist Party was 
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listed by 2 per cent of Moldovans, and Agrarian Party by 2 per cent. The 
respondents also mentioned the customs (3 per cent of Bulgarians) and 
Parliament (2 per cent of Bulgarians).  
 
2.1. The roots of the ethno political conflict 
 
Since the period of national revival, the ethno political situation in 
Moldova has been an example of polarization of interethnic and intercultural 
contradictions. The national idea or the idea of defending the national interests 
can become the methodology for political consolidation. The ethnic groups 
cannot emerge as independent subjects in the political sphere because their 
actions do not bear a formal character of a group. Their interests are 
represented by the ethnic elites that get involved in the political struggle for 
power, in other words they become subjects of political struggle (Rosca, 2006: 
70). Presently, one can see the contradiction between the government on one 
side, and the ideological orientation of the political elites, on the other side. Any 
ideology is a project of the future society. The complexity of the ideas that 
represent the interests of the ethnos are systematized by the politicians in a set 
of norms, values, directions which allow for an influence on the ethnos or  on 
each individual, and allow winning the political space. Thus, ideology justifies 
the government‘s actions and represents a means for political struggle.  
The interests of the group are subordinated to the common idea, which 
directs the group in a certain direction for the achievement of the goal. The 
political leader presenting the interests of his or her group interprets them, 
turns them into an ideology, and subordinates them to his or her interests. The 
politicization of the ethnic factor occurs, which signifies a real transformation 
of the ethnic factor into a tool of political struggle. The political conflicts then 
become ethnic conflicts. Rothschild J. believes that politicizing the ethnic 
element means:  
1. To give individuals the possibility of understanding the role of politics 
in the preservation of ethno cultural values and vice versa; 
2. To stimulate their attention towards this connection; 
3. To mobilize people in forming ethnic groups with a collective self-
conscience; 
4. To direct them in the sphere of political activities, based on this 
understanding and collective self-conscience (Rothschild, 1981: 9);  
In the case of ethnopolitical conflicts, we can outline some common 
aspects characterized by set goals and ideology. In many cases, the conflicts start 
with an approach and discussion on the national language issue, and these 
particular conflicts changed from closed into opened conflicts. This sphere had a 
large mobilizing force because it resorted to all people of this ethnic group. Then 
the claims were generally entering the political sphere and were extending over 
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the state. Consequently, one got the territorial claims, which implies conflicts 
regarding the resources of the relevant ethnic group. At this stage, one frequently 
invoked the historic past, certain events and traditions from the past. Moreover, 
both parties start using vast historical and archeological materials, which then 
come to justify the claims put forth by both parties.  
The congruence of the national claims with the struggle of political 
elites for power represents a reality of the transition period. The trends that 
follow in this situation can be different: in some cases, the importance of the 
ethnic factor grows and is then used in the political struggle. One must also 
consider these consequences generated by the worsening of the living standards 
of the population, massive migrations that could generate a tension in the 
interethnic relations. Preoccupied with the national identity, the ethnic groups 
will continue to be an object of manipulation of the formal and informal elites 
during the political struggle for the division of power positions. Although there 
is an interdiction for the creation of political parties on ethnic principles, the 
politological analysis openly proves that there is a trend in the distribution of 
the electorate by national criteria. 
In the case of politicization of national issues, one focuses the attention 
on the ―main‖ identity and on the need to choose from mutually exclusive 
identities. In this case, politicization represents an essential stimulus for the 
―nationalism―, which represents a politicized national idea. When the goal is a 
successful democratization, the researchers focus on the multiple identities, 
which represent the changing reality and which are built on the social basis of 
individual‘s identities. The human capacity for complementary and multiple 
identity, besides guaranteeing the right for equal and full citizenship, represents 
a key factor that makes democracy in multinational states possible (Linz, 
Stepan, 2004: 51). The emergence of political and civic identities is considered 
one of the opportunities of democratic consolidation.  
 
2.2. The civic identity and its concept 
 
We can distinguish several approaches of the concept of civic identity. 
One of them however can be considered the basic approach, which considers 
the political citizenship as the central point from which all other dimensions 
derive. For Barber, the civic identity represents the genuine affiliation to 
political community, which, despite the distinctive identity references, unites 
everybody through common preoccupations affecting everyone (Page, 1997: 
22-32). Most authors outline that the concept of citizenship is getting wider 
within a general social change: transition from modern to post-modern societies 
David Miller conceives citizenship as practiced in several ways: Right of 
association, civil right to a relative freedom, the social right to a minimal 
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standard of living ensured by the welfare state and a postmodern warrant of 
access the communication technologies (Miller, 1999).  
Bryan Turner defines citizenship as a set of practices in a civil society 
(Turner, 1993). We agree with the larger concept according to which, the civic 
identity embraces the feeling of the individual to be included in the social 
contract, the conscience of being a member of a certain social group, one of the 
many groups from the political community. Derek Heather explains that the 
community and political affiliations are not mutually exclusive at the individual 
level (Heather, 1999). He argues that such a situation could lead to the 
emergence of a multiple identity: A person can be simultaneously a member of 
a state (through citizenship) and a member of civil society. The civic conscience 
is supposed to be assured by the daily process of negotiation between different 
groups. It is more of a process than a final destination. We can assert that the 
political identity backed up by the right to participate and exercise political 
power, and the civic identity, as a feeling of belonging to a state and society, are 
mutually stimulating. The determinist correlation and the feeling of devotion 
towards a state, the common interest of all members of the society, can have 
multiple sources with a different impact in varied contexts.  
Thus, the empirical analysis suggests that the civic identity can be based 
on the state or local identity, implying rights and duties, economic interest, 
perceptions about common goals and a common future. Based on this 
understanding of the term of civic identity, the creation of a common civic 
identity of the representatives of different national entities from Moldova is 
defined through the relevance of determination of national identity, and 
establishing the clear lines between „us― and „them‘, adherence to democratic 
values, and nurturing the hope for the future. A common pattern for all citizens 
of Moldova can be also the aspiration towards democratization of the society, 
orientation towards European integration, which is currently supported by a 
significant part of the population (Rosca, 2006: 72). Largely, the emergence of 
civic identity is determined by the orientation towards the modernization of the 
society, a phenomenon conditioned by the inclusion in the contemporary global 
processes (Kymlicka, 1995).  
The issue of correlation between democracy and interethnic problems 
has been on the agenda since the French Revolution, experiencing a new 
impulse with the „third wave of democratization―, which in 1970s 
overwhelmed the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Analysing the 
definitions of the term democracy in the present political science, we notice 
that one of the most used definition includes, in addition to the traditional 
approach, the public competition and political participation, thus implying that 
democracy includes civil and political rights, freedom of expression, press, 
freedom of assembly, existence of organizations necessary for free competition-
based elections. The relationship between the terms democracy and 
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democratization is similar to the relationship between a state and a process. 
Through democracy, one understands the process of transition towards a 
democratic form of government. In the spotlight of researchers studying the 
issue of democratization, are the issues of the dynamics of transition period 
processes, of the ―democratic transition‖ including the period of political 
development between two regimes.  
 
2.3. The correlation between democratization and interethnic 
processes 
 
Another deduction relates to the issue of correlation between 
democratization and interethnic processes and to the condition that the chances 
of democratic consolidation in a multinational and multicultural society grow 
due to policies applied by the state. The adopting of the laws on language, 
citizenship, Moldovan Constitution and other laws guaranteed a full and equal 
citizenship and a common ―shelter‖ for all citizens regarding individual rights. 
The analysis of ethnic and national identity in the Soviet period allows us to 
draw the conclusion that the ―soviet identity‖, which also claimed to be a state 
identity, was rather ideological, closed, politicized and ethnocentric. The 
phenomenon of double conscience spread and persisted at the beginning of the 
Perestroika, the attitudes towards state institutions and the state being as low. 
At the same time, the level of trust in nongovernmental institutions, such as the 
Church, is high. Concerning mass conscience, the situation cannot be changed 
rapidly, that is why national ideas persisted in the post totalitarian period and 
were largely predetermined by the Soviet legacy. At the beginning of 
Perestroika, the national idea was regarded by many people from the country as 
a supreme ideological value and this idea mattered as much as the idea of 
socialism in the Soviet period. Pointing at these aspects, the researchers also 
mention the closed character of mass conscience during social cataclysms and, 
therefore, the phenomenon of national idea appeared in closed version, more 
precisely, in the ethno cultural form. Like in Soviet times, the mass conscience 
was not oriented towards openness, general and universal values; it was leading 
to deadlock, being also one of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Consequently, the closed form of the conscience has changed. According to the 
Delphi study results, the representatives of different ethnic groups took 
different ideological stands.  
The Moldovans advocate democratization and perceive independence 
as national revival. The survey participants belonging to national minorities 
perceive independence as an opportunity for the consolidation of a new nation 
and existence of multi ethnic mixture. We identified several attitudes of the 
representatives of different ethnic groups regarding Moldova as a state. In 
addition, the ethnic groups provide different appreciations regarding the 
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political events from the country related to domestic as well as external policy. 
Some issues are viewed only from the perspective adopted by the survey 
participants. Nevertheless, as proved by the survey, some controversial issues 
on the country‘s political agenda have a high potential of conflict that could 
place different ethnic groups in controversial or even conflicting positions. The 
different opinions regarding the Transdniestrian conflict and the possible 
solutions put the representatives of different ethnic groups in conflicting 
positions. The topics with the highest conflict potential identified by the 
participants in the first part of the survey were the state configuration: unitary 
state, federal state; strategic orientation of Moldova‘s foreign policy: EU or CIS; 
topics related to the national identity, threat of losing the Moldovan statehood. 
This set of issues with a high potential for conflict generally identified by the 
participants is perfectly overlapping in the first part of the survey with the set of 
issues identified by the participants as having a potential of causing interethnic 
conflicts.  
During democratization, one of the main problems the societies are 
facing with is the stabilization of the formal institutions. Thus, during the 
transition period, Moldova adopted several laws and took certain measures in 
regulating interethnic relations. In addition to the structures that more or less 
dependent on the state (Department for Interethnic Relations, Institute for 
Interethnic Relations within the Moldovan Academy of Sciences), the groups or 
persons influencing (mostly in a negative way) the interethnic relations in 
Moldova are represented almost exclusively by politicians or political parties. 
Democratic transformations also imply the reformation of political system from 
the respective societies, including the establishment of multiparty system. 
Nevertheless, although nobody denies the need for multiparty system in 
transition countries, where the democratic principles only start to emerge, the 
political parties are not very popular.  
 
3. Differences in ethnic diversity and formation party rules 
 
The results of Public Opinion Barometer from Moldova indicate show 
that political parties have the lowest popularity among social organizations from 
country (Rosca, 2006: 73). Although there is an interdiction for the creation of 
political parties on ethnic principles, the politological analysis openly proves 
that there is a trend in the distribution of the electorate by national criteria. 
When the goal is a successful democratization, the researchers focus on the 
multiple identities, which represent the changing reality and which are built on 
the social basis of individual‘s identities. The human capacity for  
complementary and multiple identity, besides guaranteeing the right for equal 
and full citizenship, represents a key factor that makes democracy in 
multinational states possible, and the emergence of political and civic identities 
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is considered one of the opportunities of democratic consolidation. Based on 
this, the creation of a common civic identity of the representatives of different 
national entities from Moldova is defined through the relevance of 
determination of national identity and establishing the clear lines between „us― 
and „them‘, adherence to democratic values and nurturing the hope for the 
future. As a common pattern for the citizens of Moldova it could serve the 
aspiration towards democratization, modernization and social progress.  
Variety in diversity leads to the expectation that the content and type of 
demographic interaction with party registration rules will differ between countries 
depending on the size, cohesion, geographical concentration, and attributes 
specific to the group. Attributes of the individual group interact with the specific 
types of party registration rules in ways that make them more or less of a barrier 
to electoral participation by the group and the resulting group potential for 
conflict behaviour. For example, a ban on ethnic parties affects only linguistically 
and/or culturally distinct groups such as indigenous peoples and national 
minorities, but not de facto racial groups. Consequently, where other avenues for 
the political representation of the group are prevented, one might expect a ban 
on ethnic parties to augment the conflict potential of linguistically and culturally 
distinct groups but not of racial groups. 
Size of the group is another characteristic that is important to the 
impact that formation rules will have. Racial groups, for instance, tend to be 
larger than the average national ethnic minorities and may, therefore, demand 
greater input in a country‘s governance than small national minorities, whose 
primary objective more likely involves greater autonomy over their own affairs. 
When restrictive formation barriers successfully keep the larger groups from 
representation one might expect any subsequent political conflict to be bitterer 
and have as its objective a more radical change to national politics than the 
change a small national minority might seek. Which type of group, small or 
large, formation rules are likely to present the greatest barriers to is not, 
however, entirely clear. For example, larger more internally diverse groups are 
less likely to overcome the collective action problem required to mobilize 
successfully (Madrid Raúl, 2005: 689-707). Any additional barriers presented by 
formation rules will likely further prevent successful collective action by such 
large groups. At the same time small groups may experience difficulties in 
mobilizing enough of their members for political action. In the case of small 
groups formation rules may therefore prevent the successful conclusion of an 
already difficult task. How small is too small for electoral mobilization is not 
evident. For example, in the relatively homogeneous Poland the small German 
minority does run a separate party in national elections, and the same is true for 
Greeks in Albania, but a party representing the sizeable community of 
Ukrainians in Moldova has never gained legislative representation. 
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Pre-election signature requirements are among the specific rules that 
interact with the size of the group to alter its potential for mobilization and 
representation and consequent potential for conflict behaviour. Theoretically, 
pre-election signature requirements place a proportionally heavier burden on 
smaller groups and groups in the early stages of mobilization than on large and 
established ones. Indeed, where electoral institutions are very permissive, the 
registration requirements effectively substitute for the effects of more restrictive 
electoral institutions. Alternatively, because pre-election signature requirements 
work as an incentive for internal party consolidation, if the requirements are not 
sufficiently high, ethnic groups that might otherwise consolidate to run a unified 
political party fragment in their electoral competition to the detriment of ethnic 
group representation (Bieber, 2004: pp. 231-248).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This purpose of this paper has been to highlight some of the complex 
historical, theoretical and structural aspects hindering the capacity of 
parliaments to reflect the cultural diversity of the Moldavian community. At 
present, ethnic minorities remains disproportionately under-represented in 
legislatures in the Republic of Moldova. The debate surrounding the 
appropriate level of presence of ethnic minorities in legislative 
revolves around questions of democracy, equality and recognition. It gives rise 
to the threshold question of which groups deserve representation, and how are 
these groups to be defined? There are no simple answers and matters are 
complicated further by the fact that many people have multiple group 
identifications and that groups can come into being and then fade away. 
Essentially it is a question of the balance that needs to be struck between the 
representation of minorities, and the maintenance and development of an 
overarching sense of national identity and purpose. If the ultimate goal is 
democracy building and consolidation, the quality of democratic governance of 
political elites must be central. A successful democratization strategy requires 
less majoritarian and more consensual policies in each of these fields. This can 
be guaranteed by modernizing the society, changing the mentality of population 
as well as political leaders and determining the democratic values as unique and 
irreversible.  
The existence of numerous ethnic minorities, e.g. Ukrainians, Russians 
and Gagauz, raises additional questions of principle, which would increase in 
importance if the predominantly non- Moldova ethnic population in the 
Transdniestrian region were to be incorporated in Moldovan elections. The 
reduction in the electoral threshold to would allow large minorities, e.g. 
Russians and Ukrainians, to be represented in Parliament – if a substantial 
portion of the ethnic group wished to be represented by an ethnic party. The 
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Gagauz minority does not appear to be large enough to clear a four per cent 
threshold but because it is spatially concentrated, it can enjoy power in local 
government in its special region. In Romania 19 of the 346 seats in Parliament 
are allocated to minorities, equivalent to 5 or 6 seats in a 101 - seat Moldovan 
Parliament. To follow the Romanian practice would, however, create difficulties 
in determining which ethnic minorities should receive scheduled seats - and five 
seats would under-represent the larger minorities. Moreover, it would 
institutional divisions in a political system where the integration of diverse 
ethnic groups is a sine qua non for the maintenance of the state. Lowering the 
threshold to one per cent would allow smaller minorities to get at least one 
voice in Parliament, if there was a significant degree of cohesive voting along 
ethnic lines. Making such provisions would also avoid the normatively and 
empirically contentious issues of deciding whether or not Moldovan citizens 
ought to be represented on ethnic grounds or in terms of other cleavages of 
income, urban /residence, etc. That decision should not be taken by legislation 
but by the electorate. 
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Abstract. The increased interest of international organizations and institutions toward 
minorities has led to the accumulation of a sufficient amount to respond to the desideratum of 
"equal rights". The two components of the international system of protection of national minorities 
- hard law and soft law – advertise active intervention of states. The institution with the mandate 
of organizing and executing the law is the public administration. The range of administrative tools 
used by public authorities on the question of minorities is varied. They are classified 
conventionally, in compulsory and voluntary instruments.  
The application of administrative tools in the protection and promotion of minority rights 
requires broad categories of resources: authority, financial capacity, official structure, information. 
Cultural conventions and regulations at the international and national level can provide to certain 
tools greater legal character than to others.  
In order to ensure the respect of the compulsory legal documents and of those politically 
binding, the efforts of the public authorities should be channeled at least in two directions: 
formulating and implementing appropriate policies and ensuring a sense of identity security of 
pluralistic demands. The identification as an ethnic minority related only by the verb "to be" and 
not to the verb "to do", impose that administrative tools must be selected according to criteria 
fairness, efficiency and of existing social support. Policies on minorities will be even more effective, if 
they will be based on comprehensive statistical data or some other data on the situation of ethnic 
groups, and approach the quality identity. The analysis of administrative tools by emphasizing the 
social impact that it produces, can serve as a foundation support for administrative decisions. 
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 The increased interest of international institutions and organizations 
subject to ethnic minorities has led to the accumulation of sufficient legal 
weight to meet the demands expressed by the minorities. Taking into account 
the specific content of documents, soft law and hard law, as well as their large 
number, it is probably‖... for the administration to fail.‖, as alerts the depressant 
Jessop (Pierre, 2006). There are at least two reasons to suspect a failure of the 
implementation of provisions existing in the field. The first expression of the 
failure could be the lack of an engagement process between those entitled to 
administrative functions and the ethnic group, the second failure - the 
inopportune choice of the administrative tools. 
The key-problem we want to put into question is to assess the 
administrative institutions and the tools used by them, and the description of 
some options or models that could have more to offer in solving the problems of 
minorities. Structurally, the speech highlights three issues: 1) an overview of the 
international protection of minorities, 2) a theoretical excursion on administrative 
tools, 3) considerations on the impact of applying administrative tools.  
The first aspect is necessary for methodological reasons. Whether the 
provisions of international documents are directly applicable in domestic law, 
or they are developed into own domestic legal instruments, the mission to 
execute them is for the public administration. 
The creation of an international system of the national minorities 
protection is determined by at least two factors: the consideration of minority 
rights as human rights, and also the fact that the field is not reserved exclusively 
for the state sovereignty. In a synthetic formula, the international system of the 
national minorities rights include: 
 -the Law System as developed in the UN  
- the Law System developed within the OSCE 
 -the Law System developed within the Council of Europe (Andreescu, 
2004: 142-146).  
Some conclusions are imposed on the international system of national 
minority rights. Except the Framework Convention for National Minorities 
Protection of the Council of Europe and the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages, all other documents are of the soft law. Although, there 
were expressed some views that insist on not to distinguish between mandatory 
and legal binding requirements, the violation of political agreements being  as 
unacceptable as any violation of the international law (Bloed, 1993: 51-52), such 
documents as soft law offer the public administrations a greater public 
discretion. 
An unresolved issue remains the definition of: „national minority‖ or 
„ethnic minority‖. There is no a generally accepted definition on the 
international level that could be imposed on any state or that could be invoked 
with the international standard authority. There is no document where any 
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definition of concepts is found. The logic of this abstention is given by the 
large number of reservations expressed about the criteria according to which a 
group can be considered a minority and the extent to which the identity of 
persons may be only the result of self-identification. 
To mitigate a confused discussion on ethnic minorities, we invoke the 
paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen Document which states: „Belonging to a 
minority is a matter of individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from 
such a choice‖.1 In this respect, there is a consideration expressed H.-R. 
Patapievici, about which the author himself says that it doesn‘t go too far and 
should not be exaggerated: ―to be Romanian, to be anybody else is, therefore, 
assuming a given rather than the giving itself‖ (Patapievici, 2004: 32). 
The claim substantiation is found in an admirable passage from Virgil 
Nemoianu. ―I‘m only half-Romanian for, while both grandparents are pure and 
integral Romanian, both grandmothers are of other ethnic descent: one Serb, 
the other Italian-blooded German. The consequence is that my son, who 
speaks Romanian imperfectly  (in which he does not know to read or write) and 
whom only a vague, amusing and condescending sympathy links to the  
Romanian, but by no means an awareness of belonging, however,  is - strictly 
ethnic considered more  Romanian than I am, his  mother being  Romanian 
without any interference‖ (Patapievici, 2004: 32).  
Another problem is the use of terms. For example, the term ―minority‖- 
politically correct in its primary meaning, from the beginning emphasizes a 
relation of force between the most numerous and the less numerous, 
overshadowing  the historical status and the diversity of minorities in question, 
which are: ethnic minorities and national minorities. The distinction between 
―national minorities‖ and ―ethnic minorities‖ we consider of less importance. 
The conferment of powers of the administrative structures and the 
development of a policy issued by the public administration will have as the 
background the rights of minorities as such, and not their origins. 
Moldova is a state with a multiethnic and multilingual population. The 
national composition of the Moldovan population, recorded by the census in 
2004, the Moldovans, which is the majority, constitutes 75.8% of the total 
population, marking an increase of 5.9% compared to 1989. Besides Moldovans 
there live: Ukrainians, representing 8.4%, Russians accounting for 5.9%, 
Gagauz - 4.4%, Romanian - 2.2%, Bulgarians -1.9% and other nationalities 
accounting 1.0% of the total population. For 0.4% of residents the nationality 
was not recorded.2 
                                                          
1Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the  Conference on the Human Dimension 
of he CSCE, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304   
2 http://www.statistica.md/newsview. 
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Multiethnic and polylinguistic specificity of Moldova is elucidated on the 
Ethnic Map of Moldova ‖Structure and ethnic consciousness of the population 
in Moldova‖. The map was made in a joint project by the Austrian Academy of 
Sciences in collaboration with the National Museum of Ethnography and Natural 
History of Moldova and the Association of Geography and Ethnology of 
Moldova „Moldova AW‖. According to Prof. Theda Kahl, a researcher at the 
Austrian Academy of Sciences, this is the first detailed map of the current ethnic 
structure of Moldova‘s population at the community level, published in the 2004 
census. The map also includes adjacent regions of Romania and Ukraine, 
presenting the ethnic situation in Eastern Romania, Odessa and Chernivtsi 
regions, Vinnitsa, Kirovograd and Nikolaev in Ukraine. 
The legal framework that refers to the rights of national minorities in 
Moldova includes more than 30 documents, 10 of which are of international 
importance. According to experts, this is considered to be a relatively complex 
and satisfactory one. The law of the Republic of Moldova regarding persons 
belonging to national minorities recognizes by persons belonging to national 
minorities „persons residing in Moldova, who are its citizens, have ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic and religious features different from the majority of 
population - Moldovan - and consider themselves of a different ethnic origin. 
The institutions empowered to enforce provisions of legislation are:  
- the Bureau of Interethnic Relations  
- the Ethnic Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova  
- the Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights and National 
Minorities 
- the Center for Human Rights in Moldova. 
The perception of minorities theme involves, certainly, discussions 
regarding technical issues of implementing the existing legislation on the 
protection and promotion of ethnic minorities rights. The means or the real 
devices that the administrative institutions have at their disposal to ensure the 
application of laws and law enforcement in specific are varied. Researchers have 
tried for many times to identify the administrative tools and to classify them 
into significant categories. The resulting schemes do not have much in 
common. Some of them have either a high level of abstraction, or insist too 
much on certain tools. 
A sufficiently abstract scheme to encompass many existing possibilities 
and a specific enough yet, to match the way by which those involved in the 
administrative process implement their options, is developed by Howlett and 
Ramesh. The scheme is developed from the analysis of the extent to which the 
state is involved in providing goods and services involving the use of each tool. 
Using this analysis as a criterion, the result is a classification which arranges 
various public policy tools on an axis of the voluntary nature and an axis of the 
binding nature. 
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The binding tools, also called routing tools, require or direct the actions 
of individuals or societies. The administrative body, practicing  the authority, 
can train people to carry out certain activities, may force the societies it controls 
to perform any function desired, or can directly provide requested goods and 
services through bureaucratic structures. These are tools with a high coercive 
feature. The binding tools are: regulations, public enterprises, direct delivery 
(Howlett, Ramesh, 2004: 95) 
The voluntary tools involve the administrative interference in a very small 
degree or they don‘t involve it at all. The desired objective is achieved on a 
voluntary basis. The administrative bodies often deliberately decide that they will 
not involve a matter of public interest (―non-decision‖) because they believe that it 
can be better solved by voluntary organizations, family and market. These are 
NGOs which are acting voluntarily, meaning that their members are not required 
by the administration to perform any task. If they take any action that serves the 
public administration, this happens for reasons of self-interest, ethics or their own 
satisfaction. The voluntary instruments are family and community, voluntary 
organizations and market. (Howlett, Ramesh, 2004: 98) 
Mixed tools combine the features of voluntary and mandatory tools. 
These allow administrative bodies different levels of involvement in the decisions 
elaborated by those whose involvement ranges from a simple dissemination of 
information to fines for improper activities. Between these two extremes there is 
the subsidizing of appropriate activities and the establishment of a price 
mechanism in those sectors where the price doesn‘t exist, normally. These tools 
present, to some extent, the advantages of binding tools, as well as of those 
voluntary. (Howlett, Ramesh, 2004: 121) 
To select a tool it is necessary to take into consideration two interrelated 
variables: the administrative capacity and the civic-administrative competence 
of the local community, the latter being determined largely, by the existence of 
social and human capital. 
The administrative capacity represents the ability of public institutions 
to identify clear objectives, to set concrete priorities and to implement them 
efficiently (Cornea, 2008: 122). The citizen and administrative competence is 
expressed by citizens‘ capacity to influence administrative decisions by 
compliance with law and with administrative decisions (Sandu, 2005: 169). 
Market-based tools (the supply of goods and services by the economic agents) 
are appropriate for a high level of administrative capacity of the community and 
the certification of medium and high standard of living of the population. For a 
limited administrative capacity and a low standard of living there will be used 
such voluntary tools as family or community, the incentives, propaganda and 
persuasion. 
In order to ensure the respect of the compulsory legal documents 
required and also of those politically binding the efforts of public 
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administration should be channeled into at least two directions: -formulating 
and implementing appropriate policies and ensuring a sense of identity security 
of pluralistic demands. The identification as an ethnic minority related only by 
the verb ―to be‖ and not to the verb ―to do‖, impose that administrative tools 
must be selected according to criteria of fairness, efficiency and of existing 
social support. 
 Policies on minorities will be even more effective, if they will be based 
on comprehensive statistical data or some other data on the situation of ethnic 
groups, and approach the quality identity. Previous emphasis that focused on 
providing and guaranteeing certain rights by law under the current conditions 
should be changed and put on the rising potential of authorities and on the 
capacity of the supposed beneficiaries to realize these rights.  
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Abstract: The waning of the birth rate and of fertility, the increase in life expectancy 
and the ageing of the population trigger important imbalances on the labor market, in the 
public sector and even in the financial-banking system. The population segment able to work 
decreases in favor of that representing the older population, thus causing an increase in the 
dependence rate of the elderly. The low birth rate and the low fertility render the work force 
reserve insufficient regarding the economic growth perspectives. The social insurance and health 
care budgets undergo heavy pressure as a consequence of the ever increasing needs of the 
pensioners. In its turn, the financial-banking system suffers from a reduction in the saving 
rate, the elderly being forced to reduce their consumption, let alone to save money, due to their 
low income from pensions. 
Even if they do not represent the main causes of the current economic-financial crisis, 
without doubt, demographic changes have contributed to its start, and their unfavorable 
evolution on a long term basis can accentuate such crises or it can start new ones. In such 
circumstances, it is mandatory to transform population ageing from a problem into an 
opportunity.  
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Introduction 
  
The economic crisis can be defined as an accentuated deterioration of 
the current economic situation, as well as of the future one. With its diverse 
aspects, with its stages, with its longer or shorter periods, it represents an 
economic malfunction the causes of which have been identified within different 
areas by economists; therefore the suggested anti-crisis measures have also been 
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diverse. Such economic crises have been frequent throughout the 19th century 
until WWI but they have had a climax in the Great Depression of 1929-1933, 
and have continued with the two energy crises from 1973 and 1979, with the 
local crises from Mexico, South America, Japan during the 1990s, and in 2008 
the current international crisis broke out. Of course there were longer periods 
of sustained economic growth, especially during the post-war period until the 
beginning of the 70s in industrialized countries, which have triggered doubts 
among economists regarding the viability of the economic cycle idea. 
(Krugman, 2009: 19) 
 In these circumstances, the economists‘ concern for the identification 
of the causes generating economic crises seems natural, in view of the 
delineation of an ensemble of measures that would prevent the crises or 
manage to overcome them.  
 Keynes‘ theory, included in the well-known paper The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (1936) is a construction meant to replace the old 
classic English approach and justify the active economic policies and the 
necessity of the state‘s intervention in a differentiated manner according to the 
stages of the economic cycle, by using the key factors it controls: the budgetary, 
monetary and fiscal policy. The model he suggested is based on a few 
fundamental concepts: the tendency towards consumption, the marginal 
productivity of the capital, the interest rate and the full occupancy.  
 Keynes transfers the so-called causes of the crises from the interest rate 
area to that of the capital‘s marginal productivity: ―We were accustomed to 
explain the crisis by stressing the increasing tendency of the interest rate under 
the influence of the growing demand for money, both for commercial purposes 
and for speculative ones. In certain moments, this factor can certainly have an 
aggravating role, and occasionally an initiating one. But my suggestion is that 
the most likely explanation for the crisis, and probably the prevailing one, is not 
the increase of the interest rate, but a sudden collapse of the capital‘s marginal 
productivity.‖ (Keynes, 1936, 2009: 385) (Our translation). 
 In his introduction to the Romanian edition of this book from 2009, 
Paul Krugman considered that John M. Keynes got rid of the idea which was 
―enticing, but certainly false that the business cycle was like a morality game, 
that the economic depression was like a necessary purgative following the 
excess of a prosperity period.‖ (Keynes, 2009: 47) (Our translation). 
 Starting with the 70s we witness the intensification of the economic 
globalization process, a fact that puts a limit on the states‘ capacity for efficient 
intervention (the collapse of the myth regarding the ‗providence state‘) and 
reactivates the ideology of the ‗minimal state‘ and of the ‗limited government‘, 
embraced since 1989 by the Eastern European states too, following the 
communism‘s state-controlled experience, which has brought forth a type of 
‗anarcho-capitalism‘. (Gray, 1998: 240) Otherwise, there are economists who, when 
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talking about the effects of globalization on the economic level, underline the fact 
that it leads to ―Richesse du monde, pauvrete des nations‖. (Cohen, 1997). 
 On the background of an often exaggerated optimism, we witness a 
considerable economic growth not only in the developed countries, but also in 
the less developed ones, which will determine the increase of the oil price thrice 
in 1973 and twice in 1979, which for an economy based on oil, could not but 
trigger a major crisis with long-term effects. Paul Krugman believes that the same 
happened in 1990 when the excessive trust in the profit potential of 
informational technology and ―the growing safety feeling regarding the economy, 
the belief that the harsh recessions era was over‖ pushed the price of the stock 
shares ―to bewildering prices‖. (Krugman, 2009: 167) (Our translation) 
 Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize laureate for economy in 2008, has 
identified among the main causes of the current crisis the reduction of the trust 
in the banking system coupled with the lack of cash, the emergence in the 
economy of the ‗speculative bubble‘ be it of a real estate, financial, stock 
exchange or another nature, which eventually collapsed influencing the decline 
of investments, of the consumption, of the general demand, the increase of 
unemployment, the disturbance of the banking activities and the activity of the 
‗shadow banks‘. He also warned in the above-mentioned book about the return 
of the ‗decline economy‘. (Krugman, 2009: 79, 173-175).  
 Taking into account the recent economic and demographic evolutions 
and the forms of the current crisis, I suggest that beside the above-mentioned 
causes, one can also bring forward for discussion demographic determinants.  
  
1. Demographic changes and their economic implications 
 
Until the middle of the 20th century, demography and the economic 
sciences, just like the population and the economy, were approached by 
specialists as separate, independent research or activity areas, having separate 
subjects, methods and specific rules; they were less studied form the point of 
view of the relationships, or the interconnections among them.  Only in the last 
6-7 decades have the demographers underlined the role of the economy in 
demographic evolutions, and have the economists stressed the importance of 
the demographic elements for the economic development; thus one can 
envision more and more clearly an interconnection between the two areas.  
In this respect, Vladimir Trebici suggested that ―the interdependences 
between the demographic variables (‗the demographic transition‘) and the 
socio-economic variables (‗the economic growth‘, ‗the development‘) were 
finally admitted. Even if not all the detailed aspects of the demographic process 
have been identified, the specialists‘ studies regarding the demographic 
transition have truly become a theory of the population‘s evolution seen from 
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the point of view of its connection with the economic development.‖ (Trebici, 
1991: 302) (Our translation) 
In time, the unitary approach of economy, society, the environment and 
technology has become the pattern of a new type of development, the 
sustainable development. At the present day, numerous economists and 
politicians consider that the traditional model of economic growth is in crisis 
(Peter F. Druker, Societatea post-capitalistă, 1999; Lester C. Thurow, The Future of 
Capitalism, How Today‟s Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow‟s World, 1996; G. Soros, 
Criza capitalismului global, 1999; Lester Brown, Planul B, 2006, etc). As a 
consequence, one feels the need for ―new reconsiderations on the level of 
economic theory/ practice, the drawing up of new strategies for the two 
processes. (Popescu, Bondrea, Constantinescu, 2005: 125).  
The labor market is, like any other market a place where the demand 
meets the supply, in this case, the labor power. The demand for man power, 
materialized in job offers, is determined not only by the evolution of the 
economy and its potential, but also by the number, structure and demographic 
characteristics of the population. In its turn, the supply of labor force, 
materialized in the quantity of work that can be carried out by the active 
population, is related to this population‘s consumption needs but also by the 
ability to cope with the job‘s demands. Also in the case of the supply and 
demand of labor power, an important element is represented by the 
productivity; because the productivity and the work carried out are 
substitutable: when the overall population remains constant or increases, the 
decline in employed population can be compensated by an increase in 
productivity. At the same time, when the productivity decreases, the quantity of 
work must increase so as the consumption be constant.  
The changes that took place on the demographic level can be found 
with a certain delay both in the supply as well as in the demand of labor power. 
The decline of the birthrate and of the death rate, a common occurrence in 
many developed countries, causes population ageing and implicitly, a reduction 
of the segment of the employed population, respectively a shortage of labor 
power. This must be compensated by extra investments and by an increase in 
productivity which can be accomplished by means of devising, implementing 
and putting into practice technical progress, which in itself demands a better 
qualified, dynamic, flexible and creative work force in the area of research, 
development and innovation. On the other hand, if demographic growth is not 
accompanied by an equivalent economic growth, will determine considerable 
pressure on the unemployment rate, welfare work, education and health care 
systems. Likewise, the structuring on work domains of the employed 
population represents an indicator of a country‘s level of economic 
development: a high level of development is matched by a very little percentage 
of employed population in the primary sector (agriculture and forestry), and 
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respectively by a very high percentage of the population employed in the 
secondary sector (the processing industry) and in the tertiary industries (public 
services). All this is taken into account knowing that non-agricultural activities 
are generating production techniques which allow for a better capitalization of 
material and labor resources and they provide services for the unfolding of 
production at a higher level of efficiency and for pursuing population‘s needs, 
as well as for the society‘s safety on the whole.  
The quantitative correlations between economy and population, though 
not easily dismissed, especially if we take into account the structure of the 
population according to various criteria, are nevertheless surpassed by 
qualitative correlations, i.e. between the human capital and the efficiency 
economic indicators. ―The human capital represents one of the development 
engines, both on a social, community level and on an individual one‖ concluded 
Bogdan Voicu in a study on the human capital in Romania. (Voicu, 2004: 155) 
(Our translation) 
The physical and psychological state of health of the population is to be 
found in the quantity and the quality of the work, in the quality of family and 
professional life, even in the civic attitude and the political action. In its turn, 
the state of health varies according to the level of individual, family or national 
income and according to the educational and health care policies. ―The 
presence of a highly educated human resource having a good state of health 
determines high labor productivity, a better organization of the economic 
activity, a better production and superior income which, in their turn, bring new 
investments in education, the health care system, thus influencing the 
production of a better educated and healthier human resource.‖ (Mihail, Sandu, 
2010: 73) (Our translation) 
In the theory of economic growth, R. Solow (1956) underlines the 
importance of the demographic factor as a source of growth regarding the 
employed population, stating that a more efficient action is the replacement of 
the active population than the simple replacement of generations, the latter 
being a necessary but not sufficient condition for the replacement of the 
employed population. ―To make children is not the same thing as making them 
active‖, he used to say; in other words, a child is a potential labor force, not a 
certain one. He/she needs to be at least 16 years old till he/she might become 
active, meanwhile he/she is only a consumer, and sometimes a very demanding 
one. (Our translation) 
The level and the quality of education, not only of the initial one, but 
also of the permanent one, have a considerable impact on labor productivity, 
especially considering the ageing of the population and the decrease of the 
employed population. They also influence the level of personal income, of the 
adjustment and flexibility capacity on the labor market, the level of creativity 
and innovation. Yet education, the access to a high quality of education is 
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conditioned by a certain level of income, of social values, of educational, 
economic and social policies. 
In other words, it is a cycle that repeats itself with every generation and 
which has special characteristics on shorter intervals (election cycles, local, 
regional, international changes) on the political, ideological, economic, 
technological, even environmental levels. A study carried out in European 
countries between 2001-2003 has underlined very strong correlations between 
formal education indicators, those representing the state of health and those of 
economic power, drawing the conclusion that ―the richer societies are better 
educated and have healthier citizens, the better educated societies are richer and 
have a better state of health.‖ (Voicu, 2004: 152) (Our translation) 
One of the most important demographic changes with the greatest 
impact upon the present and future economic evolution and which may cause 
even economic crises seems to be the ageing of the population. In its turn, the 
current crisis has determined a leap backwards regarding fiscal consolidation 
issues, a fact that has imposed serious fiscal-budgetary restrictions, even 
restrictions regarding the pensions systems. The economic contractions, the 
budgetary deficits, the financial instability have pointed out the need for the 
adjustment of the retirement practices, of the pensions‘ calculus manner; the 
need for improving the efficiency and the safety of the pensions systems to 
prevent equating old age and poverty.  
Starting with the last century, one can notice a major change in 
structuring the world population according to their age – it is a population 
growing old due to the increase of life expectancy and of the number of the 
elderly as well as due to a decrease of the number of the young. Currently, the 
world population age structure looks like this: 0-14 years old: 27%, 15-64 years 
old: 65%, 65 years old and over: 8%. (CIA – The World Factbook, 2008) 
This phenomenon has affected the entire planet, but it has various 
intensities in different geographical areas. First it took place in the North, but it 
is threatening to extend with an increased velocity in the South in the next 
decades. (Pison, 2009) We can provide an example in the situation of Asia 
which has the greatest part of the world population; the chart below shows the 
fact that this area is ageing too, the number of those over 65 years old and over 
this age is increasing, at the same time with the decrease of the number of those 
between 0 and 14 years old. 
The same situation is valid for other continents: for North America 
where the size of the two segments tends to become equal; for South America 
where the situation is better at the present moment, but the same trend is 
present; and especially Europe. Only in Africa this process is not yet present 
due to a high birth rate and also due to the low life expectancy at birth.  
The ageing process, which takes the shape of a demographic imbalance 
when it comes to the age structure, is likely to cause serious economic and social 
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malfunctions on the labor market, in the pensions system, in the health care 
system, in the education system, in the social care system, in the system of 
budgetary income and expenses, even in the banking system, thus being a 
genuine carrier of crisis generating elements. This is the reason why the European 
Commission has drawn up a document called ―The Green Book of Pensions‖, 
meant to launch a debate on a European level in order to ensure safe, viable and 
suitable pensions, which would be able to sustain the efforts to reform and 
improve the present systems on a national level.  
 
Figure 1. The age structure of the population in Asia (1950-2020) 
 
 
 
Source: http://ecoglobe.ch/population/e/p2k07407.htm 
 
 In a study published in 1996, Lindh and Malmberg have underlined a 
strong positive correlation between ratio of the population between 50-64 years 
old compared to the overall population and the increase of the GDP/ 
inhabitant in the next period, respectively, a negative correlation between the 
ratio of the population over 65 years old compared to the overall population 
and the economic growth.  This was the result of classifying ages according to 
the economic behavior criterion. Thus, young people (0-14 years old) depend 
on the grown-ups for the consumption and the health care and education 
related expenses; the young adults (15-29 years old) represent the source of 
rejuvenation of the labor force  but they still need investments in the human 
capital being in various schooling stages and needing money for age appropriate 
goods and services; the working adults (30-49 years old) represent a part of the 
active man power but they spend their income for acquiring long-term utility 
goods, thus being less available for saving money; the middle age people ( 50-64 
years old) are working the and earn a high income based on their experience 
and furthermore, they can save money due to the fact that they already have the 
products that ensure the comfort of a household; the elderly (over 65 years old) 
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rely on the active people due to the transfer of income, but also rely on their 
family because of the big and expensive needs, especially those regarding the 
health care services and because of their low income from pensions. (Lindh, 
Malmberg, 1999).  
In this respect, the labor force is influenced on the one hand by the 
decrease of the number of active population, and on the other hand, by the 
diminution of work productivity, which may cause a smaller increase of the 
population‘s living standard. The compensation of the work force deficit in 
developed countries by bringing cheap man power from China, Africa and 
India will be stopped only when these countries will have themselves a work 
force deficit. In this situation, there are only two valid solutions for maintainin 
economic growth at least at the same level: the increase of the retirement age, 
respectively the increase in productivity.  
On the one hand, the increase of the retirement age is possible due to 
the increase in life expectancy and life quality; on the other hand, this is 
necessary for unblocking the pensions system and for the removal of the inner 
tensions between generations by reducing the burden on the active generations 
for supporting the pensions system. As a consequence, one needs to install 
some mechanisms for the occupancy of the elderly. But this depends on a series 
of factors: the capitalization of the old work force by the employers (the 
relationship between productivity, age and salaries); cultural aspects like: the 
attitude towards work, family values, the future, the attitude towards risk; the 
reduction of the devaluation rate of the human capital. (Algan, Cahuc, 2007) 
But this fact equally depends on the economy‘s capacity to offer jobs 
that are suitable for this age group. The statement according to which the 
massive retirement has a positive influence on the unemployment rate by 
freeing jobs for the young, is not valid in all the countries. If this fact seems to 
be valid in Spain (where the unemployment rate is higher than its European 
average), in Germany, Italy or France this does not take place. Although the 
large number of pensioners has freed numerous jobs, the unemployment rate 
did not drop due to the qualification and high goals of the young work force on 
the one hand and on the other hand due to the employers‘ needs and 
expectations. The first have new and better qualifications which entitles them to 
have higher demands regarding the income, the working conditions, the 
professional relationships; while the employers look for experience, discipline 
and acceptable salary demands. In these circumstances, the younger part of the 
old age group will be preferred, at least for certain jobs. In developed countries 
they are often requested to help as consultants or mentors.  
The increase in the occupation rate of the population over 60 years old 
(ensuring an active ageing), the discouragement of early retirement and the 
encouragement of part time work, the reform of the pensions systems, the age-
targeted policies, all of these lead to an increase of life quality and of the 
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solidarity among generations, to the correct management of the economic and 
human problems, all adapted to the differences between regions and cities. 
(Cartea verde a populaţiei: 24) 
 Paradoxically, although the increase of life expectancy should almost 
automatically lead to the increase of the retirement age, one can rather see an 
earlier exit from the labor market under the form of early retirement, or illness-
induced retirement, etc. For instance, in 2005 in Italy, Poland, Belgium and 
Luxemburg, the median age for retirement1 for men was about 7-8 years under 
the official age and over 5 years lesser in Austria. (Statistică socială europeană: 212, 
Source: Eurostat, Ancheta forţei de muncă şi indicatori structurali pentru ocupare) 
 As for the health care and education services, the population ageing 
demands changes regarding the adjustment of the structure of these services 
according to the changes occurring at the demand level: developing geriatrics 
and gerontology services, house-call services, e-medicine, e-learning schools 
and continuous education.  
 Yet demographic ageing can also be considered an opportunity, not 
only a problem. The extension of the active life will determine the transfer of a 
considerable part of the senior citizens into the rank of the active population 
and the taking over of the tasks generally associated with grandparents by great-
grandparents.  
 On the other hand, the productivity is not necessarily dependent on the 
age. Considering the new forms of learning (life learning, long-distance 
learning), the elderly are no longer situated outside the education and 
continuous learning system. In this situation, taking into account their work 
experience, they can obtain productivity levels that can surpass even those of 
the young people. The same thing can be valid with respect to innovation.  
 The ever increasing and diverse needs of the elderly, materialized in the 
growing demand for social and medical services, for specific products, represents 
an opportunity considering the setting up of jobs in these specific areas which are 
accessible even when lacking a superior qualification, but which demand a 
humane  attitude.  
 In what the financial banking system is concerned, the changes that 
population ageing might trigger regard the change in attitude of the senior 
citizens towards the consumption and savings, with an influence on the interest 
and exchange rates. Considering the increase in life expectancy, ‗the young 
pensioners‘ need to save money to be able to have the necessary resources to 
go through the old age, thus contradicting the theory of the life cycle according 
to which people save money only during their economically active period. 
                                                          
1 The actual median age for retirement is estimated from the data provided by the work force 
inquiry regarding the occupational status. In each member state it is calculated taking 
into account the age when the ratio of those who are economically active (i.e. the 
activity rate) is of 50% from all those who are economically active at the age of 50.  
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Those with large pensions are saving by reducing the everyday expenses, as well 
as those with small pensions by using different saving forms, especially using 
their home – if they own it by renting a part of it or reducing the maintenance 
costs. One can notice even a reversal of the inter-generational solidarity flow: 
the grandparents support their children and grandchildren. Of course one 
cannot generalize this tendency, because it is possible that this characteristic of 
saving money of the present pensioner generations may not be constant 
throughout all the elder generations, taking into account the type of education 
that they had, the social-economic context of their upbringing and the system 
of values and life style which is specific to each generation.  
 Another opportunity brought by the population ageing is connected to 
the reduction of the growth rhythm of the population, which connected to a 
lower consumption of the elderly contributes to the lowering of the 
environmental hazards.  
 The ageing process is further accompanied by a positive social effect, 
i.e. the decrease in the crime rate; but it is equally true that the suicide rate 
among the elderly is increasing.  
 From a political point of view, the elderly represent an ever more 
attractive category being a disciplined, interested and increasing body of 
electors. The older voters are usually associated with conservative parties, but 
the studies carried out on the baby-boomers have underlined very diverse 
political options among them, therefore stressing an uncertain voting behavior. 
(Palard, Vezina; 2007: 35) 
 As a consequence, the ageing of the population is not only a handicap, 
but also an opportunity. For Europe which has already known, researched and 
begun to capitalize on this new resource, the opportunity can become a 
pioneering enterprise by adopting some economic policies about the 
implications of the population ageing.  
 On the overall, there are two approaches to ageing and old age: a 
pessimistic one and an optimistic - triumphant one. The pessimists warn about 
some dangers connected to the pensions system failure, to the public finances 
imbalance, to the collapse of the economic growth on the background of the 
drop in productivity, competitiveness, creativity and technological innovations. 
They also warn about the rise of health care expenses, the slackening of the 
intergenerational relationships, even about the installation of a type of 
gerontocracy. In their opinion, the old person is a burden both for his/her 
family and acquaintances and also for the society.  
 On the other hand, the optimists insist on the experience that the 
elderly have and which can be successfully used, on their autonomy, freedom, 
self-promotion and development, on their contribution to the economic 
development (their capacity for consumption and investments, of saving 
money, of making donations, giving inheritances and transferring goods and 
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services), on their contribution to restoring the moral values, but also to 
moderating the current life rhythm which has become too stressful.  
 In between these two types of discourse, it is necessary to look for a 
nuanced position that cannot ignore the appearance of the Homo senectus, ―the 
new emblematic figure of contemporary history‖ and the fact that it represents 
an achievement of civilization and an ―economic, social and political force that 
cannot be ignored‖. (Palard, Vezina; 2007: 49-51) (Our translation) 
 
2. The case of Romania 
 
 In Romania, the current financial crisis manifested itself less than in 
other countries due to the fact that the Romanian financial-banking system 
does not have the proportions it has in other countries where one can notice a 
‗hypertrophy of the financial sector‘. In exchange, there was and continues to 
be an acute economic crisis. If a financial crisis can be softened by an infusion 
of capital from the reserves of the national banks, in the case of the economic 
crisis things are more complicated, the efficient measures pertaining to the area 
of economic reorganizations, innovations, investments, etc. 
 In their paper Criza economică din România anului 2009. Cauze, efecte, soluţii, the 
authors identitfy next to the impact of the external crisis, two important causes for 
the economic-financial crisis in Romania: the deficit of the trade balance and the 
budgetary deficit, both having an important demographic component. 
 Among other causes, external migration – especially that of the young 
and qualified work force – also contributes to the deficit of the trade balance, a 
fact which has contributed to the difficulties in reestablishing the proper 
structure for the Romanian economy after the collapse of the industry in the 
immediate period following 1990. For Romania, external migration represents 
10% of the total population and almost 25% of the active population, having as 
a main disadvantage the appearance of the work force deficit, especially in some 
economic sectors. Even if external migration was often considered to be an 
element of profitable export, on the long haul, the damages inflicted to the 
Romanian economy are bigger.  
It seems that the population aged 25-29 years old is the most dynamic 
when it comes to temporarily migrating abroad. (―The migration of the 
Romanians abroad: premises for public policies (I)‖, in Populatia si dezvoltarea 
României - prognoze si posibile solutii, nr.3/2007: 3).  
The prevalence of young people among the immigrants amplifies the 
phenomenon of population ageing by the negative influence this phenomenon has 
on the birth rate, and it makes difficult the correlation of production, consumption, 
the imports and exports with the potential of the work force which remains in the 
Romanian economy; knowing that the better qualified immigrants have greater 
chances of success on the labor market of the Western countries.  
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Table 2.  
The percentage of the people aged 26-40 years old from the totality of immigrants 
 
The year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
The ratio of young 
people (26-40 years 
old) from the totality 
of immigrants 
30.7 33.7 38.8 40.5 48.7 51.0 54.8 58.1 
 
Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/romania/ 
romania_2007 
 
Regarding the budgetary deficit, there was a strong influence of both 
the decrease of income and a lowering of the degree of collecting wages. On 
the other hand, the burden of increased expenses, especially those with the 
pensions and the health care system as a result of population ageing, of the 
increase in life expectancy, of early retirements have lead to a ratio of 1.5 
pensioners to 1 wage earner. Even if a better life is a great achievement, one 
wonders if those who live longer have the capacity to enjoy this longevity.  
 After 1990 Romania in its turn has faced a process of population ageing 
determined by the evolution of demographic indicators: a low birth rate, a low 
fertility rate, the increase of life expectancy at birth, a decrease of the death rate 
according to the table below: 
 
Table 3. Demogarphic indicators in Romania (1990-2007) 
 
Indicator/ 
year 
Birth 
rate 
Death 
rate 
Fertility 
circumstanti
al index 
Life expectancy at 
birth 
1990 13.6 10.6 1.8 69.78 
1991 11.9 10.9 1.6 69.52 
1992 11.4 11.6 1.5 69.48 
1993 11 11.6 1.4 69.4 
1994 10.9 11.7 1.4 69.05 
1995 10.4 12 1.3 68.95 
1996 10.2 12.7 1.3 69.24 
1997 10.5 12.4 1.3 69.74 
1998 10.5 12 1.3 70.53 
1999 10.4 11.8 1.3 71.19 
2000 10.5 11.4 1.3 71.18 
2001 9.8 11.6 1.2 71.01 
2002 9.7 12.4 1.3 71.32 
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Indicator/ 
year 
Birth 
rate 
Death 
rate 
Fertility 
circumstanti
al index 
Life expectancy at 
birth 
2003 9.8 12.3 1.3 71.76 
2004 10 11.9 1.3 72.22 
2005 10.2 12.1 1.3 72.22 
2006 10.2 12 1.3 72.61 
2007 10 11.7 1.3 72.61 
 
Source: Anuarul statistic al României – 2008, Serii timp, 1990-2007 
  
A low death and fertility rate have lead not only to the pheonomenon 
of popualtion ageing, but have also changed the structure of the dependency 
relationship. Thus, in Romania, the population aged 0-14 years old has dropped 
from 33.4 % in 1930 to 26% in 1980 and 15.6% in 2007, while the population 
over 60 years old has increased from 7.4% in 1930 to 13.3% in 1980 and 14.7% 
in 2007. (Trebici, p.112) In these circumstances, the rate of the demographic 
dependency of the elderly has risen (from 15.6% to 20.5% between 1990 and 
2000), the rate of the demographic dependency of the young people has 
decreased in the same period from 35.9% to 25.3%, and the ratio old people-
young people has increased dramatically from 43.5% in 1990 to 97.3% in 2007 
(Anuarul statistic al României – 2008, Serii timp, 1990-2007). At the same time, 
the employment rate in Romania is inferior to the European average (58.8% 
compared to 65.4% in 2007). 
 
Figure 2. The employment rate in Romania (1997-2007) 
 
 
 
Source: ASR, 2008 serii, cap. 3, pg. 137 
 
Vladimir Trebici underlines the characteristics which are specific to the 
demographic transition in Romania:  
1. The fact that Romania belongs to the Western Europe cultural model 
makes the birth and death rate level in the pre-transformational period 
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have other values than the ones registered in the currently developing 
countries: between 1930-1939 to a gross birth rate of 31.4 living newly-
born children to 1000 inhabitants and a gross death rate of 19.5 deaths 
to 1000 inhabitants, the yearly growth rate was about 1.2% considering 
that the national annual revenue per inhabitant was 100 UDS.  
2. The demographic transition took place through an accelerated decrease 
of the death rate between 1918-1956, followed by an accentuated 
decrease of the birth rate between 1957-1966. 
3. Both phenomena occurred as a follow-up of the intermingling of 
economic, political, cultural and educational factors (Trebici, 1979, p.34) 
In what the demographic projections for the next 50 years are concerned, 
they are not quite optimistic since the population of Romania continues the 
descending trend towards a total of 15-18 millions towards the 2050s.  
Nevertheless, the population statistics seem to place us in a somewhat 
normal state. The population of Romania was in July 2007 of 22,276,056 
inhabitants, having the following age structure: 0-14 years old: 15.6% (1,787,334 
men/ 1,696,270 women); 15-64 years old: 69.6% (7,721,160 men/ 7,793,063 
women); 65 years old and over: 14.7% (1,344,673 men/ 1,933,556 women). The 
average life expectancy is for the whole population of 71.91 years, with differences 
between men (68.41 years) and women (75.62). In the last two years, the usage of 
the life expectancy at birth indicator is contested by demographers because the 
greater number of years that a generation can enjoy does not necessarily mean a 
healthy life. Due to this reason, the World Health Organization has recommended 
another indicator called the average healthy life span  in order to capture the level of 
socio-economic development of a country. For Romania, in 2002, this indicator 
was of 61 years for men and 65.2 years for women.  
By comparing these data to the European Union average we can see that:  
a) There is a slightly lower share of the 0-14 years old age segment (15.7% in 
EU). 
b) There is a larger share of the 15-64 years old age segment (67.2% in EU). 
c) There is a lower share of the 65 years old and over age segment (17.1%). 
d) There is a numeric supremacy of women in the 15-64 years old age 
segment.  
The b) and c) headings seem to indicate a favorable situation, which can 
be called ‗a window of opportunity‘ due to the fact that the work resources 
represented by the population which is able to work are important in order to 
sustain a strong economy. Yet this thing took place during 2000-2008 when 
Romania had an economic growth of 4-8%.  
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Figure 3. The evolution of GDP in Romania (1990-2007) 
 
 
 
Source: ASR, 2008 serii, cap. 11, pg 471, 472 
 
 But such a demographic situation is not stable for a long period because 
the generations replace one another and the segment of population between 0-
14 years old is rather small and even more seriously, it continues to decrease. In 
a few years this situation will be far from favorable. In the same manner, the 
share of population of 65 years old and over seems to represent an advantage 
considering a lower rate of dependency. In fact, on the one hand the lower 
share of this age segment is due to a lower life expectancy in Romania as 
compared to that of the European Union (72 years compared to 78.5 years), a 
sign of underdevelopment, civilization and life quality gap; but paradoxically, on 
the other hand the dependency rate of the elderly is one among the highest in 
the EU, as a follow-up of the massive retirements and of the very numerous 
illness-triggered retirements.  
 
Figure 4. The evolution of the number of pensioners and wage-earners (1990-2007) 
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Source: ASR, 2008 serii, cap. 6, p.149,  337 
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 Early retirement, adopted by Romania as a solution to the 
unemployment problem, has lead to an outburst of the number of pensioners 
in the public system. As a consequence, the number of contributors for each 
pensioner has decreased from 3.43 in 1990 to only 0.79 in 2003.  
In these circumstances, the pensions expenses, as well as their share in 
the total of budgetary expenses and in the GDP have risen while the budgetary 
revenue represents a maximum of 33% of the GDP, a fact that situates us on 
the last position in the EU.  
This is a situation which is able to amplify the budgetary deficit, a 
‗balloon‘ (to use Krugman‘s word) which broke in the context of the current 
crisis, bringing Romania on the brink of insolvency and making it resort to 
massive loans. 
 
Figure 5. The evolution of pension expenses 
 
 
 
Source: ASR, 2008 serii, cap. 21, pg. 993 
 
One can notice that the share of social expenses represents a third of 
the total of budgetary expenses, having a great share in the GDP; which means 
that on the one hand there are other budgetary sectors and objectives that will 
lack financing, and on the other hand, these expenses put a great pressure on 
the budget, generating considerable deficits, which in their turn represent 
sources of malfunctions in the country‘s socio-economic life in general.  
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  Table 4. The social expenses from the state‘s consolidated budget 
 
The 
year 
The share of social security 
expenses in the total 
expenses of the general 
consolidated budget (%) 
The share of 
social security 
expenses in the 
GDP (%) 
The surplus/deficit of 
the general 
consolidated budget 
(% in the GDP) 
1998 30.2 10.9 - 4.1 
1999 27.7 11.3 - 4 
2000 33.4 11.8 - 4 
2001 33.5 11.2 - 3.2 
2002 34.2 11.0 - 2.6 
2003 32.9 10.2 - 2.2 
2004 33.7 10.1 - 1.2 
2005 32.9 9.9 - 0,8 
2006 26.7 9.2 - 1.68 
2007 27.5 9.8 - 2.4 
2008 27.9 10.4 - 2.94 
2009 33.1 12.7 - 7.2 
 
Source: The United Nations Development Program – UNDP, National human 
development report – Romania, 2007, p.194, pentru perioada 1998-2005, 
Ministerul Finanţelor Publice, pentru perioada 2006-2009 
 
The share of pensions expenses from the total of budgetary expenses 
(36.8%) place Romania within the European Union on the second position 
after Greece, which spends 40.5% from its revenue for pensions. 
    
Table 5. The share of pensions in the budgetary revenue within the EU 
 
Position Country Pensions/Revenue (%) 
1. Greece 40.5 
2. Romania 36.8 
3. Italy 32.6 
4. France 32.2 
5. Austria 29.5 
6. Portugal 28.6 
7. Germany 26.6 
8. Poland 26.5 
9. Spain 26.3 
10. Malta 25.2 
 
Source: Consiliul Fiscal 
 
 The inversion of the age pyramid in Romania and not only, renders the 
current pensions system inefficient, therefore needing a restructuring that 
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would make it more flexible and would interconnect the pension level, the life 
expectation and the economic growth, allowing at the same time to approach 
the target of 75% work force occupancy established by the EU Agenda 2020. 
The pensions system sustainability and the budgetary deficit reduction, coupled 
with the macroeconomic balance represent a primary objective for the 
Romanian politics on a short, medium and long term level. This might not 
prevent all future economic crises, but at least will not contribute to or amplify 
these phenomena.  
 
Conclusions: 
 
1.  In tackling the causes of economic crises one really needs to use the 
demographic factors analysis, taking into account that there is a strong 
connection between economic development and the human capital resources. 
2. One needs to transform population ageing from a problem into an 
opportunity by using a coherent strategy of stimulating the younger echelon of 
the old population into becoming economically active, of preventing the 
devaluation of the human capital. 
3. A profound reform of the pensions system is necessary by 
introducing some mechanisms of pensions‘ adjustment to the average life 
expectancy and to the average rate of economic growth.  
4. Considering the increase in longevity and the population ageing, one 
needs to encourage individual money saving coupled with the establishment of 
crisis reserve funds, so as the social insecurity situations be prevented.  
5. Socio-economic reforms should target the long-term sustainability of 
the pensions systems, even by encouraging private pensions.  
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Abstract. In this article the author analized the position of Ukrainian minority in 
Romania. It‟s dedicated to the problems of Ukrainians in Romania. The auther pointed out 
that during XX century there were two waves of immigration to Romania from Ukraine. 
Nowadays the most part of Ukrainians concentrates in Maramures, Suceava, Karash-Severin, 
Tulcea, Satu Mare, Arad and Botosani. They have some difficulties in realizing their right for 
free ethnic-cultural development. For instance, they haven‟t a possibility to study in native 
language, to listen service in Ukrainian, etc. These problems have to be solved according to 
European standards. 
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PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY PRESERVING 
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The contemporary development of the European Union demonstrates 
the growing interest toward the national minorities, to the problem of 
preserving their national, cultural, educational and other rights. The processes 
of globalization and regionalization are the parallel ones. On the one hand, 
we‘re the witnesses of the European Unions‘ enlargement. We see the wish of 
different states and nations to join the larger international union with all its 
pluses and minuses. On the other hand, the processes of regionalization, in 
which national minorities often play the key role are really are really powerful 
(for instance, precedent Kosovo). The understanding of danger of such 
processes of regionalization pushed European leaders to more active work in 
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the sphere of national minorities‘ rights preserving. In 1995 the Framework 
Convention on National Minorities Protection was adopted1. This document 
became one of the most important in regulation national minorities‘ issues. 
One of the most actual problem in this context is interaction of the state 
and its diasporas. Obviously, this interaction is not the same in different cases. 
Ukraine activated its work in that direction after proclaiming its independence. 
The most active collaboration was between Ukraine and the USA and Canada 
Diasporas. They paid big attention to Ukraine and its problems in the first years 
of independence. Nowadays the interaction between Ukraine and its neighboring 
states is developed both by politicians and scientists. 
Ukrainian researchers V. Troschyns‘ky and A. Shevchenko prepared a 
general work on Ukrainian diasporas in the world. They‘ve done the analysis of 
the position of Ukrainians in Romania. (Трощинський, Шевченко, 1999).  
Yuriy Fed‘kovych Chernivtsi National University is really active in this 
question. Its scientists pay a lot of attention to the different aspects of national 
minorities‘ life, both in Ukraine and abroad. 
Position of Ukrainian minority in Romania, its problems and prospects 
are analyzed by historians and political scientist of the Department of History, 
Political Science and International Relations of the University. Professor Y.Makar 
worked a lot on this theme. He published a number of scientific works dedicated 
to the situation with Ukrainian national minority in Romania. In his works the 
author pointed out the necessity of bigger support from Ukrainian state to 
Ukrainian diaspora in neighboring Romania (Макар 2009) V.Makar works on 
Ukrainian national identity issues. Common with V.Motsok and S.Popyk he 
published a research dedicated to this problem (Моцок, Макар, Попик, 2005).  
Several conferences dedicated to the relations in triangle Ukraine-
Romania-Moldova were initiated and held by the Bukovinian Center of Political 
Science (Chief Prof. A.Kruglashov) common with F.Ebert Foundation and 
other state and public institutions. Scientists and researchers have got a 
possibility to discuss different scientific issues during these conferences. The 
most actual issues of Ukrainian-Romanian collaboration in the sphere of 
national minorities‘ rights protection were discussed there. 
Such scholars as L.Aza, S.Popyk, O.Shvachka (Аза, Попик, Швачка, 1999) 
research the problems of the Romanian Ukrainians. They tried to draw the 
perspectives of national and cultural development of Ukrainian minority in Romania. 
So, the problem of Ukrainian minority being in Romania is rather actual 
issue in contemporary Ukrainian science.  
The author used the methods of historical analysis, historical-
chronological method and method of comparative analysis in this article. 
                                                          
1 Рамкова конвенція Ради Європи про захист національних меншин, on May 20, 2011, 
http://www.kngu.org/KongrUkr/Zakon/Zakon.htm 
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Historically ethnic Ukrainians live not only in Ukraine but also abroad, 
particularly on the territory of Romania. Around 20 millions of Ukrainians live 
abroad by different data (Макар, 2006: 7). Several waves of migration were 
during the history.  
Firstly Ukrainians appeared in Romania in the late XIX century, after 
Romania has become a modern independent state. The second wave of 
migration took place between the two world wars (1918-1939). During interwar 
period many people left the residence. They were trying to found themselves in 
foreign countries. Sometimes they emigrated far away from their state. 
Sometimes they immigrated to neighboring country, like Romania. About one 
million Ukrainians, mainly rural population, settled at that time in Romania. 
Nowadays Ukrainian community in Romania continues to be mainly rural, as it 
was in the first part of the XX century. 
For decades, Ukrainians in Romania were virtually left to fend for 
themselves. They hadn‘t any guidance in any sphere of live, i.e. cultural, 
educational, legislative etc. They had not any spiritual or material aid from 
outside, even from Ukraine, unlike other ethnic communities in Romania 
(Germans, Slovaks, Bulgarians and others). The last almost always have both 
financial and political support from their native countries.  
It is well-known that USSR2 kept little interest to the life of their people 
overseas. So, Ukraine, as a part of the Soviet Union, could not provide other 
politics toward its former compatriots. But after proclaiming independence 
Ukraine didn‘t (on our opinion) pay proper attention to the problem of ethnic 
Ukrainians living outside of Ukraine until recently. This lack of support from 
the historic homeland facilitated contacts between different groups of 
Ukrainians of Romania. It allowed the previous Romanian government to 
completely ignore an insecure minority.  
The worst times for the Ukrainian community in Romania were the 
times of Ceausescu. During his rule all minorities were suspected in disloyalty 
and even espionage. The ideal of Ceausescu was to ―dissolve‖ all the people 
regardless to their national identity in ―Romanian boiler‖3. Ukrainian schools 
were closed. That influenced a lot on the level of national identity of 
Ukrainians. According to the official data, a lot of Ukrainians lost their national 
identity and turned in Romanian during those times.  
Nowadays there are many citizens of Ukrainian origin in Romania, who 
call and consider themselves as Romanians. But even in such difficult 
conditions rather huge Ukrainian minority was kept in Romania.  
After 1989 the restoration of the Ukrainian schools or even individual 
items of educational programs have started.  
                                                          
2 USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
3 Гудзик К. Українці в Румунії, on April 12, 2011, http://www.day.kiev.ua/169982/ 
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When we‘re talking about Ukrainians in Romania, it should be noted that 
they can be both autochthons and immigrants. But it‘s rather difficult to talk 
about them as immigrants, because the main part of Ukrainians lives on the 
territory of Romania during centuries.  
Generally Ukrainians in Romania can be divided into three groups: 
1. The autochthons in northern regions of Romania – South Bukovyna and 
partly Botoshan‘ county, Maramorschyna. 
2.  The descendants of Zaporizhzhya cossacks, who after the destroying of 
Zaporizhzhya Sich settled in North Dobrudzha, created Zadunajs‘ka Sich 
which is in contemporary Tul‘cha county. 
3. Population of Eastern Banat, which is in the western part of Romania where 
the first Ukrainians from Zakarpattya appeared in second part of XVII 
century, from Galicia and other Ukrainian lands in the process of labor 
migration at the beginning of XX century (Моцок, Макар, Попик, 2006: 47).  
As far as it was told above, after the First and Second World wars a 
number of Ukrainians came into Romania. That immigration had political 
character. Some of them left in European states, some immigrated to the 
American continent.  
According to the official census of 2002 in Romania lived 61 098 people 
of Ukrainian population (around 4.4 thousand less than in 1992). 56 116 persons 
of these people declared their native language Ukrainian (almost 94% of all 
Ukrainian). However, some Ukrainians recognized their native language 
Romanian - 4540 persons (7.43%), and other languages, including Hungarian, 
German and others. As a separate ethnic minorities, the Romanian statistics 
highlights Rusyns - 257 persons in 2002, Lipovans - 35 791 person and Hutsuls 
(Юрійчук, Нечаєва-Юрійчук, 2010: 18).  
According to the opinion of many respected researchers the Romanian 
official data are not objective. It has some tendencies. The first, to the prejudice 
of members of ethnic minorities, and the second, to the artificial dissipation by 
dividing the big national community into the small sub-ethnic groups (the 
allocation of the total number of Ukrainian and Ruthenians, Hutsuls). This 
contributes to the actual lack of Romania of separate legislation that has to 
restrict state policy in ensuring the rights of persons belonging to national 
minorities. Recently there was the consideration to the Romanian Parliament 
concerning the bill on the status of national minorities. However, by preliminary 
analysis of independent experts, this bill is mainly focused on solving the 
problems of ethnic Hungarians, which have a lot of contradictions with 
Romanian authorities in contemporary political situation. 
There are also alternative non-official calculations. In particular, 
according to the information proposed by Union of Ukrainians of Romania at 
the beginning of the XXI century from 200 to 350 thousand Ukrainians lived in 
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this country. On our opinion, the true figure lies somewhere between the two 
above (official and unofficial data).  
Romania census 2002 showed that the majority of Ukrainian population 
lives in some regions - Maramures, Suceava, Karash-Severin, Tulcea, Satu Mare, 
Arad and Botosani (Аза, Попик, Швачка, 1999: 13). These are the historic 
regions of South Bukovyna: Maramoresh, where Ukrainian population live 
historically, and regions of Eastern- North Banat, Dobrogea, in which Ukrainian 
settlements have appeared in the XVIII – XIX centuries.  
The vast majority of Ukrainians in Romania lives in rural areas. That 
promotes conservation of their native language in this environment. For 
example, in Suceava region 99,8% of Ukrainians speak Ukrainian as native 
language. Similar situation is in Botoshani and Karash-Severin regions 
(respectively 99.22% and 92.51%). However, in other parts of Romania, occupied 
by Ukrainian residents, the situation is not so optimistic. We can see the tendency 
of assimilation of national minorities including Ukrainians. Obviously, the 
opportunities for education in mother tongue for Ukrainians in Romania are 
much smaller than the possibilities of Romanians in Ukraine.  
The census 2002 in Romania showed that among people declared their 
national identity as Ukrainians, the biggest part named Ukrainian as a mother 
tongue. From 61098 Ukrainians 56116 declared Ukrainian as the native language 
(it‘s around 93.96% from all Ukrainians). Romanian is the native language for 
4540 persons (7.43%), Hungarian – 149 persons (0.24%), German – 24 persons 
(0.04%), Russian-Lipovan – 226 persons (0.37%), Serbian – 10 persons (0.02%), 
Turkish – 8 persons (0.01), Tatar – 8 (or 0.01%). These data demonstrates that 
percentage of Ukrainians declared Ukrainian as the native language grew between 
census 1992 and census 2002 (Макар, 2009: 65-66). 
For better understanding the processes in Ukrainian environment it is 
necessary to pay attention to the level of Ukrainian education. According to 
Romanian official information, more than ten years ago, in 1997-1998 academic 
years 443 pupils studied in schools with Ukrainian language of learning. All these 
schools are situated in Maramuresh County. 219 pupils have studied in 1-4 
classes, 84 pupils – in 5-8 classes, and 140 pupils – in 9-12 classes. 234 children 
were in kinder gardens (Макар, 2009: 67).  
At the end of 1990-s Ukrainian language was studied in Taras Shevchenko 
lyceum, 13 schools, 46 departments and 253 classes (Трощинський, Шевченко, 
1999: 195). But in reality just several subjects were studied in Ukrainian language. 
For instance, in Taras Shevchenko lyceum (restored in 1997 in Siget-Marmatsijej) 
only 40% of all disciplines were studied in Ukrainian (Макар, 2009: 68).  
According to official data, in 1997-1998 the Ukrainian language as a 
subject in Romanian schools were studied by only 7708 students. 5429 of these 
students were residents Maramuresh County. In other counties of Romania with 
Ukrainian residents this number is much lower (particularly in the region of 
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Tulcea were Ukrainian language is currently studied by 37 peoples). In the 
Suceava region of Romania (close to the Chernivtsi region of Ukraine), just 38 
schools give their pupils the possibility to learn Ukrainian language. This number 
is twice smaller in all other regions of Romania in common.  
There are several factors which are not favorable for development of 
Ukrainian language education in Romania. Nowadays Romanian authorities are 
trying to fulfill their obligations before the European Union on national minority 
right defense, at least formally. But in reality they are not concerned in restoring 
Ukrainian schools in the districts where Ukrainians live compactly. The system of 
pedagogical personal preparing is not working properly. There are not enough 
textbooks for Ukrainian schools.  
Responsibility on such situation with education in Ukrainian language in 
Romania is laid not only on Romanian authorities, but also on Ukrainian state. 
Ukraine has to support and collaborate widely with its diasporas. But Ukraine is 
not active enough in this direction. Some meetings on high level were provided, 
some protocols were signed. But they can be considered as ―good wills‖, but not 
―active work‖ by the author. 
The serious problems in the situation with preserving rights of ethnic 
Ukrainians in Romania were also reported by international experts. They worked 
during the period from October 31 till November 3, 2006. They checked the 
conditions of Ukrainian minority in Romania, its position and perspectives. 
Monitoring was conducted in five towns (villages) of Suceava and Botoshani 
regions with compact Ukrainian population:  
- Dermeneshty commune with village Meritseya / Marike - total 
population is 1753 people. Ukrainian recorded only 27 people (1,5%). 
Representatives of SUR4 believe that 90% of the population of this village has an 
Ukrainian origin;  
- Commune Arbor (3 villages), with village Klit - total population is 1390 
people, of which 136 people are Ukrainians (10%);  
- Commune Mushenitsa (6 villages), with village Vashkivtsy / Veshkeuts - 
the total population of 669 people, of which 193 - are Ukrainians (29%); 
- Commune Belkeuts (3 villages), with Nehostyna village - the total 
population are 1486 people, with 1095 Ukrainians (73,7%),  in a fact Ukrainians is 
actually about 90% of rural population;  
- Commune Mihaylen (5 villages), with village Rohozheshty / 
Rohozhesht - total population are 719 people, of which 515 persons are 
Ukrainians (72%). In fact there are only 651 persons Ukrainians. 
This situation corresponds to the Ukrainian representation in local 
government: among the 63 advisers (MPs) of the local councils of Ukrainian 
                                                          
4 SUR – Sojuz Ukrajintsiv Rumuniji (The Union of Ukrainians of Romania) 
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villages, Ukrainians are 26 people (41,2%). Primars of these villages are three 
Romanians, one Russian - Lipovan and one Ukrainian. 
According to the results of international monitoring of 2006, financial aid 
from Romanian state and local budgets for the preservation and promotion of 
Ukrainian identity amounted to 167 050 lei. These funds were used for holding 
cultural and sports activities, repair and construction of religious buildings and 
more. However, money for the revival of Ukrainian schools is not provided.  
The analysis of the basis of preliminary results of monitoring of the level 
of religious freedom of the Ukrainian minority in Romania noted that the most 
part of the Ukrainian community today is Orthodox. They expressed the desire 
to worship proceedings both in Ukrainian and Romanian languages. Such 
situation was not always.  
Before 1948 Ukrainians were mostly Greek Catholics. Orthodox Ukrainian 
vicariate in Romanian Orthodox church was created after prohibition of Greek 
Catholic. It was situated in Siget-Marmatijej. In 1952 Orthodox Ukrainian vicariate 
was transformed in Protopopiat under Romanian Orthodox Bishop in Baja Mare. 
In 1990 Orthodox Ukrainian vicariate was restored. Nowadays it‘s under 
jurisdiction of Romanian Orthodox Church and unites around 50 thousand 
believers. Till now Ukrainian language believers have troubles with listening to the 
mess in native language, because Romanian church is not in favor of providing 
service in Ukrainian (Моцок, Макар, Попик, 2005: 54-55).  
In 1996 General Vicariate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with 
the center in Suceava was restored. The Greek-Catholic believers have troubles 
with returning to them churches, taking out from them in 1948 (primarily in 
Maramuresh and Southern Bukovyna).  
The important feature of national minority life is media and publication 
in native language. Ukrainian minority in Romania has some possibilities for 
realizing their constitutional rights in this direction. Access to media is basically 
provided by four periodicals of Union of Ukrainians of Romania: 3 – in 
Ukrainian language and 1 bilingual (Ukrainian-Romanian): ―Free word‖, 
―Ukrainian Herald‖, ―Our Voice‖ and ―Kur'yerul ukrayinyan‖. Circulation - 2-3 
thousand copies per month distributed exclusively through branches of SUR.  
On public TV of Romania (TVRI, TVR2) there are two weekly one-hour 
TV program in Romanian for 18 national minorities. Part of the programs 
provided for the Ukrainian population is bilingual. Special program in Ukrainian 
language is absent. There is a program in the Ukrainian language at Radio Iasi (in 
summer - 30 minutes, in winter period - 20 minutes) per week (Юрійчук, 
Нечаєва-Юрійчук, 2010: 21). 
In local government the Ukrainian language is used only orally. Local 
Councils meeting and the paperwork are exclusively in Romanian language. 
Ukrainian names usually transliterated in the Latin graphics. 
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The schools with Ukrainian language teaching are absent. There are only 
Romanian language schools in all villages with Ukrainian community.  
According to the results of the monitoring the cultural life of the 
Ukrainian national minority in mentioned above five communes we can indicate 
that the minimum amount of literature in Ukrainian (200-600 copies) and artistic 
groups exist in two of them. 
In the context of the analysis results of the first phase of monitoring by 
the substantial comments from representatives of the OSCE significant 
imbalance should be noted in the provision of minority rights in Romania. In 
particular, they clearly pointed out the lack of real opportunities for Ukrainians in 
Romania for education in native language, for preservation and development of 
their ethnic culture at the same legal level as well as the indigenous nation. At the 
same time, experts from the OSCE stated that the Romanian minority, which 
lives compactly in Chernivtsi region through appropriate legal policy of Ukraine, 
has managed to maintain a strong ethno-cultural identity and keep the Romanian 
language as their mother in contrast to Ukrainian minority in Romania.   
Ethnic Romanians in Ukraine have opportunity to study in schools, 
which are taught entirely in Romanian language. According to observations of 
foreign experts, unlike Ukrainians in Romania, they have possibility to provide all 
cultural and religious services in native language. For comparison the situation 
the author can give some statistic information. Ukraine has 77 schools teaching in 
Romanian language (15 397 pupils), 16 of them - mixed in Chernivtsi region, 18 - 
in Odessa (on Moldovan language teaching) and 11 - in Transcarpathia. A 
number of universities, particularly Chernivtsi National University, Uzhgorod 
State University and Izmail Pedagogical Institute prepare teaching staff for 
schools with Romanian language of study.  
Romanian minority has a number of local, regional and national 
magazines and newspapers (Zorile Bukoviney (the newspaper of Chernivtsi 
Regional Council), Concordia (supplement to parliament newspaper ―Voice of 
Ukraine‖), ―Arkashul‖, ―Play Romynesk‖, ―Septentrion literar‖, ―Newspaper of 
Hertza‖. In Chernivtsi Romanian national house "Alexandru cel Bun" is also 
active. Romanian language television broadcast is over 450 hours per year 
(Нечаєва-Юрійчук, Юрійчук, 2011: 90). Romanian language radio broadcast is 
about 356 hours per year. (Program are preparing by Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian 
and Odessa regional broadcasters)  
Romanian language uses in 106 Orthodox parishes and 50 Protestant 
communities. Ethnic Romanians are represented in local governments 
proportionally to their number. During last elections ethnic Romanians make up 
96% Gertza District Council members, over 60% - Glyboka and more than 40% 
- Storozhynetz District Countcils. 
An important factor for proper functioning of any national community is 
the possibility to publish of the literature in their native language. Unlike the 
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Hungarians or Germans, Ukrainians in Romania have not their own publishing 
house. Ability to print in Ukrainian literature provides only state publishing house 
for national minorities ―Kryterion‖ with the Ukrainian section. Council of 
National Minorities in Romania provides the Ukrainian periodical publication 
―Ukrainian Journal‖ (every two weeks) and ―Our Voice‖ (once a month).  
The debate which has lasted for more than a year has not increased 
airtime. It didn‘t improve the quality of Ukrainian language programs on radio 
and television broadcasts.  
An important factor in solving rights of the minority is the activity of 
public organizations. There are some public organizations in Romania which 
represent Ukrainian community. The biggest one is the Ukrainians Union of 
Romania (SUR). It has rather interesting history. The first serious attempt to 
internal self-government was done by the Union of Ukrainians of Romania 
(SUR), formed in 1946. It was organized with the support of much of Ukrainian. 
The main goal of SUR is the protection of the rights of Ukrainians as an ethnic 
minority. This organization is supported by most of those counties in the country 
where there is the highest level of Ukrainian identity, particularly in Suceava.  
Ukrainians in the parliament of Romania have only one seat. SUR has 
representation in the Parliament of Romania (1 place), as well as in the Council of 
National Minorities (advisory body to the Government of Romania).  
In 1996 the split of Union of Ukrainians of Romania took place. There 
was created an alternative organization - Ukrainian Democratic Union of 
Romania (DSUR). This structure has no representation in Parliament and is not 
subsidized by the government. There is also AHN - Association of Hutsul people 
– in Romania.  
Significant split of the Ukrainian community in Romania was fixed during 
the census in 2002. Among Ukrainian organizations there are Hutsuly and 
Ruthenians (Rusins), which are represented by Rusins Cultural Union and the 
General Union of Romanian Ethnic Societies of Hutsuls.  
Another split in Ukrainians Union of Romania took place in 2010. Some 
Ukrainians in Maramures County created the new organization - the Regional 
Centre for Ukrainian Hutsuls of Romania (RCUHR) headed by V.Popovic. The 
leaders of SUR believe that the establishing of this new organization may lead to 
separation from SUR almost 20 thousand ethnic Ukrainian and has an aim to 
divide the Ukrainian community in Romania.  
Since 2009, a new organization - the National Forum of Ukrainians of 
Romania (NFUR) - started its activities in Suceava region. 
A number of Ukrainian-Romanian official agreements signed by the 
presidents of two countries have to improve the situation with the rights of 
Ukrainian minority. We can say that they are not realized yet. A problem of 
material and technical software of a single Ukrainian language institution in 
Romania - Ukrainian Lyceum in Sigetul-Marmatsiey still exist. Romania is not yet 
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realized its promise to open the Faculty of Bucharest, Suceava and Kluzh 
university departments of the Ukrainian language, as well as a number of inter-
ministerial agreements.  
Thus, the situation with Ukrainians in Romania is quite complex and in 
some aspects is not correspond to European standards. It is also quite different 
from the situation with Romanian community in Ukraine. On our opinion, the 
future of ethnic identity of local Ukrainian population is in risk in the 
neighboring Romania. 
In this case, the main goal of current leaders of numerous European 
Ukrainian communities – the opposition to the assimilation processes, is very 
actual issue for Ukrainians in Romania. As Chairman of the European Congress 
of Ukrainians Yaroslava Hartyani pointed, it is the time to explain to the 
European politicians and leaders of Ukrainian communities the difference 
between the processes of ―assimilation‖ and ―integration‖. The problem of the 
fate of Ukrainian Diaspora has a long history, but the activation of the 
processes of European integration encourages some political leaders to the 
substitution of concepts.  
The entering of Romania to the European Union and development of 
Ukrainian-Romanian cooperation in different spheres opens the possibilities for 
realization of European standards for national minorities in Romania. The 
activity of civil society, NGO‘s, local authorities, scientists and experts of both 
countries is very important in this situation. 
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Abstract. The objective of this study is to analyze the discursive identity buildings 
from the perspective of the members of the Hungarian political elite who has to give a reasoned 
endorsement to the people that it stands for, as a way to prove not only a territorial belonging, 
but also the irreconcilable differences of this ethnic group in relationship to the majority 
represented by the Romanians. From this perspective, we analyze the feeling of the national 
affiliation, the claim of the regional autonomy and the setting of the “historical memory” in the 
public sphere, with recurrent use in the rhetoric of the Hungarian political elite, as possible 
elements generating conflict for a minority group whose level of perception of its own difference in 
opposition to the identity of the majority is very high. 
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Introduction 
 
In social sciences, a minority is considered to be a ―self-identified group 
of people‖ (Triandafyllidou, Anagnostou, 2005: 49), culturally, politically, 
ethnically distinct from the dominant group that coexists with, ―who have in 
common a historic language and culture particular to a geographical place, but 
which does not benefit of its own state‖ (Triandafyllidou, Anagnostou, 2005: 
49). Accordingly, the subordinancy is the main defining characteristic of a 
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minority group. For this reason, sociologists may use the expressions of 
―subordinate group‖ and ―dominant group‖ in parallel with ―minority‖ and 
―majority‖. Nevertheless, using these concepts does not involve for us having 
made a classification according to the criterion of superiority or inferiority of a 
group against another one, but this classification may only underline a 
domination of a group over another one. Otherwise, the finding of cultural 
diversity led anthropologists to show that ―there is neither superiority in 
culture, but only a relative diversity, nor classification criteria that can order the 
different cultures hierarchically‖(Alain Beitone, 2000: 200). From this point of 
view, we talk about ―cultural relativism‖. The concept of cultural superiority is 
the result of a fundamental bias that is the ―ethnocentrism‖. This term was 
invented by William Graham Sumner in his book Folkways (1907) to ―describe 
and criticize U.S. imperialism‖. The ethnocentrism, ―collective attitude that 
consists in evaluating others in terms of their own culture‖ (Bădescu, Cucu-
Oancea, 2005: 169), is viewing one‘s own culture as superior1 to all other 
cultures. The most eloquent example of this theory that develops the model of 
the human being within his own culture is represented by the Nazi doctrine 
which claims the idea of the superiority of the Aryan race over another one, in 
this case the Jews or the Gypsies, considered by Hitler ―racially inferiors‖. The 
Nazi politics is one of many examples of racism led to an extreme point. Yet, 
the process of recognition2 of cultural diversity does not share the humanity in 
races, superior and inferior, as racism which, while denying the acceptance of 
cultures, rejects the different others out of civilization, in nature, considering 
them ―barbarians‖, ―wild‖, ―underdeveloped‖ or ―uncivilized‖. However, some 
discrimination attitudes, prejudices, stereotypes and stigmatizing the different 
other can define the multicultural societies. Moreover, we consider that an 
ethnic group or a group with a particular identity at the national level, called 
                                                          
1 According to William Graham Sumner‘s definition (1959 [1907]: 13), ―the 
ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one‘s own group 
is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it‖.‎ 
2 It seems that the ―notion of humanity, which includes, without distinction of race or 
civilization, all forms of the human species, was developed very late and had a 
limited expansion; but for large fractions of human history and within tens of 
thousands of years this notion seems to be totally absent‖ (Bădescu, Cucu-Oancea, 
2005: 169). Indeed, the recognition of cultural diversity does not date for a long 
time. It is the twentieth century that recognizes the differences and cultural 
diversity. The cultural cohabitation has become one of the most important stakes 
for the XXI century, since humankind has entered the era of multicultural 
civilization. One of the most important objectives of our century is to create a 
bridge between the different cultures. 
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―national minorities‖3, is perceived towards the members of another group, a 
dominant one, and for this reason that can give rise to such attitudes. This 
exists in ―processes of categorizing social groups and acts as rational knowledge 
in order to separate and reject specific social groups‖ (Govaris, Kaldi, 2010).  
In this context, the explanation of an ethnic identity as a production 
process of different items showing the difference comparing with the majority 
does not ignore the difficulty of the concept of identity itself inherently 
problematic: covering a rich signification, mostly ambiguous and contradictory, 
which balance between continuity and rupture, stability and change, differences 
and similarities, perceptible and indiscernible, objectivity and subjectivity, etc.. 
According to Mucchielli (1986), the feeling of having his ―own culture‖ refers to 
a conception of identity designed in an interactive network of influences, 
confrontation, conflict, tension, positioning, therefore in a constant 
development since the identity is not given once for all; contrarily, it is rather a 
dynamic reality, in permanent construction and transformation. The identity 
―refers in the same time to what remains, what distinguishes and what brings 
together. It concerns individuals, as groups. It is conceivable only as 
combination of heterogeneous elements. It is experienced and manifested in 
the selected figures depending on the context. It changes in response to 
changing social relations and affiliations‖ (Chevallier, Morel, 1985: 3).  
Moreover, the identity is built in relation with the Other, because 
the group, as individuals, need to confront the Other. It is a contesting 
perspective, because the identity involves the confrontation with the Other, 
tending to exclude the difference. The multiplicity of the different 
participations and the variability of the references lead to permanent changes. 
For this reason, the identity is not considered a static concept. Contrarily, it is 
rather a dynamic, fluid and adaptive product, constructed, deconstructed, 
reconstructed to each interaction or contact. Referring to the idea expressed 
previously, January Stets and Peter Burke (2000: 234) suggest that it is a 
―dynamic process that changes during the whole life, being marked by 
ruptures and crises‖.  
Starting from these theoretical elements and by reference to the 
Romania‘s territory, a multicultural country4 if we consider the ―18 minority 
groups represented in Parliament, and 23 categories of identity recorded by the 
census, thus occupying the third place among countries with a significant 
                                                          
3 According to Irina Culic (2005: 14) that are ―minorities for which there exist national 
states rooted on the ethnic groups of which they are part of‖. 
4 In the Romania‘s Constitution it is stipulated that ―Romania is the common and 
indivisible country of all its citizens irrespective of race, nationality, ethnic origin, 
language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social status‖ (Article 
4, paragraph 2). http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_1&par1=1 
accessed in 2011, on June the 27th.  
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number of minority, after the Russian Federation with 45 national minorities 
and Ukraine with 23‖ (Salat, 2008: 9), we focus on the Hungarian minority, the 
most important ethnic community5 in Romania, territorially concentrated in 
Harghita, Covasna and Mureş (HCM). 
According to the common sense, the minorities are generally 
considered discriminated within the nation-state and the recognition of the 
multiculturalism is a very long process requiring primarily a series of policies in 
favour of this subordinate group, to go along the changing mentalities in a 
multicultural state. However, in Romania, whether some specialists recognize 
that recently ―several processes were realized in the benefit of the minorities, 
especially the Hungarian one‖ (Horvath, 2005: 3), they remain reluctant to 
pronounce themselves on the multiculturalism in the host country because ―the 
multiculturalism, as it is understood in Romania, becomes a politics of 
limitation of the minority nationalism‖ (Horvath, 2005: 9); some others 
consider that ―in Romania, the Hungarian community, like other national 
minorities (…), benefits from the most favourable legislation across the Europe 
(only Croatia equals our country) with guaranteed representation in Parliament. 
There is a large number of rights that guarantees a real cultural autonomy for 
the Hungarian community: bilingual inscriptions, bilingual official documents, 
education in Hungarian at all levels, full autonomy of the Hungarian religious 
and absolutely no fencing to assert their own identities‖ (Duca, 2011). Actually, 
in Romania, after more than twenty years of the collapse of the communist 
government, the status of national minorities has not been yet adopted. 
Currently, the Commission of Human Rights of the Deputies‘ Chamber is 
working on. On the other hand, it is true that the few rights the national 
minorities received, especially after 1996, compared with the period before, do 
not affect its identity; on the contrary, they strengthen it. However, we need to 
accept that there still remain many things to improve on the national minorities‘ 
status. On the other hand, as a multicultural country, which recognizes and 
works to maintain differences, Romania cannot escape from conflicts, as the 
―Hungarian revisionist discourse, the claiming of territorial autonomy on ethnic 
criteria, intended to obtain the region inhabited by the Szeklers, the memory of 
the Great Hungary‖ (Duca, 2011). 
In this context, the purpose of our analysis is to radiography the 
references of the Hungarian minority identity with regard to the Romanian 
                                                          
5 According to the given data from the National Institute of Statistics on the 2002 census 
(http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol4/cuvvol4.pdf, accessed in 2011, 
on June the 13th), the main ethnic group in Romania is the Romanians‘, as Romanian 
language speakers. They represent 89.5% of the population. An important ethnic 
community (6.6% of the population) is that of the Hungarians, with more than 1.4 
million and the Gypsies (2% of the population), the Germans (0.3%) and the 
Ukrainians (0.3%). The other ethnicities are underrepresented (0.2%).  
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national identity passing by the rhetoric of the elite of this minority group. As 
the identity involves being conscious of its specificity and refers to the 
difference, considering the identity strategies of the Hungarians entails to 
analyze how the ethnic group in question defines itself in relation to the 
Romanians, as majority group, within the Romanian nation-state, by a complex 
game of identification and differentiation. To achieve this objective, we intend 
to identify the discursive buildings of this ethnic identity belonging to the 
Romanian territory, and make out the different items of identification between 
a minor and major national group. Taking into account the cultural dimension 
of the representations that are emerging in the national context implies the 
inclusion in our study of certain indicators6 such as the feeling of national 
affiliation, the claim of regional autonomy and the setting of ―historical 
memory‖7, as possible elements generating conflict, if used in public sphere, for 
a minority group whose level of perception of his own difference in opposition 
to the identity of the majority is very high.  
The description of the strategies put into action by the Hungarian 
political elite in order to provide an identity (re)definition of the ethnic group that 
it represents makes possible to address its stakes, especially since this elite is 
currently well represented in the Parliament, taking active part in it8. We are 
committed therefore to determine the role of this elite producing the identity 
discourses seeking to impose its own definition of the values attached to a 
representative ethnic identity in relation to a supra-ethnic identity, a national one. 
What discursive modalities use the Hungarian political elite to build the 
identity of the ethnic group that it is representing, positioning itself against the 
dominant group and at the same time within this majority group? What does 
oppose Hungarians to the Romanians, the ―Others‖, seen as difference? - 
These are the main questions of our study! 
Our underlying assumption is that the discursive identity buildings of the 
Hungarian political elite take shape based on historically and socially constituted 
                                                          
6 Saying this, we don‘t claim that our analysis is exhaustive or singular within the 
research regarding the Hungarian minority – on the contrary the literature on this 
minority group is very rich. 
7 In his work on the ―collective memory‖, the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs 
(1877-1945) addressed during the 1920s the question of the use of our mental images 
of the present to reconstruct our past. Following his thoughts, we oppose the 
―historical memory‖ (the so-called objective history) to the ―social memory‖ (taking 
into account the personal views in the choice of the memorial items).  
8 From 1996 onwards the Hungarian minority party, UDMR (Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania), take part in the coalition. Since than, ―the coalition that 
came to power in 1996 (…) advanced a program clearly directed towards the 
redefinition of both the minorities‘ status and their way of integration within the 
Romanian state‖ (Horvath, 2005: 2).  
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habitus, and that it leads to a conflicting relationship among actors that represent the 
minority in opposition to the majority within the Romanian nation-state. 
Using the concept of ―habitus‖, our issue has the roots in the 
Bourdieu‘s theory (1980: 87, 88).  Sociologist Bourdieu that forges the concept 
of ―habitus‖ refers to a set of dispositions which generate individual or 
collective practices and perceptions, whose limits are set by the historically and 
socially situated conditions of its production, ―the complex process by which 
we are both acting and taking action‖9. These dispositions only exist in, through 
and because of the actors‘ practices and their interaction with each other and 
their environment. From this point of view, the representations of Self are pre-
disposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to ―fulfil a social function of 
legitimating social differences‖, and thus contribute to the process of social 
reproduction. Taking into account this theory, our endeavour is to identify how 
the practices and perceptions are related to the historical and social conditions 
in which the ―habitus‖ that generated them was constituted. We try to 
understand if this ―habitus‖ is responsible for the identity buildings of the 
Hungarian political elite who is charged to denote the items of identification for 
the ethnic group that she leads.   
Our study is organized into three sections according to the three 
indicators we choose to question: the first chapter deals with the feeling of the 
national affiliation for the Hungarians living in Romania who are facing with 
the dilemma of their status: citizen of a state and, in the same time, members of 
their ethnic group. The second one addresses the issue of regional autonomy as 
recognition of the cultural differences between the majority and the minority. 
The third one cross-examines the setting of ―historical memory‖ in the public 
sphere and its stakes. 
 
1. The feeling of the national affiliation  
 
This chapter deals with the analysis of the collective identities‘ 
multiplicity, as the case of an ethnic identity. It addresses the issue of the 
nationalism and the relationship to the feeling of the national identity in the 
public discourse. An important element of the analysis is the triptych: the ethnic 
rhetoric identity perceptions and buildings in relationship to the national 
identity and other identities than the identity circumscribed to the national 
geographic area respectively. Are there conflicts or on the contrary 
complementarities among these identities? What is the most frequent 
identification item for an ethnic group within a multicultural state? Could the 
Hungarians living in Romania identify themselves in the first place with another 
                                                          
9 Interview with Pierre Bourdieu, http://www.dialogus2.org/BOU/habitus.html, 
accessed in 2011, on June the 17th. 
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identity then an ethnic one? How could we explain the identification with a 
Hungarian identity in public rhetoric in opposition to the other identities, 
especially a Romanian national identity? Could the Romanian identity go 
beyond the ethnic identity?  
Referring to a group identity, it is generally considered that its members 
―are identifying themselves with a similar set of values, norms, rules and this 
identity of the members among them makes up the unity of the group‖10. The 
personal recognition of these items makes a person identify himself or herself 
with a particular group. Historian Robert Frank (1994: 133-134) declares that: 
―The cultural group identity is made of common characteristics that make its 
members to feel themselves ―alike‖. [...] Although distinct, they feel identical 
because they oppose to ―others‖‖. For instance, it is recognized that the 
national identity is in the first place the awareness of belonging to the national 
space, in opposition to those that do not belong to it, the consciousness of 
similarity and the recognition of the resemblance of the members, the feeling of 
belonging to a culture, translated into a set of common elements acquired by 
each individual. In addition to this, the national identity is the ―legal link 
common to all citizens‖. The belonging to the same political community, the 
Nation, is due to the citizenship. According to Dominique Schnapper (1994: 
44), ―which is a necessary condition for the existence of a nation is that its 
citizens share the idea that there is a political domain independently constituted 
from its own interests, and they must respect the rules of its function‖. 
Moreover, ―the process of national consciousness, [is] based on (...) the feeling 
of a common destiny and ―places of memory‖ [« lieux de mémoire »], of a 
common language and culture‖ (Geremek, 2010: 140). The ―national 
consciousness‖ therefore refers to a common memory, a territorial, linguistic or 
religious unity. 
In Romania, sharing a common past find the foundations in the 
ethnogenesis as a result of the fusion of the Daces and the Romans, and the 
assimilation of the different migration substrates, that the archaeological, 
ethnographic and anthropological evidence, as well as the documentary 
mentions, support the authenticity. The indigenous component represented by 
des Thraces et des Daces (as fundamental substrate of the ethnogenesis) 
conquered by the Romans reconstructs the origins of the Romanian identity by 
the references to both the native and ―the founder ancestor‖, a hero come from 
another world who delivers goods and cultural values that make him ―hero that 
share culture‖‖ (Mesnil, 2007: 31). The founder myth of the ―Great Ancestors‖ 
(the example of Trajan, the Roman emperor who civilized the Daces) justifies a 
Romanian identity which renewed its genesis in the past. Yet, our historical 
                                                          
10 http://www.communautarisme.net/capve/Identite-culturelle-article-paru-dans-le-
bulletin-CAPVE-n-14_a120.html 
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memory in relation to the Hungarians is fed only to divisions and animosities 
because of the submission to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This legacy that 
emerges from the past does not link the Romanians and the Hungarians, but 
oppose them.  
Another element of national unity is, apart from history, the unity of the 
language or religion, ―key factors around which is built the identity feeling‖ 
(Mesnil, 2007: 26). Indeed, the ―identity construction‖ pass through the 
Romanian linguistic unification: the introduction of the Latin in the seventeenth 
century instead of the Slavonic language11 (in fact, having had a considerable 
influence in the Orthodox religion for the peoples of Indo-European languages 
like the Romanian principalities, Moldavia and Walachia, until the late fifteenth 
century when the Greek Church of Constantinople take its relay), but finally 
adopted in the nineteenth century, ―following the movements of awareness of 
the Romanian people‘s cultural and political identity (determination to be linked 
to the Roman Latinity)‖ (Piru, 1962: 29) is the guarantee of an assumed national 
unity. However, the appropriation of the Hungarian language used in the region 
HGM which goes sometimes to a rejection of the Romanian language, mostly 
in private sphere, is an important reference for the ethnic identity, which serves 
at the same time to define the difference. For instance, Tanczos Barna, 
executive vice-president of UDMR, said that the use of the native language „is 
not a favour, a positive discrimination, (...) but every citizen‘s right‖ and its no-
use could lead to „the assimilation and the disappearance of the community‖12. 
The command of the Hungarian language becomes an important stake for the 
ethnic group in question, whose representative members, involved in the 
production of the identity representations, are entitled to support its use in the 
public space. Consequently, the language became an important item of 
identification of this group. Similarly for the confession, where the differences 
in opposition to the dominant group are irreconcilables. All the items analyzed 
previously, the historical roots, the language or confession, are source of 
disparity among the ethnic communities and a national group. 
                                                          
11 According to Al. Piru (1962, p. 6), Slavonic was the official language even in the 
early Feudal period ―that runs from the tenth century, when we have the first 
attestations of feudal masters on the Romanian territory, until the fourteenth 
century, when the feudal states of Walachia and Moldova were formed.‖ In the late 
fourteenth century, the Slavonic language ―is not only the language of the Church, 
but also of the Voievods‘ Chancery and the boyars domain‖ (Al Piru, 1962, p.7). 
The Slavonic, used as language of religious literature in the fifteenth century 
(Filotei, Nicodim, Grigore Ţamblac) will be abandoned in the late sixteenth century 
in the favour of the use of the Romanian language having a Latin origin (the Coresi 
prints are the first attestations of the use of this language). 
12http://www.ziare.com/udmr/stiri-udmr/tanczos-barna-la-tv-ziare-com-folosirea-
limbii-materne-un-drept-al-minoritatilor-981661, in 2011, on June the 28th. 
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Thus, the recognition of a national identity at the expense of an ethnic 
identity within a multicultural nation-state as Romania opens up some 
problems, especially if the assimilation of the ethnic minorities into the 
dominant culture is impossible because of the very high perception of its own 
difference. Irina Culic (2005: 13) talks about a ―dilemma that a national 
minority person confronts [being] the result of a double and complex 
belonging. One is a formal, legal belonging to the state whose citizen this 
person is, and the other a cultural, emotional belonging to the nation he/she 
comes from, and which is constituted itself into another state‖. Whereas a 
country can impose to its citizens some obligations due to the legal belonging 
to the state (as political entity defined in national term) which provides rights 
and facilities to all the people living here, it cannot oblige to feel something for 
it. Moreover, the prevailing cultural background, native or acquired during the 
socialisation, gives to the members of a minority group the possibility to feel 
and express the national appertaining or the ethnic feeling. From this point of 
view, the Hungarian minority, although within the Romanian state, seems to be 
more attached to the Hungarian nation than to the Romanian one, since 
recently some members13 of its political elite have applied for obtaining the 
Hungarian citizenship. Subsequently, we could say that the Romanian national 
feeling is not only less important than the feeling resulting from the emotional 
belonging, but also rejected. Our assertion is strengthened by some Hungarian 
political elite statements, as Tamas Sandor‘s for whom the ―Hungarian 
citizenship solved (…) only the ―formalities‖ because the Szeklers were and are 
part of the Hungarian nation‖14. The patriotic sentiment attached to the 
emotional belonging is then stronger than the national feeling imposed by a 
birth certificate. The sense of the Romanian national belonging is erased before 
the Hungarian ethnic belonging. The references of this ethnic minority, formed 
in-group, remain within its own group, as holder of identity. As a result, the 
Romanian identifications cannot go beyond the Hungarian ethnic identity 
which is more powerful than any other reference.   
                                                          
13 According to the journal ―Curentul‖, on the celebration of the Day of the 
Hungarians from Everywhere, (…) the Presidents of the departmental councils of 
Harghita [Borboly Csaba], Covasna [Tamas Sandor] and Mureş [Lokodi Edita 
Emoke] received the Hungarian citizenship, after the allegiance to the Republic of 
Hungary‖, 
http://www.curentul.ro/2011/index.php/2011031655954/Actualitate/Avram-
Iancu-spanzurat-de-extremistii-unguri-de-Ziua-Maghiarilor-de-Pretutindeni.html, 
accessed in 2011, on June the 27th.  
14 Ibidem 13. 
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2. The regional autonomy - political project of the Hungarian 
minority overruling the nation-state territorial principle  
 
This section interrogates the cultural perspective which gives birth to 
debates on the autonomy of the Szekler Land [Ţinutul Secuiesc], a 
geographically delimitated territory in the heart of Romania which is mostly 
occupied by the Hungarian ethnic group. The representation of this 
delimitation creates the image of a micro-state within the Romanian political 
nation which the borders are delimitated for almost a century. The idea of the 
territorial autonomy, which is claimed by the minority in question, raises the 
problem of the relationship between geography and culture. Could the Szekler 
Land be separated from Romania as a consequence of a cultural delimitation 
criterion? Could the cultural borders impose a geographical delimitation within 
a ―national, sovereign and independent, unitary and indivisible state‖15?  
Having formulated this topic, we point out the fact that our analysis 
imposes a characterization of the national identity as a spatial notion which 
includes multicultural differences. From this perspective, the borders are 
considered as an important instrument in the construction of the identity, 
―continuing to influence and assist in people‘s construction of the self‖ 
(Triandafyllidou, Anagnostou, 2005: 48). They are the appearance of an identity 
expressed in terms of territorial delimitation. Moreover, the borders are an 
imposer not only of an identity, but a support of difference too. This can be 
used as a manner of identification with the others sharing the same cultural 
references, and as means to differentiation against the different other. 
Accordingly, the borders can be used by the similar people to their own 
advantage, in order to acquire a more visible functionality in defining 
themselves and establishing their identity in front of the Other.  
With this idea as basis of their reflection around their specificity, the 
Hungarian members of the political elite consider the cultural borders 
represented by the region Harghita-Covasna-Mureş, although drawn within the 
borders of a nation-state, inclusive for the Hungarian minority and exclusive for 
other identities. Moreover, this incites them to demand the territorial autonomy 
of the Szekler Land as a space imposing external borders clearly settled from a 
territorial point of view.  
Apparently, the ―rejection of the Trianon Treaty, deeply embedded in 
the consciousness of the Hungarian nation that has produced a veritable 
                                                          
15 Romania‘s Constitution, Article 1, http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den= 
act2_1&par1=1 accessed in 2011 on June the 27th. 
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trauma‖,16 calls for a territorial reorganization based on cultural similarities. In 
addition to this, although in the Romanian state, the Hungarian political elite 
does not consider natural the idea of nation. Being against this political project, 
they ask for a territorial autonomy. The most important reason of this request is 
the displaying of an ethnic identity which dominates a territory delimitated by 
cultural borders. The most important support of this geographical delimitation 
is the attachment to the Hungarian language, intensively used in the domestic 
household and public sphere17.  
The physical structures of the territory the Hungarians‘ ethnic minority 
occupies in Romania build a model of a territorial identity based on 
instrumental manipulation of a language for its own interest and at the expense 
of the national identity which language use has a secondary place. The role of 
the state that is supposed to build a national identity developed through the 
nationalism process seams to be obliterated in the favour of a territory that 
imposes its rules in order to preserve his cultural identity. From the beginning, 
Kelemen Hunor, the President of the Union approved the need to ―rewrite‖ 
the current development regions, ―because the current structure [of the 
territory] is useless for a coherent development of the communities‖18. 
Additionally, in order to support the ―principles and interests of the [Hungarian 
ethnic] local communities‖,19 the President of the UDMR, does not approve the 
new proposal for a reorganization20 of the country in territories that could 
separate Harghita, Mures and Covasna or the Partium Region (departments of 
Bihor and Satu Mare). ―We don‘t make a puzzle play. We are talking about 
principles and interests of local communities‖21, he said. For this reason, the 
majority proposal of the territorial reorganisation was interpreted as an anti-
Hungarian manifestation. Moreover, according to Kelemen Hunor, the reform 
concerning the national minorities needs to consider the ―institutional frame 
for the cultural autonomy‖22, because the current territorial division made in the 
                                                          
16http://www.ziaristionline.ro/2011/03/15/autonomia-%E2%80%9Etinutului-
secuiesc%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%93-radiografia-unei-intoxicari-o-analiza-de-
dorin-suciu-pentru-ziaristi-online/ accessed in 2011 on June the 24th. 
17 Since 2010 it can be used in the public administration too. 
18 http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/kelemen-udmr-nu-poate-accepta-varianta-8-2-
chiar-daca-parea-interesanta-ar-scinda-comunitatea-maghiarilor-8386948 accessed 
in 2011 on June the 28th. 
19 http://www.e-politic.ro/Scena-politica/UDMR-curtata-in-continuare-de-PDL-si-
USL_119452_4.html accessed in 2011, on June the 22nd. 
20 which was proposed this year during the month of June.  
21 Ibidem 19. 
22http://www.ziare.com/kelemen-hunor/presedinte-udmr/kelemen-nu-vom-accepta-
incorporarea-tinutului-secuiesc-in-schimbul-legii-minoritatilor-1102417 accessed in 
2011, on June the 23rd. 
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late ‗90s, was ―based on statistical, artificial criteria‖, which ―did not take into 
account certain historical characteristics‖23. In this context, the historical 
characteristics refer to the cultural identity of the minority group living here. In 
the opinion of the Hungarian political elite, this is the most important factor 
that could influence a territorial delimitation overruling the nation-state 
territorial principle. 
 
3. The setting of the “historical memory” in the Romanian public 
sphere 
 
This chapter points out the relevance of the setting of the history in the 
space of the ―memory‖ for the Hungarian minority which historical references 
do not correspond to the historical memory of the majority group. Which are 
the events accepted / rejected in the process of identity buildings? How does 
the historical memory work in relationship with the social memory? Is the 
meaning of history demystified in order to respond to the identity 
appropriations of a group? 
According to Bogumil Jewsiewicki, ―the memory makes present what is 
absent because it happened in another time, in the past. If we want to analyze 
the past in its own time, we rather use the history. While the history works as a 
kind of affirmation, the memory works quite in hollow. The memory is more a 
comparison with the past of a particular genre, because the memory is made of 
comings and goings between different times (mostly when it is a testimony), it 
values the view of actors‖ (Bogumil Jewsiewicki, 2004). If we agree with 
Bogumil Jewsiewicki, we can assert that taking into account the actors‘ memory, 
the history can get other dimensions, being used as an identity positioning in 
front of the Other.  
The idea expressed previously obliged us to choose through some major 
historical events being sources of fixation of the historical memory in the public 
sphere, and analyze them from the point of view of the social memory. In 
consequence, we proceed to an analysis of the celebration of the Romanians‘ 
National Day on December the 1st, the commemoration of the Treaty of 
Trianon. In relationship to these items, we need to study the meaning of some 
acts of the minority group radical members towards the Romanian historical 
personalities around which a national identity was created. What is the 
significance of these historical events for the minority and majority group that 
structure the Romanian public space when building identity discourse? Can be 
the preservation of a particular type of memory for the minority group an 
essential element generating conflict in relationship to the setting of the 
historical memory by the majority group? 
                                                          
23 Ibidem 18. 
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The creation of the modern Romanian state (basically made in two steps 
if we don‘t count the matter with Bucovina) date of the twentieth century, 
when Walachia and Moldavia, ancient medieval principalities, were been joined 
together in 1859; then, in 1918, Transylvania was attached to them. However, 
the recognition of the Union of Transylvania with Romania is done passing 
only by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, on June the 4th, signed between the 
Allied Powers, having won in the World War I, and Hungary as a defeated state. 
This is the national event recorded by the history, and celebrated in Romania 
on December the 1st. Yet, in Romanian public space some extremist actors of 
the Hungarian minority group are trying to change this historical memory, with 
a social one. Various protests against the identity of the majority, such as those 
organized by ―the Hungarian extremists, with Csibi Barna, at Miercurea Ciuc, 
when celebrating the 91st anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon‖ 24, begun 
subversive elements of division, separating the minority group of the majority. 
In addition to this, the extremists have held a ―moment of silence to 
commemorate the great ―injustice‖ that was committed in the history of this 
country, the division of the Great Hungary‖ 25. According to the Romanian 
mass-media, this action was supported by Csaba Sogor, member of the 
European Parliament elected on the UDMR lists, who has posted on his 
Facebook page a message where he said he didn‘t like the Treaty of Trianon. 
Moreover, Csaba Sogor has urged his friends to put their picture next to the 
Hungarian flag on social networking site‖26. We are thus inside an ideological 
training meant to rewrite the Romanian history. 
The Hungarian extremists‘ behaviour and Csaba Sogor‘s is not a single 
attempt to deny the Romanian historical memory. Nostalgia for the glorious 
past of the Austro-Hungarian Empire determines the Hungarian Presidency, 
currently at the head of the European Union, ―to make its promotion in 
Brussels by displaying some symbols of its past glory, on a carpet in the centre 
of which it was drawn a map from 1848 of the Habsburg Empire‖27. The 
Hungarian authorities‘ explanation regarding the two maps, the first one drawn 
in the bottom right representing the ―Hungary and its neighbours in the Middle 
Ages, and the second one, larger and placed in the centre of the picture of the 
Habsburg Empire, containing the date ―1848‖ in the middle‖, was that ―it only 
represents a map of the Habsburg Empire and, more generally, a map of the 
Central and Eastern Europe‖28. According to Ziare.com, in response to the 
                                                          
24 http://www.ziare.com/articole/tratat+trianon+ungaria accessed in 2011, on June the 23rd. 
25 Ibidem 24. 
26 Ibidem 24. 
27http://www.ziare.com/europa/ungaria/ungaria-isi-promoveaza-presedintia-ue-cu-o-
harta-a-imperiului-habsburgic-1068347 accessed in 2011, on June the 19th. 
28 Ibidem 27. 
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promotion of Hungary in Brussels, Bogdan Diaconu, Vice-President of the 
Conservator Party said that ―the map of the Empire displayed by the Hungary 
country on the EU Council building is an insult to the nations that have 
regained the rights and freedom by the Treaty of Trianon, and a violation of the 
fundamental principles of the Union‖29. 
On the other hand, in the winter of 2010, when the Romanian 
authorities have rented the main hall of the National Theatre of Hungary in 
order to celebrate Romania‘s National Day on December the 1st, the Hungarian 
authorities have reacted accordingly, refusing any Romanian cultural 
manifestation. Furthermore, Robert Alfold, the director of the theatre, was 
accused of having ―working with the anti-Hungarian forces‖ through his 
consent to the request of the Romania‘s Embassy.30 Thus, this was interpreted 
as ―treason‖ towards the Hungarian state. 
If the Romanian minority group living in the Hungary does not have the 
right to celebrate the Romanian National Day in their host country, in Romania the 
situation is different: the National Day of the Hungarians on Mars the 15th became 
a ―local National Day‖. The Hungarian minority grant it a great significance, being 
a ―source of remembrance of the meaning of the Revolution of 1848, and a source 
of celebration of the liberties obtained by the Hungarian community from 
Romania after 1989‖. Referring to this Day, Kelemen Hunor, the President of the 
Union has announced that: ―March the 15th has been freely commemorated in 
Romania for 20 years. For us, it was normal to display the flag of the Hungarian 
nation, and the Romanian community got used to commemorating the Revolution 
of 1848 and to use unreservedly the national symbols. The Day of March the 15th is 
very important to us because it reminds us not only the Forty-eighters Revolution, 
but also our freedom acquired since 1989. The Hungarians living anywhere in 
Romania can walk with their head up in order to commemorate the 15th of March. 
It is something natural!‖31. Furthermore, this Day became a solid foundation of the 
Hungarians from anywhere‘s unity. This could be also an occasion to reaffirm the 
basis of the Hungarian minority identity which draws on historical and cultural 
roots: ―Our love of freedom, the Hungarians‘, cannot be destroyed by anyone, 
neither then, in 1848, nor today. Our hope and freedom has always united the 
Hungarians. The Hungarians can count only on themselves; our fight cannot be 
taken by others, but only by us. As a young person of 1848, we must look forward 
for the national identity, to have clear goals, and we need all Hungarians in this 
work, we need to keep our historical and cultural traditions, because without them 
                                                          
29 Ibidem 27. 
30 http://www.ziare.com/europa/ungaria/ziarele-din-ungaria-despre-ziua-nationala-a-romaniei 
-zi-de-doliu-serbati-furtul-ardealului-1056522 accessed in 2011, on June the 19th. 
31http://www.mediafax.ro/social/kelemen-oriunde-traiesc-maghiari-in-romania-pot-pasi-
cu-capul-sus-pentru-a-comemora-15-martie-8057127 accessed in 2011 on June the 18th. 
Identity Perceptions and Buildings of the Hungarian Minority in Relationship ...  
 
97 
we have no future. We need young people and children to ensure the Hungarian 
future in Transylvania‖32, said Kelemen Hunor. Analyzing this statement, we 
understand that this minority group defines itself by the references to a Hungarian 
identity, no way to a Romanian‘s. Having found its roots in the collective memory 
of the Hungarians, this minority is placing itself outside the Romanians‘ history, 
particularly in this memory that structures the life of the nation and 
gives its political contours. The social imperatives of the collective memory of the 
Hungarian minority ask for other references, even if invented, that could respond 
to their present needs of identification. 
 Sometimes, affirming and setting the identity signifies also rejecting the 
different Other and its identifications. Accordingly, the celebration of this Day 
at a local level could give birth to anti-Romanian actions. This kind of acts 
could be the demystifying of the Romanian national symbols. Hence, to 
perform historical elements about the 1848 year in the shape of a theatre play, 
Csibi Barna, a Hungarian extremist working in the public administration in 
Miercurea Ciuc, used this so-called ―cultural action‖ to organize an anti-
Romanian event33 directed against Avram Iancu, one of the Romanian people‘s 
personalities around which it was constituted ―the ―patriotic‖ historiographical 
discourse‖ (Cioroianu, 2001: 20), a prominent personality of the ―Transylvanian 
Romanian intellectuals who was fighting for social and national emancipation‖34 
and the Romanian national fight in the Revolution of 1848. 
The theatre play staged by Barna, a person calling himself as leader of 
―Culture and Tradition Association of the Szekler Guard [Asociaţia de Cultură 
şi Tradiţii Garda Secuiască]‖35, the day before the 15th of March – the Day of 
the Hungarians from Everywhere [Ziua Maghiarilor de Pretutindeni] - was a 
―public trial in the course of which Avram Iancu, a symbol of Romanism, was 
sentenced to death by hanging. The show (...) culminated with a hanging of a 
doll in straw, dressed in traditional Romanian port36. Analysing his 
performance, the Romanian mass-media characterized Csibi Barna as 
――universal soldier‖ inspiring the Magyars Nazi‖. Accordingly, his performing 
act was sanctioned by the representative voices of the majority as extremist. 
Apparently, for the Hungarian extremist this is a way of expressing his 
disagreement with the unification of the Transylvania with the Romanian 
people. Moreover, it seems that Csibi Barna wanted through his actions to 
bring to the public attention the ―crimes of the local people led by Avram 
Iancu, Petru Dobra, Axente Sever and others‖, committed against the 
                                                          
32 Ibidem 31. 
33Ibidem 14. 
34 Ibidem 14. 
35 Ibidem 14. 
36 Ibidem 14. 
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Hungarians with an ―animal cruelty‖ 37. Currently, it is accepted by historians 
that atrocities were committed in both directions. 
In relation to this kind of events concerning the Romanian personality, 
mystified in order to create a national identity, the official Hungarian political 
elite‘s reaction is shown as being against this kind of ―values‖ promoted in-
group, ―likened to the Arab countries‘ style‖. The member of the European 
Parliament Laszlo Tokes said that ―this action has nothing in common with the 
celebration of Hungarian traditions; our holidays are not directed against 
anyone‖38. Under this statement, we can read once again the attachment to the 
Hungarian people. Csibi Barna‘s provocative actions on the14th of March were 
disavowed by Laszlo Tokes, Kelemen Hunor and others, being labelled as 
disrespectful. ―It‘s unfortunate what happened, unfortunate and disrespectful. 
We have asked every time for respect for our national day, for our traditions, 
for our holidays for our values. And this respect must be mutual‖39, said 
Kelemen Hunor. The mayor Robert Raduly added that he approved another 
kind of manifestation, and he concluded that Csibi Barna had to pay for his 
actions. Approved or not, sanctioned or not, the Csibi Barna‘s performing 
exists and it reactualizes the conflict between the majority and the minority.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This study sets out to investigate the extent to which the feeling of the 
national affiliation, the claim of the regional autonomy and the setting of the 
―historical memory‖ in the public sphere could become items of identification 
for the Hungarian minority. Our main question was focused around the 
relationship between a national identity and an ethnic one.  
The inscription of the collective memory in the social memory of the 
Hungarian minority group is the product of a praxis which is due to build an 
identity to be shared by all members of the ethnic group in 
question. Their social memory produced outside the historical references of the 
majority obliterated in the process of the ethnic identity construction has the 
role of forming a minority group identity reference. Halbwachs (1950) was 
right to assert that the social processes strongly influence not only people‘s 
personal memories, but also the community‘s shared memories of the past. 
Indeed, the historical support of the social memory, even if appropriated, 
invented or counterfeit, is undeniable for the members of a group that are 
                                                          
37 Ibidem 14. 
38http://www.gandul.info/politica/cine-este-barna-csibi-extremistul-maghiar-care-l-a-
spanzurat-pe-avram-iancu-si-a-provocat-scandalul-de-aseara-din-parlament-ce-
spun-laszlo-tokes-si-kelemen-hunor-8069605 accessed in 2011, on June the 27th.  
39 Ibidem 14.  
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sharing the same references. Their social memory finds support in a ―habitus‖ 
incorporated by all members. This ―habitus‖ is called to account for the past 
into the present. Nevertheless, between the subjectivity of the memory and the 
objectivity of the history, the Hungarian minority chooses to place its 
memory in the narrative, creating its own identity. Built by this minority group, 
its social memory, that is the past conveyed in the present, has 
a teleological function because the truth of the past events lies in the 
present. Except that this present is shaped in order to meet an identity 
positioning. For this reason, March the 15th, the Day of the Hungarians from 
Everywhere, began a more important resource to set the references of the 
Hungarians minority than December the 1st, the Romania‘s National Day. 
The narrative that accompanies the historical event connects the minority to the 
identity of the Hungarians living in Hungary rather than to the identity of the 
Romanians whose country provides to the minority group in question an area to 
register its cultural repertoire. Moreover, constituted as symbolic space, this 
cultural area set an ethnic identity, greatly claimed in the rhetoric. This identity is 
built in relationship to the Hungarians‘ identity, and not to the Romanians‘. 
Therefore, it is normal for the Hungarian minority from Romania not to be 
attached to the Romanian national feeling. The contradictions between an 
assumed identity and an identity imposed by the dominant group, but rejected by 
the dominated one, make double identity to be reabsorbed into the dominated 
group‘s cultural specificity. Because of this, the identity parameters built in-group 
do not give access to any identification with the out-group. This is allowed only 
when a minority group is assimilated by a dominant one. In the case of the 
Hungarian minority from Romania, the identity is designed from the beginning as 
specificity. But the minority group‘s cultural specificity is built relational, against 
the majority group. Therefore, the identity is built as difference as well. The 
cultural specificity, exalted in the rhetoric at the expense of the difference, is a 
good reason to claim the geographical delimitation within the Romanian national 
space, defined in the Constitution as ―unitary and indivisible state‖. From the 
point of view of those elites supposed to have generated the idea of regional 
autonomy, this could enshrine the identity of this minority group. Moreover, in 
order to mark the very strong sense of belonging of this cultural area, the 
rejection of the difference is materialized in all kinds of performances, such as 
Barna‘s theatre play. Although sanctioned in the public sphere by the political 
elite of the minority, these performances are designed to place the minority‘s 
roots in identity terms. This kind of acting put into practice in interaction with 
the difference aims at denying any element which is built outside the identity 
boundaries of the group in question.  
Our conclusion is that the ways the minority behave, act, interrelate, 
build narrative and develop possibilities are the result of a ―habitus‖ set by the 
historically and socially situated conditions of its production. This ―habitus‖ 
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becomes the matrix of in-group behaviour which involves denying over-group 
determinism. The sense of minority‘s place, inscribed in their members‘ minds 
through the ―cultural products‖ including systems of education, language, 
judgements, values, methods of classification and everyday life‘s activities, leads 
to an unconscious acceptance of its specificity. This specificity becomes 
conscious when opposite to the difference and claimed in the public 
space. Certainly, it leads to a conflicting relationship among actors that 
represent the minority in opposition to the majority within the Romanian 
nation-state. In this context, we talk about a social construction of the reality 
which may respond to the necessity of a group to set his identity regarding 
―otherness‖.  
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Abstract. The analysis of marriages within a community can provide important 
information on the meaning of demographic processes that are part of the community. Thus, high 
levels of marriage indicate the existence of young population of childbearing age, able to ensure 
biological reproduction of the group; a low level of marriage registration shows the regressive 
model of the community, which can eventually cause the demographic disappearance of the group 
by depletion of biological regeneration. Our surveys show the findings of a sociological research 
conducted on Romanian communities from the county of Hajdu-Bihar (Hungary). 
 
 
 
 
 
MARITAL STRATEGIES AND IDENTITY CHANGES  
OF ROMANIANS IN HUNGARY (HAJDU-BIHAR) 
 
 
 
Gheorghe ŞIŞEŞTEAN* 
 
 
 
1. Orthodox parish marriages in Apateu 
 
In the summer of 2000, together with a group of students in sociology 
at the University of Oradea we conducted a sociological research on Romanian 
communities in the county of Hajdu-Bihar (Hungary). Some of our findings are 
listed below. The surveys below are based on parish registers that we found in 
some regions of the Romanian-Hungarian border area. 
 The analysis of marriages within a community can provide important 
information on the meaning of demographic processes that are part of the 
community. Thus, high levels of marriage indicate, undoubtedly, the existence 
of a young population of childbearing age, capable to ensure the biological 
reproduction of the group, while a low level of marriage registration shows the 
regressive model of the community, which can eventually cause the 
demographic disappearance of the group by depletion of biological 
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regeneration. Undoubtedly, a low level of marriage will be associated with a low 
birth rate, at least in the traditional type communities such as the ones within 
the rural areas.  
Starting from these premises, we proposed the analysis of marriage in 
the Romanian community in the village of Apateu, through the only statistical 
means we had at hand: parish registers of marriages. Unfortunately, because of 
unfortunate historical circumstances, the old parish registers disappeared so the 
Orthodox Parish in Apateu does have only registers that cover the period 1930-
20001, for marriages, births and deaths. However, they are of the utmost 
importance because they capture demographic phenomena occurring in a 
period of high mobility of population, during changes of regimes, and also in a 
period of high territorial mobility determined by the entrance of peasant 
communities in the historical trend of modernity, in the post-war period. Our 
analysis will capture a specific fact for the Romanian communities within the 
eastern Hungary (Hajdu-Bihar County), namely that the demographic 
regression is strongly associated with a strong ethnic identity dislocation, in fact 
the Romanian communities in this area undergoing extinction. 
 
Table 1 
                                                          
1 Orthodox parish from Apateu. Parish registers (1930-2000) 
Year 
Number of 
marriages 
Year 
Number of 
marriages 
1930 7 1966 1 
1931 9 1967 2 
1932 4 1968 2 
1933 5 1969 2 
1934 8 1970 0 
1935 6 1971 2 
1936 8 1972 0 
1937 8 1973 2 
1938 6 1974 2 
1939 6 1975 0 
1940 4 1976 0 
1941 2 1977 0 
1942 1 1978 0 
1943 3 1979 0 
1944 0 1980 0 
1945 2 1981 0 
1946 6 1982 1 
1947 7 1983 0 
1948 2 1984 2 
1949 4 1985 0 
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The statistical analysis of marriages in the Orthodox parish of the village 
of Apateu allows for shaping the next evolution of marriage: 
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Analyzing the statistical series in terms of number of marriages, we were 
able to distinguish between various periods in the dynamics of marriage: 
1. 1930-1939, corresponding to a specific model of traditional village 
characterized by a relatively high number of marriages and homogeneity 
Year 
Number of 
marriages 
Year 
Number of 
marriages 
1950 5 1986 0 
1951 4 1987 0 
1952 12 1988 0 
1953 3 1989 0 
1954 10 1990 0 
1955 5 1991 0 
1956 4 1992 0 
1957 3 1993 0 
1958 7 1994 0 
1959 2 1995 1 
1960 9 1996 0 
1961 1 1997 0 
1962 3 1998 0 
1963 4 1999 0 
1964 2 2000 0 
1965 1   
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of their annual distribution. During this interval there is an average of 
6.7 marriages per year, deviations from the average value having a 
relatively small value. 
2. 1940-1945, corresponding to WW II. The consequences of the war are 
reflected in the marital regime, so that the year of 1940 still recorded a 
total of four marriages; between 4 September 1943 and 1945 no 
marriage is recorded. The average annual number of marriages in this 
period is 2. 
3. 1946-1960 may reveal a new marital period, which has similarities to 
that of the interwar period, i.e. an average relatively close to the interwar 
average, 5.53 marriages a year. Marital trends are not homogeneously 
distributed, recording large annual deviations from the average. 
4. The decrease in the volume of marriages, registered for the period 1946-
1960, continues of an accelerated manner during in the period from 
1961 to 1974. The annual average is only 1.71 marriages, falling under 
the average recorded during the war. In 1970 and 1972 no marriage is 
recorded. 
5. The 1974-2000 interval marks a true collapse of marriage. In the 26 
years there were only four marriages, fact that corresponds to an annual 
average nearing zero, i.e. 0.1 marriages per year. It is obvious that such a 
marital regime will decisively and irreversibly affect the birth 
phenomenon, which, as I will show later, falls into the same regression 
demographic trend. Basically, in a short while, the disappearance of 
older generation will lead to the disappearance of the Romanian 
community from Apateu. 
 
2. Birth dates and ways of marital selection 
 
The analysis of surnames can be a sociological method extremely 
interesting in trying to capture at least two aspects: 
a) Political influence on onomastics. It is well known that the Hungarian 
administration practiced extensively the Magyarization (Hungarization) 
of names during the dualism. It is however noted that the Apponyi Law 
of 1907 does not do anything else but to express in a systematic and 
coherent way, even at the legislative level, an old but constant tendency 
in the Hungarian policies, namely the Magyarization of names of 
populations of other ethnicities. However, the analysis of onomastics of 
the early years of dualism show through parish registers that population 
still retain complete Romanian names, even if they are often written 
with specific Hungarian phonetic rules. Besides, the Romanian first 
name is maintained. The situation will change in the first part of the 
inter-war period when the Magyarization of last names is not enough. 
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On the other hand, in times of liberalization of political life in Hungary, 
Romanian name will resurface, and then again in times of political 
repression of minorities, as it was the period 1940-1944, the Romanian 
names are replaced by their Magyarized version. 
b) similarities of names at regional level are an indicator of cultural 
homogeneity, thus they can configure cultural areas, characterized also 
by marital exchanges, through which, on the male line, there is an inter-
community dynamics of names, so various names circulate from one 
village to another, through their integration in marital exchange games. 
 
We will proceed below to an inventory of last names, and first surnames 
within the places called Săcal and Apateu. Our analysis will refer specifically to 
Apateu where we held an exhaustive inventory of parish registers, which 
unfortunately were not preserved outside the period 1930-2000. On the other 
hand, wherever possible, based on parish registers from Apateu, we mentioned 
the last name specific to other villages in the area, with Catholic or Greek 
Orthodox population, who maintained marital exchanges with Apateul. It is the 
case of the villages housing Romanian communities Komádi, Magyarhomorog, 
Vecherd, Jaca, Bedeu, Mezőpeterd, Biharkeresztes and others, which we will 
mention at the right time. 
First though, we reproduce a short list of names of Săcal , contained in 
the parish register of weddings. It should be noted that fortunately the wedding 
registers in this town escaped destruction in 1944, when before the arrival of 
Romanian and Soviet troops the archive was devastated and the registers 
scattered on the field. These records begin in 1853, so they are much older than 
the ones in Apateu. The writing of the old records was done with Cyrillic 
letters. The priests will use both Latin and Cyrillic characters to record data. In 
fact, until about 1866 it is not uncommon to find this interesting mixture 
between Cyrillic and Latin in records, often even in the same word. After 1867 
the Latin alphabet prevails, but the priest sometimes forgets to stick just to 
Latin and writes a name or several letters in Cyrillic script. Another interesting 
remark can be made in relation to the combination of Romanian and 
Hungarian spellings; the priest often used Hungarian rules in Romanian script 
when writing names: ş-s, ţ-cz, j-zs, s-sz etc. Sometimes the same name appears 
with both elements from Romanian and Hungarian spelling, such as Ţeghea 
Floarea is written Czeghea Floarea or a Silaghi Floarea is written Szilaghi. It 
should be noted however, that the 1867 does not have a process of names 
Magyarization, the sometimes use of the Hungarian spelling is not a sign of that 
Magyarization but of a period when the scripts varied, especially with sounds 
and letters like: ţ, ş, ă, ci, j etc. On the other hand, all the first names are 
Romanian, without any tendency for their Magyarization that we we later on 
find. But here, for example, a small list of names as we extracted them from the 
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register of marriages of Săcal, during 1853-19082 (Esketési anyakőnyv II-ik 
kőtete 1853-1908): 
Table 2 
 
                                                          
2Orthodox parish from Săcal. Marriage register (Esketési anyakőnyv II-ik kőtete 1853-1908) 
Year, 
month 
and the 
day of 
marriage 
Groom and bride names Age Religion 
Place of 
birth 
Place of 
residence 
1867 
30. 08 
Gurbadan Ioan, widower, with 
widow Gurbadan Ana 
31 
29 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Săcal 
Săcal 
Săcal 
10. 09 
Iovan Giorgie, not married, with 
girl Balkus Sofia 
23 
19 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Darvaş 
Magyar-
homorog 
Săcal 
1. 10 
Veres Ioan, not married, with girl 
Haida Floarea 
24 
19 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Apateu 
Săcal 
Săcal 
(?). 10 
Iuhasz Ioan,  not married, with 
girl Szilaghi  Floarea 
24 
19 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Jaca 
Magyar-
homorog 
Jaca 
15. 10 
Gerdan Flore, with girl Czeghea 
Floarea 
21 
19 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Săcal 
Săcal 
Săcal 
1868 
11. 01 
Monok Mihailu, widower, with 
widow Petka Anna 
43 
40 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Săcal 
Cefa 
Săcal 
14. 01 
Mezei Ioan, widower, with 
widow Miru Floarea 
24 
22 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Vecherd 
Săcal 
Vecherd 
14. 01 
Varga Crăciun,  not married, with 
girl Hodiman Maria 
23 
27 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
? 
Săcal 
Szent-
Miklos 
28. 01 
Gurbadan Dimitrie,  not married, 
with girl Opre Sofia 
23 
17 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Săcal 
Darvaş 
Săcal 
1. 02 
Zsuro Ioan,  not married, with 
widow Olá Jusanna (?) 
25 
28 
Orthodox 
Reformed 
Săcal 
Harsany 
Săcal 
4. 02 
Fár Ioan,  not married, with 
Dobai Ana 
29 
18 
Orthodox 
Ortodox 
Săcal 
Săcal 
Săcal 
4. 02 
Tamucza (n.n.Tomuţa) Nicolae,  
not married, with girl Pintea 
Maria 
25 
19 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Apateu 
Magyar- 
Homorog 
Apateu 
5. 04 
Gerdan Ioan,  not married, with 
girl Csikortas (n. n. Cicortaş) 
28 
25 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Săcal 
Săcal 
Săcal 
25. 04 
Drimbe Ioan, widower, with 
Sonea Floarea, widow 
33 
30 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Apateu 
Săcal 
Apateu 
12. 05 
Vajna Irimie,  not married, with 
girl Szilágy Maria 
23 
17 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
? 
Tarian 
Mező-
keresztes 
(Bihar-
keresztes) 
30. 06 
Nikita Ioan,  not married, with 
girl Szakadatan (n.n. Scădătan) 
Ana 
24 
16 
Orthodox 
Orthodox 
Săcal 
Săcal 
Săcal 
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All entries made by the priest in this register are in Romanian. Based on 
the last names, they can be grouped into three classes: 
 a) Romanian names; 
 b) names whose origin is difficult to determine; 
 c) names common to both Romanians and Hungarians.  
In terms of onomastic classes we can group them as follows: 
a) Romanian names: Gurbădan, Iovan, Ţeghea, Miru, Tomuţa, Jura 
(Juro), Cicortaş, Drimbe (Drimba, Drâmba), Sonea, Nichita, 
Săcădătan, Opre, Bălcuş, Pintea 
 b) names whose origin is difficult to determine: Fár, Vajna, Petka, 
Gerdan, Monok; 
 c) names common to both Romanians and Hungarians: Veres, Iuhasz 
(Iuhász), Silaghi (Szilágyi), Mezei, Varga, Ola (Olá). 
 
As it can be seen from this small onomastic sample, in Săcal at the 
beginnings of the dualist system Romanian names are the most numerous. In 
terms of first names, they are all Romanian, fact that could not be encountered 
in some later periods when all the first names are Magyarized (Floare becoming 
Virág, Gheorghe-Győrgy, Petru-Péter, Teodor-Tivadár, Ioan-Iános, Ana-Anna, 
Iuliana-Iuliánna, Maria-Mária, Ileana-Ilona, Irimie-Imre, Alexandru-Sándor, and 
the list could go on). 
With regard to Apateu, in the analysis of last names we used marriage 
statistics from the period 1930-2000, so a period longer than in the case of 
Săcal. It is nteresting to highlight a link between names and historical periods. 
In 1930-1934 all last names are written in Hungarian spelling and first names 
are Magyarized. Between 1935 and July 1940 it was a period of liberalization 
that makes the most first names be Romanian and written in Romanian 
spelling. With regard to names, after the long period of Magyarization, the 
priest Gregory Muresan will use a hybrid system, some names are written in 
Romanian spelling, for others he will further use the Hungarian spelling. It is 
interesting that the events of the summer of 1940, i.e. the yealding of the 
northwest Transylvania to Hungary will have direct consequences on the 
Orthodox parish of Apateu; entries in the register will suddenly go from 
Romanian to Hungarian spelling and to the Magyarized variant of the names. In 
1945, with the entry of Hungary into a new historical phase, i.e. the entry of 
Romanian and Soviet armies in Hungary, it was an immediate return to the 
Romanian first and last names; this phenomenon will go on throughout the 
interwar period, until 1974. We chose 1974 as the reference year because until 
then we can construct statistical series  relatively continuous; beyond that, the 
next marriage will take place only in 1982 (in fact, between 1975 to 2000, the 
Orthodox parish will record only 4 marriage-see table of Apateu register 
marriages). On the other hand, very few cases of Orthodox people from 
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Apateu who marry after 1974 will have their names Magyarized, just like today, 
when, in fact, the Orthodox families are currently registered in the records of 
the Apateu Orthodox Church. Let us take a look at the names registered in the 
parish of Apateu and their frequency in the period 1930-2000: 
 
Name of the Orthodox in Apateu (by last name of groom and bride 
from parish records) 
 
Family name 
Number 
of listings 
Blaga (both as the Romanian Blaga, and the Hungarian Blága) 7 
Leu (both as the Romanian Leu, in the deaths records, one Ecaterina Leu,  
from Apateu, deceased in 1951, and the Hungarian Leó, in the marriages 
records) 
1 
Berche (also with the Hungarian variant, Berke) 31 
Kovari, the Romanian register will maintain the Hungarian k, but it also lists 
the Romanian form Chivari, and often the totally Hungarized form of Kővári. 
In fact, this name is a translation of the Romanian name Chioreanu, well 
spread in the north-western Romania   
16 
Lazăr, also with Hungarian spelling, Lázár 8 
Drimba, found in the villages from Bihor-Romania, as Drâmba, and Drimba. 
Obviously, the Romanian î was transformed into i, according to the 
Hungarian phonetism  
16 
Csora, found as the Romanian Ciora 4 
Kalugyer, obviously the Romanian Călugăr. The name is listed under the 
Romanian form Călugăr in the parish records  
12 
Groza, the same form all throughout the register  8 
Budai, the same form all throughout the register 2 
Maruşca, also with the Hungarian form of Maroska 4 
Kiss, also inother forms, either Chiş, or Chişiu, or Mic 26 
Papp, also as Pap, and Pop 27 
Laţcău, also as Laczko  3 
Gui, also as Guiu or as the Hungarian form of Guj 8 
Iuhas, also as the Hungarian Iuhász 15 
Ţegle, Ţeglea, also as the Hungarian Czegle 12 
Torgea, also as the Hungarian Torzsa 3 
Sonea, also as the Hungarian Szonya 8 
But, Butu, also as the Hungarian Butt 6 
Gâtea, rarely found with this form. Usually it is the Hungarian form, Gitye or 
the transformation from the Magyarized name, Ghitea 
5 
Botău, also listed with this form, but most often as its Magyarized form of 
Bottó 
8 
Huli 1 
Szaporan (evidently, the Magyarized form of the Romanian Săpuran, listed in 
the deaths registers -Ioan Săpuran, from Magyarhomorod, dead in 1955) 
1 
Mezei 1 
Tripon, mostly in its Magyarized form -Trippon 6 
Pintea, mostly in its Magyarized form -Pintye 4 
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Family name 
Number 
of listings 
Veres 3 
Ardelean, mostly in its Magyarized form -Argyelan 5 
Şinca 1 
Precup, also as the Hungarian -Prekup 1 
Hodoşan, evidently Romanian  1 
Csorba, evidently a linguistic change, Magyarized after the Romanian Ciorba 1 
Bui, Buiu, also the Hungarian Buj 3 
Săcădat, also the Hungarian Szakadati 3 
Moldovan 1 
Pantea, also the Hungarian Pantya 4 
Luncan, also the Hungarian -Lankan  2 
Teberan 2 
Geoara 1 
Raţ, Raţiu 2 
Ţenţ, but also a linguistic hybrid -Czenţ and a hngarian form -Czencz 5 
Silaghi 3 
Irimi 2 
Brumaru 1 
Goron 3 
Haniş 1 
Oşorhanu 1 
Irimie 1 
Bonariu 1 
Rugaci, Rugaciu 3 
Bonaţi 1 
Guiaş 1 
Schupkeger (two brothers, it seems, of Lutheran religion, who marry Orthodox 
women) 
2 
Dobai 1 
Covaci, also an interesting semi-Magyarised form-Covács 2 
Magău 1 
 
Analogous to the method used for Săcal, we grouped the last names in 
onomastic classes, building the following table:  
 
Romanian 
names 
Frequency 
Romanian and 
Hungarian joint names 
Frequency 
Names with 
uncertain origin 
Frequen
cy 
Blaga 7 Chivari, Kővári 16 Huli 1 
Leu 1 Budai 2 Geo    Geoara 1 
Berche 31 Chiş, Chişiu Kiss 26 Irimi 2 
Lazăr 8 Papp, Pap, Pop 27 Rugaci 3 
Drimba 16 Iuhas, Iuhász 15 Bonaţi 1 
Ciora 4 Mezei 1 Guiaş 1 
Călugăr 12 Veres 1 Teberan 2 
Groza 8 Moldovan 1   
Laţcău 3 Szilágy, Silaghi 3   
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Romanian 
names 
Frequency 
Romanian and 
Hungarian joint names 
Frequency 
Names with 
uncertain origin 
Frequen
cy 
Gui 8 Dobai 1   
Ţegle, Ţeglea 12 Kovács, Covaci 2   
Torgea 3     
Sonea 8     
Gâtea, Gitea 5     
Botău 8     
Săpuran 1     
Tripon 6     
Pintea 4     
Ardelean 5     
Pantea 4     
Luncan 2     
Ţenţ 5     
Brumaru 1     
Goron 3     
Haniş 1     
Irimie 1     
Oşorhanu 1     
Magău 1     
Bonariu 1     
Şinca 1     
Precup 1     
Hodoşan 1     
Ciorba 1     
Bui 3     
Săcădat 3     
 
One can see that the vast majority is formed of Romanian names, even 
though in many cases they are Magyarized and using the Hungarian spelling, the 
Romanian name is still visible. 
 
3. Zonal network of marital exchanges with Apateu 
 
Marriages with partners from Săcal. Marriage duration 
 
Gender  1930-1939 1940-1945 1946-1960 1961-1974 1975-2000 Total 
Masculin 4  6   10 
Feminin 3 1 5 2  11 
Total 7 1 11 2 0 21 
 
Most inter-marriages of young people in Apateu are recorded to be with 
people from Săcal, a fact explained by the approximately 4 km that separates 
the two towns and the existence of large Romanian Orthodox communities in 
both villages. 
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Marriages with partners from Komádi 
 
Total marriages with people from Komádi, between 1930-2000: three 
marriages (three men marry girls from Apateu) from 1930 to 1939, when in this 
town there were some Orthodox population left. 
 At Komádi, a town situated about 11 km from Apateu, there was an 
Orthodox community, but also a Greek Catholic community. The 1900 census 
recorded a total population of 7520 people, of which 48 are declared Romanian 
(criteria of the mother tongue). The same census recorded 28 Greek Catholics 
and an impressive number of Orthodox: 546 people. In our knowledge, there 
was no church of their faith in Komádi. Currently there is no declared 
Romanian, however the parish registers of Apateu show for people from 
Komádi married to people from Apateu family names of evident Romanian 
descent. These are some of these names: 
1. A Dürgő Gyula, ie Durgheu, (born May 25, 1907); this name is popular in 
the area, as we see in other villages with Romanian population; he 
married at 10.01.1931 with a woman from Apateu. They are both of 
Orthodox religion. 
2. Pintye Maria, mother of Dürgő Pintye Gyula. Also of Orthodox religion. 
The name of Pintye-Pinte-Pintea is of obvious Romanian origins, wide 
spread in the villages in the area, can be met both in Săcal and Apateu. 
3. A Ianos Guj, meaning Gui Ion, born at 22.04.1902, Komádi resident, 
married in Apateu at 31.08.1931, both partners are of Orthodox 
religion. The names of Guj, Gui, Guiu are found also in Apateu. 
4. His mother is called Hodosán Anna and she is of Orthodox religion. 
Despite the Hungarian spelling, it is clearly a name of Romanian origin-
Hodoşan. 
5.  Szilágyi Ianos of Komádi, born 20.03.1907, of Orthodox religion, 
married at 12.11.1932 to an Orthodox girl from Apateu. Szilagyi's 
mother is called Pintye Szófia. 
 
Marriages with partners from Magyarhomorog 
 
Total marriages with people from Mogyarhomorog: 8 marriages, of 
which 5 in the period 1930-1939 and 3 in the period 1946-1960.  
Magyarhomorog City is at about 9 kilometers from Apateu. The census 
of 1900 mentions here a relatively large Romanian community. The number of 
declared Romanians (by the criterion of the mother tongue) is 174, thus more 
than in Komadi. They are also records of 383 Orthodox, a difference of 209 
between the number of Romanian people and the number of Orthodox records 
indicating that there is a heavy loss process and assimilation of ethnic 
Romanian Orthodox among Hungarians. The whole locality comprises 1756 
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people. Unfortunately we do not know where the records for Romanian 
Orthodox are in Magyarhomorog, not even if they were still kept. Absolutely 
limited information about the existence of this population can still be gathered 
from the analysis of parish registers that capture marriages between people 
from Apateu with partners from Magyarhomorog. This information can 
sometimes revive Romanian names that were Magyarized. Here is the list of 
people in Magyarhomorog, married in the period of 1930-2000, to people from 
Apateu: 
1. Kacsora Mária, born on 01. 03. 1913, of Orthodox religion, married at 
24.10.1931 a man from Apateu, also of Orthodox religion. Her mother 
is called Farkas Iuliánna. 
2. Papp Iános, born 28.05.1898, married at 28.12.1931 a girl from Apateu. 
The boy‘s mother is called Erdeli Mária. The two partners are of 
Orthodox religion. 
3. Butt Sándor, born 15.05.1905, of the Orthodox religion, married at 
19.05.1934 with a local girl from Apateu. The names of Butt, But, are 
among the most common name for the Romanians in Apateu. Also, the 
boy‘s mother has a clear Romanian name: Tipanucz Zsofia, ie Tipănuţ 
Sofia. 
4. Elizabeth Kovacs, of Magyarhomorog, the Roman Catholic religion, 
married a Romanian Orthodox from Apateu, Pintye Ion, at 02.10.1937. 
The mother's maiden name, Szófia Zsuzsa (ie Sofia Juja) seems to 
indicate a Romanian origin, and it could be a mixed marriage between a 
Hungarian and a Roman Catholic Romanian who inherited the 
Orthodox religion from her father. 
5. Teberan Mihai, Orthodox from Magyarhomorog, married at 19.02.1938. 
The boy‘s mother is called Catalina Erdei. 
6. Ioan Magău, Magyarhomorog Orthodox, married at 07.02.1952 an 
Orthodox girl from Apateu. The boy‘s mother has a very popular name 
with the Romanians in the area: Floarea Drimba. 
7. Moise Magău, 28 years old, an Orthodox from Magyarhomorog, 
married at 26.06.1953, another Orthodox from Apateu. Her mother has 
a Romanian name: Maria Gligor. 
8. Here is a very interesting case: Emeric Dan, 27 years old, Roman 
Catholic from Magyaromorog married at 21.10.1956 an Orthodox girl 
from Apateu. The boy‘s mother is called Carolina Ţeglea, a very 
common name in Apateu, and Dan is evidently a Romanian name. In 
this case we can find ourselves in front of a phenomenon: some 
Romanians left the Orthodoxism or Greek Catholicism, and converted 
to Roman Catholics. In fact, some oral information that we collected in 
the area, from the Roman Catholic priest in Komádi, Zoltán Dénes, 
refers to some possible Roman Catholics Romanians who lived in this 
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town. Information at the time of research could not be verified, but the 
Săcal archives list conversions from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism 
or Calvinism. This seems to confirm the existence of these religions 
conversions. Obviously, we cannot overlook here the mixed marriages, 
when a child can keep the name (from the father), but can acquire the 
maternal religion. 
 
The marriages between Orthodox people in Apateu and people from 
other localities within the area 
 
From Bedeu there is only one person, Vancsa Iános, of the Greek 
Catholic religion, married in 1930 an Orthodox woman from Apateu. The 
name of Vancsa (Vancea), which is often found at the Greek Catholics in 
Bedeu (where there is only one church, namely Greek Catholic and a very 
strong Romanian community, with Romanians as the majority in 1900) is of 
evident Romanian origins. 
From Jaca (where there was a great Romanian Orthodox community, 
today practically extinct; no one here knows Romanian anymore, but there is 
still an Orthodox Church), from the following people, we found the following 
people married with inhabitans from Apateu : 
-Kurucz Győrgy, Orthodox religion, married at 23.03.1931 to an 
Orthodox girl from Apateu. His mother, Klára Pintye has a Romanian family 
name, common in Orthodox communities in the area. 
 -In 1934, his sister, Kurucz Roza, will marry an Orthodox from 
Apateu. 
 -at 26. 06. 1937, another Orthodox, Iuliu Gál, will marry an Apateu 
Orthodox girl. 
 -at 18. 02. 1939 Emeric Goron, an Orthodox from Jaca will marry a girl 
from Apateu. The Goron name and the married name of his mother, Maria 
Murgui (written Murguj) indicate an origin undoubtedly Romanian 
- Iosif Ghitea, 29 years old, son of Elena Pintea, an Orthodox from Jaca 
will marry Maria Tripon, an Apateu Orthodox. 
 The place called Vecherd was practically Romanian in 1900, marking a 
total population of 467 inhabitants, of which 449 were Romanian and as many 
Orthodox. Currently, in Vecherd nobody speaks or knows Romanian. The 
parish registers record the following marriages between people from Apateu 
with people from Vecherd: 
-On 16. 11. 1951, Iosif Cordoş, 20 years old, an Orthodox from 
Vecherd, married Irina Maruşca, an Orthodox from Apateu . The groom‘s 
mother is called Ecaterina Fărcaş. 
 -On 12. 11. 1960, Ion Durgheu, 26 years old, an Orthodox from 
Vecherd marries Maria Blaga, 19, of Orthodox religion from Apateu. 
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In the town Biharkeresztes the census in 1900 recorded a small 
Romanian community. After the Magyarization, the records show 30 Romanian 
and in terms of religion, 9 185 Greek Catholics and Orthodox. The Romanian 
Community of Biharkeresztes never had its own church. The locality is about 
15 kilometers from Apateu, close to the current border crossing between 
Hungary and Romania, Artánd-Bors. The parish register records the following 
people from Biharkeresztes who married partners from Apateu: 
-Iuhasz Iozsef, Orthodox, 23 years old, married at 22.03.1934 with a 
local girl from Apateu. 
 -Vasiliu Magyari, Biharkeresztes, Orthodox, married at 26.02.1938 
Rozalia Tripon from Apateu. The groom‘s mother is called Floarea Panya 
(Pane), a name with evident Romanian origins. 
 -Maria Urs, 29 years old, an Orthodox from Cresteş (Biharkeresztes) 
married at 07. 02. 1952 with an Orthodox from Apateu. The bride‘s is called 
Florica Chivari, family name Chivari, as we have seen, it is very popular among 
the Orthodox in the area. 
The 1900 census shows that in Berettyóújfalu there was an important 
community of 227 Orthodox believers, and also a small group of 52 Greek 
Catholics. But the two communities are in an advanced process of ethnic 
Hungarian assimilation, only one person declaring himself as having Romanian 
language. But the Orthodox have maintained Berettóújfalu matrimonial ties 
with the Orthodox in Apateu. The number of marriages is small. 
-Mágyary Ianos, Berettóújfalu, Orthodox, married at 22.09.1934 
Orthodox girl from Apateu. 
-Ianos-Berke, Berettóújfalu, Orthodox, married in 1982 with an 
Orthodox Apateu (name Berke, Berchem, often found within the area) 
In the place called Berekbőszőrmény, located on the road between 
Apateu and Biharkeresztes, the census from 1900 recorded 41 Romanians, 3 
Greek Orthodox and 98 Catholics. This town too had links with Apateu in 
terms of marriages. 
-In February 1939, Ioan Iuhasz, Berekbőszőrmény, Orthodox, married 
Iuliana Berke, Apateu, Orthodox. The boy‘s mother is called Floarea Argyelan. 
Obviously, it is the Romanian case from Berekbőszőrmény. 
-A girl, Maria Chivari, 25 years old, from Berekbőszőrmény, Orthodox, 
married an Orthodox from Apateu at 07. 02. 1952. Her mother is called Ana 
Fazecaş. 
-Magdalena Csőrsz (read Ciorş), 18 years old, from Berekbőszőrmény 
Orthodox, married at 24.10.1959, Iohn Pantea, an Orthodox from Apateu. Her 
mother is called Elena Gurbădan, an obvious Romanian name. 
Mezőpeterd City had in 1900 a large Romanian community, with 
Romanians holding here an absolute majority. Of the 799 residents, 444 were of 
Romanian language. In the village there were 24 Catholics and 428 Greek 
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Orthodox. The city currently has an Orthodox church. And the people here 
also had marriage links with those from Apateu. 
-At 03.02.1940 Georgiu Veres, Mezőpeterd, Orthodox, married Mărie 
Berke, Apateu, Orthodox. 
- Atym Ion, meaning Ion Achim, 26 years old, Mezőpeterd, Orthodox, 
married Ecaterina Ţenţ, an Orthodox from Zsadány, at 13.11.1954. The 
marriage is registered in Apateu. The name Achim is, without doubt, Romanian, 
and the awning, and Ţenţ is also spread among the Romanians in the area. 
-Gheorge Papp, 25 years old, from Mezőpeterd, married at 12.11.1955 
Ion Iuhas, an Orthodox from Apateu. The groom's mother is called Carolina 
Achim, which proves that the name Achim, also found in previous marriage, is 
well spread among the Romanians in the area. 
Zsadány, a village situated about 20 kilometers from Apateu, had in 
1900 a Romanian community of 197 people from a total of 2 433 people. From 
the religious point of view, 263 Greek Orthodox and 1 Catholic are registered. 
2 Orthodox from this village are registered in the parish registers of Apateu. We 
already presented a case of marriage between a man from this village with a 
woman from Mezőpeterd. Another case is that of a girl from Zsadány, Kővári 
Iuliánna, of Orthodox religion, who in 1934 married an Orthodox from 
Apateu. Her mother has a Romanian name wide spread in the rural area-Butt 
(But) Virág (Floare). 
A special case is the period from August 1940 to October 1944, when 
after the Vienna Award the western part of Bihor came into the composition of 
Hungary, including a series of villages between Oradea and Salonta, neighbouring 
Apateu. In the new conditions, the extra marital selection area will expand, 
including villages from Romania, with which the villagers from Apateu 
traditionally had closed links, as currently stated by Apateu villagers. This 
resumption of contacts between Romanian villages situated on both sides of the 
border resulted in few inter-marriages. Thus, the Kacsora Iános from Roit (from 
the present Romania) will marry at 01.03.1931 with Kalugyer Ilona of Apateu. 
Both spouses are of Orthodox religion. The boy‘s mother is called Lázár Katalin. 
Beyond the Magyarization of names, including the Orthodox Romanians from 
Roit, resumed after the Vienna Award, it is to be noted that both the name of 
Kocsora (Ciora, possibly from the Romanian Cioara, name in fact widespread in 
the area), and that of Lazăr, are found on both sides of the Romanian-Hungarian 
border, indicating that this area represented a Romanian Orthodox cultural 
homogeneity, even at the level of onomastics. Another marriage from this period 
(16. 05. 1943) is that of Trippon Győrgy, 31 years old, an Orthodox from Apateu 
with Ianosdan Katalin of Marţihaz (Bihor, Romania). 
After 1944, the relations between the Romanians on either side of the 
border will continue for some time, also at the marital level. On 22.02.1947, the 
parish of Apateu will record the marriage of Alexander Drimba, 28 years old, from 
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Cheresig (Bihor, Romania) and Maria Papp, 20 years old, from Apateu. The 
groom‘s parents are called Florian Drimba and Iuliana Tripon, which again shows 
the similarity of last names in the villages situated on both sides of the Romanian-
Hungarian border (as we have shown, the names of Drimba and Tripon are very 
widespread among the Orthodox Romanians in Hajdu-Bihar, Hungary). 
After WW II an extension of marital selection area can be noted, including 
frther Romanian Orthodox communities. It is the case of the Micherechi village, 
where there has been a large Romanian Orthodox community. We have no current 
demographic data on the actual current demographic volume; the census of 1900, 
which we took as the baseline for all surveyed areas, indicats a total population of 
1670 people, of which 1516 are Romanian. Confessionally, the village has two 
Greek Catholic and 1520 Orthodox. 
In the marital ties with Apateu, the parish register here reported for 
25.02.1951 the marriage of Teodor Rocsin, 26 years old, from Micherechi, with 
Elena Oşorhanu, 16 years old, an Orthodox from Apateu. The groom‘s mother is 
called Maria Marc. Another marriage is recorded at 17.08.1959. It is between 
Teodor Rujea, 30 years old, an Orthodox from Micherechi and Ileana Berchem, 24 
years old, an Orthodox from Apateu. The groom's mother is called Floarea Nistor. 
In a later phase, that of dissolution of the Romanian community, 
beginning around 1974, the marriages recorded by the Orthodox parish are 
increasingly rare, after 1974 and until 2001, i.e. only four marriages. Their 
registration in the parish register, however, is incomplete (see the table listing 
marriages). Nevertheless, these notes show that the selection area extends 
beyond the community or geographical area, including remote villages and 
people of Reformed or Roman Catholic religions. Moreover, this phenomenon 
of national and inter-confessional expansion of the marital selection area starts 
around 1965. Belonging to Orthodoxy and to Romanian ethnicity are no longer 
structuring factors of marital behavior. 
In conclusion, we could say that the analysis allows the capture of two 
types of marital selection areas: 
 a) A geographic type area, limited to the surrounding villages, mostly 
Orthodox and Romanian. In terms of statistical manifestation, this historical 
period of marital behavior corresponds to a high marriage percentage. 
 b) After 1965, there is the tendency of developing a large selection of 
areas across Hungary. In this new aspect of religious behavior the marital and 
ethnic criteria lose their importance, as we saw from records of marriages with 
Hungarian Reformed or Catholics. Statistically, this stage corresponds to a very 
low marriage, at least in religious marriages concluded by Orthodox parish, with 
a very low incidence. 
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4. Vienna Award and the waiver of Orthodoxy 
 
Because the Apateu-Săcal was part of Hungary after 1918, one might 
believe that the period after the Vienna Award had no politico-social or 
religious consequences of the Romanian communities here, the Magyarization 
and expulsion of the Romanian population being carried out to the east, within 
that part of Transylvania that was awarded to Hungary. However, during 1940-
1944, the Magyarization pressures were intensified on the Romanians in the 
area of Apateu, some showing many similarities to those carried out against the 
Romanians in the yealded Transylvania. First it was the attempt to forcely 
introduce the Hungarian language in the Romanian Orthodox churches in 
Hungary. In fact, suddenly, the parish registers from Săcal or Apateu are written 
in Hungarian, and the names of people are Magyarized overnight. The parish 
stamp is also printed in Hungarian. On the other hand, in the case of Apateu, 
for instance, there are attempts to bring a Hungarian Orthodox priest, who 
obviously has to hold the liturgy in Hungarian. From interviews with older 
people in Apateu, they remember, although they were then very young, that the 
inhabitants of Apateu chased the Hungarian Orthodox priest imposed by the 
authorities. Also in the period 1940-1944, we see, it seems, an intense campaign 
to convince the Romanian Orthodox, almost completely Magyarized, to 
convert to either the Hungarian religion, Roman Catholic or Reformed. This 
action took place primarily in villages where there were small Romanian 
communities, obviously, without a priest or an Orthodox church. Passage 
phenomena, less numerous, were recorded in villages like Apateu or Săcal, 
where there were both priests and Orthodox churches. Such crossings were 
recorded by the Romanian Orthodox priest in Săcal; they are listed in parish 
records that were kept here. Unfortunately, Apateu keeps only a part of the 
records, many have been lost over time, and the remaining ones show no 
mention of such conversions. 
In the parish archives from Săcal we found a parish register that is 
absolutely surprising, that the conversion of people from the Orthodox religion 
to other religions, primarily to Reformed religion but to a lesser extent to 
Roman Catholics3. This register may explain, at least in part, the disappearance 
of Romanians from several villages from Hajdu-Bihar; the 1900 census 
mentions the existence of Romanians, and of Orthodox believers but then they 
gradually disappear. Based on data from these records, it appears that the 
disappearance of the Romanian ethnic identity occurred in several stages 
a) Romanian linguistic identity loss, many mentioning as the reason for 
conversion the fact that the person does not know Romanian. So, it 
seems that in localities where the Romanian community was 
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numerically small and located within a Hungarian majority, the 
bilingualism, so common within the Romanians in multiethnic 
community was gradually replaced by the Hungarian 
monolingualism. The documents do not allow us to discern, but it 
can be assumed that the transition from bilingualism to 
monolingualism was accompanied by the loss of Romanian ethnic 
identity consciousness - as it happened in the last decades in the 
village of Apateu. 
 b) Giving up the Orthodox religion, by converting to the Reformed or 
Roman Catholics, as a next step to losing the old Romanian linguistic 
identity. In some cases such a waiver occurred by mixed marriage ( 
conversion from the Orthodox religion to the religion of the to 
partner). In this late phase of linguistic and ethnic identity 
displacement, the identity remains only with the name, but this 
criterion is often enough irrelevant. We think for instance at the 
common name of the Romanians and Hungarians, such as Iuhasz, 
Papp, Magyari, Varga, names that cannot provide conclusive 
information about former ethnicity. On the other hand, the mixed 
marriages where woman is Romanian Orthodox and takes her 
husband‘s name deletes, by means of the new name and by crossing 
over to a new religion, any information about the former ethnicity. 
However, even in these cases the transition will be able to maintain 
the male lineage, with the ancient Romanian names, although in that 
village there is neither Romanians, nor Orthodox left. 
The conversions from the Orthodox to Reformed or Roman Catholic 
that the parish register from Săcal  records refer to the period between 1942-
1944, that is exactly the time when the Romanian communities were either in 
Hungary, or they were ceded to Hungary after the Vienna Award; the 
Magyarization put great pressure on the Romanian people. As we have seen, 
these pressures have also pushed the Magyarization of Romanian names. With 
all this Magyarization, under the crust of the Hungarian language the old 
Romanian name is many times visible. 
Below we present a list of people who converted from Orthodox to 
Reformed, with the reason for the conversion in the cases where we found this 
information. Usually, the reason is that the person does not know Romanian. 
On the other hand, judging by the conversion age, it seems that in most cases it 
is about marriage, although this is explicit only in few cases. 
1. A Etelka Papp, from Săcal, born in 1921, in the Orthodox religion, 
converts to the Reformed religion in 15. 01.1942, ―reason for conversion is 
that she does not know Romanian and does not understand the divine services.” It 
seems that this woman belongs to a mixed family, the mother is 
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Hungarian and the father is Romanian (Burzuk-Bursuc Iános), being 
baptized in the religion of the father, then abandoning the religion. 
2. Herring Iános, born November 23, 1922, in Săcal, with parents on 
Herring Imre, Orthodox and Irimias Maria, Orthodox; she converts to 
Roman Catholics in February 15, 1941, as ―she does not understand the divine 
services in Romanian”  
3. Magyari Győrgy, born in Komádi, parents Magyari Győrgy and Papp 
Maria, both Orthodox; she converts to Roman Catholics in 15. 02. 1942 
by the same reason of the same ―she does not understand the divine services in 
Romanian”. It should be noted that in Komádi there was not an Orthodox 
church, although the Orthodox community had over 500 people in early 
twentieth century, although only 48 declared Romanian as their mother 
tongue. 
4. Also from Komadi comes Kirila (obviously Cyril) Marie, of Orthodox 
religion, born here on 28. 07. 1923, passing to the Reformed religion on 
16. 02. 1942. 
5. Probably a brother or husband, Kirila Sandor, 29 years old, from Komádi 
Orthodox, passing to the Reformed religion on on the same day. 
6. Oladi Tivadar, born in Komádi in 08. 05. 1915, of Orthodox religion, 
move to the Reformed at 03. 03. 1942. 
7. Kiss Ioszef, Orthodox, born in 27. 09.1907 in Biharugra, move to the 
Reformed religion at 05. 03. 1942. 
8. Száva Antal (Sava), Orthodox, Sándor Száva father, mother Czige (Ţighe) 
Erzsébet, born October 19, 1911 at Geszt, to Reformed at 05. 03. 1942. 
9. Hodosán (obviously Hodoşan, Romanian name) Tivadar, Orthodox, 
Tivadar Hodosán father, mother Rozália Szalai, born Biharugra , 06. 10. 
1913, passing to the Reformed on 05. 03. 1942. 
10. Nasza (probably a Romanian name, Nosa) Gyorgy, Orthodox, born in 
the Jackal 09. 01. 1924, passes to Roman Catholics on 11. 07. 1942. 
11. Vilma Bordas, orthodox, father Bordas Sándor, mother Iuhasz Virág 
mother, born at 22. April 1924 in Komádi, passes to the Reformed. 
12. Iuliánna Bordas, Orthodox, born 01. 07. 1919, Apateu, go to the 
reformed on 14 January 1943. 
13. Bordas Virág, Orthodox, born in Biharugra on 14. 03. 1921 passes to the 
Reformed in January 14, 1943. 
14. Abrudan (obviously novelistic Abrudan) Iozsef, Orthodox, born in 1912 in 
Komádi passes to the Reformed in January 14, 1943. The reason for 
conversion “he does not know Romanian and this is why he leaves the church. The family 
is of the Reformed faith.” (nn probably new family, resulting from marriage). 
15. Pantya (Pantea) Mozes, Orthodox, father Pantya Ianos, mother Zsuró 
Anna, born Komádi 16. 03. 1923 passes to the Reformed in January 25, 
1943. The reason is marriage, his wife being Reformed. 
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16. Taga Győrgy, Orthodox, father Taga Győrgy, mother Káss (probably 
Caş) Maria, of Greek Catholic religion, born 05. 10. 1923 in Săcal, passes 
to Roman Catholics. 
17. Radovics Ianos, Orthodox, 25 years old, born in Biharugra, Ianos 
Radovics father, mother Mária Papp, and passed came to the Reformed 
"because the bride does not know Romanian and she is reformed." Moves to the 
Reformed in February 15, 1943. 
18. Hotya (the name of Hotea being spread among the Romanians in 
northwest of Transylvania) Sándor, Orthodox religion, born Sacal, 20. 03. 
1912, of parents Hotya Ianos and Zsuró Maria, passes to Roman 
Catholics at 24. 07. 1943 because he does not know Romanian. 
19. Miru Mary, Orthodox, 31 years old, from Sacal, parents Mirú Iános and 
Dobai Virág, converts to Roman Catholics at 24. 07. 1943, because he 
does not know Romanian. 
20. Onáka (Onaca) Iózzef, Orthodox from Sacal, born 19. 09. 1914 of 
Onáka Demeter and Bordas Maria, pass in 24. 07. 1943 to Roman 
Catholicism because he doesn‘t know Romanian. 
21. Onáka Józsefine, Orthodox, 21 years old, born of parents Onáka Iószef 
and Burzuc Rozalia, converts to Roman Catholicism at 24. 07. 1943, 
because they do not know Romanian. 
22. Mirú Mária, Orthodox born in 11. 06. 1922 in Sacal, to Mirú Győrgy şi 
Lazurán (Lăzuran) Mária, goes to Roman Catholics in 30. 10. 1943. 
23. Iózsef Szilágyi, 36 years old, Orthodox, born in Biharkeresztes, from 
Drimba Maria and Szilágyi Iózsef, converts to Roman Catholics on 30. 
10. 1943. 
24. Varga Gyuláme, 32 years old, born Orthodox in Komádi but living in 
Sacal turns to Roman Catholicism on 30. 10. 1943. 
25. Iliszi Katalin, Orthodox, Komádi, 35 years old. Father Iliszi Ianos. 
Moves to Roman Catholicism. 
26. Szoke Károlyne, 26 years old, Orthodox fromto the Reformed on 01. 11. 
1943 
27. Pintye Péter, Orthodox from Zsadány, born on 9 May 1923, father 
Pintye Ianos, Orthodox, mother Mária Varga, Orthodox, moves to the 
Reformed. 
28. Gerdán Ianos, Orthodox 20 years old, born in Sacal, Gerdán Győrgy 
Orthodox father, mother Futur Katalin (apparently Roman Catholic), 
goes to Roman Catholics, 25. 11. 1943. 
29. Szilágyi Gyuláne (maiden name Far Iuliánna), 18 years, Orthodox, father 
Far Tivadar, mother Drimba Piroska, passes through marriage to Roman 
Catholics. 
30. Trippon Virág, Orthodox born in Sacal, 23 years old, father and mother 
Tripon Ianos and Erdei Ilona. The girl passes to the Reformed on 22. 01. 
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1944. The reason recorded by the priest is that "she does not understand the 
language of the Orthodox religious service." 
31. Iulánna Varga, Orthodox, 18 years old, Varja Lajos father and mother 
Daicin Virág, born Komádi, move to reform at 23. 04. 1944 
32. Gyuláné Gaál, Fekete girl named Mary, Orthodox and 42 years with 
being born Biharkeresztes. My father called Imre Fekete and his mother 
Iuliánna Borza. Through marriage, she passes to the Greek Catholics on 
13. 04. 1944. 
33. Trippon Sándor, Orthodox, 18 years old, from Magyarhomorog, parents 
are Trippon László and Bordas Piroska; he passes in 13. 04. 1944 to the 
Reformed. 
34. Radovics Ilona, born Orthodox, in Biharugra, on 16. 05. 1920, she passes 
to the Reformed on 13. 04. 1944 
35. Gyula Gombos, Orthodox, 37 years old, parents Gombos Károly and 
Papp Iuliánna, born in Komádi, passes to the Reformed. 
36. A very interesting case of transition from Orthodox to Reformed and then 
back to Orthodoxy: Hodosán Veronka 24 years old, from Sacal, converted 
to the Reformed in 1940 and then returned to Orthodoxy in March 1942. 
This case is an exception, the general movement is from the Orthodox to 
Reformed or Roman Catholic and we found no cases of a person of 
Reformed or Roman Catholic religions to pass to Orthodoxism (even 
though there were very few people of Reformed or Roman Catholic religion 
married to Orthodox, they never changed their religion by marriage). 
As it can be noted, the register includes not only people from Săcal but 
also Orthodox from the surrounding villages, who had no Orthodox church 
and who turned to the religious service of the priest from Săcal (Biharkeresztes, 
Biharugra, Magyarhomorog, Komádi, Zadány). In all these villages the 
Romanian population is nearly extinct. It is however possible that some people 
still keep their Romanian identity and perhaps, the language, but we failed to 
detect them. In 2000, when we started our investigation in Hungary, we found 
no Romanian in Biharkeresztes, a locality situated on the border near the 
Romanian village of Bors. Continuing to travel in the area, to my surprise, in 
2003, I found a person in Biharkeresztes, a restaurant and boarding house 
owner, who told me in a very good Romanian language that he was a Romanian 
local and he kept his Romanian language intact because he was a customs‘ 
officer at the crossing point with Romania and his job required good command 
of Romanian. In fact, after opening the borders with Hungary, many stores and 
restaurants rose on the road from Biharkeresztes listing prices in both 
languages, Hungarian and Romanian, and some of the staff speak very good 
Romanian. By initiating conversations with these people, I was able to find out 
that they were of Romanian origins and they had some knowledge of Romanian 
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from their parents, and then maintaining close contact with the Romanians who 
cross the border helped perfecting their command of Romanian. 
Going back to the problem of giving up their Orthodox or Greek 
Catholic allegiance, unfortunately, the transition to Reformed or to Roman 
Catholics is recorded only for a period of three years. Based on the above, we 
can imagine the extent of the shift from Greek Orthodoxy or Catholicism to 
new religions, as a consequence of the loss of Romanian linguistic identity and 
mixed marriages. We believe that this phenomenon is the main mechanism that 
explains the disappearance of entire Romanian Orthodox communities in the 
area. It is clear that the loss of linguistic identity or the mixed marriage are 
among the ultimate causes of the disappearance of the Romanian communities, 
in a whole causal chain. Giving up Orthodoxy and converting to Catholicism or 
the Reformed takes place against the background of extinction of the linguistic 
and ethnic identity links with the religion of the Romanians. It is important, 
however, to explain the concrete sociological determinisms that made possible 
the loss of Romanian linguistic and ethnic identity. The lack of Romanian 
schools and Orthodox priests for a very long period after WW I, the 
Magyarization pressures of the period 1940-1944 as well as the involvement of 
territorial mobility area after WW II were factors that augmented the loss of 
ethnic identity, rendering the reconstruction of Romanian identity impossible. 
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name are completely Magyarized, it is rare when we detected an ancient Romanian 
name. Perhaps the old registers are also found in the archives of the Diocese of 
Niregyhaza and surely these records, dating from a time when the liturgy was 
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Abstract. Bihor – Hajdu Bihar Euroregion is a form of cross-border 
cooperation that includes the counties of Bihor and Hajdu Bihor, at the midst of which 
there are the two county capitals, Oradea and Debrecen, communities that have a diverse 
ethnical structure, sharing a history older than 800 years. Nowadays we can talk about 
anintense cross-border cooperation at the Romanian-Hungarian border of various forms 
and shapes. 
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The cities of Debrecen and Oradea, two cities on each side of the 
Romanian-Hungarian border, sharing a history of more than 800 years, found 
elements that made the two communities develop a series of cross-border 
cooperation elements on both sides of the border. 
The two municipalities become in 2002 part of Bihor-Hajdu Bihar 
Euroregion, a newly created structure within a diversified area in terms of 
ethnic-confessions, culture and not least of cross-border cooperation, a 
structure that aims at being an engine for cooperation at the level of the 
Euroregional structure that houses 2 NUTS elements: the counties of Bihor 
and Hajdu Bihar, as well as the two cities. 
The two cities analysed from the point of view of the Debrecen-Oradea 
are at the centre, considering that they reach several levels such as: 
- there is a local level in both municipalities; these are the most 
important cities in the area from the point of view of the political, 
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administrative, and economic points of view; here we can find the highest 
concentration of people; they are both border cities and regional points 
- the county level; here we remind the counties of Bihor and Hajdú-
Bihar, where Oradea and Debrecen are the most important cities 
- from the point of view of the regional level, the two development 
regions to which the two centres belong, North-Western Development Region 
and Eszak-Alfold Development Region, are representative 
- the Euroregional level is represented by the Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar 
Euroregion (according to NUTS, there is no such level in Romania) 
- the national level is represented by the two neighbouring countries: 
Romania and Hungary. 
 
Map 1. Bihor County - NUTS system. 
 
 
Own elaboration 
Map 2. Hajdu Bihar county-NUTS 
system. 
 
 
Own elaboration 
 
The idea of Euroregion occurs at the same time with the evolving 
process of local autonomy and regionalisation. The aim is to set direct 
connections between regions and communities on both sides of state borders 
by virtue of local authorities‘ competences as they are defined in national and 
European law. The conditions for optimal development of a Euroregion are 
minimal economic balance, cultural similarities despite ethnic diversity, 
geographical proximity and common historical heritage. Cooperation develops 
mainly in these fields. 
Originally, the Euroregion refers to cooperation between authorities at 
the border while the Council of Europe shows that cross-border regions have a 
certain homogeneity and functional interdependence, otherwise cooperation 
would not be needed. 
Association of European Border Regions states that ―within the limits 
of the geographical aim of cooperation, cross-border structures are cooperation 
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arrangements for cooperation between local or regional governmental 
structures lying along the border in agreement with the promotion of common 
interest to increase the standard of living of border populations 
Euroregions can be identified as territorial structures established with the 
aim to strengthen interregional and cross-border cooperation to reach a coherent 
area for economic, scientific, social and cultural development (A. Ilieş, 2004, p 24). 
Cross-border cooperation Euroregion is a voluntary association 
respecting national and international law, territorial and administrative 
structures of the countries at different levels with the aim to eliminate territorial 
isolation and to settle the framework for cultural connection or to rebuild 
typical groups, and to set up economic development nuclei to achieve a balance 
between the centre and the periphery at an advanced stage of functional 
territorial systems (Ilieş A., 2006). 
Cross-border cooperation regions aim at reducing border conflicts in 
convergence and good neighbourhood areas, eliminating isolation and reaching 
confidence between neighbouring states. 
Elements of Euroregions: cross-border structure, cooperation between 
governmental structures, interregional cooperation, economic development, 
scientific development, social development, cultural development, cross-border 
cooperation, pursuing common interests, territorial-administrative structure, 
association of communities, compact area, development of functional territorial 
systems, promoting common interests, promoting joint projects, respect for 
national and international law, developing common projects and partnerships in 
different directions that are a priority for Euroregions, Euroregional actors, 
Supporting good neighbourhood, eliminating isolation. 
Sucha shows the main elements of Euroregions as follows (K. Czimre, 
2006, p 84): 
 Core forms of cross-border cooperation 
 Instruments to diminish differences between border regions 
 Strong confidence and cooperation with the citizens 
 Studies in the field of good neighbourhood and integration 
 Preventing negative heritage 
 Important elements for the Central European countries‘ integration 
to the European Union 
There are two types of factors generating cooperation. They are as 
follows (K. Czimre, 2006, p 87): 
 Unifying factors: geographical position, climate, common history, 
common culture, economic development, trade, linguistic 
competences, common strategies 
 Inhibiting factors: differences envisaging the administrative system 
and responsibilities, tax system, territorial planning and regional 
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development, legal and executive methods, environmental 
protection and territorial planning, linguistic elements. 
In order to have an efficient cooperation and communication on the 
regional and Euroregional levels, we have to consider a wide range of aspects 
(Thomas Lunden, 2004, pp 25-125): space, time, technology, rules, policies, 
power exercise, economy, communication: language, symbols, culture, identity, 
human resources, social aspect 
The Bihor-Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion was established at the end of 
2002 upon the initiative of the Bihor County Council (Romania) and the Hajdu-
Bihar Local Government (Hungary). They seized the important role of cross-
border cooperation in fields of common interest for European integration. 
The management of the Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion (A. Ilieş, 
2004, p 163): Co-presidents, Council of the Euroregion, Steering Board, 
Secretariats, Working Commissions. The Council is the main decision-maker of 
the Euroregion. (http://www.cjbihor.ro/index.php?act=euroregiune) 
Tasks of the Euroregion Council: 
1. discusses and approves the strategic priorities of the Euroregion for the 
following year;  
2. Decides on changes to the association‘s legal status; 
3. Approves the budget of the Euroregion that is equally supported by the 
members, as well as the changes to the budget;  
4. Approves the report on activities funded by the Euroregion;  
5. Debates and approves the changes to the internal Regulations of the 
Euroregion;  
6. Decides on admission new members or withdrawal of existing members;  
7. Elects the Board members;  
8. Approves the Board report;  
9. Appoints the members of the Working Commissions;  
9. Appoints the Secretariats;  
 
From the point of view of communication between the two counties, 
we will mention the crossing points between them: 
Table 1 
Pos Crossing point Traffic type 
Means of 
transport 
1 Valea lui Mihai/Nyirabrany International Vehicle 
2 Valea lui Mihai/Nyirabrany International Railway 
3 Episcopia Bihor/Beretyoufalu International Railway 
4 Borş/Artand International Vehicle 
5 Salonta/Mehkerek International Vehicle 
6 Salonta/Mehkerek International Railway 
7 Oradea International Airport 
8 Debrecen International Airport 
 
Source: Alexandru Ilieş, România. Euroregiuni, Oradea, 2004, p174 
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Map 3. Ethnics groups in Bihor-Hajdu Bihar  
 
 
 
Source: Tabel 2, Tabel 3, Tabel 4 
 
Table 2. Ethnic structure in the Bihor – Hajdu Bihar Euroregion in 2002 
 
Ev 
Region 
NTUS 3 
Összesen Román Magyar Cigány Német Szlovák Ukrán Egyéb 
2002 Bihor 600246 404468 155829 30089 1163 7370 198 1304 
 % 100 67.38 25.96 5.01 0.19 1.22 0.03 0.21 
2001 
Hajdu 
Bihar 
553043 669 540721 10836 319 48 208 242 
 % 100 0.12 98.77 1.96 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.03 
2001 
2002 
Bihor- 
Hajdu 
Bihar 
Euroregion 
1153266 405137 696570 40925 1482 7418 406 1546 
 % 100 35.13 60.39 3.54 0.13 0.64 0.04 0.13 
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Table 3. The main towns in the Bihor County according to the 2002 statistics 
 
 Total Romani Maghiari 
Germa
ni 
Evrei Ţigani 
Ucrai 
nieni 
Szerb Szlovák 
Total 600246 404468 155829 1163 224 30089 198 35 7379 
Oradea 206614 145284 56985 563 166 2449 93 20 474 
Salonta 18074 7267 10335 29 3 379 9 1 45 
Aleşd 7387 4503 1566 9 3 938 3 - 360 
Beiuş 10996 9849 930 19 3 169 0 2 3 
Marghita 17291 9167 7468 33 2 485 3 1 82 
Nucet 2399 2275 66 8  44    
Ştei 8637 8272 319 8 2 18 4  2 
Vale lui 
Mihai 10324 
1442 8757 10 4 95 4  5 
Vaşcău 2854 2804 15 5  20 9   
Săcuieni 11665 891 9010 3 1 1747 1  2 
 
Source: http://www.kia.hu/konyvtar/erdely/erd2002/bhetn02.pdf 
 
Table 4 . Towns in the Hajdu Bihar County 
 
Locality Inhabitants Locality Inhabitants Locality Inhabitants 
Debrecen 211 034 Hajdúszoboszló 23 425 Téglás 6 213 
Balmazújváros 17 974 Létavértes 7 045 Hajdúdorog 9 463 
Berettyóújfalu 16 116 Nádudvar 9 074 Hajdúhadház 12 709 
Biharkeresztes 4 230 Nyíradony 7 701 Hajdúnánás 18 055 
Derecske 9 136 Polgár 8 373 Tiszacsege 4 975 
Hajdúböszörmény 31 993 Püspökladány 15 946   
 
Source: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/04/tartalom.html 
 
 
Table 5.  Comune în Hajdu Bihar 
 
Locality Inhabitants Locality Inhabitants Locality Inhabitants 
Álmosd 1 694 Görbeháza 2 641 Nyírábrány 3 952 
Ártánd 550 Hajdúbagos 1 972 Nyíracsád 3 982 
Bagamér 2 418 Hajdúsámson 10 677 Nyírmártonfalva 2 165 
Bakonszeg 1 240 Hajdúszovát 3 149 Pocsaj 2 733 
Báránd 2 692 Hencida 1 318 Sáp 1 051 
Bedő / Bedeu 317 Hortobágy 1 772 Sáránd 2 310 
Berekböszörmény 1 849 Hosszúpályi 5 471 Sárrétudvari 3 009 
Bihardancsháza 218 Kaba 6 369 Szentpéterszeg 1 252 
Biharnagybajom 2 936 Kismarja 1 400 Szerep 1 628 
Bihartorda 988 Kokad 701 Tépe 1 175 
Bocskaikert 2 410 Komádi 6 015 Tetétlen 1 463 
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Locality Inhabitants Locality Inhabitants Locality Inhabitants 
Bojt 590 Konyár 2 263 Tiszagyulaháza 828 
Csökmő 2 171 
Körösszakál / 
Săcal 
911 Told 353 
Darvas 650 
Körösszegapáti 
/ 
Apateu 
984 Újiráz 596 
Ebes 4 480 
Magyarhomoro
g 
917 Újléta 1 071 
Egyek 5 535 Mezőpeterd 586 Újszentmargita 1 602 
Esztár 1 367 Mezősas 680 Újtikos 931 
Folyás 430 Mikepércs 3 465 Vámospércs 5 465 
Földes 4 338 Monostorpályi 2 191 Váncsod 1 348 
Furta 1 182 Nagyhegyes 2 665 
Vekerd / 
Vecherd 
167 
Fülöp 1 895 Nagykereki 1 361 Zsáka 1 702 
Gáborján 928 Nagyrábé 2 367   
 
Source: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/04/tartalom.html 
 
 
At the level of Bihor County there is another structure, namely Oradea 
Metropolitan Area, a structure gathering around Oradea the communities that 
now have a more harmonious perspective for development; see below the 
demographic composition of Oradea Metropolitan Area  
Debrecen and Oradea are two cities with a common history of almost 
800 years old, so we think that in the near future, it is likely to begin a much 
closer cooperation, it can set the example of good practice, as being the most 
modern and developed in terms of cross-border relations. 
The ethnic-demographic analysis at the level of the two neighbouring 
counties, plus the analysis of the territorial administrative units, show us an 
ethnic-demographic diversity at the Romanian-Hungarian border, in a region 
that shares the same history for more than 800 years, period with moments of 
cross-border cooperation. 
Nowadays, and more accurately after 1989, the cooperation at the 
Romanian-Hungarian border at the level of Debrecen and Oradea communities 
and of Bihor-Hajdu Bihar Euroregion has been more dynamic than ever. We 
can note an increased cooperation, in a diversity of ethnicities, and cultures, and 
religions; moreover, the perspectives of a cross-border cooperation and more 
recently territorial through the newest European cooperation instrument, i.e. 
Groupings for Territorial Cooperation - EGTC, have led us to debating on a 
new form of cooperation at the level of the two communities of Debrecen and 
Oradea, mainly through a possible Eurometropolis Debrecen – Oradea. 
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Abstract. Intercultural and interethnic tensions have influenced the formation of 
Moldova's statehood, and have largely determined the political consciousness and behavior of 
the population over the past 20 years. Different socio-cultural issues such as national 
identity, the historical, linguistic and religious questions etc. have been subject to various 
participatory events and numerous civic and protest actions. This proved the existence and 
maintenance of a strong center-periphery cleavage (in terms of S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan) 
in the post-communist context in the Moldovan state. Moldovan society remains divided in 
the promoters of nationalist message and the advocates for multicultural vision of state 
development, and communication between them is quite formal and inefficient. One of the 
main criteria of the division of population in these opposed categories is the national self-
identification, which confirms the key role of national factors in determining the intercultural 
dialogue in the country. The ambivalence in social and cultural orientations of Moldovan 
citizens determined the ambiguity in the civilizational status of Moldova. This causes the 
presence of fragmented and conflictual political culture in Moldova, which affects national 
consolidation and modernization of the state in general. The purpose of this paper lies in 
highlighting and analyzing the features of consciousness and socio-political behavior of 
representatives of various ethnic groups in Moldova, and the main national and ethno-
cultural problems and issues characteristic for Moldovan society during the last 20 years. 
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The actual processes of globalization intensify the interaction and 
contraposition of different socio-cultural models. The catalytic role in these 
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* MA Political Sciences, scientific employee State University of the Republic of Moldova, 
Scientific laboratory ―Political Sociology‖, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, E-mail: 
anna_gorban@yahoo.com 
Keywords: democratization, ethnic minorities, national identity, ethnic consciousness, 
ethnic conflict, ethno-cultural stereotypes. 
 
Anna GORBAN 
 
134 
extent on the socio-cultural self-identification process of individuals, social 
groups and large human communities. It is caused by the special significance 
ethnic identity has for the individuals and for the society. Thus, Professor of 
Social Anthropology, University of Sussex (UK) A. Epstein argues that ethnic 
identification ―... is the ultimate identity, which embraces the smaller roles, 
statuses and identities‖ (Avksentiev, 1996: 44). 
Ethnicity is not a matter of free choice. In most cases, people "choose" 
their ethnic identity once in a lifetime in the socialization process, which with 
rare exceptions is not conscious. If linguistic and religious elements of socio-
cultural code are relatively flexible and may be subject to personal choice, then 
ethnic identity is static and remains virtually unchanging. People change their 
religion, learn foreign languages, acquire new values and beliefs, identify with 
the new symbols, adapt to a new way of living, but at the same time cannot 
change their roots, ethnicity being constant in this regard. If ethnogenesis is 
mixed (parents with different ethnicity) the situation is complicated, there is a 
socio-cultural conflict, in which the individual is exposed simultaneously or 
sequentially to the influence coming from different ethnicities (Balan, 2008: 77). 
Beginning in the 1960s, Western civilization discovers a new social 
phenomenon - the ethnic revival or ethnic paradox of our time. The essence of this 
phenomenon is the significant increase in the role of ethnicity in social processes, 
renewed interest in ethnic culture, language, customs, traditions, way of life against 
the backdrop of the growing internationalization of economic, social and political 
life and globalization of human activity (Avksentiev, 1996: 47). 
In the 1960-1970-s ethnic revival spreads into Europe, gradually involving 
more and more nations in the process. In the former Soviet Union, ethnic revival is 
evident from the mid-1980s, playing an important role in the subsequent 
disintegration of the state. In the last third of a century ethnic revival turned into a 
worldwide phenomenon, defining the contours of the historical process at the turn 
of the century. The ethnic revival is not an ethnic conflict by itself, but it has a 
strong conflict-potential. The line separating ethnic patriotism from nationalism is 
very blurred and mobile. A slight change of emphasis can often lead to crossing the 
invisible line, and developing of intellectual and spiritual environment favorable for 
the conflict (Avksentiev, 1996: 48). 
National contradictions are also characteristic for Moldova, a 
multiethnic and multicultural state, which after becoming independent has 
stepped on a very complex and controversial way of finding its own identity, its 
place in the contemporary world (Moşneaga, 2001: 148). On the territory of 
Moldovan state have merged elements of various socio-cultural models, 
including the Western model (European), Eastern Christian (Orthodox) and 
Turkic (Gagauz) with strong influence from Hebrew, Armenian, and other 
cultures. All this has been a fertile ground for the emergence and development 
of various conflicts of ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc. nature. A complicating 
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factor in this regard is the geopolitical one, which is manifested both globally 
(Republic of Moldova as part of post-Soviet space, which American political 
scientist Z. Brzeziński called "grand chessboard" where the interests of big 
powers such as USA, EU and Russia are played), and locally, Moldova being 
situated in a region called by Western researcher "space of tension" between 
Russia, Romania and Ukraine (Jaz'kova, 2008: 289).  
Throughout the process of democratic transition ethnic and social 
cleavages continuously troubled and divided Moldovan society. Unstable 
economic and political situation in the country to some extent is caused by the 
unbalanced ethnic and political situation - consequences of armed conflict 
between left and right banks of the Dniester, the lack of integration of the 
Gagauz autonomy in the united socio-political and cultural space of the 
republic, various contradictions on the national, linguistic, historical issues. This 
and more is not conducive to the maintenance of stability within the state and 
the final determination of the civilizational status of the country (in particular, 
the process of European integration). 
Decisive role of ethno-cultural issues has been specific for difficult 
transition process in the Moldovan society, the very creation of independent and 
sovereign Moldovan state being preceded by national revival activism at the end of 
1980s - early 1990s. At the end of 1980s Moldovan society was subject to excessive 
politicization manifested in the phenomena of political frustration and large extent 
of participatory forms of protest. Engaging people in the political sphere was 
stimulated by disintegration processes in the USSR, the deepening ethnical 
problems and promoted democratic ideas, the population being divided into two 
opposing camps - reformers and conservatives. Protest activism centered on 
ethno-cultural issues reached its peak within the 1990-1991 period, due to the 
democratic forces supported by overwhelming number of militants. 
The liberalization process initiated by Gorbachev‘s "restructuring", 
created favorable climate which prompted the appearance and 
institutionalization of political and ideological pluralism. Political pluralism in 
Moldovan society, in particular, was determined by the national revival with the 
upraise of various social formations in 1988-1989 (Popular Front of Moldova, 
International Movement "Unity-Edinstvo", Popular Movement "Gagauz Halki" 
and Bulgarian Social-Cultural Association "Vozrojdenie"). Gradually, however, 
they began to make political demands, which were derived from national and 
language problems. One of the defining features of the considered period reside 
in different attitudes and specific orientations of political parties and social 
movements towards the national question, to the process of national revival of  
titular and other ethnic groups inhabiting the country. 
It should be mentioned also that after declaring of independence of 
Moldova, local intellectuals were mainly pro-Romanian, rural population was 
mainly pro-Moldovan and Russian-speaking minorities, who constituted in the 
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early 90s about 35% of all population and were concentrated in the main cities, 
have expressed constant pro-Russian attitudes. Indeed, the value systems 
shared by Moldovans over a millennium and more were deeply Christian, being 
substituted in the 40s-90s of the last century with the communist ones. Finally, 
the consequences were dramatic - faith in God was lost, and communism was 
impossible to be built. This resulted, on the one hand, in frustration and lack of 
values for the absolute majority of the population, and on the other hand, 
created a true "paradise" for the "upstarts". In such cases, usually luck of 
guidelines is compensated by calls to return to the "authentic" national, 
traditional values, ancestor‘s faith, etc. This situation stimulated the rise of 
nationalism in the late '80s and early ‗90s, when the disintegration of USSR has 
occurred. Later, the transition has imposed "borrowing" of some attractive 
social models, which asserted its viability and performance in other, Western 
countries (Guvernare şi democraţie, 2008: 12-13). 
Development of nationalist and Russophobe tendencies in Moldova in 
the late 1980's fits into such phenomenon as the emergence of new 
nationalisms in the former Soviet Union or the "new irredentism". The post-
Soviet space, according to Ernest Gellner, refers to "the fourth belt" of 
"irredentisation" process that is, the emergence of new nations and 
nationalisms. Any emerging nationalism must be directed against any external 
enemy (a "negative integrator") used for the integration, of the new nation. 
Virtually in all post-Soviet countries, the object of such "integration against" 
was Russia as the former imperial center. In addition, the growth of such 
rhetoric is triggered using Russia as a "negative integrator" in many "third zone" 
countries by E. Gellner (Eastern Europe and the Baltic). 
Fusion of the ideas of liberalism, anti-communism and nationalism, 
which occurred at the beginning of the democratic reform of the Republic of 
Moldova‘s political system initiated processes of social disintegration, splitting 
the society on the political and ethnic grounds. Use of nationalist rhetoric by 
the supporters of liberal ideas, often with offensive attacks on the non-titular 
ethnic groups living in the country, has turned a considerable part of Russian-
speaking population into the social stronghold of the conservative forces which 
resist change in the new socio-political conditions. Therefore the political 
culture of the Moldovan society since the beginning of transition has become a 
split culture (Braga, 2010: 100).  
Later, in the 1990 - 1994 period political forces continued to formulate 
those values under which they intended to win confidence of the public. 
During this period the right political forces called for democratization, 
"national renaissance", orientation for union with Romania. Thus, in view of 
local researchers I. Rusandu and R. Cărbune Moldovan political spectrum 
during the 90 has two aspects, namely ethno-national and socio-economic: 
- early 90's - concern for ethno-national and national-state problems; 
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- starting with the mid '90s  - differences and confrontations between 
political parties mainly based on socio-economic problems (Rusandu, Cărbune, 
2008: 53). 
However, despite the relative attenuation of national factor in identity of 
political parties in the country, the population of the republic still makes a 
distinction between political parties, taking into account the ethnic factor, i.e. 
distinguishes parties oriented toward Romania and Russia oriented parties 
(Rusandu, Cărbune, 2008: 54). Urgency of ethno-cultural issues is related also 
with the ambiguity of Moldova's geopolitical status, which explains to some 
extent the division of political parties and organizations by national criteria.  
From time to time issue of interethnic relations in the Republic of 
Moldova has a new impetus, becomes a "bargaining chip" in the political game of 
different political parties and socio-political movements. With great power 
confrontation on the ethnic and cultural basis manifested during the protests in 
the first half of 2002, when Christian Democratic People's Party had demanded 
rescinding of the authority‘s decision on the introduction of compulsory schools 
courses of Russian language and history of Moldova, starting with the second 
grade (Bolotov, 2002: 52). The abovementioned events were also notable for the 
fact that these unpopular measures related to the linguistic and historical issues 
adopted by ruling Communist Party have provoked demands of Government‘s 
resignation. Along with other examples of civil dissent in the history of 
Moldova's independence, this fact clearly demonstrates that the imprudent 
handling of matters of ethnic and socio-cultural order could seriously undermine 
the legitimacy of national political parties. 
In general, the dynamics of many contemporary conflicts confirms the 
role of catalyst of national factor for the emergence and escalation of intergroup 
contradictions, and the fairly high receptivity of the masses to ethnical problem 
certifies the actuality of this parameter for the social self-identification process. In 
particular, such a situation is characteristic for multinational societies usually in 
the process of transition, with the population which is characterized by a split 
consciousness by unresolved national self-determination issue. The Republic of 
Moldova is typical in this respect, the conflict of identity representations in the 
Moldovan society is manifested not only by national problem (dividing of the 
titular ethnic group in "Moldavians" and "Romanians"), but also language 
problems ("Moldovan" or "Romanian") and historical ("History of Romanians" 
or "History of Moldova"). Such a state of continuous division of society based on 
many parameters is created due to objective (problematic and ambiguous 
historical past) and the subjective (ideological and politicized approach to socio-
cultural issues, manipulation and speculation on national linguistic and historical 
issues, in order to achieve personal and group interests of the various forces 
inside and outside the country) factors. Artificial kindling of socio-cultural 
contradictions preserves and deepens the existing in Moldova strong social 
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"center-periphery" cleavage (in terms of S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan), namely 
between representatives of ethnic minorities and the titular nation. Therefore, 
Moldavian researchers R. Gorincioi and V. Varzari deemed deliberate 
politicization of ethnic relations, the language ethnonyms, history and identity is 
part of the political threats and vulnerabilities for national security (Gorincioi, 
Varzari, 2007: 48).  
According to renowned Moldavian analyst I. Boţan, "Moldova is 
practically the only country in Europe where identity crisis (Moldovan - 
Romanian) is a determining factor in attitudes polarization of political forces. It is 
used constantly in election campaigns, starting with the 1994 elections. In this 
respect, serious discussions between the parties on social-economic and political 
issues are often deliberately replaced with ethno-linguistic, historical, etc. 
discussions. This kind of discussion has the maximum propaganda impact, 
appealing directly to the emotions of citizens and the natural need of identity" 
(Guvernare şi democraţie, 2008: 38).  
Maintaining largely artificial division of the Moldovan society by national 
criteria perfectly fits the logic of fragmented and conflicting political culture, both 
in terms of differences between the its carriers and in terms of ways of expression 
and its functioning. In the political culture, and beyond, there is a social isolation, 
lack of trust between different social groups and classes, between elites and 
masses, reflecting different states of conflict and political instability generating 
social tension in society (Fruntaşu, Rusnac, 1999: 76). 
In this context there is a series of questions: 1. What is the nature of 
ethnic consciousness and other socio-cultural identity in Moldova? 2. What is the 
mechanism that determines the individual's self-identification with an ethnic or 
national group and its subsequent political socialization in the chosen 
community? 3. What are the characteristics of socio-political consciousness and 
behavior of representatives of various ethnic groups in Moldova? 
 
1. Ethnic consciousness and other socio-cultural identity in 
Moldova 
 
Self-consciousness and national consciousness are manifested in their full 
extent especially during the turning point stages in the historical development of 
nations. From this perspective, in the modern Republic of Moldova development 
conditions national factor is manifested by an explosion of ethnic consciousness - 
both titular ethnic group, and other ethnic groups living in the same space. Ethnic 
origin remains one of the basic forms of manifestation of individuality, because in 
principle there are no people without national affiliation or ethnic group without its 
concrete bearers. Thus, ethnic traits of human individuality are indissoluble 
components of its concrete socio-human existence (Balan, 2008: 101). 
Moldovan political analyst N. Vizitei describing the social consciousness 
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in Moldova, qualifies its ethno-cultural component as one of "ideological blocks" 
specific to local population (others being soviet-socialist ideas, the principles of 
liberal doctrine and orthodox religious values) (Vizitei, 1998: 226). Thus, social 
orientations and principles related to the idea of strengthening and development 
of specific ethno-cultural consciousness are immanent to Moldovan citizens. 
The high importance of the ethnic component in the social 
consciousness of the Moldovan population is due, in particular, the fact that in 
situations of social uncertainty, which is characterized by unpredictability, 
difficulty to control, individual searches support group required to meet the basic 
needs in stability. Along with such characteristics of ethnic group as the stability 
in time and status, stability of composition, important function of ethnicity in 
modern society is that it serves as a kind of "information filter" which allows 
people to identify themselves with a particular social group, and to be oriented 
towards its norms and values (Kaunenko, 2008: 40).  
A high level of national identity in Moldova can be demonstrated on the 
basis of statistical data on the importance of various socio-cultural identities for 
Moldovan students (Table 1). 
Empirical data were obtained during quantitative sociological research 
held in spring 2010 by a team of researchers from the State University of 
Moldova within international bilateral project "Youth in civilizational dilemma: 
based on Republic of Moldova and southern Russia" (survey based on the sample 
of 1226 students of the major universities and colleges of the northern, central 
and southern regions of the country). 
Statistical data in Table 1 demonstrate a high level of civil, ethnic and 
religious identities of the Moldovan youth. As part of the distribution of 
responses, depending on the nationality of the students we should note the high 
level of recognition of importance of civic identity by all ethnic groups; for 70-
80% of them the statement "I am - a citizen of the Republic of Moldova" is true. 
The exceptions are Ukrainian respondents, among them the rate is half the figure. 
These correlations are broadly confirmed by the national surveys data, according 
to which 85% (index 0,74) of Moldavians/Romanians, 72% (index 0,48) of 
Russians and 78% (index 0,61) of Ukrainians1 are proud of the status of citizen of 
the Republic of Moldova. At the same time the answers of ethnic minorities‘ 
representatives are more reserved in this regard. In particular, among 
representatives of the titular ethnic group the option "I am very proud" prevailed, 
while among Russians and Ukrainians - "I am quite proud‖ (Barometrul de 
Opinie Publică, 2011: 125).  
 
                                                          
1 Unfortunately, survey data refers only to the Russians and Ukrainians. 
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Table 1. The significance of the main socio-cultural identities for young students 
of the Republic of Moldova in general and depending on ethnicity  
(% of total number of respondents for each type of identity) 
 
Significance  
level 
Opinion / 
nationality 
It is very 
important 
to me 
 
It is 
importan
t to me 
 
It is of 
little 
importance 
to me 
It is not 
important 
to me at all 
 
No 
answer 
Total Index2 
I am a citizen of the 
Republic of Moldova 
 
33,8 
 
46,2 
 
15,3 
 
4,0 
 
0,7 
 
100 
 
0,61 
Moldavians 36,8 46,7 13,4 2,8 0,3 100 0,67 
Romanians3 31,4 52,3 12,8 2,3 1,2 100 0,69 
Russians 21,7 48,3 21,7 8,3 0 100 0,40 
Ukrainians 14,3 30,3 39,3 14,3 1,8 100 -0,09 
Gagauz 23,2 55,4 16,0 5,4 0 100 0,57 
Bulgarians 40,6 34,4 18,8 6,2 0 100 0,50 
I am a representative 
of my nationality  
 
45,3 
 
37,3 
 
12,8 
 
3,6 
 
1,1 
 
100 
 
0,66 
Moldavians 45,5 37,4 13,4 2,8 0,9 100 0,67 
Romanians 65,1 25,6 5,8 2,3 1,2 100 0,83 
Russians 28,3 50,0 16,7 5,0 0 100 0,57 
Ukrainians 25,0 42,9 19,6 12,5 0 100 0,36 
Gagauz 44,6 42,9 10,7 1,8 0 100 0,75 
Bulgarians 62,5 21,9 9,4 3,1 3,1 100 0,72 
I a m a representative 
of my religion  
 
47,0 
 
29,2 
 
14,2 
 
7,8 
 
1,8 
 
100 
 
0,54 
Moldavians 51,7 28,9 12,7 5,2 1,5 100 0,63 
Romanians 41,9 24,4 22,1 10,5 1,1 100 0,34 
Russians 16,7 36,7 28,3 18,3 0 100 0,07 
Ukrainians 26,8 28,6 23,2 21,4 0 100 0,11 
Gagauz 50,0 25,0 10,7 12,5 1,8 100 0,52 
Bulgarians 37,5 31,3 9,4 15,6 6,2 100 0,44 
 
 
                                                          
2 The index is calculated by the formula: I = (+) - (-) / (+) + (0) + (-), where (+) - "It is 
very important to me" and "It is important to me", (-) - "It is of little importance to me" 
and "It's not important to me at all"; (0) - "No answer". The numerical value of the 
index ranges from +1 to -1, respectively, from positive to negative value of variable. 
3 Moldovan or Romanian ethnicities were chosen by the respondents themselves. In this 
case it is necessary to understand the fact that students who identified themselves as 
"Moldavians" or "Romanian" are part of the same majority ethnic group (the titular 
nation). Separation of the respondents into "Moldavians" and "Romanians" in the 
survey is necessary to identify the specific of socio-cultural identity of each of these 
categories. As well know, the dichotomy between "Moldovan" and "Romanian" 
identity emerged due to the ideological perception of national and cultural issues, 
conflict of approaches to political and historical processes in the country and appears 
not only in the "disrupted" identity of the titular ethnic group but also in the name of 
the state language (Moldovan/Romanian), and national history study courses ("History 
of Romanians"/"Integrated History" or "History of Moldova"). 
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To be mentioned high level of national consciousness, which is observed 
in representatives of all analyzed ethnic groups: the vast majority of respondents 
for each of these categories underscores the importance of belonging to a 
particular nationality.  
This figure is highest among those who identify themselves as Romanians 
and the Bulgarians and Gagauz: about 90% of these groups emphasize the 
importance of the attitude "I am a representative of my ethnic group", of which 
almost two-thirds believe that "it is very important" for them (among the Gagauz, 
this percentage is less than 44,6%). Among the other ethnic groups (Moldovans, 
Ukrainians and Russian) the importance of national identity is represented at the 
level of 70-80%, and, unlike the students of Moldovan nationality, Russians and 
Ukrainians are more reserved in this respect: only a quarter of them share the view 
of the special, high importance of this type of socio-cultural identity (the 
representatives of the majoritarian nation – 45,5%). 
Analyzing the level of development and priority of the religious factor in 
the self-determination of the respondents, it should be noted the high importance 
of this type of identity for young people of Moldavian nationality (80,6%), Gagauz 
(75%), Bulgarians (68,8%) and students with self-identification as Romanians 
(66,3%). Ukrainians and Russians in particular are less inclined to associate 
themselves with any religion: slightly more than half of respondents from each of 
these ethnic groups recognize the importance of this identity component. 
Thus, the above data confirmed high level of importance of ethnical 
identity for students of different ethnicity. In this connection, noteworthy is the 
fact that the minimum value of the index of the importance of national identity 
is recorded in students of East Slavic ethnic origin (Russian and in particular 
Ukrainian). Amorphousness of identity views of Slavic respondents is obviously 
connected with their less compact residence compared with the Bulgarians and 
Gagauz and greater territorial dispersion, which in turn determines high level of 
integration in the socio-cultural space of the country. National minority living 
in the south of Moldova, have a territorial-administrative (Gagauz) or cultural 
(Bulgaria) autonomy, allowing them to avoid large-scale assimilation with the 
majority nation and maintain a high level of national consciousness.  
A specific feature of ethnic consciousness Moldovan youth is its 
structure. According to some researchers in the field (Kaunenko, 2006) for 
titular and Russian ethnic groups is characteristic the mono-ethnic identity, 
while for Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz – bi-ethnic, including 
identification with own ethnic group and not with the Russian  one while 
Russian language is the mother tongue for these ethnic minorities in Moldova 
(Timuş, 2008: 126). In this context, noteworthy is the fact that national 
minorities in Moldova have experienced two contradictory processes - updating 
of national identity, intraethnic consolidation - on the one hand, and cohesion 
Anna GORBAN 
 
142 
in a multinational ethno-political aggregate "Russian language speakers" - on 
the other (Shornikov, 2002: 163). 
Another aspect of ethnic consciousness is different stereotypes and 
normative notions of students related to the ethnic component of social life 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2.  Distribution of respondents based on the question "Compare the 
following statements and mark on the scale the statement which is closer to 
your opinion" (% of the respondents who answered the question) 
 
1. Interethnic marriages are natural 
and acceptable 
It is better to marry with 
representatives of the same 
nationality 
 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 Index 
29,9 12,2 21,2 17,8 18,9 -0,05 
2. National minorities should have 
equal rights with the titular ethnic 
group and have additional guarantees 
of their rights  
Representatives of the titular 
ethnic group holding should 
have unconditional priority  
 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 Index 
23,7 15,6 27,3 19,8 13,6 -0,06 
3. There are single laws of living, 
common for all humanity, which 
provides similarity of all 
communities in the world.  
Human world is characterized 
by a diversity of cultural 
models, each of which is unique 
and different from others  
 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 Index 
12,4 11,2 18,7 22,8 34,9 0,34 
4. My ethnicity is not so important to 
me; all people are equal and similar. 
My ethnicity plays an important 
role in my life  
 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 Index 
18,5 12,8 19,7 20,0 29,0 0,18 
 
Source:  Based on the data of the same sociological survey 
 
In analyzing the data presented in Table 2, an interesting picture 
emerges: first, the quite high significance of ethnicity among the students has 
been confirmed (position 4). Secondly, against the explicit recognition of 
cultural pluralism of the world (position 3), only less than 40% of the 
respondents believe that national minorities should enjoy equal rights with 
majority nation and provided with additional guarantees of their rights (position 
2). It is noteworthy that almost a third of the students chose to give a neutral 
response (a score of "0") on this "tricky" question and another third favored the 
"absolute priority of representatives of state-nation". Third, the number of 
young people who think that mono-ethnic marriages are more appropriate is 
quite large (36,7%), while the number of supporters of the opposing point of 
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view is only 6% bigger (position 1). 
Thus, we can draw conclusions about the relative progressiveness of the 
views of the Moldovan students in certain aspects of national issues. At the 
same time, ethnic and cultural stereotypes of young people signal a certain 
patriarchal and conservative attitudes (attraction in more than a third of 
respondents to the unmixed marriages), and also identify risk of maintaining 
and deployment of nationalist tendencies (recognition of importance of 
ethnicity and sharing the ideas about the primacy of the rights of titular nation 
in the third of the students). 
The conflict potential of ethnic and cultural stereotypes of young people 
may be explained, partly by that, perhaps, against the background of continued 
relatively high level of ethnic tolerance in Moldova, so-called protective 
nationalism is growing fueled by the fear of representatives of the titular ethnic 
group of exclusion from familiar to them life space (Petuhov, 2004: 35).  
 
2. Ethnic consciousness and political consolidation 
 
In this context the problem of the interaction between ethnic 
consciousness and identity on the one hand and political sphere, on the other 
arises. Correlation between national and political factors is fairly complex and is 
determined by their interdependence. Social-economic problems and political 
issues intertwine in ethnic canvas, forming a whole, a complete and complex 
picture of contemporary society. Difficulties and socio-economic, political and 
spiritual crises in the society largely condition transformation of ethnic 
consciousness of people (Balan, 2008: 107). 
An important aspect of the interaction between ethnic and political factors 
is related to the problem of correlation between such phenomena as ethnic identity 
and national identity. According to Romanian researcher Maria Cobianu-Bacanu 
(Cobianu-Băcanu, 1999: 313-314) ethnic identity is the consciousness of belonging 
to an ethnic group, which shows both in the inter-relations and in internal world of 
those who belong to the group. In relation to ethnic identity, national identity, 
according to the researcher, means consciousness of belonging to a nation and 
both adoption and evidence of common features shared with its members, 
expressed in culture, language, religion, customs and traditions. Centered on nation, 
nation-state and national sentiment, national identity is strongly linked to a territory 
and has political connotation. Researcher concludes that as an attribute of the 
individual, national identity is an option, meaning that the individual has the right 
to opt for a national identity that does not result automatically from ethnic identity 
(Balan, 2008: 78).  
Thus, the connection between ethnic and political factor is mediated by 
national problem and shows, in fact, as the question of correlation between 
particular and general, which requires integration of ethno-cultural features in a 
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single socio-cultural system. This is achieved through the mechanism of political 
socialization of the individual, especially by its pluralistic model specific to 
European countries, where the presence of various subcultures, which initially 
socialize individual according to values, roles and norms specific for the given 
subculture (party, ethnic group etc.), and does not prevent achievement of national 
consensus, because of existence of a set of common values (Balan, 2009: 69).  
Such a model corresponds to the specificity of the Republic of Moldova, 
multiethnic and multicultural state, where the optimal strategies for the 
development of unique national consciousness, could favorably influence the 
quality of political life, as well as psychosocial and interethnic climate (Balan, 
2008: 107). Integration of ethnic particularities in a single national space is 
important for establishing the civic political culture in Moldova, which involves 
arranging the interests and actions of all social actors in a set of general societal 
values and goals. 
However currently in Moldova exists an ambivalence of national interest 
due to opposition of pro-European and pro-Russian vectors in local socio-
political life. Society remains divided by national criteria, and the population is 
far from model of consolidated and united nation. 
 
3. Political subcultures of ethnic minorities in Moldova  
 
According to political scientists P. Fruntaşu and G. Rusnac in the 
Moldovan political culture can be distinguished certain categories of subcultures, 
which include also the ethno-linguistic one (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, etc. 
political subcultures).  
Peculiarities of political subcultures of minorities in Moldova can be 
identified through Republican polls data analysis, which allows revealing of 
socio-political consciousness of representatives of country‘s various ethnic 
groups (in this context our analysis is limited to the titular nation, Russians and 
Ukrainians due to lack of empirical data on other ethnic groups). To achieve 
our purpose we will call the data of Public Opinion Barometer from May 2011, 
conducted by the Institute for Public Policy of Moldova (Table 3). 
First of all we should mention that the local population does not show a 
significant concern in the issue of interethnic relations in Moldova, it always occupies 
the last place among problems which the citizens of our country are concerned (after 
the last survey in May 2011 with interethnic relations are concerned only 3% of 
respondents, the highest indicator is among Ukrainians - 7%). 
Responses to survey questions showed that ethnic Russians and 
Ukrainians show a higher level of dissatisfaction of virtually all aspects of social 
and political situation in the country (Russians are significantly more dissatisfied 
than other ethnic groups with their job and Ukrainians - the available financial 
resources and politics). Also, Russians and especially Ukrainians gave more 
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negative evaluation to changes in their lives over the last year and expressed a 
stronger skepticism for improving their lives in the near future. 
Regarding the political parameters slightly higher interest in politics 
among ethnic minorities was found. According to the survey, ethnic Russians 
and Ukrainians show less confidence in virtually all socio-political institutions 
(governmental and non-governmental) in the country compared with the 
Moldavians/Romanians. 
Exceptions in this respect are parties, the credibility of which is equal 
for all ethnic study. The survey showed that there are more Russians and 
Ukrainians than Moldavians/Romanians, who believe that Moldova is not 
governed by the will of the people and that elections in Moldova are not free 
and fair (this applies only to Russians). Also among Russians and Ukrainians 
were more frequently certified orientations towards electoral absenteeism and 
predisposition to protest activities. 
After analyzing Barometer of Public Opinion data we can conclude that 
socio-political consciousness of the East Slavic ethnic minorities (Russians and 
Ukrainians) is quite specific and indicates a certain level of marginalization of 
ethnic representatives in the Moldovan political space. Generally, we can talk 
about low credibility and legitimacy of social institutions in vision of main 
ethnic groups. Thus, it can be said that Russians and Ukrainians have proved to 
be more receptive to political instability and systemic socio-economic crisis in 
Republic of Moldova, mainly declarative character of pro-European slogans, 
the escalation of nationalist tendencies and increasing antagonism in society, 
which exacerbates existing socio-cultural contradictions. 
If socio-political consciousness of ethnic minorities in Moldova is 
characterized by higher levels of criticism and discontent with the basic parameters of 
social and political life, then how these characteristics are manifested in political 
behavior of these groups? In this regard, we note that in the past two years, after 
coming to power of right-wing political parties in July 2009, Moldova has seen 
increased political participation of ethnic minorities. Thus, in mid-2010, 20 public 
associations of national minorities of Moldova took the initiative to hold a referendum 
on declaring the Russian second state language, which they proposed to hold at the 
same time with a constitutional referendum on returning to the nation-wide procedure 
of president election. Certain initiatives on the improving the status of Russian 
language were developed by the Gagauz autonomy, its leadership sent to the Acting 
President Mihai Ghimpu on February 4, 2010 the proposals to amend the Constitution 
of Moldova, providing the Russian language with official status and give Gagauz-Eri 
the right for self-determination in case Republic of Moldova looses its independence. 
These initiatives were not supported by the Moldovan government, but despite this 
they are still relevant for certain part of society. Currently, in Bălţi, the second largest 
city of the right-bank Moldova, which has a high percentage of Russian speakers, an 
initiative group "The referendum for the Russian language" has been created. 
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Table 3.  Moldovan population attitude towards various aspects of local social life 
overall and depending on ethnicity (the indexes4 of the total number of 
respondents in each category). 
 
                                  Population  
category 
Variable 
Overalll 
population 
Moldavians / 
Romanians 
Russians Ukrainians 
Overall assessment of the country‘s 
direction of development ("right/wrong")  
-0,46 -0,42 -0,67 -0,74 
The degree of satisfaction with economic 
situation in the country 
-0,48 -0,45 -0,45 -0,59 
Assessment of the political life of the 
country 
-0,41 -0,38 -0,43 -0,61 
The degree of satisfaction with own life -0,21 -0,17 -0,30 -0,29 
Assessment of changes in own life over 
the last year ("better / worse") 
-0,19 -0,15 -0,36 -0,50 
Forecast of change in own life through the 
year ("better / worse") 
0,07 0,12 -0,22 -0,19 
Evaluation of the availability of free access to 
information for people such as respondent  
0,28 0,27 0,21 0,19 
Assessment of freedom of expression on 
the country's leadership 
0,04 0,04 0,07 -0,07 
Assessment of personal freedom for street 
protest against the decision taken by the 
government  
-0,19 -0,20 -0,07 -0,10 
Level of interest for politics -0,03 -0,05 0,04 0,03 
Evaluation of opportunities for people like 
the respondent to influence the decision 
making process at local level  
-0,47 -0,48 -0,46 -0,47 
Evaluation of opportunities for people like 
the respondent to influence the decision 
making process at national level 
-0,58 -0,59 -0,48 -0,53 
The potential to vote in case of 
organization of parliamentary elections in 
the near future  
0,76 0,78 0,64 0,70 
Evaluation of governance in Moldova in 
terms of its conformity to the will of the 
people 
-0,39 -0,34 -0,52 -0,49 
Assessment of fairness and freedom of 
elections in Moldova 
-0,15 -0,13 -0,38 -0,07 
 
Source:  Public Opinion Barometer from May 2011 (Barometrul de opinie publică, 2011) 
                                                          
4 The index is calculated by the formula: I= (+) - (-) / (+) + (0) + (-), where (+) - the 
response options corresponding to the positive evaluation of the variable, (-) - the 
response options corresponding to a negative assessment of the variable; (0) - the 
response options corresponding to a neutral evaluation of a variable, as well as the 
option "no answer". The numerical value of the index ranges from +1 to -1, 
respectively, from positive to negative value of the variable. 
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Political participation of Russian-speaking youth is part of the increased 
activity of the League of Russian youth of the Republic of Moldova, positioning 
itself as a social organization ethno-cultural anti-fascist organization. It 
organizes numerous events and pro-Russian and anti-Western activities (for 
example, the pickets demanding the dismantling of the memorial stone "In 
memory of victims of Soviet occupation and communist totalitarian regime", 
celebration of Russian holidays in Moldova, and rallies against NATO and the 
"Eastern Partnership", etc.). 
Thus, we can conclude the following theses: 
1. Ethnic and national component of the political culture of Moldova 
has played an important role in the formation of the Moldovan statehood itself, 
as well as in the dynamics and nature of the Moldovan public life throughout 
the 20-year period of democratic transition. 
2. The contradictions of ethnic and cultural character appear in the 
existing in Moldova cleavage "center (majority Romanian-speaking ethnic 
group)" - "peripherals (ethnic minorities, Russian language acts as their 
consolidation factor)". There is also observed the existence of identity conflict 
within the titular ethnic group (Moldovan versus Romanian identity in its 
national, linguistic and historical aspects). These conflicts cause the lack of a 
consolidated political nation and national unity in the country. 
 3. National problematic in Moldova has always been highly politicized. 
Ethno-cultural issues are often the subject of political speculation and 
propaganda by various parties and organizations. The split along ethnic lines 
existing in the Moldovan society nourishes and maintains the polarization of 
political forces and preferences (as a rule, representatives of the majoritary 
nation with the Romanian identity supported right-wing parties which use the 
nationalist and pro-Western rhetoric while ethnic minorities - the left flank 
parties, which speculate on the pro-Russian sentiments, important for a 
significant part of the population). 
 4. Ethno-cultural component of the social consciousness of the 
Moldovan population is characterized by a high level of national consciousness, 
well formed civil and religious identity among all ethnic groups (except for 
Russians and Ukrainians,  their social and cultural identities are less 
pronounced). Ethno-cultural stereotypes of Moldovan citizens are fairly 
progressive and broadly consistent with the pluralistic national model, but 
retain a certain potential for conflict and risk of deployment of nationalism. 
 5. Political culture of Moldova's population is still characterized by a 
high degree of conflict and fragmentation. It contains subcultures of different 
ethnic groups with certain particularities of political consciousness and behavior 
of their representatives. In general, the political culture of national minorities is 
characterized by a more critical and cautious attitude towards various aspects of 
social and political life, as well as a certain activity, including the protesting one, 
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directed towards promotion of their own ethnic interests at the political level. 
These processes are largely determined by the specifics of national and foreign 
policy pursued by the ruling in Moldova liberal-democratic forces. 
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Abstract. Citizenship represents the permanent legal and political relationship that 
exists between the state and the individual. Citizenship is often defined in terms of legislation 
and accompanying political debates, far from the realities experienced by citizens. 
Due to the lack of uniformity between laws of different countries regarding the criteria 
for granting citizenship, an individual can be found in a position to have more than one 
citizenship or in a position where his/her right to citizenship is denied. We are facing a 
citizenship conflict that bears the concept of multi-nationality or even of statelessness. 
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body, the citizen‘s loyalty toward the state that protects him and grants him civic 
rights, access to public life and civic participation (O'Byrne, 2003: 5-10). 
In this context, the citizen is a legal person, free to act in accordance 
with the law and entitled to claim protection of the law. 
The second dimension involves the possession by the citizens of a 
status of political agent, participating actively in the activity of political 
institutions of the political society. Not least, the notion of ―citizen‖ makes 
reference to membership of a political community that provides a distinct 
source of identity (Heater, 2004 188-191). 
How T. H. Marshall1 sees citizenship is fully conventional. First, he 
states that citizenship comes as a status attached to those community members 
possessing full rights, equals in terms of rights and liberties resulting from it. 
Marshall adds that different societies will assign different rights and different 
responsibilities to the citizen status, as there is no universal principle that may 
determine those rights and responsibilities which are particularly required by the 
citizenship, in general. It is the very fact that Marshall goes beyond the 
conventional idea, i.e. the membership of a community is predominantly a 
political matter, that it contributes greatly to the study of citizenship. He 
identifies three distinct parts or elements of citizenship: civil rights, political 
rights and social rights (Beşteliu, 1997: 147). 
The most important aspect of Marshall‘s theory on citizenship might be 
that he addresses directly and explicitly the issue of the relationship between 
citizenship and social class. Marshall notes that the development of modern 
citizenship institutions has coincided with the rise of capitalism. He regards this 
as an anomaly because, while capitalism creates class inequality between 
individuals, citizenship is a status that allows its possessors to enjoy same rights 
and responsibilities. Therefore, Marshall concludes that ―it is natural to expect 
that the impact of citizenship on the social class would take the form of a 
conflict between opposite principles‖. The description of this relationship is 
particularly convincing as Marshall succeeds in explaining the apparently 
opposite effects without falling in contradiction (Barbalet, 1998: 22). 
Mobility of individuals and development of societies lead to the concept 
of ―multiple citizenship‖, allowing people to be citizens of more than one 
country simultaneously (Tilly, 1996: 14-17). Each state is competent to 
establish, by national law, conditions for granting citizenship. The effects of 
citizenship as compared to other countries from the international community 
may be limited by norms of international law.   
Citizenship becomes even more complicated because, in time, a number 
of features will arise, such it is the case of ―dual citizenship‖ - the legal situation 
in which a person possesses at the same time citizenships of two different states 
                                                          
1 Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1893-1981), English sociologist, known for his essay 
collection on  citizenship and social classes  
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(http://www.euroavocatura.ro: 2011). This brings us to the main concept of 
this paper, with a note that we will address this concept at a much more 
pragmatic level. 
The basic principle of nationalism is the fact that each nation must 
create a nation-state, which, as its name says, must encompass the entire nation. 
In theory, this principle might work, but it is difficult to implement. The so-
called nation-states created after World War I and the fall of the great European 
empires, especially the Austro-Hungarian Empire, failed to meet this principle. 
The interdependence of the various ethnic communities living within the 
empire prevented them from reaching their objective, namely to create a 
nation-state for each community. The emergence of minorities in the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe created room for revisionist policies and 
proliferation of ethnic nationalism, which is based on cultural mobilization. 
This is the particular distinction between the one who belongs to the 
community, and the one who does not correspond to common features of 
language, religion and culture.  
After losing much of its territory, the new Hungarian state made a 
priority from protecting ―Hungarians from everywhere‖. Currently, when the 
period of aggressive nationalism has faded away, the protection of Hungarians 
in other countries relates to providing facilities for maintaining living contact 
with the Hungarian state, but especially to prevent assimilation. In 2010, the 
Hungarian government adopted the law granting dual citizenship to Hungarians 
in other countries, who could prove their Hungarian ancestry and who spoke 
the Hungarian language. This was an addition to the law on benefits granted to 
ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries of Hungary, adopted in 2001. 
Initially it included some important benefits for ethnic Hungarians, such as 
employment opportunities, social services and public health insurance. 
The attempt to protect the ethnic Hungarians was seen as a 
counterbalance to the troubled history that the Hungarian community has had. 
At the same time, it was perceived as an attempt to preserve the cultural 
identity intact. This discussion may seem outdated already, in the context of EU 
enlargement to the east and at a time when it is believed that the nationalist 
discourse has been put behind. 
Is dual citizenship a right, or a privilege granted to Hungarians in other 
countries? The protection issue of Hungarians from everywhere raises both 
nationalist reactions, and political responses. This paper addresses the 
politicization of these nationalist reactions within both Hungarian domestic 
politics, and domestic politics in countries that have a significant Hungarian 
minority. In addition, the integration of this situation in the unifying context of 
the European Union must also be addressed. 
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Hungarian Status Law, the precursor of dual citizenship  
 
The efforts to protect the Hungarian community from everywhere are 
explained by the specific of the Hungarian community. The extent of this 
community living outside Hungary‘s borders is ―unusually high, even for 
Europe‖; about a quarter of the ethnic Hungarians total live in Hungary‘s 
neighboring states (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 159). Most ethnic Hungarians live 
in Romania (about 1.7 million), in Slovakia, (about 600,000), in Ukraine (about 
135,000) and in Serbia (about 350 thousand) (http://news.bbc.co.uk: 2011). 
Thus, given the size of ethnic Hungarian community, its protection is regarded 
as a priority for the Hungarian authorities in Budapest. The irredentism that 
had manifested in public discourse, even up toward the ‗90s, was considered a 
possible solution to prevent assimilation of Hungarians living in the 
neighboring countries. But the prospect of accession to the European Union 
has mitigated these claims, and the desire for action in favor of minorities 
turned into a political initiative, called the Hungarian Status Law (Stewart, 2009: 
14). It was adopted in 2001, despite heated political debates and international 
protests (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 155). 
The result of this law was the introduction of a specific certificate for ethnic 
Hungarians living in Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia. 
The Hungarian Status Law defines a number of cultural, economic and 
political objectives. At the cultural level, the law aims to preserve the national 
identity of Hungarians beyond the borders, while at the economic level, the law 
plans to improve their living standards. These objectives are framed in the 
ambiguous idea of ―unification of the Hungarian nation‖ (Stewart, 2009: 15). 
The problem with the initiative lies in the reaffirmation of ethnic nationalism, 
based entirely on sharing a language and a religion common to all Hungarians. 
In a time when Hungary‘s neighboring states were focused on measures to 
protect minorities in the context of EU accession, the Hungarian state has 
reignited a debate of almost an irredentist nature. Furthermore, although it was 
a law that practically affected citizens of neighboring countries, the status law 
was a unilateral movement from Hungary to create ―a cross-border form of 
citizenship‖ (Malloy, 2008: 75). Although not offering direct citizenship, the 
benefits and privileges enjoyed by holders of this card were initially offered to 
create a sense of belonging to the Hungarian nation. 
Following protests of neighboring states, the law was amended in June 
2003. The benefits related to social security, public health services and access to 
employment were canceled. The amendment to the law stipulates that any 
benefits will be the result of bilateral agreements between the home country 
and Hungary. However, they maintained some privileges of Hungarian 
communities granted in the state of residence, namely providing funding for 
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organizations working to promote the Hungarian language and culture, and 
tradition of Hungarian identity (Krupper, 2010: 159). 
In conclusion, at a symbolic level, the premises of Hungarian 
citizenship had already existed for ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring 
states. The Hungarian status law can thus be considered a precursor of dual 
citizenship law because it establishes the symbolism of Hungarian citizenship 
and it institutionalizes it through an official document. However, there was a 
felt need to strengthen the links between the community from across the 
borders and the community from the ―mother land‖. These links refer to 
granting the Hungarian citizenship. The initiative started in 2004, but not even 
this one was accomplished without protests and objections from both the 
international space, and the domestic political environment in Hungary. 
 
Adoption and implementation of the law granting dual 
citizenship  
 
From 1 January 2011, ethnic Hungarians living in other countries can 
apply for Hungarian citizenship by a simplified procedure, described in the law 
adopted on 26 May 2010. The law liberalizes the application procedure for 
Hungarian citizenship as it eliminates the criterion for granting permanent 
residence in Hungary as a prerequisite to granting citizenship (Szymanowska, 
2011). But the right to Hungarian citizenship law is not coupled with the 
possibility to vote in internal elections in Hungary. 
At a first glance, this law seems to be just another move to stimulate the 
Hungarian community within neighboring Hungarian surroundings. However, 
the support and preservation of ethnic Hungarians‘ identity in other countries 
has been on the political agenda of the Fidesz Party that has recently won 
elections in the neighboring country. This move was supported by the 
rightwing Hungarian electorate, thereby decreasing support for the Jobbik 
Nationalist Party from 17% during the previous election to 7% (Szymanowska, 
2011). The Fidesz Party‘s strategy was therefore to incorporate in their agenda 
an initiative to boost Hungarian identity and this happened in accordance with 
a political scenario designed to ensure popular support for electoral victory. In 
fact, this was the first legislative draft voted by the new Hungarian parliament 
by an overwhelming majority (http://www.evz.ro, 2010). The law entered in force 
on 20 August, the National Day of Hungary. Thus, the new Hungarian 
government played the ethnic nationalism card, calling symbolism, history, and 
emotion in order to keep the Hungarian nation alive, a nation wronged 
throughout history and in order to contribute to shaping the myth of 
Hungarian pan-nationalism. 
International reactions caused problems for the Hungarian government. 
Romania, Serbia and Croatia reacted calmly to Hungary‘s decision. In the case 
of Romania, this is understandable because Romania has a similar law for 
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Moldovan citizens. It is important to add that the lack of reaction from 
Romania, however, was predictable, according to an analysis published in The 
Guardian or the Wall Street Journal. ―Since Bucharest, too, handed over 
discreetly thousands of passports to ethnic Romanians in the Republic of 
Moldova, which to be clear is not an EU member, Romania will not make 
much fuss of the dual citizenship law in Hungary‖ (Traynor, 2011), writes The 
Guardian.  Moreover, the Hungarian Deputy Prime-Minister stated that the 
Hungarian law is shaped almost entirely following the Romanian law: 
―Following the Romanian model, we will grant citizenship on a fast-track pace‖ 
(http://www.adevarul.ro, 2010).  
The Hungarian government has thus fended any criticism coming from 
the European Union by claiming similarity to the Romanian law. Although the 
Hungarian citizenship for the Hungarian ethnic minority within Romania and 
Slovakia remains symbolic, as both countries are members of the European 
Union (Slovakia is also a member of the Schengen area), the communities from 
Serbia and Ukraine might get Hungarian citizenship because of the possibility 
of moving freely throughout Europe. Neither Serbia, nor Ukraine had 
objections to enforcing the law (Szymanowska, 2011).  
According to some estimates, during the first three weeks of January 
about 8,000 applications were recorded in Romania. 
 
 Articles from the Romanian press 
 
The article titled “Dual citizenship for the Hungarians from 
Romania, a priority for Hungary” (http://www.ziare.com/europa/ 
ungaria/lege-controversata-in-ungaria-privind-dubla-cetatenie-1016296, 2011) 
published by the Cotidianul website on 15.04.2010, written by Razvan 
Ciobotariu, breaks down the structure of the new power in Budapest who 
wants to simplify the procedure for granting citizenship and for changing the 
diplomatic personnel within neighboring countries, and to establish a 
department of Hungarians from everywhere. By these measures the Hungarian 
Government wishes to accelerate the process of granting Hungarian citizenship 
by putting into operation an effective mechanism. 
 This mechanism has caused anxiety not only in the Romanian media but 
also in the world politics. The Romanian media presents with a significant dose 
of negativism the lack of reaction from the Romanian diplomacy. The lack of 
reaction was harshly criticized by the press in Romania, especially in direct 
comparison with the vehement reaction that the political sphere had in Slovakia. 
 The law on granting dual nationality to ethnic Hungarians living in 
neighboring countries will be one of the first laws passed by the new Hungarian 
parliament. This measure addresses approximately 3.5 million people, most of 
whom living in Romania and Slovakia. The vehement reaction that came from 
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Slovakia was not surprising, especially since these ethnic Hungarians will be 
granted Hungarian citizenship based only on filling in a simple individual 
application. Let us remind the reader that the ethnic Hungarian population is 
slightly over less 10% of the entire population in Slovakia. 
 In addition to criticizing the Romanian Government caused by the lack 
of response and to presenting the vehement Slovakian reaction, the Romanian 
media analyzes the political and legal approaches in Hungary that led to the 
adoption of this law.  
 The article published on the news website Ziare, on 18.05.2010, titled 
―Controversial law in Hungary, on dual citizenship‖ (Idem) presents the 
step-by-step political approach that was initiated and run by the Hungarian 
Governing party, Fidesz, which owns a majority of two thirds. In addition to 
this overwhelming majority of the Hungarian parliament there is the pressure 
put on both voters and Government by the far-right party Jobbik, which treats 
the subject of dual citizenship with special interest. 
 The media in Romania presents in several articles published in the 
period May to July 2010 some of the relief measures that have been adopted by 
the Hungarian authorities for states housing important communities of 
Hungarians. The Hungarian politicians invoke the Romanian model of granting 
citizenship for the ethnic Romanians in Moldova. 
 Regardless of the measures adopted by the Hungarian political circles, 
Slovakia has maintained the role of firm opponent to the project. 
Serbia and Ukraine that house important communities of Hungarians 
have not made any comments on the decision, although Ukraine does not allow 
for dual citizenship. 
Bucharest has not made any comments regarding the approach of 
Budapest, perhaps because the Romanian law allows for dual citizenship. 
Besides, Romania carries a similar policy of citizenship in the case of Romanian 
ethnics from the Republic of Moldova. 
 On 08.03.2011 Aura Costache signs the article ―Tens of thousands of 
Romanians want Hungarian citizenship‖ (http://www.glasulmaramuresului.ro, 
2011) that is published by the news website Adevarul, telling the story of the 35 
million of Transylvanians who intend to apply for Hungarian citizenship, 
subsequent to a batch of 12,000 people who have already applied for it. 
After we have analyzed a large number of articles from the Romanian 
press, we can conclude that the media have considered the matter from all 
possible angles, with a focus on the reaction of neighboring states and on the 
reaction of the Hungarian community in Romania. It is important to mention 
the criticism of the Romanian Government brought by a large number of 
articles, precisely because of its lack of reaction. 
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Articles from the Hungarian press 
 
 The article published on 20.05.2010 on the HVG website, titled “Dual 
citizenship: Jobbik bid on Fidesz” (http://hvg.hu/itthon, 2011) presents 
perfectly the tense atmosphere of the Hungarian politics around this law. 
 The ruling party, Fidesz, has presented the draft law for granting 
citizenship to ethnic Hungarians from everywhere. The bill specifically 
describes the rights and obligations of the new Hungarian citizens and the ways 
in which Hungarians from everywhere may apply for the citizenship. To apply 
for Hungarian citizenship, the individual must speak Hungarian, must have 
Hungarian ancestry and (s)he must have the birth certificate names registered 
with Hungarian spelling. 
 Tensions have been caused not only by the socialist opposition in 
Hungary, who opposed to no avail to this bill, but also by the far-right party 
Jobbik, who criticized the restricted rights of the new citizens. More specifically, 
they wanted to introduce the voting right in the bill. 
 In addition to presenting and analyzing the domestic political debates, the 
Hungarian media has analyzed and presented the political backlash within the 
countries where there is a Hungarian minority. The critical tone of the Hungarian 
press was mainly addressed to Slovakia and to the Slovak political circles, in 
response to the vehement and even extremist reactions against Hungary. 
 In general, we can say that a big part of the Hungarian press supported 
the ―Hungarian cause‖ and limited itself to political analysis inside Hungary. 
 At the same time we need to remind the reader about the criticism 
made especially by the leftist media representatives from Hungary, which in 
many media appearances have criticized the bill. These criticisms have focused 
on the costs of this project and on the anxiety caused by a possible migration to 
Hungary of the new citizens. 
* 
 The results listed within the present study were obtained from analyzing 
articles published in the Romanian and Hungarian press from Hungary in the 
period April to June 2010 and January to May 2011. We will present in this 
paper only some of the significant articles published in the Romanian and 
Hungarian press, together with their conclusions 
 The citizenship is the permanent legal and political connection that 
exists between the state and the citizen. In our society we discuss at length the 
issue of dual citizenship. To these public debates not only the juridical or the 
political circles take part, but also the large masses of the population 
represented by the mass media.  
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Dual citizenship: right or privilege? 
 
Dual citizenship has been interpreted as a step towards a post-national 
opening of multiple identities and their free movement. Why was the 
Hungarians‘ motivation for such a law built on nationalist bases, though? To 
prove this point it suffices to study the incipit of the amendment for dual 
citizenship that regulates Hungarian citizenship. It invokes the Hungarian 
constitution which stipulates that: ―The Republic of Hungary has a sense of 
responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside the borders and will 
promote and strengthen their relations with Hungary‖. Maintaining relations 
with Hungary and preserving the Hungarian identity are the reasons for this 
amendment (http://www.allampolgarsag.gov.hu, 2010). The need to protect the 
Hungarian identity is achieved though by even the members of the very 
Hungarian ethnic community, given the known homogeneity of the Hungarian 
minorities living in countries neighboring Hungary. 
Although the current tendency is to disengage citizenship from ethnicity 
by promoting a civic nationalism based on civic values and on political 
community, the Hungarian law carries out the opposed operation. The dual 
citizenship law seeks to combine dual citizenship with ethnicity. Reaffirming 
the ethnic component in granting citizenship is demonstrated by a statement of 
the Deputy Prime Minister who claims that the Hungarian nation is subject to 
assimilation, and the assimilation process can be stopped only by granting 
citizenship. The same official stated that ―the Hungarian nation is a nation with 
public rights ever since St. Stephen‖, thus reiterating the myth of the Hungarian 
nation that transcends the centuries. The problem with this type of statements 
is that it arouses nationalist sentiments, sentiments that took 90 years to temper. 
Hungarians who became minorities in the newly created states from Central 
Europe after World War I had a choice between either the new state 
citizenship, or relocating to Hungary and, consequently, acquiring the 
Hungarian citizenship (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 161-163). Of course, the 
frontiers of those times were borders separating nations and they were closed. 
Today, the borders are open, and the discussion shifted to conversing them to 
links and not divisions. For this reason, the Hungarian law for dual citizenship 
is not viable in the unifying context of the European Union and in the post-
national developments. Besides, the European Union promotes diversity and 
multilingualism in favor of homogenization and assimilation of minority ethnic 
communities.  
According to the opponents of this law, Hungary must accept that the 
Hungarians abroad are citizens of other states, and protecting the Hungarian 
minority must be done within the efforts to strengthen individual and collective 
rights from the states of residence (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 161-163). It is thus 
a new dilemma that is arising: the new Hungarian citizens might consider 
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themselves members of a diaspora, or members of a minority community that 
has already been enjoying full rights in the state of residence. The success of the 
initiative affirms the need of the Hungarian minorities, both from the EU 
Member States, and from Serbia, Croatia and Ukraine, to institutionalize this 
cultural identity and not necessarily the benefits of obtaining Hungarian 
citizenship. In addition to this, a fact that demonstrates the Hungarian-Slovak 
dispute is the discourse on cultural identity and on ethnic nationalism, seen 
strictly in terms of belonging to a homogeneous community based on culture, 
language, religion, history. Therefore, granting dual citizenship to Hungarians 
from ―everywhere‖ could be considered a right in terms of reaffirming the 
cultural identity of ethnic Hungarians. Although the contemporary society has 
proven that the cultural identity does not need a clear label reading ―citizen‖ to 
be used before the name of ethnicity, the specificity of Hungarian ethnic 
nationalism requires the assertion of this right. 
Granting the right to vote by changing the Hungarian Constitution can 
turn this right into a privilege, but it would generate a series of internal and 
external problems. The internal problems would be justified by the fact that 
those citizens who do not reside in Hungary, and thus they are not directly 
affected by the outcome of the vote, can influence the outcome of the 
Hungarian parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the external feedback 
can generate a new conflict with neighboring countries, especially with Slovakia 
that proved quite inflexible in dealing with this situation. 
 
*** 
 
Citizenship represents the permanent legal and political relationship that 
exists between the state and the individual. Citizenship is often defined in terms 
of legislation and accompanying political debates, far from the realities 
experienced by citizens. 
The citizen quality must be redefined in the post-socialist context, 
where it escapes from all definitions given by political elites, mainly because of 
their inability to guarantee the social rights expected by the citizens.  
Due to the lack of uniformity between laws of different countries 
regarding the criteria for granting citizenship, an individual can be found in a 
position to have more than one citizenship or in a position where his/her right 
to citizenship is denied. We are facing a citizenship conflict that bears the 
concept of multi-nationality or even of statelessness. 
Multi-nationality or better said dual citizenship or rather dual 
statelessness result from obtaining a new citizenship without losing the one of 
the state of origin. 
In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the issue of dual citizenship 
was raised politically, becoming a useful electoral strategy of the party led by the 
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Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban. Similarly, the Slovak response was 
political, to problem of cultural identity. Although nationalism was stained with 
political reactions and intervention, it can be thus proved how viable are the 
debates on national identity within an increasing talk of post-national state 
evolution inside the European Union.  
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Abstract. The Gagauz people are a Turkish-speaking group adhering to the 
Christian Orthodox faith. Today, the majority of them live in the autonomous region of the 
Republic of Moldova called Gagauz Yeri (Gagauz Territorial Autonomous Unit). Also, 
smaller groups live in enamoring districts in The Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, 
Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the pockets in the Caucasus. This research wills 
traits the main peculiarities and the lacks of sociopolitical integration\disintegration of The 
Gagauz in Moldovan society. Certainly, the integration of ethnic groups in a nation-building 
state represents a complex and dynamical process of accommodation. In particular, it will be 
analyzed the degree of participation and interest of The Gagauz in the socio-political processes 
in Republic of Moldova and in autonomous unit; the degree of identification of Gagauz 
people with Moldavian state and their elements. To assure a positive result it‟s important to 
improve the implication of the both parts: one side, the main goal of ethnic politics of state 
needs to be the protection of identity of that segment of population and an equilibrate 
naturalization by accommodation in the state community; other side, the ethnic groups mast 
to wish a live in a democratic integral state. Especially, the autonomous status of the Gagauz 
in Moldova doesn‟t stipulate the separation or isolation, but represents a guarantee for 
accommodation of the Gagauz by keeping their ethnic specific. 
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plural societies is the need to mitigate the unfortunate effects of majority rule in 
ethnically divided societies (Horowitz, 1985). This role is realized by politics of 
minorities‘ integration. To be effective, social integration requires a bottom-line 
consensus on what individuals involved see as a desirable and necessary 
outcome. The terms and the expected effects of integration need to be 
negotiated among and across broad segments of both the majority and minority 
communities. However, majority and minority groups seem to pursue different 
goals and thus favor different, partially excluding means to achieve societal 
integration. While the members of the majority regard integration as a tool with 
which to increase social cohesion and improve institutional performance, the 
members of minority usually seek to augment group integrity and stability by 
securing the status of their group (Agarin, Brosig, 2009: 15) 
Taking into consideration the whole situation in the Moldovan society, 
we will refer to the situation of interethnic relation during the last twenty years, 
to identify the producing variances of national/ethnic policies, to reflect the 
results, but also the blockages and lacks of legal and institutional framework in 
Republic of Moldova, to analyze the causes of manifestation intolerance 
phenomena and the factors of Minority‘s disintegration. It is necessary to 
approach these components of the model through the identity that could 
facilitate the understanding of the social environment. Examining the 
phenomena of the Gagauz ethnic identification and integration, the dominance 
of the political factor is obvious.  
 
1. The general framework of Minorities status in Republic of 
Moldova 
 
To achieve stability and prosper as a democratic state, Republic of 
Moldova requires a new model of the state and its relations with ethnic groups. 
Moldova especially requires a political model that specifies the responsibilities, 
as well as rights, that citizens have toward and in the state. There are many 
models for organizing democracies, some of which encourage more conflict 
between interest groups than others. Kaufman (1996) argues that Moldova‘s 
conflicts during the early post-Soviet period occurred because of a convergence 
of three factors: hostiles masses, belligerent leaders, and interethnic security dilemmas. In 
post-Soviet Moldova the population was ethnically and regionally diverse, 
increasing the complexity of accomplishing such fundamental tasks as selecting 
state and official languages, crafting citizenship laws, and developing political 
authority to local districts (Cash, 2004: 1). The wide variety of local situations 
and the rather different position of the ethnic minority in each societies 
generates a series of peculiarities with a great relevance that refers on general: 
what are the local factors determining mutual understanding and institutional 
adjustment of the ethnic groups; the local factors determining mutual mistrust 
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and institutional conflicts of the ethnic groups; the types of institutional 
arrangements seem to facilitate the interethnic integration/disintegration in the 
local context; the measures for resolving manifest or latent interethnic tensions 
and conflicts?  
After the collapse of USRR most of republic within post-Soviet area 
was larger multiethnic. The cote of minorities in Moldova in 1989 was about 
36%. The ethnic migration in the earlier 1990 increase a bit titular nation 
ponders. At the time of the 2004 census, Moldova‘s total population was 
3,383,332. The largest ethnic group in the republic is the 
Romanians/Moldavians accounting for 76.1 % of the population. Other major 
ethnic groups are the Ukrainians (8.4 %), Russians (5.8 %), Gagauz (4.4 %), 
Bulgarians (1.9 %), and Jews (2 %) etc. When Republic of Moldova became 
independent, enshrining the titular language as the official language was closely 
bound up with the idea of establishing and maintaining full independence. By 
this time, however, Russian and Russophone minorities had become identified 
with opposition to democracy and independence. Finding themselves treated as 
second-class (and probably disloyal) citizens, they turned to Moscow for help. 
This only served to confirm the suspicion and mistrust of the newly 
independent states. Issues of language and national identity fuelled the series of 
conflicts which led to the breakup of the USSR (Waters, 2001: 5). While the 
Chisinau authorities spent as much of their political energy on defending this 
conceptual duality as their opponents from both sides on attacking it, political 
and economic reforms were on the backburner (Meurs, 2004). 
 
1.2. The peculiarities of national/ethnic politics of Republic of 
Moldova  
 
Against the background of the empirical evidence and the efforts to 
conceptualize issues of interethnic integration, it is more and more often 
interpreted as mutual adjustment of various ethnic groups in the major sectors 
of social life: 
• Interethnic integration undoubtedly supposes the recognition of the 
need for equal economic opportunities for representatives of all ethnic groups in a 
given society. The basic elements of these equal opportunities are the access to 
jobs, in particular to good quality jobs, together with the equal opportunity for 
private economic activity. 
• Another key dimension of the so understood interethnic integration is 
the equality of rights and opportunities for political participation. In practical terms, this 
means equality in legal regulations and in practicing active and passive election 
rights and equal opportunities for representatives of ethnic groups to be placed 
in institutions. In facts, Moldova‘s current political system and legislative 
framework discourages the formation or recognition of distinct ethnic parties. 
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Political structure, procedures, and interests are not correlative with ethnic 
identity. 
• The third component concerns the equality of involvement in the cultural 
life of the society under scrutiny. Undoubtedly, the key condition for realization 
of this equality is the command of the common language or languages, together 
with the development of shared cultural institutions. In fact, this element of 
integration is also unrealized. We will describe the languages situation in further 
compartments of this article.  
• Last but not least, interethnic integration presupposes the 
development of a widespread value-normative identification with the given society, 
crosscutting the boundaries of ethnic groups. This is possible when they 
develop shared traditions and an understanding of shared challenges and a 
shared future (Genov, 2007: 9-10). In this context, it‘s important to remark the 
undefined national interest and the large difficulties in transformation of 
different ethnic interests into general. Fully analyzed, typological diversity of 
interests allows us to identify evolutionary trends and involution of interethnic 
relations, to design active social behaviors and actions, and reactive ethnic 
background. Polyvalent state interests, conceived as a whole enables the 
determination and assessment of the integrative and disintegrative ethnic policy. 
The transformation of private interests of ethnic groups in national and 
economic interests, national, social, national-cultural is the way of successful 
integration of minorities (Saca). 
Taking into account the overall political context Boţan (2002) can 
identify five main factors that had or may have a decisive impact on interethnic 
relations problems concerning Moldova. These are:  
1) Political speculations on the history of Moldova and the indigenous 
ethnic identification, 
 2) The Moldovan authorities' policies on ensuring the rights of national 
minorities and the attitude of the main political forces in the country to these 
policies, 
3) International legal framework on national minority rights;  
4) The policies of neighboring countries to their respective ethnic 
communities; 
 5) Integration policies in Europe (Botan, 2002). The last of the three 
factors mentioned are external and internal factors influencing crucial impact 
on ensuring the rights of national minorities ‘integration into the Moldovan 
society. Analyzing all this factors we can indentify some different cleavages of 
Moldovan society. It means the identity cleavage of ethnic majority; extern policies 
cleavage of political parties system and electorate; territorial cleavage (the existence of separatist 
territory in the eastern part of Moldova); the ethnic cleavage in interethnic relations; the 
ethnocentric cleavage of ethnic group within Moldova. 
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The activities of Moldovan state on minorities‘ integration could be 
oriented in three key directions: 
1. Communicative-linguistic integration – it would be realized by creating 
of an uncial informational area and the Moldovan/Romanian linguistic 
environment with condition of keeping the cultural diversity and mutual 
tolerance. 
2. Political and legal integration, that should be made by formation of a 
population state fair, by respect to law and the committed to support 
and defend it. Unfortunately, the political element is the most difficult 
to realize. The equilibrium between ethnic and civic (political) 
identification is an imperative in this way. 
3. Socio-political integration - it means achieve an ability to compete and a 
social viable mobility by each member of society regardless of ethnicity 
or language (Morozan, 2005). 
In general lines, the policy promoted by Moldova‘s government in 
interethnic relations area aim at preserving the cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity of the national minorities, and not their assimilation. At the same time, 
the Moldovan authorities asked for the support of the OSCE high 
commissioner on national minorities to work out a national program for the 
national minorities to study the state languages from childhood, at kindergarten 
or primary school. Also is welcomed the implementation of the project backed 
by the OSCE high commissioner on national minorities on the studying of the 
state language by the civil servants and local public administrations‘ 
representatives from Moldova. In near future it will be presented a conceptual 
document on a strategy for ethnic minority‘s integration into society, drafted by 
OSCE experts to Moldova.  
 
1.3. The status of national minorities in Republic of Moldova – 
legal aspect 
  
The current legislation is imperfect and stimulates unreal expectations, 
violates the balance between the rights and obligations both of the majority and 
of the minorities, prescribes to the language of a minority representatives the 
status of interethnic language of communication to the detriment of the official 
state language and encourages leaders, representatives of some national 
minorities to use their cultural identity to gain benefits for their own, as is the 
case of Gagauz minority (Coreţchi, Pascaru, Stevens, 2002). The basic 
legislation regarding national minorities has not changed in the last years, so it is 
safe to switch back to the 1994 Constitution at this stage. Article 10 II of the 
Constitution recognizes the right of all citizens to preserve, develop and express 
their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity and Article 13, although 
reaffirming Moldovan as the state language, acknowledges and protects the 
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right to preserve, develop and use the Russian language and other languages 
spoken within the Republic of Moldova. The language tests, which had been 
originally envisaged for 1994, had been postponed in the meantime and will 
probably, now never, be introduced. Russian was not officially granted the 
status of a second state language, as most Russian speakers wished; 
nevertheless, it does have de facto such status (Neukirch, 1999: 53). The division 
of the Moldovan society according to the ethnic criteria is just a visible part of 
the iceberg. This is a way to hide the incompetence of the governing body that 
is challenged to solve the problems confronting the society, negatively 
impacting the majority as well as minority populations. Among the key issues 
that persist is the attempt to manipulate and politicizes the linguistic context 
within the society. The Law on the Functioning of Languages (1989), considered in 
relation to international legal standards, was tolerable to those unfamiliar with 
the language of the majority, and encouraged the representatives of the national 
minorities to learn the official language during a transition period up to 3-7 
years (Coreţchi, Pascaru, Stevens, 2002). 
The Law on the right of persons belonging to national minorities (2001) was 
adopted only after ten years of Moldova‘s independence and represents nothing 
but a copy of languages law from 1989 (Anghel, 2002: 11). Delayed nature of 
this law and respectively of Law on national concept of Republic of Moldova (2005) 
reveals an action and decision-making paradox of Moldovan Government. In 
these circumstances, a strategy on integration of national minorities in Republic of 
Moldova is just in preliminary stage of draft. 
 Another bone of contention in language and minority politics is usually 
the education sector. Article 35 II of the Moldovan Constitution envisages that the 
state will enforce the right of each person to choose his or her language in 
which teaching will be conducted. This provision, which is reinforced in the 
language and in the education laws, is followed in practice as far as possible 
under the current socio-economic crises. In practice, Moldovan and Russian 
dominate in schools and higher education institutions. Schools with education 
in Ukrainian (77), Gagauz (49), Bulgarian (32), Ivrit (2) and German (1) also 
exist, but none teaches the whole curriculum in one of these languages 
(Neurkirch, 1999: 54). Thus, it may seem that some lessons have been learned 
regarding the language legislation and its application in practice, but others 
probably have to be taken. First of all, it is now for the Russian-speaking 
community in Moldova to accept that learning the state language of the state of 
which they are citizens is a necessary step for integration. This does not mean 
that they should be assimilated. But symmetric bilinguism has to replace the 
asymmetric bilinguism which has prevailed in Moldova until today if the idea of 
a multi-ethnic Republican Moldovan identity is to have a chance in reality. 
Secondly, the Moldovan government has to undertake further efforts to offer real 
possibilities for Russian speakers to learn Moldovan and for other nationalities 
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also to learn the native language. Thirdly, Moldovans should refrain from any 
aggressive propaganda against the use of Russian in public or in parliament, as 
has happened recently, in order not to alienate Russian speakers again (or not to 
do so further). Fourthly, young Moldovans should continue to learn and to 
speak Russian in order to ensure that Moldova remains a bilingual society. 
Trends are already visible that more and more Moldovans are not learning a full 
command of Russian. If Moldovans start to abandon Russian, and Russians, 
Ukrainians and others continue to refuse to learn and speak Moldovan, the 
chances for the development of a republican Moldovan identity are bleak 
(Neurkirch, 1999). 
 
2. The role and place of Gagauz in ethnic structure of Moldovan 
society 
 
The 153,000 Gagauz who lived in Moldova in 1989 have no kin state. 
Outside Moldova, Gagauz settlements can be found only in the neighboring 
Odessa region of Ukraine (36,000), Romania and Bulgaria (four cities and 67 
villages where Gagauz predominated). Gagauz origins in southern Moldova can 
be traced to migration from northeastern Bulgaria in 1750-1791 and 1808-1812 
(Chinn, Roper, 1998: 88). The Gagauz have been heavily russified in the past. 
Many use Russian even for daily encounters, whereas hardly any Gagauz speaks 
Moldovan. Thus, like Russians and Ukrainians, they felt threatened by the 
language law and the politics of ―Romanization‖ and ―derussification‖ which 
were pursued by the new Prime Minister, Mircea Druc. The Gagauz Halki 
(Gagauz People) movement, which had been founded in 1989 and which had 
sided with the Popular Front of Moldova at the beginning, consequently 
changed sides after the adoption of the language law. The Gagauz leadership 
under Stepan Topal, a nationalist-turned communist, then sought closer 
relationships with pro-soviet forces (Neukirch, 1999: 49). The autonomy of 
Gagauz Yeri came about in the context of violent clashes between the central 
government of Moldova and the separatist Transnistria during the first half of 
the nineties. 
 In Moldova, the Autonomous Gagauz Republic is still another special 
case of the ethnicisation of politics after the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union. In order to avoid additional interethnic tensions after the bloody 
conflict in Transnistria, the government in Chisinau agreed to include the 
political autonomy of the Gagauz people (Turkish speaking Christians) in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. But the situation in the Gagauz 
Autonomous Republic still very much depends on developments in and outside 
of the country (Genov, 2007: 8). Stabilization or changes in the ethnic 
stratification in the Autonomous Republic of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) in the 
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framework of the Republic of Moldova might be initiated or supported by 
various domestic and international factors. 
 
2.1. Geopolitical repercussions in the process of Gagauz 
integration 
 
The geopolitical background of southern and eastern part of state is 
characterized by such complex influences from ethnical groups Patron-states 
and other political regional interests. At the same time, external homelands are 
another variable deeply involved in Moldavian politics. Russians and Ukrainians 
ask their mother countries to interfere in Moldavian politics to promote their 
interests or protect privileges from Soviet times, and other minorities engage in 
similar behavior. Gagauzes, for instance, established an autonomous status with 
strong support from Turkey, which is speculating on linguistic and racial 
kinship. Bulgarians, in turn, can thank the direct involvement of the authorities 
in Sofia for their success in obtaining a special status for the Taraclia district in 
the south, where they are in the majority, as well as a national university 
(Caşu:246). However, economically and culturally, the population of this 
Autonomous Republic is more closely connected to Transnistria and to Russia 
than to Moldova, which is dominated by the Moldovan (Romanian) ethnic 
group. Since the Republic of Moldova has experienced a catastrophic economic 
decline during the transformation period and the prospect of economic 
recovery has been substantially delayed, the ensuing problems can be easily 
used and abused for the purposes of constructive or destructive ethnic policies. 
The unresolved issue of Transnistria and the yet unclear geo-strategic situation 
of the country also offer a variety of options for further changes (Genov, 
Potentials.., 2007: 35). The Gagauz elites need to understand that while a pro-
Russian and pro-Transnistrian position is bound to alienate Moldova‘s political 
establishment and civil society, especially in the present context in which 
European integration has been mainstreamed as the priority not only of 
Moldovan foreign policy, but also of internal reforms (Avram 2010). 
 
2.2. The impact of russification and sovietization factor  
 
During Soviet rule, russification proceeded more successfully among 
the Gagauz than among the titular nation. Education within the Gagauz region 
was almost entirely in Russian. As a result of Soviet educational policy, the most 
educated portion of the Gagauz population became the most russified (Chinn, 
Roper, 1998: 90). The education that targeted the representatives of the 
minorities in Moldova is neither an alternative education, nor one 
complementary to the State. Instead, it‘s an education that reflects nostalgia on 
the part of the population for the old regime and its incapacity to adapt itself to 
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democratic changes and European values (Pascaru, 2000). Soviet education as a 
value system was limited in that as it included only a marginal exponent of the 
national cultures of the Soviet nations. The parents and grandparents educated 
by the Soviet ideology now are modelling the younger generation, 
compounding the issues of a system that failed to encourage learning other 
languages and cultures. As a result, the education for minorities is hampered by 
the incapacity to revitalise the national component of the education and by the 
impossibility, due to objective and subjective factors, to integrate into 
universality (Coreţchi, Pascaru, Stevens, 2002).  
 
2.3. The emergencies of linguistic situation in Gagauzian 
Autonomy 
 
In spite of russification of Soviet times, 97% in 2005 maintained 
Gagauz as their native languages, 89% claimed to speak Russian, while only 3% 
claimed competence in Moldovan/Romanian (Etnobarometrul, 2005). 
Unfortunately, Russian remains the primary language of administration, 
commerce, and education after fifteen years of autonomy. This fact questions 
the proposed objectives in the founding acts of Gagauz Autonomy. While the 
Gagauz movement for autonomy has resulted in increased attention to the 
native language in schools and media, it is not yet resulted in a shift from 
Russian as the primary language of instruction. Indeed, for a long period of 
time, Gagauz only functioned as an oral – or ‗‘kitchen‘‘- language (Menz, 2003). 
Although based on cultural and linguistic criteria, Gagauzes preserved the 
Russian language in its administrative and education systems, as in the Soviet 
era. Thus, the case of Gagauz most directly reflects the fact that ethnic issues 
have been instrumentalized by local elites in their struggle for power and 
prestige. The international community, however, especially the Council of 
Europe, has criticized this approach to solving ethnic problems by offering 
territorial autonomy as a dangerous precedent for other secessionist 
movements (Caşu: 244). Rendering reference to lows establishing autonomy the 
stipulate trilingual solution does not work. This fact becomes an impediment to 
ascertainment relationships, communication between autonomy population and 
central government because the politics of central authorities is focused on the 
state language as a means of communication. In current circumstances the 
Gagauzes face long-term difficulties in establish and operation trilingual or 
bilingual system where the state language would be registered. Such discordance 
of the situation in which central government has Romanian as a working 
language and regional government – the Russian generates less desired effect.  
A survey carried out by a Moldovan research team among 
representatives of regional political, cultural and business elites responded that 
only about one-third of the respondents had full command Gagauz, whereas all 
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claimed to be fluent speakers of Russian (Teosa et al. 2008:   199). The official 
homepage of the Gagauz region is supposedly trilingual, but a closer look is 
more sobering, since besides the menu of the website, there is no further 
information in the local idiom. Notably, only the Russian version is up-to-date, 
whilst even the Moldovan one has been filled with some content (Avram 2010). 
Gagauz language newspapers and broadcast media remain limited and often 
originate with the small group of Gagauz intellectuals in Chisinau rather in 
Gagauzia. The first and most significant newspaper in Gagauz, ‘‘Ana Sozu‘‘ 
(Mather Language), began in 1986 and was published in Chisinau (Chinn, 
Roper 1998: 91). All local laws are published in Russian only Code of Gagauzia 
was translated into Gagauz and Romanian only after the intervention of the 
Moldovan Supreme Court. The election campaign was also conducted mainly in 
Russian. Although Gaguaz as a language is today taught in the region, there is 
no single school teaching the whole curriculum in Gagauz. The language of 
education at the Comrat University, which founded in 1991, is also Russian. 
The former regional government did not show much interest in changing this 
situation and respective effort by the Moldovan Ministry of Education, were 
met whit a cool response. Moreover, a Gagauz library, organized by the 
opposition, was not supported, but harassed for political reasons (Neurkirch, 
2002:11). As a rezult the Gagauz society faces and would faced impediments in 
their integration, if the regional and central authorities hadn‘t make important 
changes on this line.  
Modest attempts have been made to improve the linguistic situation in 
Gagauzia by joint initiative of central government and Governor Mihail 
Formuzal with external partners‘ large support. In September 2005 was started 
Language Training Program for Minorities within Republic of Moldova, financed by High 
Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE (Haga). The program was 
conducted in about 10 urban and rural localities of Gagauzia and was attended 
by Governor and other civil servants of autonomy‘s authorities (Isac, 2010). In 
autumn 2009, for the first time two meeting were held by the Executive 
Committee in Gagauz and Romanian. As well, in Octomber 2009 the Governor 
took the oath   member of new Moldovan Government for the first time in 
Romanian (Cubreacov, Comrat…, 2009).  Regretfully, such gestures remain 
largely symbolic. The current Governor declared supporting the necessity in 
state language knowledge by Gagauz population for ensuring their 
competitiveness in society. Gagauz authorities assumed their obligation to 
ensure the equality of all three official languages stipulated in autonomy‘s 
legislation (Cubreacov, Interview with M. Formuzal, 2009). By the other side, 
during the campaign for national election Anna Harlamenco, President of the 
People‘s Assembly, strongly demanded to grant Russian the status of state 
language. Lack of cooperation and inconsistent statements of Gagauz political 
elites makes more difficult to apply the tasks of national politics. 
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2.3. The Gagauz between ethnic and civic identity 
 
Guboglo a leading exponent of Gagauz intelligentsia mention that in all 
ex-Soviet area the Gagauz hardest exceeded the collapse of Soviet Union. Thus, 
about 67, 5% of respondents categorized that event as very grave and 
particularly grave. At the same time 30% considered like homeland - URSS and 
16,1% - Republic of Moldova (Guboglo, 2009: 11). Answering at option I 
consider myself primarily Gagauz or citizen of Republic of Moldova? The result was 
respectively 81% and 46% (Etnobarometrul, 2005). A very important 
component of Gagauz self-awareness is historical orientation. Answering at the 
question what means to be Gagauz? A lot of respondents of older generation 
mention – Christian civilization membership, the need to preserve the ethnic 
authenticity, respect for the history of his people, the memory of the Soviet 
past, the spirit of people unity in an enormous state. The overall landscape of 
ethnic perception by the Gagauz young generation is different. The explosion 
of ethnicity remained in last plan; at the moment dominate state political 
pessimism that influences more the provisions of ethnic conscience. The young 
Gagauzes couldn‘t identify clearly the peculiarities of their ―gagaunization‖. 
This situation can be explained by his widespread use of Russian language and 
deeply pro-Russian orientation. Such orientation has more practical than 
ideological or civilization reasons (as eventually emigration destination for work 
or study interest) (Anikin, 2009: 24-25). As the data shows, none of possible 
markers – religion, language or history – has the potential of serving as 
fundament for Gagauz identy (Avram, 2010). A strong ethnic identity is assured 
by amassing compact nature of Gagauz during all their habitation in the southern 
Moldova. The Gagauz habitation in Moldovan state lasts more than two 
centuries and theirs concentration in the southern part didn‘t decrease. In spite 
of this the Gagauz ethnic is profoundly reduced by russification and 
sovietizaton. We find that the Gagauzes like Moldovans faces identity cleavage. 
Without national consciousness, the development of a Gagauz-based nation-
building process seems quite improbable, if not impossible, to achieve. The 
weakness of Gagauz identity is compensated through recourse to the USSR as 
an ―imagined community‖ with Russian as a key component. The political elites 
also make no attempts to accelerate the process of deconstructing Soviet 
identity (Avram, 2010). 
Appealing to social distance scale between social groups developed by 
Bogardus in 1925, we can measures the inter-ethnic perceptions and stereotypes 
manifested in actionable and verbal behavior (Anghel, 2004: 70). The 
comparative study “Potentials for interethnic integration and disintegration”, was realized 
in a few Turkish-speaking minority states. In Republic of Moldova it was made 
based on interviews with representatives of economical, cultural and political 
Gagauz elites. The results of this research allow us to make some findings: The 
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Gagauz people live in a society every day becoming more distanced from Russian 
influence. Despite of this fact the Gagauz elites have a strong preference to 
cooperation with Russians (14 of 32 respondents). This strong affinity with 
Russians is in a contradiction with low level of affinity with their ethnic group. 
Just 1/5 of respondents expressed their willingness to cooperate ―intra-group‖ 
(Genov, 2007). This fact may have some explanations – a low intra-group 
orientation or a strong preference for universalistic (cosmopolite) normative-
value guidelines. Ethnocentrism represents the essence of ethnicity postulating as 
a kind of ideal being, which embodies all the qualities of good and beautiful and 
place foreign population outside the family word, whose appearance and 
manners embodies their ugliness and evil (Roth, 1998: 77). 
Kolsto says that linguistic russification did not mean a lack of identity 
but showed instead that the identity was in process of changing. Despite the 
concessions received from the majority, the Gagauz identity remains confused 
because the majority of them continue to speak Russian instead of their native 
language. 
 
2.4. The influence of political and ideological factors in Gagauz 
integration\disintegration 
 
This factor is closely related to sovietization, russification and linguistic 
factors. High developed Sovietic identity continuing influence to date heavily 
the Gagauz mentality and perceptions. The Gagauz leaders utilizes often the 
ideological rhetoric especially in national and regional electoral campaigns that 
influence the increasing of ethnicity phenomena and distance the Gagauz 
electorate from the national political process. Analyzing the electoral presence 
of Gagauz population in national election we remark decreasing effect of 
interest in Moldovan political live. Another condition that assures the 
ideological impact is the large utilizing of Russian and local mass-media sources 
rather than Moldavian. Information mainly from external sources that often 
intentionally distort political, social events in the country has negative effect in 
perception of Moldovan state realities and stops the Gagauz integration.  
The content analyze of principal official Gagauz newspaper allows us to 
identify the objectives and consequences of published articles. The criterions 
for comparison concerns are: 1) formal characteristics of articles dealing with 
attitudes of the ethnic majority towards the ethnic groups - this topic can be 
found on the front pages of the larger publications, indicating the importance 
attached to the ethnic issues. An exception in this respect is the newspaper 
Vesti Gagauzii, which publishes documents (7% of the local sample of 
information units), thus continuing the Soviet tradition. In the soviet times, the 
newspapers used to inform the population about important official decisions. 
In a small autonomous political unit in a post-Soviet country, this still makes 
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sense under the conditions of on-going series of political and institutional 
changes (Golovin, 2007: 25); 2) the emotional orientation of public - post-
Soviet Gagauzia (Moldova) is also characterized by multilateral polemics, but 
the disputes are characterized by the domination of representatives of the local 
authorities (53%). Thus, the formal characteristics of the published materials 
show structural similarities to the functions of the press in describing ethnic 
policy among both the EU members and the post-Soviet countries. (Golovin, 
2007: 27). In many respects, it expresses the position of the regional authorities, 
who hope to inspire optimism among the public of the region. Vesti Gagauzii, in 
Moldova, is also emotional in a positive way, reflecting the success of the 
Gagauz people in their autonomisation. According to the newspaper Vesti 
Gagauzii, the political aspect of this ethnic conflict is most prominent. This can 
easily be explained by the history of conflict in the establishment of the 
Gagauzian autonomy; 3) The analyse of the ideological and manipulator 
content of the press publications revealed the strong influence of Soviet 
political discourse on newspapers in Gagauzia. This discourse often obscures 
the issues with the help of integrative slogans (Golovin, 2007: 33).  
Among the reasons of anxiety of Gagauz people, the following are put 
forward: the ethnic group is poorly represented in the political decision-making 
process; it is difficult for Gagauz people to get a public service position and to 
find a well paid job; public opinion is against the ethnic group. The interviewees 
identify discriminatory practices in relation to the Gagauz in the economic, as 
well as in cultural and linguistic spheres. Religious beliefs are not a subject of 
anxiety (Tsurcan, Teosa, Molodilo, 2007: 76). Referring to relationship between 
central and autonomous authorities we remark a hardly stabilizing effect. Elites 
both at the central and the sub-state level appear to bear the responsibility for 
this modest result (Avram, 2010).  
 
3. Conclusion  
 
Although, the regulations of relevant legislation are categorized as quasi-
tolerant, the overall institutionalization, development of right, and integration 
of national minorities in the socio-political system of Moldova remain in 
arrears. Therefore, conclude that the main reasons are for stagnating integration 
of ethnic minorities in Moldova. The evaluation of the Gagauz question 
autonomy model raises more questions than it answers. On the normative level, 
the persistence of Soviet elements makes it difficult to employ the theory of 
multiculturalism to justify the existence of Gagauzian territorial autonomy 
(Avram, 2010). Notwithstanding the objective factors conditioning the situation 
on the ground, it should be borne in mind that for Gagauz elites, the most 
important achievement of the power-sharing agreement is the possibility of not 
having to learn Romanian (Troebest, 2001: 77). The fact that at least a few steps 
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have been taken in the direction of promoting the Gagauz language and culture 
shows that territorial autonomy may serve to offer the societal framework for 
such measures to take place. The official declaration of 2010 as the ―year of the 
Gagauz language‖ serves as an example in this respect (Avram, 2010).  
The imperative step of Moldovan government that will be made is to 
ensure the real conditions for developing cultural diversity in this area and to 
achieve the successful integration of ethno-national minorities. The basic tool 
for plenary asserting of a citizen in society is knowledge of the state language. 
At the same time, Government have to be aware that any change can generate 
resistance, especially when there are factors and forces ready to obstruct such 
changes. Thus, integration policy must be linked supported by opinion leaders 
in those communities. It‘s important the ―stripping‖ of minorities and 
harnessing the benefits offered by a genuine integration politics. 
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Abstract. In the Soviet period the Romanian ethic minority in Ukraine was 
submitted to a Russification process, in order to achieve the so-called Soviet People, speaking 
of the Russian language. Now there is a process of Ukrainization in order to achieve a 
Ukrainian nation, including the ethnic minorities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova (RM) have the duty to establish agreements and 
cooperation with Ukraine, to create common governmental Ukrainian-Romanian-
Moldovan commissions on the fields of education, culture and so on, to solve all problems 
regarding the preservation of the ethnic identity of the Romanian minority. In this regard 
there are a few topical problems: to open schools with the Romanian language of teaching in 
the Romanian villages with no such schools; to create an University with Romanian as the 
language of teaching in Cernăuţi (Chernivtsy) or in Herţa; the problem of the recognition of 
diplomas obtained by the Ukrainian citizens in Romania and RM (the graduates have to 
pay a lot and must take certain exams); a branch of the Romanian Cultural Institute in 
Cernăuţi is a matter of urgency; to enhance the cooperation within the Upper Prut Euro 
region and Lower Danube Euro region, between the RM, Ukraine and Romania;  to open 
all the possibilities for the Romanian minority to travel in Romania, as it can travel in 
Moldova, without visas (in this regard, the authorities from Bucharest and from Kiev must 
achieve the same agreements as the Polish Government achieved with the Ukrainian 
Government); the example of the Swedish minority from Finland would be useful to follow: 
as it is known, the Swedish language has the status of state language in Finland. Perhaps, 
it would be useful to introduce the Romanian language as the official language in the 
Romanian villages from the Cernăuţi and Odessa regions. The perspectives of the 
Romanian minority survival depend on the implementing these proposals.  
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The ethnic Romanian community in Ukraine is the third ethnic group as 
a number, after the Ukrainian and the Russian communities. According to the 
last census of 2001, the number of ethnic Romanians was about 410 000 
people. Unofficially, the number of our nationals can be estimated at 500 000, 
taking into account that the number of the Romanians who identify themselves 
as Moldovans decreased by 27%, compared to the previous average forecast. 
They declare themselves as belonging to other ethnic groups from various 
reasons (linguistic assimilation – ―desire to naturalize‖, by tuition of children in 
the dominant ethnic group language and the tendency to change their social 
status, reducing the natural increase) (Popescu, Ungureanu, 2010: 42, 61). The 
main regions of compact living of Romanians in Ukraine are: Odessa: 123 751 
Moldovans and 724 Romanians; Chernivtsi: 114 555 Romanians and 67 225 
Moldovans and Zakarpattya: 32 152 Romanians (Popescu, Ungureanu, 2010: 
48). This article is like a warning on the difficult situation in which is the native 
Moldovan-Romanian population of the Moldovan/Romanian historical 
territories, currently within the state borders of Ukraine.  
The greatest challenge the Romanian community faces in Ukraine is 
related to that of assimilation - its Ukrainization – to wit giving up the Romanian 
(Moldovan – in northern and southern Bessarabia, and in areas beyond the 
Dniester and the Bug) identity by the community members. This process became 
quickly a trend, as today more and more Romanian parents enroll their children 
in classes with Ukrainian language of instruction, having as reason the wish their 
children to study at a university in the region where they live. Higher education in 
Ukraine, as well as in the educational institutions of Chernivtsi (Cernăuţi), Odessa 
and Uzhgorod is performed in Ukrainian language. At the only faculty where 
students can study in Romanian language – that of Philology, Romanian 
department – half of the courses are taught in Ukrainian, the education 
authorities justifying this fact as an advantage for students, because this way the 
graduates have increased employment opportunities, based on their personal 
choice option or need in schools with Ukrainian language of instruction. Those 
who want to be enrolled as students to the Faculty of Philology, Romanian 
department, of the Chernivsti State University, have to get through Ukrainian 
Language/History of Ukraine Exams.  On the other hand, Ukrainian citizens 
who obtain degrees in Romania or in the Republic of Moldova can get an 
equivalence/nostrification of their diploma Study Degree with great difficulty: 
they have to pay exorbitant fees and pass additional exams in Ukrainian language, 
as well as for the Ukrainian language.  
We are aware of the importance and necessity of inter-ethnic dialogue 
within the Ukrainian state, where our nationals‘ community should be involved 
in. But above all, it is necessary to establish a Romanian-Romanian dialogue 
between the Romanians of the two Romanian states – Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova on the one hand and – with the Romanian community in 
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Ukraine on the other hand. Romania and the Republic of Moldova do not 
support the Romanian minority from the neighboring state they way that 
Hungary supports the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattya (151 500 people) 
(Popescu, Ungureanu, 2010: 39). A Pedagogical Institute with Hungarian 
language of instruction activates in the locality of Beregovo; it prepares teachers 
for schools with Hungarian language of instruction from Zakarpattya region, 
where the Hungarian minority lives, and it is supported by the Hungarian state. 
So, we need first to consolidate the Romania-Romanian dialogue in order to 
preserve the Romanian ethnicity in the Moldovan and Romanian historic 
territories of Ukraine. An interethnic dialogue is possible between the cultures 
and ethnic groups consolidated in the result of an intra-ethnic dialogue. When 
an ethnic group is about to lose its cultural identity - foremost the mother 
tongue – it is necessary to focus on finding solutions to ensure the conditions 
for the cultural survival of the ethnic minorities are kept. If during the period of 
ten years the Romanians who identify themselves as Moldovans have decreased 
by 27% in Ukraine (according to the census of 2001 compared with 1989 
census data), it means that the Moldovan-Romanian minority in Ukraine is in a 
difficult situation. These 27% have not emigrated to the Republic of Moldova, 
Romania or other countries. An explanation of this decrease would be that 
people who form these 27% have disowned their parents' ethnic identity in 
order to firm up in the Ukrainian society. If for gaining a foothold (get a higher 
status) in Ukraine, you have to give up your own  ethnic and cultural identity (as 
do the  Moldovan-Romanian parents from the village of Coteleu (Koteleva), 
district of Novoselytsia, who speak Ukrainian with their preschool children – in 
order to make it easier when they go to school – where the language of 
instruction is Ukrainian), then the situation is not one of the best for the 
Moldovan-Romanian minority, which is on its historical territory, where it has 
been formed as a ethnicity, a territory which is currently within the state 
borders of Ukraine.     
In February 2011, I have conducted an opinion survey of the Romanian 
ethnicity in the Chernivtsi region. The questionnaire ―on polling the opinion of 
people who are part of the Moldovan-Romanian community on the Moldovan 
historic territory - Chernivtsi region (currently part of Ukraine)‖ contained the 
following questions: 
1. Do you consider that the rights of the Moldovan-Romanian minority 
from Chernivtsi region (the Moldovan historic territory) regarding the 
preservation and use of the mother tongue in the society, as well as of 
the traditions and customs are observed? If „NO‖, what needs to be 
changed in order to improve the situation? 
2. Do you support the idea of the requirement to assign the Romanian 
language the official/state language status in Chernivtsi region, where, 
on its historic territory, the Moldovan-Romanian community lives? 
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3. What actions should the Government of the Republic of Moldova take 
in order to support the Moldovan-Romanian community from the 
Moldovan historic territory - Chernivtsi region? 
4. Would you support the idea of creating a territorial-administrative 
autonomy, which would comprise the localities populated by the 
Moldovan-Romanian community from the regions of Storozhynets, 
Adancata, Hertsa and Novoselytsia, centered in the town of Hertsa, 
where to create a university having the Romanian language as a language 
of instruction? 
5. Would you support the idea of exchanging territories between the 
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, following which the localities from 
the Republic of Moldova inhabited by the Ukrainians (especially those 
over the Dniester) would return to Ukraine, and the localities inhabited 
by the Moldovan-Romanian community from the region of Chernivtsi 
would re-enter within the Republic of Moldova?    
There were interviewed 25 persons from the districts of Storozhynets, 
Adancata, Hertsa and Novoselytsia. At the first question 15 persons answered 
„no‖. A respondent underlined: „Romanians are not respected in general – 
neither the language, nor the customs, no door is opened in front of you without 
knowing the Ukrainian language‖; „I consider the state should assign the 
Romanian language the same level as of the Ukrainian language‖. Other 
respondent answered that „the customs and traditions are respected, but the 
language no‖. The answers at the question what needs to be changed in order to 
improve the situation were the following: „Democratization of the country‖, 
„We should change first‖, „The law on the state language and the languages of 
the minorities should be observed. According to this law, the language of the 
minorities should be used by state bodies in that region where the minority lives 
compact – thing that does not happen here‖. Another 7 persons answered „yes‖, 
some of them mentioned that „the Moldovan-Romanian minority does nothing 
for its rights to be observed, it does not fight for these rights to be exercised in 
the day by day life‖; „The Constitution of Ukraine provides the rights for the 
national minorities, but we have not learnt how to respect ourselves as a nation, 
have not learnt how to demand our rights‖. Two respondents answered: 
„Partly‖. One of them mentioned, as an answer to the question what needs to be 
changed in order to improve the situation: „to maintain the schools where the 
language of instruction is Romanian, to perform extracurricular activities in the 
mother tongue - Romanian, to draw up the documents in the Romanian 
language, to have available in Romanian language methodic literature, scripts for 
festivities and others (currently these are missing)‖.   
At the second question, 19 persons answered „yes‖, 5 persons 
answered „no‖, two gave no explanation, and another person, who lives in 
Novoselytsia, where the process of Ukrainization is more advanced, explained 
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that „Few people know literary Romanian language. People would laugh to 
scorn of the documents drawn up by the officials in Romanian‖. One 
respondent answered „I do not know‖.  
At the third question, among others, I was given, these answers: „By 
belles, popularizing the science in Romanian language, both Romanian and 
world writers, study books, books for children‖. „It should take interest in what 
happens here, keep contiguity with us‖. „Pay more attention to us, not to 
neglect us, to show interest toward our minority‘s concerns‖. „To defend our 
interests, to be able freely to contact with Moldova, to be able to visit our 
relatives in Moldova without any passports requirement‖. ―To provide support 
by publishing historical documents‖. „The relation between Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova shall be similar to that of Germany and Austria (to 
recognize a language – Romanian – and an ethnic community – Romanian)‖. 
„To assist in creating and organizing of cultural societies of the Moldovan-
Romanian community; to explain the rights, to inform the masses – people do 
not know they have rights‖. „Collegial relations, exchange of experience‖. I got 
one answer: „Nothing‖, „It does not matter for me‖. One respondent answered 
„I do not know‖. A respondent answered: „I cannot answer this question; I am 
not interested in these issues‖. A respondent did not answer at all. 
At the fourth question 21 respondents answered „yes‖, one of whom 
added: ―If the [administrative territorial] reorganization of the country is to take 
place‖, and another answered: ―Yes, although in this case I will have to learn 
literary version of Romanian language, which I do not know‖. One 
respondent said: ―University – yes, an autonomous administrative-territorial 
formation – I do not know‖. One said ―no‖. Another respondent said: ―It is 
impossible. Hertsa cannot replace Chernivtsi, which is our soul‖. One said: ―I 
do not feel it is real‖. 
At the fifth question 10 respondents answered „yes‖ (one respondent 
explained: yes, because we cannot study at universities [in Ukraine] in 
Romanian language), 5 respondents said „no‖. 2 respondents said „yes‖ 
conditioned: „Yes, if it is possible‖, 2 respondents said „Yes, but I don‘t think 
it is possible‖. One said that „Ukraine is not going to give up‖. Two were 
skeptical about such a possibility, without giving an „yes‖ or „no‖ answer: „But 
is it really possible?‖; „Let‘s wait for the referendum and we‘ll give an answer‖. 
One respondent said: „I don‘t know. I have never been to Moldova‖. One 
respondent said: „I don‘t think it is real‖, adding however „50/50‖. One 
respondent said: „At present, more no than yes‖. 
From these answers we can conclude that our nationals are looking 
forward to get the assistance they need from Romania and from the Republic 
of Moldova. First of all, a dialogue on how to improve the situation of our 
nationals has to be performed between the authorities of Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova on the one hand and the authorities of Ukraine on the 
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other hand. Although, the Romanian-Ukrainian agreement, signed in 1997 by 
the presidents Emil Constantinescu and Leonid Kuchma, provided the 
foundation of a multicultural university, with faculties with the Romanian 
language of instruction, this provision has not been implemented. During a 
discussion held in Kiev on 25 May 2011 with the participation of the Vice 
President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the Deputy of the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Ion Popescu, a native of Patrautsii de Jos, 
Stotojinets district, Chernivtsi region, being asked ―Why the project of 
foundation of a multicultural university in Chernivtsi is not performed?‖, he 
cited the lack of financial resources from the Ukrainian state. ―If Romania and 
the Republic of Moldova involved with financial support, an institution of 
higher education with Romanian language of instruction could be created in 
Ukraine‖, said Ion Popescu. Also, diploma equivalence issues shall be addressed 
at the intergovernmental level, such as: cancellation of fees (which are currently 
very high), ceasing to oblige the graduates of higher education institutions from 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova pass any exams in various universities 
from Ukraine, for equivalence of diplomas. Bologna Process, which includes 
both Romania and Moldova, and Ukraine, provides mutual recognition of 
diplomas obtained in the states party to the process.  
Romanian states should get involved to ensure the economic and 
cultural development of the Romanian community. The Euro-regions the 
Upper Prut and the Lower Danube was conceived as a framework for joint 
working and collaboration of the communities from Romania, Republic of 
Moldova and Ukraine (Chernivtsi and Odessa regions), which for centuries had 
lived together without borders between them. Unfortunately, cross-border 
cooperation remains to be one at a low level because of difficulties in 
elaboration of projects. Once Romania joined the European Union, there was 
created the Joint Operational Programme Romania-Ukraine-Republic of 
Moldova 2007-2013. It receives funding from Europe in this period through 
the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. ―The program aims 
to create a bridge between the three partner states in order to support 
communities in border areas to find common solutions to similar problems 
they face‖1. Through this program, local authorities and other organizations in 
the border areas are encouraged to collaborate in developing local economy, in 
solving certain environmental problems and to strengthen emergency 
preparedness. The program aims, also to promote a better interaction between 
the communities in the border areas. The European Commission provides 
funding of EUR 126.72 million for the Joint Operational Programme Romania-
Ukraine-Republic of Moldova 2007-2013 for the corresponding period. The 
                                                          
1 http://ro-ua-md.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=190&Itemid 
=226, 9.06.2011. 
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three partner states should participate by co-financing, amounting to EUR 11, 
404, 628. A total program budget for 2007-2013 is of EUR 138 122 69. 
However, very few have managed to access the funds - at two offices of the 
program, in Suceava and Iasi - from 2010, when the actual financing had 
started. The authorities should give more support to potential beneficiaries by 
informing and advising them on developing of projects.  
The assistance offered by the authorities of Romania and the Republic 
of Moldova should focus on culture and education. The lack of classes having 
Romanian as a language of instruction in some villages with mixed population, 
lack of classical literature in libraries, of teaching literature in schools (even if in 
Ukraine cannot be used textbooks not approved by the Ministry of Education 
of Ukraine) - denotes the absence of real relations between the Romanians 
from Romania and the Republic of Moldova and those from Ukraine.  
The Romanian-Ukrainian agreement, signed in 1997 by the presidents 
Emil Constantinescu and Leonid Kuchma aroused discontentment, and some 
intellectuals of the Romanian community in Ukraine had qualified it as an act of 
treason against the Romanians in their historical territories, currently under 
state borders of Ukraine. It is not clear why the Romanian side did not include 
in the agreement some clauses to help the Romanian community. It is known 
that the Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920 in the Grand Trianon Palace 
in Versailles by the victorious Allies of World War I (16 allied countries, 
including Romania) and Hungary, as the successor state of the Austro -
Hungarian Empire, defeated State, provided, for example, the possibility of 
creating a territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. I 
think the Romanians from Chernivtsi region could request the official status for 
the Romanian language in Chernivtsi region. In Finland, thanks to the Aland 
Islands, populated by Swedes and which belong to Finland at present, the 
Swedish is the second official language throughout Finland. If the proposal of 
assigning the official status for the Romanian language in Chernivtsi region 
might seem exaggerated to Ukrainian community from this region, there could 
be considered the possibility of establishing a territorial-administrative unit 
which could include the district of Herts and the Romanian localities from the 
districts of Storozhynets, Adancata, Hertsa and Novoselytsia, where the 
Romanian language would have the official status. In the Republic of Moldova 
there are two such examples: Gagauz autonomous territorial unit and Taraclia, 
which includes villages populated by the Bulgarian community.  
During the Austrian domination Bukovina intellectuals and their leaders 
actively advocated for an autonomous status of Bukovina within the empire 
(Ungureanu, 2003: 136, 142, 178, 234). In the „Promemoriul la Petiţia Ţării 
Bucovina din anul 1848‖ (Promemoria on the Petition of Land of Bukovina of 
1848) among the 9 clauses (which provided the separation of Bukovina from 
Galicia, arguing from the historical pint of view the right of Bukovina to 
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become an autonomous province), there was also mentioned that ―the 
Romanian language had to enter the national schools, government and the 
provincial diet‖ (Ungureanu, 2003: 135). The document mentioned that ―there 
must be assured the free circulation between Bukovina and Danubian 
Principalities‖ (Ungureanu, 2003: 135). Today the claims of 1848 turn to be 
current: the Romanian language is not used in the administration of the region 
and the regional council. However, after decades of Soviet occupation regime, 
we found out within the Moldovan-Romanian community a state of 
indifference to the problems of their ethnicity or a state of fear. On the other 
hand, we have noticed a division of the Romanian cultural societies from 
Chernivtsi. In addition, there is another division, into two ethnic groups - 
Moldovans (population of Novoselytsia district, Chernivtsi region and southern 
Bessarabia, Odessa region) and Romanians (population of districts Hertsa, 
Storozhynets and Adancata). This fact does not contribute to the solving of the 
problems of the minority, because only by joining efforts notable results can be 
obtained. Unfortunately, by reason that, the Romanian population of Chernivtsi 
and Odessa regions is poorly informed about the rights it has (including the 
constitutional rights), it is subjected to fear when it comes to demand rights and 
it is divided within itself, makes its survival prospects as an ethnic group (as 
ethnic minority) in Ukraine to be less optimistic.  
The absence in the curriculum of the subject "History of Romanians" 
leads to a situation when the Romanian national consciousness (including 
Moldovan - in the districts where our nationals identify themselves as Moldovans 
- especially in Novoselytsia, Reni, Sarata, Tatarbunar etc.) becomes more 
obsolete. Therefore, at present we can observe the phenomenon when parents 
give their children to schools/classes with Ukrainian language of instruction. 
Even more frequent are cases when parents from Romanian villages call for the 
formation of classes with Ukrainian language of instruction in schools where 
from the beginning of Soviet occupation and so far the Romanian language was 
the language of instruction, such schools become Ukrainized2. They explain this 
option by their desire for their children after graduating schools to be easier to 
study at higher education institutions in Ukraine - the educational process is 
conducted in Ukrainian, but also ―to prevent the ashamed situations when 
Ukrainian would make fun of their (Romanians) poor level of speaking Ukrainian 
language‖, said the director of the school with Romanian language of instruction 
from the village of Ropcea, Storozhynets district, Chernivtsi region, where from 1 
September 2011 a new class with Ukrainian language of instruction will be 
created, at the request of a group of parents of Romanian ethnicity. Although the 
                                                          
2 Lavric Aurelian, „În Nordul Bucovinei procesul de ukrainizare a şcolilor româneşti ia 
amploare‖, http://www.arena.md/?go=news&n=3220&t=În_Nordul_Bucovinei 
_procesul_de_ukrainizare_a_şcolilor_româneşti_ia_amploare, 22.06.2011. 
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Constitution of Ukraine stipulates the right of ethnic minorities to study in their 
mother tongue, including at university level, because of ignorance of the law, the 
Romanian minority are ready to obey to the process of Ukrainization, rather than 
to request, as taxpayers in the state budget of Ukraine, to create for them a 
university with Romanian language of instruction.  
What is required? What should be done for the preservation, survival 
and development of local Romanian community, from its historical territory, 
now within the borders of Ukraine? After examining the situation of our 
compatriots from Ukraine, I have identified several urgent measures to be 
taken, which I would display by items: 
1. It is necessary to create common governmental Ukrainian-Romanian-
Moldovan commissions on the fields of education, culture and so on, to 
solve all problems of the Romanian ethic minority;  
2. To create institutions of higher education in Romanian language (an university 
or an pedagogical institute with Romanian as the language of teaching) 
in Cernăuţi or in Herţa; or to establish faculties with Romanian language 
of instruction at the University of Chernivtsi, in other words – the 
transformation of this university from a mono-cultural into a 
multicultural one, pursuant to the provisions of the Romanian-
Ukrainian Agreement of 1997. The example of the Hungarian minority 
from Romania, which has the possibility to study at colleges and 
universities in their native language - Hungarian (there are over 90 
departments in Hungarian at the University of Cluj), and the Bulgarian 
and Gagauz minorities from the Republic of Moldova, each one having 
a university with Gagauz language of instruction in Comrat and 
Bulgarian language in Taraclia, are models that have to be promoted. As 
part of measures to improve the situation of the Romanian community 
in Ukraine can be considered similar measures aiming the Ukrainian 
community in Romania and the Republic of Moldova.  
3. The relation Ukraine – Republic of Moldova needs symmetry with 
regard to opening of schools where teaching is performed in the mother 
tongue (or transforming the existing ones, where teaching is performed 
in a language other than the mother tongue, in schools where teaching 
is performed in mother tongue of the ethnicity residing in the village). 
At present, in the Republic of Moldova in most of the villages 
populated by Ukrainians the language of instruction in schools is 
Russian, the same as in Ukraine there are Romanian or Moldovan 
villages where the language of instruction in schools is Russian or 
Ukrainian.  So there is a need to open schools with the Romanian 
language of teaching in the Romanian villages with no such schools. 
4. If such an approach is accepted, the authorities of the Ukrainian state and 
of the Moldovan state, possibly of the Romanian state would take interest 
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of these reborn schools to equip them with textbooks and the libraries 
with bells and other literature. The Ministries of Education from 
Romania and RM have to provide teaching materials, if the Ukrainian 
authorities cannot do this for their citizens – tax payers; to provide books 
by classic writers, dictionaries, literature for children for the Romanian 
schools (Romania could support ―Alexandu cel Bun‖ Publishing house  
from Chernivtsi to publish the texts of the classic writers). 
5. The exchange of experience between the teachers that perform the 
tuition in Romanian language in Ukraine with their colleagues from 
Romania and from the Republic of Moldova would constitute another 
important step in helping our compatriots across the political borders of 
the two Romanian states.  
6. Another measure to be taken is signing of new interstate agreements on 
the recognition or equivalence/nostrification  of diplomas obtained in 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova by citizens of Ukraine, without 
their owners having to pay fees (which are very high) and pass other 
exams in Ukrainian or for Ukrainian language.  
7. Opening, in localities inhabited by Romanian, of bookshops with 
Romanian literature, as, for example, the Hungarian minority in 
Romania also has such bookshops. 
8. Opening of radio and television stations to broadcast in the language of 
the Romanian minority in areas where the Romanian minority from 
Ukraine lives.  
9. To create the opportunities to make subscriptions to the cultural 
Romanian and Moldovan newspapers. 
10. To organize the festivals of movies produced in Romania and RM.  
11. Opening of a theater in Romanian language in Chernivtsi or Hertsa, 
often tours of the theaters from Romania and the Republic of Moldova 
(to show theatre performances) in the localities inhabited by Romanians 
on the Moldovan/Romanian historic territory, currently within Ukraine. 
12. Opening a branch of the Romanian Cultural Institute in Chernivtsi or 
Hertsa is a matter of urgency. 
13. Reaching of an agreement on local border traffic between Romania and 
Ukraine, for the Romanians from Ukraine to obtain the right to cross 
the Romanian-Ukrainian border without a visa (possibly without 
passports, by means of the identity cards) as they can travel in Moldova 
(in this regard, the authorities from Bucharest and from Kiev must 
achieve the same agreement as the Polish Government achieved with 
the Ukrainian Government). 
14. Restitution of the Romanian House building, built for this purpose 
since the interwar period, to the Romanian community. Currently the 
building lodges the Army/‖officers‖ and other institutions.  
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15. To enhance the cooperation within the Upper Prut Euro region and 
Lower Danube Euro region, between the RM, Ukraine and Romania.   
16. The example of the Swedish minority from Finland would be useful to 
follow: as it is known, the Swedish language has the status of state 
language in Finland. Perhaps, it would be useful to introduce the 
Romanian language as the official language in the Romanian villages 
from the Chernivtsy, Odesa and Transcarpathian regions. 
In conclusion, we can say that Romania and the Republic of Moldova 
should morally and materially support the Moldovan-Romanian minority on its 
historical territories, now within Ukraine. 
So, for the survival of the Moldovan-Romanian minority on its 
historical territories, currently under state borders of Ukraine, it is necessary to 
put together the efforts of the authorities and civil societies of the two 
Romanian states, Romania and the Republic of Moldova, and also the minority 
Moldovan-Romanian in Ukraine shall take actions, shall aim to keep its ethnic 
identity and require observance of its rights stipulated both in the Constitution 
and in other laws.  
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Abstract. The slovak population from the upper part of Bistra valley  played an 
important role in the economic, social and political life of the area. Present  here  from the late 
XVIIIth century, the slovak community faced all the  changes  caused by historical, political, 
economical evolutions and still remains, in the present, an active and important part of daily life 
with significant influence upon all ather social and economic components. 
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VALLEY, BIHOR COUNTY 
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1. Location of the study area 
 
The Bistra basin is situated in the north-western part of Romania, being 
framed by the following mathematical coordinates: 22°36‘ - 22°64‘East longitude 
and 47°12‘ şi 47°37‘ North latitude, the river being the most important tributtary 
of Barcau river. 
The territory drained by the Bistra river overlaps the three morpho-
structural types of units, namely: the mountainous unit (Plopis Mountains), hilly 
unit (Dernei Hills) and depression relief, including a corridor of the valley 
(Barcau river valley), which finds its explanation in the tectonics and structure 
formation in the region and the extensive erosion  agents. 
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Fig. 1. The location of the study area within Romania and Bihor county 
 
 
The creation of the most important river in the region (Bistra), imposed 
both by the size of the basin, and by his age. Has its source in Mount Plopiş, 
with a relatively large catchment area (180 km2). 
 
2. Historical landmarks of the colonisation 
 
The colonisation of slovak population was made under two control 
factors: some hungarian noble families, such as Csáki family, who rule the 
Sinteu domain, or Bárányi and Banfy families; under the control of Austrian-
Hungarian authority, in different parts of Transsylvania. 
The colonisation process was made by the Imperial authorities in 
several steps the most important moment being the following: 
 First families arrived from three different regions: Orava, Kysica and 
Gemer in 1785 and they founded Budoi village (Štefanco, 2004: 20). But 
according to other sources the foundation of Budoi village could be 
related to year 1828 (Suciu, I, 1966: 110). The most probable year of 
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foundation it is considered to be 1785 as the moment of the arrival of 
the Slovak colonists because the first documentary mention, 1828, did 
not meant the year of appearance of the village. 
 new slovak colonists arived In 1790  from gemer and Zemplin area and 
they founded villages Borumlaca and Varzari (Štefanco, 2004: 20). 
 In 1817 Count Bánffy colonize with slovak settlers from Šariš, Gemer 
and Zemplín, Tarna valley and Sinteu. (Štefanco, 2004: 20). 
 
 
3. Historical Evolution of the Slovak Community  
 
 This process has some different stages and all the stages went under 
different historical, political, economical and social circumstances but all 
these processes has in common the following circumstances:  during 
times they kept a strong  relation with their home land (in 1829 the 
slovak community from  Budoi built his own church) (Štefanco, 2004: 
31); in the interwar period many slovak teachers came from Slovakia 
and were involved in the live of these communities; after 1945 many 
slovak families went back to Chechoslovakia;  the isolation of these 
communities  is the primary cause of preservation of authonomy and 
ethic identity (Štefanco, 2004: 21-23). 
 
Fig. 2 Slovak families from Budoi in the 30s 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Source of pictures: Ondjei Andreiko, Despre slovacii din România, Editura Ivan 
Krasko, 2001: 8) 
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4. The economic activities – key factors in the preservation of  the 
identity of slovak population.  
 
The forest exploitation, the glass producing activity and the mining 
activity were the first industrial activities in which the slovak community was 
largely involved (Štefanco, 2004: 20-23).  The mining activity started at the 
beginning of XIX th century, the first geological surveys being made in 1818. 
The first mine was called Budoi Tunel because the coal was transported 
through an underground tunnel to Derna Tatarus village, where a hungarian 
company called Magyar Asphalt had built an asphalt and bitumen processing 
factory. 
Fig. 3. Miners from Budoi in the 80s 
 
 
 
(Source of picture, www. Adevarul.ro) 
 
From 1948 the mines belonged to Romania state and they were 
operationals up to 2004 The firs way of disposal were in 1997 and the process 
continued up to 2004 when the mines were completely closed (the mines 
functioned relatively long period comparatively with other mining areas in 
Romania). 
 
4.1 The happy days.  
  
This period is so-called the „happy days period― because it was, by far, 
the most significant from financial point of view.  The period started with the 
opening of quarry exploitation, in 1980, in Budoi 1 site, and was continued with 
the opening of the second quarry, in 1991, the estimated reserves in 1990 were 
over 1 milion tones of coal. In 1985 the total production of the mines covered 
6% of Romania s lignite production (source of data: Ministry of Economy). 
 
4.2 The glass factory from Padurea Neagra  
 
The first factory appeared in the first period of the XVIIth century at 
Huta Sinteu but few years later was built the factory which soon will become 
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the icon of the glass makers in the north-western part of Romania, the glass 
factory from Padurea Neagra (Pinta, 1991: 153). During the period of 
functioning the factory was renewed several times, unfortunately, in the 90s was 
completely abandoned. The skill and the attachment to the traditions of the 
Slovak workers turn them into unique values of this craft. 
 
Fig. 4. The ―Happy Days‖ of the glass factory from Padurea Neagra in 1915 
 
 
 
 (courtesy of Mr.  Constantin Demeter private collection) 
 
5. The present 
 
Unfortunately the present is not so bright as the past was for the Slovak 
communities. The economic decline of the area and demographic negative 
balance forced the Slovak community to face a new situation, unknown in the 
past. The mines, which represented the economic background for the 
communities, were closed in several steps: Varzari mine in 1999, Cuzap mine in  
1994-1995, Budoi mine in 1997 (underground exploitations), and the quarries 
were closed in 2003-2004. 
Although the mining activity is closed, the communities shows strong 
attachment to the values of the past although, slowly by slowly, all the signs of 
the past are removed. The communities try to face the situation in different 
ways the most representative ways being the following: the refuse to accept the 
difficult present situation and the permanent will to find solutions. The most 
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accepted way of facing the situation is the emigration of the male  former 
workers from the glass factory or miners mainly in Senica area (souther 
Slovakia) in the glass factories. 
 
Fig. 5. The symbols of the past still present in the collective memory of the 
community 
  
 
(Source of pictures, Nistor S.) 
 
 Being a very open community, the Slovaks allowed the presence among 
them of a variety of different ethnic groups (romanians, hungarians, gypsies, 
jews) this feature having as a result the existence of an multi-ethic demographic 
structure of the upper Bistra valley. This feature allowed the Slovaks to learn 
the language of the other ethnic groups (for example Hungarian language) 
which is significantly useful in present because allowed the Slovak workers a 
very easy integration in the glass factories from Ajka (Hungary). 
 
 6. Conclusions 
 
Under present circumstances the future of the Slovak community is 
definitely not a bright one. Although the present sighs are not very bright the 
future, under a clever management of the present circumstances could turn into 
a better one. In brief, the favorable conditions could be summarized as follows: 
 - Natural resources (accesibile montains,  mineral  and thermal water 
resources, relatively untouched landscape) sandy bitumen and coal reserves for 
industrial exploitations coul represent the base for a future economic 
background, the first good signs  being already present (the re-opening of the 
former coal quarries by local and foreign investors); 
 - Taking into account the potential, the development of local tourism 
could be a good alternative. This alternative is based on two main factors: the 
closeness of three important cities (Oradea, Alesd and Marghita) which could 
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supply weekend tourists; the vicinity of Hungary (about 60 km from Debrecen, 
Hungary s second larges city) and the hungarian language;  
- Relatively good road infrastructure is an other major factor and the 
importance of this factor will definitely increase after the opening of the 
Transylvania Highway in the nearby vicinity of the area. 
 
Fig. 6. Padurea Neagra holiday village 
 
 
 
 (Source of picture Nistor S.) 
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Abstract. Migration is a key element of modern society, bringing benefits and 
conflicts both to the receiving places and to the places of origin and raising issues of security, 
social measurements and multiculturalism in our globalised world. This paper aims to analyse 
the processes of integration into a new society for immigrants, providing examples of the 
experiences of groups moving from countries of the former Soviet Union to the USA 
(Washington State) or to the UK (Scotland). We compare immigrant groups‟ experiences in 
different countries through different times and argue that different elements have an effect on 
the integration and acculturation process, e.g. how the receiving society‟s characteristics and 
attitudes, or how the characteristics of the immigrants, can modify the newcomers‟ adaptation 
processes of the new culture, country and customs. These circumstances can have significant 
impacts on the individuals‟ lives, by relieving or exacerbating the difficulties of the period of 
integration. Our methodology comprises questionnaire surveys (91+81) of immigrants and 
local citizens, and qualitative interviews (17+4) of émigrés and local authorities in both 
countries: in Scotland and Washington State. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE INTEGRATION PROCESS OF IMMIGRANTS IN 
SCOTLAND, UK AND IN WASHINGTON STATE, USA. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the international migration has not involved huge proportion of 
the world‘s population, it has got very significant impact on the countries of 
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departures and destinations. ―By 2007, the figure [international migrants] 
approached 200 million or approximately 3 percent of the world‘s population 
of 6.5 billion people.‖ (Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. 2009). However, 3% does 
not suggest big volume worldwide, but because the immigration happens to be 
concentrated in certain places and certain times, requiring fast reaction for 
both, the destination and departure sides, its consequences have effects on the 
economies and societies of both places for a long period. In many cases the 
host countries are surprised by very significant immigration waves challenging 
their capabilities to handle these situations.  
The number of the publications about international migration is almost 
uncountable, it is impossible to look at and study them all. It is still significant 
its literature if we only focus on one aspect of the relating issues within the 
whole immigration studies. We were interested in papers related to immigrants‘ 
integration, acculturation. Many of them investigate selected ethnic groups‘ 
situation in their new home places, like Woltman and Newbolt or Skop wrote 
about the Cuban Americans émigrés (Woltman K, and Newbolt, K. B. 2009, 
Skop, E. H. 2001). E.g. Haines studied the Vietnamese (Haines, D. W. 2002); 
Martin, Martinez, Oppenheimer, Alba explored immigration issues of Mexicans 
(Martin, P. 2002; Martinez, 1994; Oppenheimer, R. 1985, Alba, R. 2006); 
Hardwick, Kishinevsky, Kopnina wrote about immigrants from countries of the 
former Soviet Union (Hardwick, S. W. 1993, Kishinevsky, V. 2004, Kopnina, 
H. 2005); Robila‘s work investigates émigrés from East Europe in the USA 
(Robila, M. 2010), etc. Other papers focus on the theoretical issues of 
immigration and immigrants‘ adaptation. Portes and Böröcz underline three 
basic dimensions of assimilation: 1) condition of exit; 2) the class origin of 
immigrants and 3) the contexts of reception (Portes, A. – Böröcz, J. 1989). The 
segmented adaptation theory is based on three factors: 1) the nature of 
migration to the host country (forced or voluntary); 2) the resources that 
immigrants bring; and 3) the host country‘s reception (Portes, A. – Zhou, M. 
1993, Skop, E. H. 2001). Woltman and Newbold consider the segmented 
assimilation theory (―discrimination and unequal opportunities affect processes 
of adaptation‖) ―in the context of how the adaptation of Cuban émigrés differs 
along lines of race‖ (Woltman, K. –Newbold, K. B. 2009). Skop argues the 
same issue in case of the adaptation of Mariel Exiles (Skop, E. H. 2001). 
Zelinsky and Lee pointed out the impact of the new technologies on 
immigrants‘ sociospatial behaviour, how inventions reformed the late 20th 
century‘s communication provided new aspects for people to keep in touch, 
creating or keeping their social networks (Zelinsky, W. and Lee, B. A. 1998). 
Berry introduced four-four acculturation strategies of ethno-cultural groups and 
larger society: Strategies of ethno-cultural groups are: integration, assimilation, 
separation and marginalization, while the acculturation strategies of larger 
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society are: multiculturalism, melting pot, segregation and exclusion (Berry, J. 
W. in: ed. by Azzi, A.E, Chryssochoou, X, Klandermans, B, Simon, B. 2011.).  
This paper focuses on the process of the immigrants from the countries 
of the former Soviet Union in Washington State, USA and in Scotland, UK. In 
this research we employed both statistical and empirical methods. We asked 
altogether 172 people: 91 immigrants and 81 local citizens in the two host 
countries. As the consequences of the lack of statistical data about these 
immigrants‘ figures we only could utilize non probability sample. We also used 
in-depth interviewing among immigrants and locals. Additionally we contacted 
with different associations dealing with immigrants and immigration issues in 
both countries, we conducted altogether 21 interviews. 
 
2. Adaptation to the new place and society 
 
Our approach includes two ways process: studying the characteristics 
and resources of the immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union 
in Washington State and Scotland; and investigating the local residents‘ 
attitudes of the host societies toward the immigration. As these characteristics 
are changing, the adaptation process alters as well determining the acculturation 
of an immigrant or immigrants groups. 
 
2.1. Characteristics and resources of immigrants 
 
The way and the reason how and why migrants leave their countries of 
origin has effect on the process of adaptation. Many scholars emphasized that 
the process of integration or assimilation is different if someone experienced 
forced or voluntary immigration as one dimension of the segmented 
assimilation (Portes, A. and Zhou, M. 1993, Portes, A. and Böröcz, J. 1989, 
Skop, E. H. 2001). If people had to flee because of war or political, religious or 
ethnic persecution, could receive refugee status in their new countries, which 
would provide very different situation for them: they would receive significant 
help in their place of destination (of course it may vary according to the 
receiving country‘s immigration policy). Portes and Böröcz also pointed out 
that if an immigrant loses his/her possibility to return to his or her homeland it 
effects his/her attitude toward his/her new country resulting special process of 
his or her adaptation to the new society (Portes, A. and Böröcz, J. 1989).  
Hardwick (1993) says about the Russian speaking immigrants in the 
West Coast, USA, that ―Russians have not been typical of other Euramerican 
immigrant groups in North America…Russian residential enclaves have been 
relatively slow to disperse through time‖ (Hardwick, S. W. 1993, p.4). Hardwick 
argued that there are many reasons behind this phenomenon, like members of 
some religious groups tend to stay separated from the main stream of the 
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society, but the host country negative reception also made obstacles for these 
immigrants‘ integration (Hardwick, S. W. 1993). Our research results show that 
after 1990 the characteristics of immigrants from the countries of the former 
Soviet Union have been changed in this area of the USA. There are still refuges 
but their number has significantly dropped. More and more people arrive with 
work visa permit or other visas finally finding their way to stay.  
The immigrants‘ story from the countries of the former Soviet Union is a 
bit different in Scotland. As Kopnina says ―in the nineteenth century, most 
Russian migrants left for America, Canada, Germany and France. …[In Britain] 
However, members of the Russian political opposition, although not numerous, 
were quite influential.‖ (Kopnina, H. 2005, p. 24). She refers to four waves of 
immigration from the Soviet Union to Great Britain: the first one related to the 
Russian Revolution in 1917, the second one occurred after the Second World 
War, the third wave concerns the period between 1950 and the end of 1980s. All 
of these émigrés left their homeland because of political, cultural, religious or 
ethnic persecutions (Kopnina, H. 2005). After this period more and more people 
arrive from these countries because of economic reason during the fourth wave 
up to recent days (Kopnina, H. 2005). Many arrived from the Baltic states after 
the join to the European Union as our result represents (table 1). 
 
Table 1 Characteristics of respondents: making decision about leaving their 
country 
 Washington 
State % 
Scotland 
% 
Why did they 
leave their 
home 
countries? 
Unfavourable economic circumstances 
in the CoO (Country of Origin) 
24.1 29.7 
Religious discrimination 22.3 2.7 
Ethnic discrimination 26 5.4 
Better economic situation in the USA 
/UK 
37 62.2 
Better future for their children 38.9 43.2 
Family reason 18.5 29.7 
 
According to the outcome of our questionnaire survey there are still 
numerous émigrés who left their homeland because of religious and ethnic 
persecution in Washington State, however, their proportion is less than 30% 
within our Washington State sample while their percentage is very low among 
our respondents in Scotland (2.7% and 5.4%). Most of the immigrants decided 
to leave their countries of origin because of economic reason or hoping better 
future for their children, but in Scotland their proportion is much higher 
(62.2%) than in Washington State (37%) (table1). 70.4% of these émigrés 
arrived at the USA between 1991 and 2004, while 61.1% of our immigrant 
respondents went to the UK after 2004. In both receiving countries had benefit 
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accommodate large proportion of highly educated people among these 
immigrants (in Washington State: 53.7%; in Scotland: 86.5%), but it is 
extremely significant in Scotland which refers to the brain drain phenomenon.  
It was not easy to investigate their success of their new life. When we 
carried in-depth interviewing they mainly reported that they would be very 
happy, very satisfied with everything. When we asked them how they would 
measure their happiness in their home countries when they lived there, then 
their satisfaction with the circumstances and things when they just arrived at 
the destination country and finally how happy they are now, after living for few 
years in their new home place, they provided more classified answers. While 
among immigrants who live in Washington State we can see an improving 
progress since they left their countries of origin, among émigrés in Scotland 
from these countries had not had so bad experience in their homeland, but 
their feelings toward their new life had got better by the time (table 2).  
 
Table 2 Characteristics of respondents: attitude: happiness and national identity 
 
 
Washington 
State 
Scotland 
How happy they 
were/are (scale 1-5) 
to live in their countries of origin 3.43  3.61 
when they entered 3.63  3.61 
now 4.22 4.11  
Their national 
identity (%) 
Russian 66.7 73 
Russian American 3.7 - 
Russian with Jewish roots 5.6 - 
Ukrainian 5.6 - 
Estonian - 2.7 
No 7.4 18.9 
Proud of their nationalities (scale 1-5) 3.56 4.19 
 
The reason of this result is palpable if we look at the next table. We can 
see that among those who fled their home places because of some kind of 
discrimination, the happiness index is the lowest. They probably still have 
memories about how much they suffered and stated it in our questionnaire 
(table 3). And because their number was more significant in Washington State 
than in Scotland it had impact on the happiness index of the whole studied 
group in Washington state. This is why they even felt happier being in the USA 
when they just arrived despite all the hassle and difficulties what an immigrant 
has to tolerate. However, among those who had to flee because of ethnic 
discrimination we cannot see the similar progress of their happiness then 
among who suffered religious persecution. Among the former group the 
improvement level was two times bigger than in the latter one. However, 
among those who experienced ethnic persecution in their homeland their 
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happiness level was lower than those who had to bear religious discrimination 
in their countries of origin. But the former group had higher level of happiness 
by today. It is possible that those who belong to a special religious 
denomination perceive some kind of separation. Hardwick also argued that the 
strong religious belief had a role in the Russian speaking immigrants‘ integration 
in the West Coast in case of some religious groups and could make this process 
slower than it usually is among white European: ―Religious affiliations thus 
emerged as both a help and a hindrance to larger assimilation experience for 
these and other groups of refugees and immigrants‖ (Hardwick, S. W. in: ed. 
Jones, R. C. 2008, p. 36). If we continue the analysis of the immigrants‘ 
adaptation using people‘s happiness as its indicator, it is also interesting that the 
improvement of their happiness since they left their homeland is also relatively 
low among those who left their countries of origin because of economic reason. 
However, they provided the happiest group in recent time with those who hope 
a better future in for their children in their new countries (table 3). Further 
investigation shows relating to this issue that the happiest at home were among 
those who left their countries of origin because of family reason. Many émigrés 
arrived when they were elderly to join to their children. It is more difficult for 
them to adopt a new society, they usually do not speak the language, and they 
left their friends and other relatives behind. Only among this particular group 
we could see that they were less happy when they arrived than in their 
homeland and however, there is an improvement in their feelings by recent 
time, but it is very little betterment (table 3). 
 
Table 3 Happiness level of living in their home countries and in the host places 
according to the reason of leaving their countries of origin 
 
Statistics, scale 1-5 
(1= the worse, 
5=the best) 
1. happiness 
level of 
living in 
their home 
country 
2. satisfaction 
when they 
arrived at the 
USA/UK 
3. how they 
like living in 
the USA/ 
UK now 
difference 
between  
2-1 
difference 
between  
3-1 
better future for 
their children 
3.35 3.62 4.49 0.27 1.14 
bad economic 
situation in their 
home countries 
3.46 3.64 4.42 0.18 0.96 
all economic related  
reason 
3.51 3.67 4.36 0.16 0.85 
better economic 
situation in the new 
places 
3.52 3.69 4.35 0.17 0.83 
ethnic discrimination 
in their home 
2.80 3.53 4.31 0.73 1.51 
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Statistics, scale 1-5 
(1= the worse, 
5=the best) 
1. happiness 
level of 
living in 
their home 
country 
2. satisfaction 
when they 
arrived at the 
USA/UK 
3. how they 
like living in 
the USA/ 
UK now 
difference 
between  
2-1 
difference 
between  
3-1 
countries 
religious 
discrimination in 
their home countries 
3.27 3.45 4.09 0.18 0.82 
family reason 3.86 3.48 3.95 -0.38 0.10 
 
One of our respondents explained well this situation: ―We were not 
afraid to try a new life...As far as our homesickness is concerned, the beginning 
of our life here was the hardest...One should not emigrate without a very 
serious reason, because the lack of a serious reason will overtake you later and 
destroy your life‖ (Kotelnikov, D. 2001:50). Here we have to mention that 
because of our methods we cannot represent a real picture of the success of the 
acculturation. Not only because our sample is relatively small but because we 
could not interview those immigrants who returned to their home countries 
after a while. The frame of this study did not provide resources for broader 
investigation neither in its element of sample or its territorial expansion. This 
could be a further aim of our study. Most of our respondents considered 
themselves as Russian, however, in Scotland almost 20% of our immigrants 
said that they do not have national identity at all (table 2). Mainly they arrived 
from the Baltic states. This raises the question whether there is any connection 
between the attitudes towards their national identity and any issues of ethnicity 
in the post-Soviet states, such as one that was described by one of our Russian 
interviewees who left Estonia with his family: ―In Estonia we were Russians, in 
Russia we were Estonians‖ (Kotelnikov, V. 2001:12). For those Russians who 
lived outside the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union the 
situation became more difficult, as we can see in the case of the Baltic states 
(Smith, D. – Burch, S. 2007). Meantime it is interesting that for the question 
how proud they are for their nationalities, we received more positive answer 
from our émigrés living in Scotland then from those who live in Washington 
State (table2) In both destination countries our immigrants (around 65% or 
more of them in both studied areas) tend to live in those neighbourhoods 
where other people with same nationalities live (table 4). Despite more than 
60% of our respondents‘ closest friends‘ nationalities are the same than their 
nationalities, only around 10% stated that they would not have any international 
friends and in both destination countries more than 25% of our émigrés 
possesses that their closest friends come from the local citizens (table 4). Our 
result shows that there are significant differences between the factors of 
immigrants‘ acquaintances and friends, relatives in the destination places who 
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are playing important role in the immigration and in the choice that what it 
would be their place of destination. While among our respondents in 
Washington State almost 80% of them had friends, relatives in their new 
country before they moved there, in case of the émigrés who settled down in 
Scotland this figure was only 46% (table 4). Maybe the distance and the fact 
that it is harder to enter the USA than UK from these countries, especially it is 
easy to move for the Baltic states members within the European Union, could 
have effect on this. When it becomes more difficult to move somewhere, 
émigrés rather would prefer chain migration to ensure their resettle process, as 
Portes and Rumbaut pointed out as well (Portes, A and Rumbaut, R. G. 2006). 
 
 
Table 4 Resources of immigrants respondents: social network 
 
 
Washington 
State % 
Scotland 
% 
Know people (relatives/friends) in the area before they 
came here 
77.8 45.9 
Live in the area where other people from their countries 
of origin live 
68.5 64.9 
They have friends among them 53.7 51.4 
Their 
friends‘ 
nationalities 
Only people with the same nationalities 
than they are 
11.1 10.8 
Closest friends among local Americans, 
Scottish, British people 
26.2 27 
Their 
closest 
friends‘ 
nationalities 
The same nationalities than they are 65.6 64.9 
 
We cannot see big differences between the characteristics and attitude 
of our émigrés according to their relocated groups in the USA and UK. Their 
happiness level are very similar too, however, when we were curious about 
whether they want to return to their homeland, more our émigrés in Scotland 
stated that they would like to do that or they are thinking about it (table 5). We 
also could find some differences in their happiness according to the reason of 
their moving as we presented in this subchapter. But in general there were no 
significant dissimilarities between the characteristics of our immigrants in 
Washington State and Scotland.  
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Table 5 Characteristics of respondents: thinking about returning to their 
countries of origin 
 
 Washington State % Scotland % 
Would they like to 
return their CoO? 
No 63 43.2 
Yes 7.4 13.5 
Maybe 27.8 37.8 
 
2.2. Characteristics and reception of the places of destinations 
 
This subshapter investigates the attitude of the local societies toward 
the immigrants. Is there any signifcant differences between the mind-set and 
outlook of the two study areas‘ local citizens toward this issue? How their 
attitude alter the process of adaptation of immigrants? How open these 
societies are toward immigration? The characteristics and reception of the host 
societies play significant role in the process of adaptation of émigrés. As Berry 
argued: „acculturation is a two-way interaction, resulting in actions and 
reactions to the contact situation.‖ (Berry, J. W. in: Azzi, A.E, Chryssochoou, 
X, Klandermans, B, Simon, B. 2011, p.282). We tried to explore the locals‘ 
social networks regarding their relations and connections with international 
people. The table 6 shows that our Americans in Washington State had more 
international friends than local people living in Scotland. The figure is even 
more extreme if we do not count British or English people as international 
(table 6). If we look at their closest friends‘ nationalities, we can see that more 
Americans have international friends than Scottish people (table 6). These 
figures suggest that the Americans are more open toward immigrations. During 
our surveying our local American respondents emphasized that they are 
immigrants themselves. In contrast for a Scottish person an English man or 
woman is a foreigner. 
 
Table 6 Characteristics of the place of destinations: social network of the local 
Americans/Scottish people 
 
 Washington 
State % 
Scotland 
% 
They have friends in their neighbourhood 84.3 86.7 
Their friends are only Americans/Scottish people - 
Sc+Br+En 
11.8 36.7/63.7 
Closest friend‘s nationality is American/ Scottish 
people - Sc+Br+En 
78.4 86.7/96.7 
 
The immigrants received more help in the USA than émigrés in 
Scotland according to our data (table 7). The reason of this is that there were 
more refugees in Washington state in our sample than in Scotland and there is 
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an officially organised service for them which provide help them to settle down 
in the US. 
 
Table 7 Reception of the place of destination: supporting émigrés 
 
 
Washington 
State % 
Scotland 
% 
Received help when they moved to the USA / UK 66.7 29.7 
Received help to settle down, financial support 50 18.9 
Financial support 
from 
family 13 2.7 
government 16.7 5.4 
friends, company 5.6 - 
 
The reception of the host society always plays significant role in the 
development of adaptation of émigrés. Not only the resources and the 
characteristics of the newcomers can modify this process but the host society 
reception as well as many argued (Portes A. and Böröcz J 1998, Skop, E. H. 
2001, Woltman, K. Newbolt, K. B. 2009 and others). One element of this 
treatment is the level of discrimination against foreigners, the lack or the 
existence of xenophobia, the level of tolerance toward these immigrants. In our 
sample we could not really discover strong discrimination against our 
immigrants group (table 8). They only experienced a little impatience from 
locals because of their lack of English (table 8).  
 
Table 8 Reception of the place of destination: discrimination 
 
Scale 1: never  –  5: always 
Washington 
State 
Scotland 
discrimination because of their nationalities 1.37 1.35 
uncomfortable feeling because they are foreign 1.98 2.0 
feeling that they are not welcome because of their 
nationalities 
1.77 1.57 
disadvantages because of their English 2.59 2.37 
 
Finally we asked our local Scottish citizens what benefits and difficulties 
are there in Scotland in receiving immigrants (table 9). They rather see cultural 
diversity as a good thing, however, they worry about their loosing position in 
the labour market because of the immigration. Regarding the qualification and 
demographical issues they welcome immigrants. Some of them mentioned the 
increasing house cost and tapering social benefits as one of the causing 
elements by immigration (table 9). 
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Table 9. Reception of the place of destination: attitude toward immigration in 
Scotland 1 
What benefits/difficulties are there in Scotland 
in receiving immigrants 
Benefits Disadvantages 
Cultural diversity 56.7 16.7 
Regarding employment 13.3 60 
Regarding qualification 30 3.3 
Growing population 10 - 
Increasing housing costs - 16.7 
Having problem to provide additional support - 16.7 
Some immigrants only use benefits but cannot give 
anything back to the country 
- 6.7 
Increasing crime level - 3.3 
 
Altogether 86.7% of our Scottish respondants mentioned at least one 
benefit in receiving immigrants and 90 % of them stated at least one 
disadventageous factor (table 10). 23.3% of them see two things as good about 
it and 16.7% of them brought up two reasons why it is not beneficial and 
furthermore 10% of them had thre things to say as difficulties about having 
émigrés in Scotland (table 10) So the picture is complex, but not hopeless. The 
advantages and disadvantages are almost ballanced among the Scottish locals. 
 
Table 10 Reception of the place of destination: attitude toward immigration in 
Scotland 2 
 
What 
benefits/difficulties 
are there in 
Scotland in 
receiving 
immigrants 
Altogether 
% 
Mentioning 
1 thing (%) 
Mentioning 
2 things 
(%) 
Mentioning 3 
things (%) 
Immigration has 
benefits 
86.7 63.3 23.3 - 
Immigration has 
disadvantages  
90 63.3 16.7 10 
 
One of our interviewees explained the role of very supportive attitude‘s 
importance of their integration process: ―We have lots of help. Lots of people, 
American people around offering help like once a week, twice a week you could 
come they could help with the language, it was amazing. And one person who 
we used to live with in an apartment building, her name is Miss C, at the time 
when we met she was an international counsellor at the Seattle Pacific 
University. She offered us help, right away when we came after a week, she 
helped us with language, and she helped Michael, my husband, and he started a 
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couple of courses at the Seattle Pacific University. This lady was amazing to 
us.‖ (Lena, November 2009). We called this element micro environmental 
factor, which can have significant effects on the individuals‘ lives, by relieving 
the difficulties of the period of integration. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
We have to emphasize that the international migration and the process 
of the adaptation, acculturation of immigrants are very complex phenomenons. 
It is not possible to forcast exactly how many people are going to leave their 
homeland and when it could occur, where they would move, etc. Our model 
represents this complicated system (Figure 1). The process of acculturation is 
similarly complex, relying on many factors and elements as we can see in Figure 
2. However, in this paper we do not aim to introduce these models in more 
detailed as it is the purpose of our future article. We only provided them as to 
demonstrate the complexities of these phenomenons. Both models represent 
open systems. In case of the migration the model shows the two main poles of 
the system, the place of departure and destination. The characteristics of them 
and their players and the interactions, relations between these elements will 
create an always changing situation for the migration. The adaptation model 
describes the two-way process, the characteristics of these factors and elements 
wich determine and modify the success of the émigres‘ accultaration.  
 
Figure 1 Model of immigration 
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Figure 2 Model of the process of the adaptation of immigrants 
 
 
 
In this paper we provided some examples for this integration process in 
case of the immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union in two 
departure places: in Washington State, USA and Scotland, UK. Our result 
shows that immigrants in Washington State experienced more significant 
change in their happiness if we compare its levels at their home countries with 
their new home. They think less to moving back, they are very satisfied with 
their life and their children possibilities in the US. However, the immigrants 
from the same countries in Scotland are also quite happy, more than 50% of 
them thinking about to return their home countries. It is also palpable that the 
Scottish people less open toward immigrants than Americans in Washington 
State. Despite their similar apperances than the local citizens have, they feel 
being strangers in their new home, which for the first generation is not unusual. 
The question is that how the local society will accept their children if their 
parents could manage their stay in the UK and then how this second generation 
will be able to acculturate. It is positive that the Scottish people think about 
multiculturalism as a good thing, however, they are also concerned about their 
perception in the shrinking labour market and the immbalanced social system 
because of the immigrants. There always be a conflict between the new arrivals 
and locals if the number of émigrés reached a certain amount at a time and at a 
place. In some cases it is just simple impossible to prepare for receiving these 
immigrants in every level of the society, but well organised measurements can 
reduce tens significantly. It is a matter of not only macro political and economic 
regulations but also micro political actions, civil society programs and 
supportive attitude of induviduals and communities. Many immigrants remain 
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in their new country because of e.g. they cannot return to their homeland for 
different reasons (they lost their citizens, war, extremely unfavourable 
economic circumstances, corrupt political system, etc.), or their children who 
grew up in the new country, do not want to leave, their parents‘ country is 
strange to them, etc. It is beneficial for everyone if they can resettle well and 
find a good way of their new life. If they can see their children being happy and 
having good opportunity they will be more satisfied themselves and their 
children can integrate very well into their new society. If the destination 
countries‘ societies, politics, measurements cause obstacle to their acculturation 
progress there would be a risk that they might fail to integrate and will remain 
being exluded. If this would happen in the target countries of the migration this 
could cause serious problems in their economies and societies. Europe has very 
different experience regarding to the migration then the USA, in both places 
there are success and failures in their experiences regarding to the integration of 
immigrants. Supporting the first generation helps to integrate the second 
generation well. Providing support to the host communities to accept émigrés 
helps the acculturation process. All these things with good political and 
economic measurements could establish a successful multiculturalism. 
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Abstract. This essay explores the strong and weak aspects of Moldovan 
Communities formation abroad. As the Moldovan Diaspora is not yet established, the process 
is at the beginning, the formula Moldovan Communities Abroad is accepted. Authors referred 
to the role of Moldovan Communities in maintaining and promoting cultural, national values 
in the host countries: Italy, Spain, Portugal. Also, the relations between Moldovan 
Communities Abroad and authorities from Republic of Moldova to strengthening the dialog 
are analyzed. The Scientific Diaspora is treated as a type of Diaspora which contributes to 
cultural and education relations with the homeland. We consider that representatives of the 
Moldovan diplomatic corps should increase their relationship with Diaspora associations 
abroad in order to offer their total support to Moldovan citizens, working migrants. 
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Throughout human history, people singly, more often in groups, have 
moved across international borders. Migration is considered one of the defining 
global issues of the early twenty-first century, as more and more people are on the 
move today than at any other point in human history. There are now about 192 
million people living outside their place of birth, which is about three per cent of 
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the world's population1. This means that roughly one of every thirty-five persons in 
the world is a migrant. With globalization the numbers continue to grow.  
The migration in Republic of Moldova represents a widespread and 
highly important process due to the fact that a significant share of persons able 
to work is involved there into, and related money transfers make up 1/3 of 
GDP. There is no adequate and complete information regarding the exact 
number of migrants working abroad. One of the reasons is the lack of an 
effective and log-life recordkeeping of migration processes. In addition, the lack 
of overall national control on eastern borders of the country, resulting from the 
unsolved Transdniestrian Conflict also has adverse impact on the labor 
migrants‘ record-keeping process.  
Diasporas are the consequence of transnational migration. A Diaspora 
is a transnational community that defined itself as a singular ethnic group based 
upon its shared identity. Diasporas result from historical emigration from an 
original homeland. Ethnic Diaspora communities are now recognized by 
scholars as "inevitable" and "endemic" features of the international system. 
Diasporas are thus perceived as transnational political entities, operating on 
"behalf of their entire people", and capable of acting independently from any 
individual state (be it their homeland or host states).  
Diasporas are the consequence of transnational migration. A Diaspora 
is a transnational community that defines itself as a singular ethnic group based 
upon its shared identity. Diasporas result from historical emigration from an 
original homeland. Ethnic Diaspora communities are now recognized by 
scholars as "inevitable" and "endemic" features of the international system. 
Diasporas are thus perceived as transnational political entities, operating on 
"behalf of their entire people", and capable of acting independently from any 
individual state (be it their homeland or host states).  
The interest in Diasporas, defined here as migrants and their 
descendants who have maintained strong sentimental and material links with 
their countries of origin, is not hard to understand. The definition of Diaspora 
includes temporary and permanent migrants and is adapted from Gabriel 
Sheffer‘s classic work on modern Diasporas. In the contemporary context, with 
the acceleration in international mobility, the term Diaspora has been used 
more broadly to encompass expatriate populations who are living outside of 
their home countries or contemporary Diaspora linked with issues of 
transnationalism and globalization2 (Hugo, 2005). Diaspora population may 
consist of people living permanently in the country of origin or country of 
                                                          
1 www.iom.int (accessed on 25.05.2011) 
2 Hugo G. Migrants in society: diversity and cohesion. A paper prepared for the Policy 
Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International 
Migration 2005 www.gcim.org/attachements/TP6.pdf (accessed on 20.05.2011) 
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destination, and migrants who work abroad temporary, people who hold 
double citizenship, ethnic Diaspora.  
The phenomenon of Diaspora poses challenges but also offers potential 
benefits to communities in both the homeland and the Diaspora. Diaspora 
communities face the dual challenge of integration into host communities and 
maintaining strong personal and cultural ties with their families and homeland. 
Countries of origin face the dual challenge of how to address issues such as 
brain drain and separated families, but also realize the full potential of financial 
remittances, business ties and other benefits of expatriate communities. 
Diasporas and home countries alike are realizing that both can benefit in 
important ways from strong partnerships addressing areas of mutual concern, 
ranging from identity in the Diaspora to development of the homeland.  
In our research we will use the term of ―Moldovan Communities 
Abroad‖ referring to Moldovan Diaspora since we consider that the process of 
the Diaspora formation is at the beginning phase. The term of ethnic 
communities is a phenomenon that characterizes the crystallization and 
strengthening of the Diaspora. Its main characteristic is, first of all, the fact that 
ethnic communities abroad are concerned with the self establishment, and are 
not preoccupied to enhance the interaction with the country of destination.  
Many migrants originally regard themselves as persons who have left 
their homeland temporarily, intending eventually to return, and are so regarded 
by officials and the public in their host countries. As many as a third do 
eventually return to their homelands. Yet, the great majority, having rebuilt 
their lives in their host country, choose, when this is possible, to remain, as do 
their locally born and locally educated children. They form communities, 
hoping to retain their inherited culture and to reproduce, as much as possible, 
and the familiar environment of their former homeland. In residential enclaves 
in urban areas, they establish institutions to serve their distinctive religious, 
cultural, social, informational, entertainment, and economic needs and to relate 
to the society and to official-dom in their host country. These communities in 
host countries constitute the Diaspora from their country of origin.  
While the Moldovan community abroad is relatively new, and many of 
the Moldovan migrants are only temporarily living abroad, these migrants 
increasingly come together to form Diaspora organizations. These 
organizations take a variety of forms, but generally aim to facilitate cultural, 
economic, social, educational links with Moldova. Some of these organizations 
collect donations from their members and send them back to Moldova for 
specific purposes, such as: the refurbishment of a school, winter clothes for a 
boarding school, or the building of a church. In addition to such nascent 
interests in development, these Diaspora organizations may also participate in 
the political, social and cultural affairs of Moldova and their own community. 
For example, the Association of the Moldovan Community in Ireland and 
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Moldova Vision established in 2006 by a group of Irish volunteers wants to 
help support rural communities in Moldova to develop social services3. 
Moldova Vision now organizes events for the Moldovan community in Ireland, 
including Martisor Festival, Annual Christmas Party, Celebration of 
Independence Day (August), International Children's Day (June). Since 
September 2009, they have supported the Moldovan Embassy in London to 
provide a consular service in Dublin once a month for Moldovan nationals 
living in Ireland. One of the achievements of the Association and Moldova 
Vision from 2006-2010 are: grant of 100,000 euro to Casa Sperantei build a 
high spec, fully wheelchair accessible community centre in Cosnita village 
(Dubasari raion), grant of 5,000 euro to Hippocrates Centre, Chisinau to 
support their work with children with physical disabilities, etc.  
The main role in order to organize and mobilize the Diaspora in the 
collective interests are material, cultural and organizational resources of the 
Diaspora and its opportunities in the country of residence, motivation and 
ability to maintain unity.  
Diaspora is influenced by and interacts with both the country of origin, 
as well as that of destination and countries of origin with communities in 
destination countries (students associations, communities of migrant workers 
(seasonal, legal, illegal and others). It seeks to develop and maintain 
relationships with political, social, cultural institutions with destination and of 
origins countries. 
A Moldavian community represents a homogeneous social 
phenomenon, which includes: 
a) "Historical Diaspora" – Moldovan ethnic communities traditional 
living abroad, and keeping historical-spiritual legacy, also representatives of 
various ethnic groups (Hebrew, Germans etc...), who lived long ago in Moldova. 
b) "Post-Soviet Diaspora," Moldovan communities abroad formed as a 
result of collapse of the Soviet Union. In the former Soviet republics, originating 
from Moldova, citizens of the new independent states found themselves: in 
Ukraine - 258 thousands, Russia - more than 200,000 persons, Kazakhstan - 19 
500 persons. Belorussia - 5000 pers., Lithuania - approximately 6000 persons, 
Kyrgyz stan- 1 500 pers., Latvia- 1 500 pers., Estonia -1 2000 pers.  
c) Moldovan communities abroad, which are formed in the context of 
labor migration and do not intend to live abroad. This process occurs actively 
mainly in Italy, Greece, Spain (Mosneaga, Rusu, 2008: 91-103). 
The process of forming Moldovan communities abroad is determined 
by a number of factors, both positive and negative. 
The strong aspects of the process of forming Moldovan communities 
abroad are the following: firstly, the demographic and geographic concentration 
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of the Republic of Moldova citizens abroad. Moldovan labor migrants are 
mostly present in Russia (60%), Italy (20%), Portugal (5%), Spain, Turkey, 
Greece, France, Romania, and Ukraine. The tendency of migrants to 
concentrate in big cities – mega polices is remarkable - ¾ of all Moldovan labor 
migrants are concentrated in 10 big cities (Moscow, Rome, Sankt-Petersburg, 
Istanbul, Odessa etc). 
Secondly, the socio-cultural Moldovan communities abroad are 
characterized by their high skills and by having learned languages of 
immigration countries.  
Thirdly, learning and emotional relationship with Moldova. This relation 
is stable and real, materialized in contacts with the family, money transfers and 
phone calls. The type of the relation is determined by the legal/illegal status, the 
seasonal nature of migration.  
Fourthly, individual and collective initiatives manifested through 
assistance in solving social and legal problems of citizens (registration in the 
country of residence, web site support and cultural initiatives). Often these 
measures are facilitated by the authorities of the country of residence and 
choices in the municipal structures for the legal foreign migrants, (Moldovan 
advisers do exist in Italy, Portugal, Spain). 
Fifthly, the church; Moldovan churches are built and opened under the 
Russian Metropolitan abroad (Russia, Italy, etc.). The church is not only an 
institution of spirituality, but also a mean of communication between migrants. 
Together with the Embassy, the church organizes Sunday schools and provides 
material help in finding a job sometimes.  
In the sixth place, migrants remittances from Moldovan workers living 
abroad. The annual share of such remittances is permanently increasing. The 
amount of money transfers of citizens temporary employed abroad 
(gastarbeiters) to Moldova via banks accounted for US$116 million in April, in 
2011 reaching US$393.35 million within 4 months. According to the National 
Bank of Moldova (NBM) data, the remittances went up US$64.84 million 
(+19.7%) in comparison to the similar period of 2010. The main share of 
money was transferred via international money transfer systems - US$336.02 
million. In 2010, the money transfers reached US$1.24 billion, which is 5.2% 
more against 2009. The historical maximum was registered in 2008, when 
Moldovan citizens remitted US$1.66 billion. According to the World Bank 
(WB) data, the transfers of Moldovan gastarbeiters reach 30% of the country 
gross domestic product (GDP)4. 
Origin countries‘ interest stems unquestionably from the remittances 
that Diasporas send back to their homelands. Remittances are huge and, relative 
to other types of financial flows to developing economies, remarkably stable – a 
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nmd/en/story/18840 (accessed on 06.06.2011) 
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particularly critical feature in a time of global economic slowdown. Diasporas 
are also considered to be a major source of direct investments in key industries 
and are often seen as ―first movers‖ who pave the way for other, more 
detached investors. They bring valuable skills, experience and networks, while 
acting as an influential lobby that can advance the homeland‘s political and 
economic interests in the destination country. Their contributions have many 
faces and appeal to policymakers in both origin and destination countries. 
Also, we have identified the weak aspects of the process of forming 
Moldovan Communities Abroad. 
Firstly, it is connected with the character of instability of the migrants 
working illegally. Illegal status prevents the formation of Moldavian 
communities abroad. It is linked to lack of legal and social protection of 
migrants, to various risks and threats that can arise.  
Secondly, poor organizational trend explained by the hard work of 
migrants. The situation differs based on the legal or illegal migrant‘s status. 
There is a mutual distance between old Diaspora and new migrants. 
Nevertheless, the events organized by the embassy (primarily spring holiday - 
Martisor) represent cultural points of unification, linking them.  
Thirdly, we have the perception of Moldovan identity amongst different 
migrants. This is subject to transformation processes in the period of post 
Soviet era, especially in Moldova. In the mass consciousness of Moldovan 
citizens the soviet and post soviet identity cohabits, as well as the political and 
ethnical identity, the Moldavian and Romanian one. This makes difficult the 
self-identification process of Moldovan Diaspora.  
Fourthly, representatives of the Moldovan diplomacy do not facilitate 
strengthening of these communities. For most migrants, embassies and 
consulates are the first and most important bridges to the homeland, (for those 
who are in capital cities where Moldovan diplomatic structures are set up). They 
are not transparent and open to migrants, working just with some associations 
of our migrants.  
Fifthly, it is the poor communication with and from Moldova. Practice 
demonstrates that Moldovan communities abroad have insufficient information 
on the situation in the country. The informal channels of communication are 
the main sources of information about Moldova: co ¬ medications with 
relatives by telephone, with international routes, bus drivers, train conductors, 
migrants who have returned. 
Please note that migrants use Internet possibilities insignificantly in 
obtaining information about Moldova. This is explained by lack of computer 
use, their inaccessibility. 
As we remarked above, IOM/CIMI research points out that one of the 
main weaknesses in the relationship between Moldova and its Diaspora is the 
inability of the government of Chisinau to communicate effectively with 
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Moldovans abroad. Many overseas nationals have no access to Moldova's 
diplomatic missions or proper information about developments in Moldova. 
The Moldovan government should find ways to strengthen its presence 
abroad through a broader network of embassies and consulates. Furthermore, 
Moldovan authorities should build up formal and informal communication 
networks and improve the use of mass media to further develop links with 
Moldovan nationals abroad. To inform its policy development, Moldova should 
establish a database of associations of Moldovan abroad. 
There are some specialized structures involved in the Diaspora 
problems: the Interethnic Relations Bureau, Coordinating Council to support 
the Moldovan citizens living abroad and Coordinating Council of the citizens of 
the Republic of Moldova live abroad.  
Thanks to the work of promoters of the Moldovan non-governmental 
organizations, in most countries in the world have already become known 
national Moldovan holidays - Republic Day and Our Language, Mărţişor. On 
the non-governmental basis are organized the Day of Moldovan culture 
(Russian Federation, Belarus), festivals of Moldovan language (Ukraine), are 
created language and cultural centers (Moscow - Russian Federation, Berlin - 
Germany Odessa - Ukraine), Sunday schools function (Latvia, Lithuania), 
working folk collectives (Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine), published 
newspapers (Ukraine), television and radio broadcasts in the Moldovan 
language (Lithuania, Ukraine) (Morozan, Margarint, 2004: 35). 
The organization of the Diaspora Congress represents a way of 
communication between migrants and homeland; it‘s a possibility to strength 
the links between Diaspora and government. Till present were organized 4 
Congresses: usually in October, in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. The IV 
Moldovan Diaspora Congress organized in Chisinau 14 October, 2010, adopts 
a resolution identifying measures such as the creation of a specialized state 
agency on Diaspora and a Diaspora council with a consultative role for 
Moldovan government; the involvement of Diaspora leaders in Moldovan 
official delegations; supporting the creation of Moldovan Cultural Centers in 
cities with large number of Moldovan migrants and promoting policies which 
would better involve the Moldovan Diaspora in the social, economic and 
political affairs of their home country. The Congress, organized by the Bureau 
of Inter-Ethnic Relations in partnership with IOM, brought together 110 
Moldovans living in 31 countries, government ministers, Moldovan President 
Mihai Ghimpu and Prime Minister Vlad Filat. 
Discussions also included the protection of migrants' rights; utilizing 
educational, cultural and scientific activities abroad to promote national culture 
and traditions; the importance of Moldovan Diaspora in promoting the country 
towards European integration and ways to consolidate the Moldovan Diaspora. 
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The adopted resolution will be discussed with Moldovan authorities at a later 
stage and will be included in the National Diaspora Action Plan5. 
Previously, the Diaspora managing and protecting Moldovan citizens 
abroad was identified as one of the key priorities in the Moldova National 
Action Plan on protecting Moldovan citizens residing abroad 2008 and the 
Program of Actions for supporting persons born in the Republic of Moldova 
residing abroad 2006-2009. 
We will examine the cultural-ethnic role of some of the Moldovan 
communities abroad in such countries as: Italy, Spain, Portugal. Adaptation and 
integration of migrants is a very complex and controversial issue. In Rome, Italy 
5 Moldovan ethno-cultural associations are registered ("Cittadini Moldavi in 
Italia", Istituto Italia-Moldavia, Assomoldave, etc.) (Moшняга, Морару, 
Руснак, 2009: 93).  
One of the Moldovan Community in Italy published a monthly 
magazine about and for migrants from Moldova - „Gazeta Basarabiei‖. The 
Association of Independent Press from the Republic of Moldova, in 
partnership with Comunison RC Association from Great Britain, published the 
first number of „Pro Diaspora‖ magazine – a periodical writing about and for 
migrants originating from the Republic of Moldova – (10,000 copies) 80 
percent of circulation is distributed abroad, 20 percent - in Moldova.  
The „Pro Diaspora‖ magazine aims at serving as a communication 
bridge between inhabitants of Republic of Moldova and fellow countrymen 
from abroad, connecting Moldovan diaspora from Europe and not only, and 
informing Moldovan migrants about the opportunities to invest the money 
earned abroad in Republic of Moldova‘s economy. „Pro Diaspora‖ shall report 
about problems, success or failure, aspirations and experiences of Moldovan 
citizens from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Great Britain, Austria, 
Germany and other states, furnishing thematic information about Moldovan 
communities abroad, professional abilities and their rights in host-countries etc.  
Official authorities being in diplomatic visit to European countries have 
on their agenda also meetings with the representatives of Moldovan 
Communities. For example, the Prime Minister Vlad Filat had a meeting with 
the Moldovan Diaspora in France on 12 April 2011. The ambassador to France, 
Oleg Serebrian, expressed satisfaction with the high number of participants in 
the meeting, noting that the France-based Moldovan community has displayed 
strong political activism. Also, he noted that France is the second host-country 
for Moldovan students (after Romania), with over 1,000 youths studying there. 
In his turn, Prime Minister Vlad Filat said that the political involvement of the 
France-based Moldovan community was proved during the 2010 snap 
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parliamentary polls, when a large number of Moldovan nationals exercised their 
right to vote.  
Moldovan Communities from Italy organizes the national holidays of 
Moldova, literature evenings dedicated to Gr. Vieru and others cultural 
manifestations. At June, 8, acting President of Moldova, Parliament Speaker, 
Marian Lupu met with representatives of the Moldovan community in Italy. The 
sides discussed issues of providing support for Moldovan citizens working in Italy, 
pensions, recognition of diplomas, etc. Were informed the representatives of the 
Moldovan community the size of the ratification of bilateral agreements between 
our countries. Moldovan community in Italy has asked the Moldovan head of state 
support in solving several problems such as corruption. Also discussed was the 
need for national economic recovery, creating well-paying jobs that providing 
Moldovan citizens to return home and work6.  
In order to consolidate the formation process of the Moldovan diaspora 
in Italy, the Pro-Diaspora Center Foundation Moldova was created with the 
following objectives: to create a network of associations between Moldova and 
Italy; to organize and support activities to preserve the national and cultural 
identity of the Moldovan Diaspora in Italy; to support the process of 
structuring the Moldovan Diaspora by supporting and establishing public 
associations; to attract potential representatives of the Moldovan Diaspora in 
developing collaborative relationship with institutions of the Republic of 
Moldova and Italy; to protect the national-cultural rights and interests of 
Moldovans in Italy in compliance with international human rights standards 
and laws of the country of residence.  
In Spain the process of Moldovan community formation, their 
institutionalization in the form of ethno-cultural associations has not received a 
flurry of manifestation yet, like in Italy (Moшняга, Цуркан, Слободенюк, 
2009: 159). Therefore, by virtue of linguistic features the Moldovans most often 
adhere to the Romanian or Russian-speaking communities. Examples include 
joint activities of the Moldovan-Romanian Association "TRAJANO" 
(translated name of the emperor Trajan), which promotes the Romanian 
culture: celebration of Martisor, Dragobete, Independence Day and other 
national and traditional holidays. 
At the same time, the Moldovan ethno-cultural society of Portugal 
(especially, the Moldovan cultural center «Sentro de cultura moldavo») is 
attempting to establish branches of its association in Spain. These attempts are 
unsuccessful; one reason for this is the tendency of creating independent 
Moldovan Communities in Spain. However, it should be emphasized that what 
is observed, is the main trend of association, self-organization, not vertically 
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and horizontally, with equality and parity rights for all associations, regardless of 
size, duration of existence, with social status of their members, etc.  
The main Moldovan communities are located in large cities such as 
Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia. 
It should be noted that in Italy and Portugal the Moldovan Diaspora 
consolidated the efforts to protect the interests of their representatives already 
on the national level. It is worth mentioning the effort of ARBs 'Bessarabia' 
association continually fighting for the rights of Moldovan citizens in Spain. 
The Association struggled enormously to establish democracy in Moldova and 
supported the voting process as much as possible.  
The Embassy of the Republic of Moldova in Spain has an important 
role in promoting dialogue between Diaspora and diplomatic representatives. 
Meetings were organized with Moldovan citizens and official Embassy 
representatives, providing assistance in disseminating general information, 
including consular consultations with legal character. Various aspects of socio-
human nature were also addressed, especially in the context of commemorating 
the 70th anniversary of the first wave of mass deportations of Moldova. 
A special theme that was addressed covered the celebration of the 
twentieth anniversary of the independence of Moldova. In this context an 
initiative group was set up, which would help to organize cultural and artistic 
events, under the patronage of the Embassy, titled "My heart is Moldova" 
(having as protagonists artists from the Republic of Moldova), which are 
expected on August 26th 2011, in Bilbao, Spain7. 
The Moldovan community in Portugal passes the process of self-
organization and possible creation of Diaspora. It should be mentioned that the 
Moldovan community in Portugal is one of the most numerous, after the 
Brazilian and Ukrainian community, and statistical data recorded over 24,000 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova (Slobodeniuc, 2007: 165). The key players 
that could contribute to the creation of Diaspora are the citizens of Moldova 
who have decided to live and work in Portugal for a longer time. 
Integration and adaptation of the citizens of Moldova is dynamic and 
complex. The complexity extends to economic, social, cultural and ecological 
relationships with intra-and inter-specific Moldovan community in Portugal. 
The most important non-governmental organizations founded by citizens of 
the Republic of Moldova which contribute more or less to cultural and social 
integration are: Centro Cultural Moldavo (CCM), Centro "Mihai Eminescu", 
Centro "Mioriţa" and Centro "Nash Style". The number of citizens who 
support the initiatives and projects aimed at community development is 
growing. However, it highlights a lack of organizational and administrative 
resources, directed to the development of the Moldovan community deserved 
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to receive the status of Diaspora in Portugal. Actions of self-organization in 
Portugal require mobile civic leaders employed full time. It opens an 
opportunity for real support from the Republic of Moldova to theirs citizens in 
Portugal, through the implementation of civic projects and international 
assistance programs. Literary Circle of the Moldovan Diaspora in Portugal 
"Dor de Plai" organized at April, 30, 2011 a soiree devoted to literary and 
musical events of April 7, 2009, and the Easter Holiday and the holiday of the 
national flag. 
As we can see, the members of Moldovan Communities from Spain, 
Portugal and Italy and decreasingly succeeding generations tend to lead 
transnational existences, economically and occupationally in their host country, 
but socially and culturally still in the old country. At home and in their 
neighborhood they communicate in their native language. They follow political 
events in the old country, they listen to radio broadcasts and read publications 
from their homeland or news and entertainment broadcast and published 
locally in their maternal language. They remit funds to help family members 
they have left behind; they contribute with funds to political movements that 
they favor in their homeland and support candidates for public office. In many 
cases as dual citizens, they are permitted to vote in elections in their former 
homeland, as well as in their adopted country. They call upon their homeland 
for cultural reinforcement, usually in the form of teachers and religious leaders, 
to help maintain their ancestral culture; governments and associations in the 
homeland eagerly provide them. They keep in touch with relatives and friends 
who have formed similar Diaspora communities in other countries and in other 
cities in their host country, and provide help when this is needed.  
The post-Soviet space, in CIS countries there Moldovan Diaspora is 
characterized by long-time existence, the presence of citizenship, language 
skills, legal status, with high social status, the integration in the culture, customs 
and traditions of the country of residence. They do not want to come back and 
will not return to Moldova. This applies to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. A similar pattern is in Estonia, Lithuania and 
Latvia. The main problem of this Diaspora is associated with the persistence 
and resurgence of language and culture of their ancestors. They seek to restore 
and establish ties with their historic homeland.  
We consider that the scientific Diaspora also, played an important role 
in the cultural-ethnic cohesion of Moldovan Communities abroad. The recent 
literature define the term scientific Diaspora as "a community antagonized by 
scientists abroad contributing to the development of their home country or 
region, mainly in science, technology, education and other related fields (Barre, 
Hernandez, Meyer, Vink, 2003). 
The exchange of information between the scientific community in the 
Diaspora and the state of origin in both directions is the simplest form of 
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interaction (Casiadi, Porcescu, Varzari, 2010: 29). In the context of transmission 
in the country of origin information and skills acquired abroad scientific Diaspora 
representatives may use the following methods: organization of annual seminars 
in cooperation with scientific institutions from the state of origin; providing 
consulting services to government authorities in the country of origin; 
involvement in training of young researchers; transfer of technology know-how; 
business network development among members of the Diaspora etc.. 
Taking into account these circumstances and acknowledging the need to 
involve scientific Diaspora of Moldova in the development of the country, 
Academy of Sciences in 2008 launched the initiative "Developing cooperation 
in Moldova's scientific Diaspora‖. The initiative is aimed primarily to create a 
platform for interaction between scientific Diaspora and the scientific 
community in Moldova by setting up staged Scientific Diaspora Network of the 
Republic of Moldova. Relevant in this respect is the project "Connecting 
scientific Diaspora from the Republic of Moldova for scientific and economic 
development of the country of origin‖, developed jointly with the Federal 
Polytechnic School in Lausanne. 
A practical initiative in this regard is the recent national project 
launched under International Organization for Migration in Moldova (IOM), 
which meant to use migration as a development factor. In the same context, 
outlining a framework for effective policy to promote practical initiatives on 
January 31, 2010, acad. Gh.Duca – president of Academy of Sciences, prof. E. 
Constantinescu - the President of Academic Scientific Forum, President of 
Romania (1996-2000), and acad. E. Doga, composer, people's artist, member of 
the Academy of Sciences of Moldova drafted and signed the Declaration from 
Chisinau. The main goal is to sensitize and mobilize of our notorious figures in 
the cultural and scientific diaspora and to accelerate the accession of Moldova 
to European Union8.  
Moldovan communities abroad represent a real bridge for the 
establishment of bilateral ties, ways of cooperation between Republic of 
Moldova and states of immigration. In this regard, it should be noted that only 
in 2008 were opened the Italian Embassy in Moldova, consulates in Bologne 
(Italy), Istanbul (Turkey), Odessa (Ukraine), a Embassy in Spain in 2010, were 
there are more Moldovan migrants concentrated.  
Migrants are often not aware of any official Moldovan organization that 
represents their interests in the place of migration. Some migrants referring to 
Diaspora organizations/MCA in their host countries, usually referred to 
unofficial groups of people involved in solving migrants‘ problems, particularly 
concerning legalization and accommodation. For most migrants interviewed, 
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the contribution of official organizations abroad to strengthening and 
mobilizing communities of other Moldovan nationals is rather 
small/insignificant.  
Moldovan diplomatic representations abroad are not currently being 
effectively used by Moldovans. Moldovans appeal to them, as a rule, when they 
have problems with documents that can only be solved through these 
institutions. Migrants often accuse diplomatic services of lacking transparency 
in their operations, being corrupt and having unprofessional attitudes towards 
their fellow citizens (no fixed fees for services, no receipts provided, selling 
labor contracts or other fake documents, extorting money).  
Expanding the network of diplomatic and consular services of the 
Republic of Moldova will consolidate Moldovan communities abroad, the 
establishment of closer ties with their homeland, migrants and the Diaspora. 
The structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of 
Moldova became more efficiently and targeted to the problem of informing 
Moldovan citizens living abroad. In this context, on the official sites of 
embassies is a compartment entitled Diaspora. Here is placed current useful 
information for migrants about the latest events from Moldova, governmental 
programs, from social, cultural area; opportunities for returning and providing 
opportunities for reintegration in Moldova.  
Among the Diaspora, Moldovan Communities Abroad we observed a 
trend – the desire of self-organization, establishing contacts between the 
Moldovan citizens, immigrants from Moldova living abroad at both local level 
(were they live and work), and at regional, national and international levels of 
ethnic and cultural cooperation. This is typical for many countries, especially 
Italy and Portugal.  
The International Organization for Migration launched at the end of 
2010 a Call for Proposals for Diaspora Associations and initiative groups under 
the Diaspora Small Grants Mechanism. The initiative aims to support the 
communication between Diaspora associations and migrants in their host 
countries, to develop existing or create new ways of communication between 
Moldova and migrants abroad, to create service platforms for migrants in host 
countries and to strengthen the institutional capacities of Diaspora associations 
and initiative groups.  
Currently, there are a number of state agencies dealing with the issue of 
external migration and management of migration problems in the Republic of 
Moldova. These agencies have different authorities, or deal in parallel with the 
same issues of data collection and problem management with no coordination 
between them‖. As a result, there is a low efficiency in solving migration-related 
problems. 
In conclusion, we outline the fact that Moldovan nationals abroad 
increasingly come together to form homeland associations. These organizations 
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take a variety of forms, but generally aim to facilitate cultural, economic, social, 
educational and political links with Moldova. 
Governmental authorities should engage Diaspora communities as 
equal partners; comprehensive dialogue should be initiated between embassies 
and Diaspora associations. These consultations should lead to concrete 
collaboration in educational and cultural programming; with Moldovan 
authorities providing migrant associations with the tools needed to implement 
such programs. 
In order to maintain and strengthen the link between migrants and their 
homeland, the Moldovan government should offer Moldovan children abroad 
Moldovan language classes, and support educational activities through the 
formation of youth movements. 
The Moldovan government should also put an emphasis on cultural 
promotion through cultural emissaries and the celebration of national festivals 
and cultural events in destination countries, including art exhibitions, musical 
events, film festivals, literary events, Moldovan cuisine, etc. The establishment 
of Cultural Houses/Centers. 
Policies should be developed to increase: the developmental impact of 
remittances, use of bank accounts and use of formal channels for money transfers. 
Temporary and permanent return migration schemes should be developed. 
Diaspora should be engaged for the purpose of joint development projects and the 
promotion of trade and investment as was stipulated in regulation on financial 
support meant for activities dealing with preserving national-cultural identity of 
persons originating from the Republic of Moldova residing abroad (Moldovan 
Diaspora) approved via decision No 1521 dated 29.12.2007. 
The Moldovan government is keen to strengthen migrant associations 
in all the main destination countries, thereby enhancing very weak 
communication links between the Chisinau government and the Diaspora and 
mobilizing resources for Moldova's development. Currently the positive impact 
of migrant organizations that are constructively engaged in development 
initiatives depends mainly on the transfer of remittances. One way to enhance 
the involvement of the Diaspora in development processes in Moldova is for 
governmental and international organizations to provide matching funds for 
such financial transfers that are put to effective developmental use. One of such 
program lunched by government is named "The attraction of remittances in the 
economy." (PARE 1+1) having the goal to mobilizing Diaspora resources for 
economic development. By rule 1 +1, the government comes to say the 
following: for every leu of remittances invested, the government will give a leu. 
In other words our migrant workers, or their first degree relatives, may receive 
a grant of up to 200,000 lei. Thus, it is a small investment of 400,000 lei, 
additional support with advice, training and information. It is an attempt to 
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redirect remittances from consumption to investment, to develop rural areas 
and create new businesses. 
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Abstract. This paper studies the linkage between migration and (in)security in the 
context of two major conflicts that have marked the recent history of the Iraqi Kurds: the Gulf 
War and the Iraq War. One of its observations is that current migratory patterns from the 
Middle East towards Western Europe and the emergence of Middle Eastern „diasporas‟ 
within the EU are important sources of perceived insecurity for the citizens of the recipient 
countries. This is related to a number of reasons including: historical experiences, recent events, 
cultural and religious cleavages, economic disparities, normative differences etc. Most of these 
factors are actually overemphasized and even exploited by the political elites or the mass-media. 
The European societies had become throughout centuries homogenous societies. The foreign 
element was usually rejected and blamed for anything went wrong within the society. A residual 
xenophobia is still manifesting in the behaviour of many Westerners whether or not they 
acknowledged it. Meanwhile, the positive aspects of migration are frequently forgotten. 
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paper regards the migrations of ethnic groups from the Middle East to the EU 
countries and the establishment of ‗diasporas‘ that signifies that these people 
define themselves as communities, fighting for their right to existence, forging or 
(re)claiming a sense of identity which is strongly related to their former 
motherland. The focus will be on the Kurdish diasporas in the EU countries. 
 
Background 
 
Some historians may have argued that the age of migration has passed 
(Musset, 2002a, 2002b), but the world in which has become more and more 
globalized, so that one can easily notice that the phenomenon of migration is 
still a daily reality. Whether or not people decide to leave their homeland 
countries for political, economic or religious reasons, the borders of the states 
are increasingly fading. The global trade, colonialism and post-colonialism or 
the development of new types of global communication (most of them allowing 
communication in real time) have in time contributed to migration. Currently, 
rural populations are seeking a better life in urban areas, so that there is a rural-
urban/urban-rural migratory flow which, most often is seen inside the borders 
of the same state (Détang-Dessendre et al., 2001: 35-62). Migratory flows are 
also noticeable within cities from central areas to suburbs. Than, there are the 
so called internally displaced people due to violence, conflicts, environmental 
catastrophes or epidemic diseases (Internal Displacement, 2011: 8). In fact, the 
trends and patterns in global migration date as back as 1945 and have 
continuously accelerated up to the present. A report of the United Nations 
Population Fund highlights that one of every three migrants now lives in 
Europe, Western European countries receiving more migrants than they send 
to other countries (United Nations Population Fund, 2006). The International 
Organization for Migration estimates the number of migrants in 2010 around 
214 million (WMR, 2010: 115). Most of them (around 42 million) are hosted by 
the USA, followed by the Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Canada, 
France, United Kingdom, Spain, India and Ukraine (WMR, 2010: 115). 
One must further notice that the Western European countries have not 
been exposed to significant migration flows since the Early Middle Ages, which 
explains the reduced genetic diversity across the European populations. The 
Western European welfare states achieved a remarkable social and ethnic 
homogeneity in the 20th century. This pattern gradually changed after the end of 
the Second World War. Another key moment was the fall of the Iron Curtain 
and its demographic repercussions. Large numbers of people from Central and 
Eastern Europe migrated towards the West attracted by the prospects of a 
better life. The same happened with migrants from Northern Africa and the 
Middle East. The Western societies had to accommodate to these new 
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demographic patterns and trends and at the same time maintain their internal 
unity and solidarity (Mau, 2007). 
 
Migration and societal security 
 
In 1998, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde introduced a new 
framework for analyzing security studies (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: VII-
VIII). They believed that the traditionalist agenda of international relations that 
emphasized the role of the military element was not offering anymore a coherent 
explanation for what was happening in the post-Cold War security agenda. These 
theorists of the Copenhagen School of security studies proposed a widening of 
security agenda, encompassing the societal sector alongside the military, 
economic, environmental or political sectors, as important elements for the 
national security. This paper argues whether the phenomenon of migration 
produces security or insecurity in the societal sector of security studies.  
In conceptualizing societal security, one must first understand its 
antinomy: societal insecurity. When a community perceives a development or 
potential threat to its existence as a community than there is societal insecurity 
(Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 119). It is a matter of identity, namely of 
imagined communities (Anderson, 1991)1 seldom associated with the nation-states. 
Such communities have the capacity of self-sustaining their identity and they 
differ from place to place and from time to time. If in nowadays‘ Europe one 
can still argue that nationality is one of the most consistent factors in defining 
identity, in other places religion or race could play the same role. In order to 
identify oneself with a group a person has to select at least one characteristic 
(political, religious, language, culture etc.), which, after all, is a matter of 
personal choice. A group identity is being constructed in this way (Cottam, Uhler, 
Mastors, Preston, 2004: 63-96)2. Moreover, the group identity is forged but 
referring it to other groups (otherness). Essentially, this means defining Us as 
not necessarily but possibly opposed to Them.  
According to Robin Cohen, there are four forms of migration after the 
Second World War (Cohen, 1996: 238-242): 
1. The mass displacements that have appeared as a consequence of 
nationalist pressures (the Muslims from India were replaced with Hindus from 
                                                          
1 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London, Verso, 1991. 
2 In psychology, the importance of the group identity is connected to the perception, 
called entiativity, which refers to ―the extent to which a collection of people is 
perceived as a coherent entity‖. The members of a family are perceived as high in 
entiativity, while in an office the colleagues are low in entiativity (see Martha Cottam, 
Beth-Diez Uhler, Elena Mastors, Thomas Preston, Introduction to Political Psychology, p. 
64; especially chapter 4 ‖The Political Psychology of Groups‖, pp. 63-96). 
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Pakistan; the expulsion of Palestinians from Israel). The two World 
Conflagrations have also caused interstate wars, civil wars, famine, economic 
crisis and political instability, which eventually led to mass migration. 
2. The unskilled labor migration has continued, sometimes illegally and 
to new destinations, like rich oil countries. Off course, one may say that after 
the Second World War there was a high demand for migrant labors due to the 
process of reconstruction. 
3. For the skilled migrant workers (such as international civil servants, 
independent entrepreneurs, scientists, doctors and dentists, business executives, 
skilled engineers, and architects) it was easy to cross the frontiers and secure a 
better advantage in their employment. 
4. The last category, the asylum-seekers tried to be recognized as 
political refugees in countries like USA, using some German and French 
constitutional provisions. But they were rapidly perceived as newcomers, 
provoking hostile, xenophobic and sometimes violent reactions. As a 
consequence, the authorities tried to impose restrictive measures in order to 
limit the access in the destination countries. 
After the Cold War there was a great concern for the illegal migration, 
which has developed organized human smuggling and crime (Guiraudon, 
Joppke, 2001: 2). 
However, one can talk about the ―old‖ migration, in 1950s and 1960s, 
when there was a great demand for migrant workers and the ―new‖ migration 
world (Guiraudon, Joppke, 2001: 1-2), the world in which we live – a world 
where there is a redundancy of migratory workers, so that the state is forced to 
adopt control policies. Thus, the migration policies nowadays favor the highly 
qualified, educated, well-off immigrants whereas the unskilled ones can only use 
the family reunion reasons (Appleyard, 2001: 14). 
When one talks about migration or the dispersal of people, one must 
definitely use the term ―diaspora‖ (Vertovec, 1996: 99-101)3, because diasporas 
appear as a consequence of migration. Michel Bruneau offers a clear definition 
of the term: ―A community diaspora first comes into being and then lives on 
owing to whatsoever in a given place forges a bond between those who want to 
group together and maintain, from afar, relations with other groups which, 
although settled elsewhere, invoke a common identity‖ (Bruneau, 2010: 35). 
Whatever the form of bond (family, community, religious, political, economic, a 
trauma or a catastrophe), these imagined communities do not consider anymore 
distance as an obstacle that separates them from the country of the origin. In 
                                                          
3 If the term was used related to the dispersal of the Jewish population, more recently it 
can refer to any transnational community, regardless to its type: immigrants, ethnic 
minorities, guest workers, expatriates, and refugees. Because of the connections 
with their homeland, one can question the loyalty of displaced people, so that often 
they are considered a threat to the state‘s security.  
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order to enhance a person‘s sense of belonging to a group, there are the ethnic 
markers (Volkan, 1998: 81-83). They can be abstract concepts, as for example 
chosen glories or traumas, or specific objects. 
The Iraqi case and the Kurdish migrants 
 
We have chosen to write about Iraq from the perspective of two 
conflicts that made the Iraqi migration politics change: the Gulf War in 1991 
and the Iraq War in 2003. Both of them brought many changes regarding 
migration and societal security. We shall write about the Kurdish migrants as 
they are a more special case. 
Iraq is not a homogenous country ethnically or religiously speaking. 
Thus, ethnically speaking there are the Arabs and the Kurds. Religiously 
speaking Iraqis are sunni Muslims, who live mostly in the North and shi‘a 
Muslims, located in the Southern Iraq. The ethnic and religious factors were the 
cause of many conflicts in Iraq. Sometimes these factors were used by whoever 
was in power in order to maintain control.  
The Kurds are an ethnic minority living in the mountains where the 
borders of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey meet. They are probably the largest 
stateless minority in the world and they never had a state of their own. Moreover, 
until the war in Iraq in 2003 they never had a political representation. However, 
the war brought Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, as president of Iraq. 
The situation of the Kurds in Iraq is significantly different compared to 
the Kurds living in Iran or Turkey – countries in which they represent only 
considerable minorities. Only Iraq recognized the Kurdish reality, offering them 
autonomy in 1974 (Vanly, 1993: 162; Human Rights Watch, 1993), except the 
cities of Khaniqin and Kirkuk (surrounded by oil fields).  
After a short interlude to power in 1963, the Baath Party took over 
completely the Iraqi political arena in 1968. Its regime proved to be remarkable 
resilient and stable. The Baath nationalism and welfare policies had reflected the 
long term values and political aspirations of the Iraqi people. It was a personal 
regime, embodying the objectives, ambitions and vanity of a single man, 
Saddam Hussein. He was a genius in capturing all political power in his country, 
but he found no way to transmit his power to a possible successor 
(Humphreys, 1999: 121). While he was overthrown, his political system 
collapsed into chaos or into a new order. 
In 1976, the Iraqi government was beginning to evacuate an area with a 
width of about 10 to 20 km along the border with Iran (Bruinessen, 1986: 16). 
Entire villages were demolished, their inhabitants being forced into moving into 
other settlements near cities. Thus, a series of internal displaced people appeared. 
It is a fact that the Kurds living alongside the Iran-Iraq border have been used by 
the Iranian and Iraqi authorities to advance their national interests.  
The Iran-Iraq war created a power vacuum that proved to provide an 
opportunity for the Kurdish movement. The fights between KDP and PUK for 
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the leadership of the movement have been so intense that literally broke in two 
the Iraqi Kurdistan from 1979 to 1980: the North and the West (the Badinan 
region) under the KDP leadership, while the South and the East (the Sooran 
region) under the PUK leadership. At the beginning of the war the clashes 
between the two sides were limited by the scarcity of military capabilities. Later, 
the two organizations have been able to build entire armies of peshmerga4 
(Bulloch, Morris, 1992: 8). The areas controlled by the Kurdish guerillas have 
literally become ‗liberated areas‘ (Karadaghi, 1993: 220). The Kurds had to face 
also mercenaries recruited by government among the Kurds (the so-called jash). 
During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi Kurds had sometimes fought 
alongside the Iranian troops against the Iraqi ones. An important consequence 
of this war from their point of view was the so-called ‗Anfal operation‘. The 
Iraqi government used two instruments in the Anfal campaign: (1) the 1987 
census and (2) the establishment of the so-called ‗restricted areas‘ 
(Gengercide.org, 1988).  
The first Kurdish mass deportations in the area situated along the Iran-
Iraq border between 1975 and 19775 had represented the first attempts of the 
Baath government to ‗cleanse‘ the Kurdish rural areas. These near border areas 
have become ‗restricted areas‘. 
The ‗campaign‘ itself lasted for six months but the Kurdish deportation 
took two years. The central figure in this campaign, the decision-maker, was Ali 
Hassan al-Majid (later nicknamed ‗The Chemical Ali‘) (Ziua, 25 June 2007), 
Saddam Hussein‘s cousin and Secretary-General of the Northern Bureau of the 
Baath Arab Socialist Party. He received ‗special powers‘ from 29 March 1987 to 
23 April 1989, in fact equivalent to those held by the Iraqi President. The 
Chemical Ali took his role very seriously, stating - during the meetings of the 
Baath Party - that any animal or human being living in the ‗restricted area‘ 
should be exterminated. A decree dated 23 June 1987 signed by Chemical Ali 
ordered the bombing of the Kurdish areas with any type of artillery, including 
chemical weapons, with the purpose to kill as many Kurds as possible (Human 
Rights Watch, 1994). Even though the inhabitants of the area might have 
surrender to the Iraqi troops, they should have been condemned to death, 
based on that infamous document. The Kurdish rebels estimated that during 
that year 182,000 persons had disappeared and over 4,000 villages had been 
utterly destroyed6. 
                                                          
4 This is the name of the PKK guerrilla warriors, in translation ―those who confront death‖. 
5 These deportations took place against the fact that for 20 years the government 
attempted to implement, in the areas considered strategic, a policy of Arabization 
consisting in bringing Arab farmers in the area.  
6 The report Human Rights Watch (1993) notes that the number varies between 50,000 and 
100,000; many victims were civilian, not only peshmerga and the majority were killed after 
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The 17 October 1987 census proved to be essential for defining which 
particular groups were to be exterminated. The destruction of the villages in the 
spring of 1987 had created a buffer-zone between the areas controlled by the 
government and those controlled by the Kurdish guerrillas. This allowed the 
Baath Party to give an ultimatum to the inhabitants of the ‗restricted areas‘: 
either they ―return to the national ranks‖ Gengercide.org, 1988), specifically by 
abandoning their households and accept the repartition into a complex, or they 
would loose the Iraqi citizenship, being considered deserters. By a decree of 
August 1987 the deserters would have met the death penalty. 
Also for defining the groups, the Chemical Ali asked the files of the 
families living in the areas controlled by the government. As a consequence, a 
number of persons had been resettled to the rural areas to share the faith of 
their peshmerga relatives. 
Yet, the most important case in the Anfal campaign was the bombing of 
the town Halabja, where it was estimated that 5,000 out of its 80,000 
inhabitants died during the first stage of Anfal (23 February 1988 – 19 March 
1988) (Lancaster, 2008: 29). 
Until the Gulf War in 1991, one can generally say that ―the Iraqi 
international migration regime was one of immigration‖ (Sirkeci, 2005: 198).  
Soon after the beginning of the Gulf War (1991), the Kurds questioned 
the willingness of the US and their allies to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia 
and defeat the Iraqis. Therefore, they adopted a neutral position. The 
condemned the invasion of Kuwait, but did not approved the response of the 
Allied forces to it. The Kurds realized that if they decided to strike Saddam‘s 
regime too early, before this would have turned sufficiently weak, there was the 
possibility for Baghdad to use once again its chemical weapons, as it did just 
early before (Bulloch, Morris, 1992: 8). 
During the Desert Storm, US President George Bush was giving a 
speech pledging the Kurds to rebel and overthrow Saddam Hussein. His 
message was broadcasted on all TV and radio stations around the world 
(Romano, 2006: 203-204), including Voice of Free Iraq (backed by CIA) which 
broadcasted from Jedda (Saudia Arabia). 
Having in memory the speech of George Bush and hoping that America 
would support their cause, especially after Saddam‘s defeat (February 1991), the 
Kurds from the North and the Shiites from the South rebelled and soon after 
managed to capture a number of towns from both areas. Their common hatred 
towards Saddam Hussein‘s regime and their belief in the total victory of the 
Allied forced, ensured that the mobilisation was relatively quick, but barely 
organised in the North. Meanwhile, the US administration worried about the 
unexpected and difficult to control consequences of a rebellion in Iraq. What 
                                                                                                                                                     
several days in captivity, or in villages marked for destruction. Some were killed during 
their flight from the attacks of the Iraqi army in the ‗restricted area‘. 
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the Kurds and the Shiites did not accounted was the unwillingness of Turkey 
and Iran to admit a Kurdish state near their borders, or that of Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait (the Allies of the US) to accept an Iraq led by Shiites that could 
have followed Iran‘s example (Bulloch, Morris, 1992: 12-14). 
As soon as Saddam Hussein realised that the external help promised for 
the rebels would not come, he struck swiftly and unmerciful, mobilising his best 
troops – the Republican Guards (which had not participated to the defence 
against the operation Desert Storm). First of all, they crushed the Southern 
Shi‘a. Then, the brutal repression was unleashed against the North, forcing two 
million refugees to flee toward the borders of Turkey and Iran. Turkey decided 
not to repeat the ‗mistake‘ of 1988 when it was criticized by the West for the 
way it handled the Kurdish refugees. Therefore, Turkey closed the border with 
Iraq just before the moment when the Kurdish refugees intended to cross it 
(Frelick, 1993: 235).  
The Kurdish refugees still remembered the infamous Anfal campaign of 
1988. In fact, the Kurdish and Shi‘a rebels profited from an actually inexistent 
political opportunity: the help promised by Bush was not a promise, while 
Saddam still held the significant elements of his repressive apparatus. 
The protests of the international public community urged the US, the 
UK, and France to consider all the options, together with their NATO Allies, 
the Turkish. Turkey, pressured by the refugee wave, came with the idea of a 
temporary ‗safe heaven‘ (Halliday, 2005: 148), protected by the Allies, in the 
Northern Iraq. It was for the first time in Kurdish history that such an area was 
to be created and protected by international forces in order to protect the 
Kurds (Olson, 1992: 485). 
The consciousness of belonging to a diaspora is evident to the Kurdish 
refugees especially when measuring the political activism from within the 
Kurdish communities. The Kurdish organizations of refugees and displaced 
persons are often influenced by political and social divisions and loyalties from 
Kurdistan. Sometimes, there had been an indirect support for the Kurdish 
cause or the Kurds‘ fight among their organizations (Wahlbeck, 1998). 
William Safran well illustrated some of the characteristics of the 
Kurdish diaspora (Safran, 1991: 83-89, quoted also in Wahlbeck, 1998): 
1. forced dislocation of Kurds; 
2. collective memory of their homeland; 
3. alienation and discrimination experienced in Europe; 
4. desire to return to Kurdistan; 
5. collective engagement toward restoring the homeland; 
6. transnational social networks. 
The concept of ‗diaspora‘ is usually associated with that of 
transnationalism. Martin van Bruinessen thinks that the term ‗transnational‘ 
designates different types of social relations and interactions transcending the 
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national borders (Bruinessen, 2000). The author affirms that the notion could be 
used to describe the network of complex contacts and activities linking the Kurdish 
communities of Germany, Great Britain, or France, but not for those linking the 
Kurdish communities of Turkey, Iran, or Iraq – for them, the author prefers the 
concept ‗cross-state‘ or ‗cross-border‘. Van Bruinessen (2000) also notes that there 
are many situations of diaspora with transnational character, in Kurds‘ case: 
1. Kurds displaced in Kurdistan, but not in the state from which they 
are citizens (e.g. the Kurds refugees into Syria during the 1920s, in the 
aftermath of Sheikh‘s Said rebellion); 
2. Kurds that had migrated to Kurdistan from other parts of the state of 
whose citizens they are (e.g. Kurds migrating from Eastern Turkey to Western 
Turkey); 
3. the most significant diasporas refer to the Kurds alienated from 
Kurdistan or from the state of whose citizens they are (e.g. during the 1960s 
there was a migration of labor force from Turkey to Lebanon, Germany, other 
Western European states, Lybia, USSR, Australia – many of those who 
departed were Kurds). 
The case of the Kurds from Europe is particularly interesting since it 
highlights three characteristics regarding the political mobilisation of diaspora 
and the long distance intervention: (1) it illustrates the complexity of diaspora 
formation and the fluid borders between the economic immigrants and the 
political refugees (not all Kurds migrants are political refugees); (2) the Kurds 
are perceived both as destroyers of peace, but also as peace-makers (due to 
their heterogeneity, there are numerous Kurdish networks within diaspora, such 
as the PKK or KOMKAR in the case of the Kurds from Turkey; PUK or KDP 
in the case of Iraqi Kurds); (3) some Kurdish associations had changed, during 
the last 20 years, the political purposes and the way in which they intend to 
fulfill their aims, infirming one of the assumptions found in the topical 
literature: the groups situated in diaspora cannot make compromises since, on 
the one hand, the conflict implies a low cost for them, and on the other hand 
the conflict has turned to be a part of their identity in exile (Vertovec, 2005). 
At the beginning, Kurdish diaspora‘s ethnic consciousness was almost 
inexistent. In time, especially due to students and political refugees7, the Kurds 
                                                          
7 The Kurdish political refugees from the diaspora originate from several waves: (1) 
following the Agreement of Alger between Saddam Hussein and the Sheikh of Iran, 
by which the last one withdrew his support for the Iraqi Kurds, approximately 50 
guerrilla warriors fled to Iran and later asked for asylum in European countries – 
granted to the most educated; (2) following the coup d‘état in Turkey (1980) and 
the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988); (3) the Kurds fleeing from the Iran Islamic 
revolution; (4) Iraqi Kurds after the Anfal campaign; (5) after the Gulf War, those 
that felt that the ‗safe heaven‘ was not entirely safe; (6)after the destruction of 
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from diaspora have begun to play an important role for Kurdistan. Some 
papers and books published in Kurdish have appeared meanwhile. The Newroz 
– the Kurdish New Year was adopted, being celebrating in 21 March, while for 
the first time, the satellite MED-TV broadcasted, for a certain time, in Kurdish. 
Some Kurdish institutes and organizations have also emerged within 
diaspora: first of all, the Kurdish Institute of Paris (founded in 1983), followed 
by similar institutes in Brussels, Berlin, Moscow, and Washington, D.C. A 
Kurdish library was founded in Stockholm. There are also two Kurdish human 
rights organizations: International Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan 
(Bonn), Kurdish Human Rights Project (London). 
Consequently, one must certainly agree that the Kurdish diaspora has 
not remained indifferent to what happens in Kurdistan. Quite the contrary, this 
diaspora has had and still has an important role especially in preserving the 
Kurdish culture. 
Nowadays, the Kurdish diaspora is one of the biggest diasporas without 
a state in the world. The Kurdish diaspora in Europe alone (without Turkey) 
numbers approximately 850,000 Kurds, out of which 85% originate from 
Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). 
The war in Iraq has once more created a climate of chaos. The memory 
of Halabja is still alive, so one can say that the presence of conflict is not 
necessary, as even the perception the possibility of impending conflict may 
trigger out-migration flows, in the form of refugee and asylum seeker flows, 
and other ways (including ―clandestine migration‖).  
As a consequence of the war in 2003, Iraq now occupies the third place 
in the world for internally displaced people (UNHCR, 2011; WMR, 2010: 264). 
Forced to leave their communities in 2006 and 2007 due to sectarian violence, 
more than 1.5 million Iraqis fled their neighborhood. Now they live in camps 
where they have no access to basic needs such as clean water, sanitation or 
electricity (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 4). 
A detailed analysis of the wars in Iraq may lead to the conclusion that, 
in fact, there was one long war that started in 1980, the war in 2003 being only 
a phase, perhaps not even the final one. The politics of changing the 
composition of the population through ethnic cleansing and mass-Arabization 
employed by Saddam Hussein are still echoing. Whenever the opportunity 
(vacuum power caused by wars or conflicts), the violence between Kurds, 
Sunni and Shi‘a will never stop. And as mentalities change in a very long time, 
probably it will take generations to forget. 
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Abstract. Politicians, specialists or the civil society have realized the major impact of 
migration upon different main social processes – culture, religion and education – only in the 
past decades, although it has been a constant element throughout our entire human 
development.  
The movement from one place to another represents one of the most important rights of 
a population, which was consented by the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, in 
article 13: (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders 
of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return 
to his country. Despite the existence of the legal ground recognized by all member states of the 
United Nations, the world‟s populations populatiile lumii do not fully enjoy the exercise of 
this freedom.  
Labour migration is one of the main forms of the contemporary migration and which 
enjoys of a better regulation than the other types of migrations, especially when we talk about 
the European space, in which the regulations ellaborated by the Council of Europe are 
primary.  
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1. Globalization and Migration 
 
Although a favourite topic nowadays, migration1 as a phenomenon has 
existed since the beginning of humankind, especially because today it has 
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greatly boosted by globalization2. This last concept defines an ensemble of 
processes of extension, depth and acceleration of human activity over regions 
and continents (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton, 2004: 39). In order to 
better understand the globalization process, we need a conceptual delimitation 
of the notion of migration, geographic mobility and population.  The total 
movement of a population is composed of the natural movement and the 
migratory movement. The population of a country or of a region modifies its 
number not only as according to birth or death rates, but also according to the 
migration of the population either through immigration or emigration. Because 
the migratory fluxes can affect categories of people in point of age and gender, 
the migration modifies not only the number of population, but also its structure 
according to gender, age, culture, religion etc. 
The inhabitants‘ movements can be done outside the locality, or between 
countries, regions or continents; they can be short, they can last longer, or they 
can last forever, which needs a detailed classification of the different types of 
migration. The migration of population is the main form of the geographic 
mobility (spatial), consisting in the definitive change of the fixed residence, 
between two administrative – territorial units. It is also called residential 
migration, as the person involved in such movement changes their residential 
statute. Regarding the official borders of a country, the migration can be:  
• the internal migration, which consists in the total of movements, 
together with the definitive (permanent) change of residence, inside a country, 
between the territorial – administrative units. 
• The international or external migration consists of the ensemble of 
movements, together with the definitive (permanent) change of residence, 
between two countries.   
Regarding the destination place (arrival), respectively the departure one 
(origin), the terms immigration and emigration are being used:   
• Immigration is migration considered from the point of view of the 
destination locality (of international migration). The individuals included in this 
migration flow are called immigrants.  
• Emigration is that type of migration seen from the point of view of 
the departure locality (of international migration). The individuals included in 
this migratory flow are called emigrants.  
                                                                                                                                                     
1 human migration = the permanent change of residence by an individual or group; it 
excludes such movements as nomadism, migrant labour, commuting, and tourism, 
all of which are transitory in nature. (Encyclopædia Britannica) 
2 The term „globalization‖ appeared in the late ‗60s and was released by the renowned 
communication theorist, Professor Marshall McLuhan at the University of Toronto and 
the American researcher on issues of communism, Zbigniew Brzezinski, from the 
Columbia University. The term ―globalization‖ first entered the dictionary in 1961.  
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 Considering that the geographic space upon which we focus the 
analysis is Europe, we will present the four main migration periods that took 
place after the end of World War II3:  
a) The migration of labour force and the reconstruction of Europe: 
period 1945-1970 
After World War II, the national ethnics and other people who moved, 
forced or not by the evolution of war, began to come back in the countries of 
origin, generating mass migratory flows in all Europe. Simultaneously with this 
ample movement, every country that participated in war began its own 
reconstruction process, thus determining higher labour demands. The massive 
requests of workers in all the fields and especially from the countries on the 
road of development, contributed to the development and successive economic 
increases in Europe during 1945 – 1975. 
Between the two main military and economic blocs began, after WWII, 
a competition in all the social, politic and economic domains. Therefore, 
Western Europe developed a series of public policies that lead not only to a 
high level of employment, but also to the improvement and modernization of 
social security systems. After 1951 we already have in view the building of the 
first Community construction4, which announces one of the main freedoms 
that define even today the European Union and that it was regulated for the 
first time in The European Economic Community (EEC)5. Under the 
circumstances of changing the paradigm of work and the European worker, 
Europe gets to know important movements of workers from countries that 
with stagnating economies and high rates of unemployment, such as Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, to states generating job vacancies: France, Belgium, 
Holland, Great Britain or Federal Germany.   
In the `60s an important increase of migration had been registered inside 
the Community, due, in most part, to the important number of Italian workers 
who were moving towards the other five Member States. But, even after the 
                                                          
3 The four main migration periods had been analyzed by Jean-Pierre Garson and Anais 
Loizillon in the work ―Changes and Challenges-Europe and Migration from 1950 
to Present‖, presented at The Economic and Social Aspects of Migrations conference, 
organized by The European Commission and the OECD, Brussels, 21-22 January 
2003, source: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/3/15516948.pdf 
4 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), signing 18 April 1951, in force 23 
July 1952, expired 23 July 2002 
5 Title III The Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital, Chapter 1 — 
Workers, Article 48 (1) The free movement of workers shall be ensured within the 
Community not later than at the date of the expiry of the transitional period. (2) 
This shall involve the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between 
workers of the Member States, as regards employment, remuneration and other 
working conditions. 
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realization, in 1968, of the legal and institutional frame for assuring this freedom, 
the migratory flows from the third countries had remained quantitatively superior 
to the intra – labour migration force (Garson, Loizillon 2003: 3).  
During 1945 – 1975, the Member States‘ economies dependence of the 
foreign workers diminished the volume of illegal migration. According to 
OECD statistics, from the early ‗60s until the early ‗70s, more of 30 million 
foreign workers entered the European Economic Community. Until the early 
‗80s, the number of foreign residents in Western Europe tripled as compared to 
the ‗50s, getting to 15 millions (Garson, Loizillon 2003: 3).  
b) The economic crises period: 1970 – 1985  
The second period of migration was determined by the world‘s 
economic changes. Therefore, in the early ‗70s, Germany strengthened its 
currency position through the possibility that this had to freely fluctuate, in the 
USA began over again the imposition of surcharges on imports – fact with 
consequences upon the CEE.  
Another determinant of the modification of migration is given by the 
change of the international monetary system, caused, primarily, by the oil crisis in 
1973, when the oil‘s price suddenly increased four times.  This crisis was the 
consequence of the Yom Kippur War, 1973, between Israel and the Arab states, 
started by a surprise attack of Egypt and Syria over Israel. The oil crisis lead to 
panic on the world‘s great markets, when the phenomenon of stagflation 
manifested first – a mix of inflation, increase of unemployment, decline of 
economic increase. In 1975, the UK asks for help to IMF (FMI), registering a 25% 
inflation. The second crisis of oil takes place in 1979, as a consequence of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran. The Iran stopped the oil exports at the end of 1978, 
OPEC doubled the price of oil, and at the end of 1979 URSS invades Afghanistan.     
As a consequence of these events, the migration of labour force had 
substantially modified. The increase of unemployment and the escalation of 
social tensions determined the governments to eliminate the active policies of 
recruitment from abroad. The costs of recruitment from abroad increased for 
the employees; the categories of foreign workers who could have been 
employed had been limited, and annual rates were settled for the foreign labour 
force. Also, the governments applied policies for encouraging the migrant 
workers to return to their states of origin, even if according to the United 
Nations estimations, only 10% of the migrant workers returned in their states 
of origin in the next two years after the 1973 oil crisis. (Tudorache, 2008: 81)  
c) The diversification of host states and the origin ones and the increase 
of the number of asylum seekers, refugees and ethnic minorities 
Traditional emigration countries in Europe such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece and Portugal, are gradually being transformed into immigration 
countries. Migrants do no longer come from the former colonies, but from 
Central and Eastern European countries. This is partly due to political changes 
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in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR, political asylum 
applications are intensifying. Also, regional conflicts, such as those in former 
Yugoslavia and northern Iraq, have caused considerable flows of asylum 
seekers and refugees from the affected areas6. (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 4) 
According to the OCDE statistics, this period is also characterized by 
the predominance of family reunification migration flows and the return of 
interest in migration and labor, particularly for the skilled and highly qualified 
workers, towards the end of the `90s. After the collapse of the communist bloc 
and the opening of borders, the east-west migration flow increased, in particular 
the movement of ethnic minorities in the countries of origin, especially 
Germany, but also Greece and Finland7. (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 4)  
d) The ―preferential‖ labour migration: skilled workers and temporary 
migration.  
In the first decade of the present century there is a change in labor 
migration flows. On the one hand, it shows an increase in permanent migration 
due to intense development of information and communication society. On the 
other hand, temporary labor migration increases as a result of highly skilled 
labor demand in areas such as health and education. Once the construction and 
agricultural sectors are developed, the demand for unskilled foreign labor 
considerably increases (see the case of Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal). The 
same situation occurs in the household services. Another phenomenon that 
emerges only at this stage of labor migration refers to foreign students, who are 
given the opportunity to help reduce labor shortages in the host countries.  
Although the offer of employment for foreign students is very important in the 
U.S. (through the Summer Work & Travel Programme), several EU countries 
(Great Britain8, Germany9, France and Spain) develop similar programmes.  
Many OCDE members bring important changes in what concerns the 
                                                          
6 The increase of asylum applications was high in the early 1990s and reached a new 
pitch in 1997, largely due to the civil war in former Yugoslavia.  In 1983, Western 
Europe recorded around 70 000 asylum seekers, and by 1992 this figure raised 
tenfold. Then, the applications decreased to 1996 (at 245 000) and recorded a small 
increase in 1997 (260,000 requests). In 2001, the Member States have made more 
than 388 000 asylum applications from a total of 612 000 requests in all OECD 
countries. 
7In  1989 and 1990, Germany received more than 620,000 people of German ethnic 
origin originating in Poland, Romania and the former Soviet Union, but Greece and 
Finland also witnessed the return of ethnic minorities originating from the former 
Soviet Union and in the case of Finland, the Baltic States.  In addition, the flow of 
gypsy people, mostly from Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 
increased, with destination Austria, Germany, France and Italy. 
8 UK Work Experience  
9 See  http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_29928/Dienststellen/besondere-Dst/ZAV/ 
Arbeitsmarktzulassung/arbeitnehmer/amz-studierende-ferienbeschaeftigung.html 
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possibilities of changing the statute and access to the labour force market after 
the closure of the training stage. After the `90s, the women share among the 
migrants increases. This tendency is noticed especially in France, Greece, 
Sweden, Great Britain and Italy. The ―feminization‖ tendency it is noted in all 
the components of the migratory flows, not only in the family reunification 
cases. (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 5) 
If in the  ‗80s, countries like Spain or Portugal begin to become 
countries exporting labour force to immigration countries, the Eastern and 
Central Europe countries, are not only migration countries, the same 
phenomenon is manifested among the EU newcomers (10+2). Therefore, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland or Romania become destinations 
for migrants from Eastern Europe Countries, like Ukraine, Moldavia, CSI.   
 
2. The Council of Europe and the regulating of labor migration 
 
2.1 Establishment and objectives 
 
It was at the end of the WW II that the United States of America 
organised Europe through the Marshall Plan and OCDE10 starting from the 
necessity of creating the collaboration spirit between states, which until not 
long time ago were on rival positions. The Council of Europe appears as a 
different structure, by its nature, compared to its predecessors, being the result 
of a spontaneous manifestation of the numerous European movements 
appeared after 1848. On the 5th of May 1949, the Statutes establishing the 
Council of Europe were signed. The official communiqué issued was 
specifying: ―…The essential characteristic of the statute … is creating a 
Committee of Ministers and of a Consultative Gathering of which assembly 
constitutes the Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers will have as 
responsibilities the development of cooperation between governments, and the 
Consultative Gathering, expressing the aspirations of the peoples of Europe, 
will provide the governments the opportunity to stay in permanent contact with 
the European public opinion.‖11 Throughout the first four decades, the 
organization thus created remained a Western European institution but after 
the fall of the Iron Curtain the Council of Europe established the first 
European institution receiving Central and Eastern European countries, as they 
                                                          
10 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international 
organization of those developed nations which accept the principles of 
representative democracy and free market economy. The organization was 
constituted in 1948, under the name Organization for European Economic Co-operation 
(OEEC), and from 1961 it was reformed taking the name of Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
11 The Statute of the Council of Europe entries into force at 3 August 1949 
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were choosing a democratic regime.  Under these circumstances, ―The aim of 
the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the 
purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their 
common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.‖12 
Any European state can become a member of the Council of Europe 
provided that it accepts the rule of law. It must also guarantee that the principle 
whereby any person within its jurisdiction can enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The Council of Europe aims particularly: protecting the 
human rights, of pluralist democracy and supremacy of law; promote awareness 
and encourage the development of European identity and unity, of identity and 
cultural diversity; seeking solutions to problems facing European societies; 
development of democratic stability and security in Europe, including the security 
of citizens, by supporting political, legislative and constitutional reforms. 
The main objectives of the Council of Europe are reflected primarily in 
the preamble of the statute: „Convinced that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and 
international co-operation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilization; 
Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of 
their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, 
principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy; Believing that, for the maintenance 
and further realization of these ideals and in the interests of economic and social progress, there 
is a need of a closer unity between all like-minded countries of Europe; Considering that, to 
respond to this need and to the expressed aspirations of their peoples in this regard, it is 
necessary forthwith to create an organization which will bring European States into closer 
association,, …‖. According to the principal assumptions referred to above, art. 1 
of Chapter I of the Statutes defines the aim of the Council of Europe. The first 
paragraph regulations, only referring explicitly to the scope of organization, are 
required to be correlated to the regulations in the preamble of the Statutes and 
with the international instruments developed by the Council of Europe. Out of 
them, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
is highly important in defending human rights and fundamental liberties. 
(Ecobescu, Nitelea, 2006: 54) 
According to Article 10 of the Statute13, the Council of Europe bodies 
are: the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. The two 
bodies being assisted by the Secretariat of the Council of Europe. According to 
the decision of the Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly in July 
1974, it would be called the Parliamentary Assembly, thus reflecting its 
structure and nature. 
 
                                                          
12 The Statute of the Council of Europe, art.1 lit. a 
13 Article 10: The organs of the Council of Europe are: - the Committee of Ministers; - 
the Consultative Assembly. Both these organs shall be served by the Secretariat of 
the Council of Europe. 
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2.2 The migrant worker in the Council of Europe regulation 
 
Before presenting the main regulations developed by the Council of 
Europe regarding the migrant labor, some considerations regarding the 
terminology are necessary. Given that in recent years, doctrines, practitioners and 
researchers on European law have increasingly used the concept of European 
social law instead of other concepts with a limited scope in point of regulated social 
relations. We refer to concepts such as: the right of the migrant worker, European 
labor right, European security law, the European Union labor law. 
Regarding the concept of European social law, the opinions are divided. 
If, for some theorists, by the European social law it is understood the ensemble of rules 
adopted by the European institutions referring to work relations and social security (Ţinca, 
2005:3), for others, the concept gathers the social regulations adopted by the Council of 
Europe and the European Union (Popescu, 2008: 260). Another opinion considers 
that the European social law represents the legal rules adopted by OIM, CE, CECO, 
CEEA and EU which govern the individual and collective legal relations, social security and 
the institutionalized legal of protection and social integration of workers from Europe 
(Nistor, 2004: 21). 
We believe that the most relevant definition of the concept of 
European social law requires some preliminary clarifications. Thus, if the 
Council of Europe, which is an intergovernmental regional organization, the 
legal instruments are the European conventions and agreements, the European 
Union, which only from December 1, 2009 has a legal personality by the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon14, regulates on the labour and social security 
field through derived sources of Community law, mainly through regulations 
and directives. The two types of rules mentioned above have a different legal 
regime in relation to their enforcement in the national law. If the rules 
prescribed by the Council of Europe are transposed into the national law by the 
will of states, by the classic procedure of ratifying international instruments, the 
rules developed by the supranational institutions of the European Union are 
directly translated into national policy, based on two Community principles 
(Diaconu, 2008: 81-89): direct applicability of the Community provision and 
primacy of Community law. Another indication that we believe it needs to be 
made concerns the applicability of EU rules in space and those of the Council 
of Europe. While the European Union rules are compulsory for its 27 member 
                                                          
14 The Treaty of Lisbon, known in draft form as the "Reform Treaty" is designed to 
replace the EU Constitutional Treaty. The official complete name is „Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty regarding the European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Union ". The treaty's text was finalized after an informal summit in 
Lisbon on 19 October 2007 and on 13 December 2007 the treaty was signed by the 
representatives of the 27 EU member states and entered into force on 1 December 
2009 (The EU Official Journal 2008/C 115/01) 
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states, the legal rules elaborated by the Council of Europe can be applied in the 
space of the 47 member states of this international organization.  
Therefore we believe that the European social law can be defined by the 
legal rules governing the individual and collective labor legal reports, as well as social security 
adopted by the European Union and the Council of Europe and which are harmonized with 
the rules adopted by the International Labour Organization. We believe that the joint 
analysis of these two categories of European regulations from the point of view 
of the European social law do not interfere the delimitation that was made in 
the internal law, where the analysis on labor law rules  is done separately from 
the social security rules.  
The fundamental document of the Council of Europe is The European 
Convention on Human Rights, which regulates only the politic and civil rights, 
even if the convention proclaims and obliges the states that ratified it to respect a 
series of rights which refer to work in its ensemble (Popescu, 2008: 268-269). It 
was only later that the need for regulation in areas of economic and social rights 
was felt. Under these conditions, the most important documents produced and 
then taken by the Council of Europe member countries are: European Social 
Charter15 which was completed by three protocols: Additional Protocol to the 
European Social Charter16, Protocol amending the European Social Charter17 and 
Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of 
Collective Complaints18. As I mentioned in first part of the paper, the sixth to 
eighth decades of the twentieth century were very dynamic in terms of labor 
migration in Europe. For these reasons, to which the objectives as set out by the 
statutes are added, the Council of Europe regulated the entire spectrum of labor 
relations, even before the European Communities. Together with the European 
Social Charter and the three protocols, the Council of Europe adopted the 
European Code of Social Security19, which was revised in 199020, and the 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers21. 
Of course, the most important document in the labour and social 
security field developed by the Council of Europe remains the European Social 
Charter. This is a synthesis of international labour law, considering that the 
document brings together the general principles mentioned mant regulations 
                                                          
15 Opening of the treaty  18/10/1961; entry into force  26/2/1965 
16 Opening of the treaty  5/5/1988; entry into force 4/9/1992 
17 Opening of the treaty  21/10/1991 
18 Opening of the treaty  9/11/1995; entry into force 1/7/1998 
19 Opening of the treaty  16/4/1964; entry into force 17/3/1968 
20 European Code of Social Security (Revised), Total number of signatures not 
followed by ratifications: 13 states / Total number of ratifications/accessions: 1 
states;  at 3/8/2011; Source: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ 
ChercheSig.asp?NT=139&CM=8& DF=03/08/2011&CL=ENG 
21 Opening of the treaty  24/11/1977; entry into force 1/5/1983 
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separately developed by the International Labour Organization (Voiculescu, 
2009: 84-85). Regarding the migrant workers, the European Social Charter 
settles their statute through articles 18 and 19, which must be correlated with 
other relevant dispositions, more precisely the article 12 (4), relating to equality 
of treatment between nationals of the contracting parts in respect of social 
security rights through bilateral or multilateral agreements (or otherwise) and 
article 13 (4), which obliges the signatories states ―to ensuring the effective 
exercise of the right to social and medical assistance, the Parties undertake: to 
apply the provisions referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this article on an 
equal footing with their nationals to nationals of other Parties lawfully within 
their territories, in accordance with their obligations under the European 
Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, signed at Paris on 11 December 
1953.‖ (Cholewinski, 2004: 11) 
Article 18 of the Charter stipulates the obligation to facilitate the 
citizens of other signatory states to work on their territory, as set out by the 
obligation to simplify the formalities for hiring migrant workers: ―With a view 
to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to engage in a gainful occupation 
in the territory of any other Party, the Parties undertake: (1) to apply existing 
regulations in a spirit of liberality; (2) to simplify existing formalities and to 
reduce or abolish chancery dues and other charges payable by foreign workers 
or their employers; (3) to liberalise, individually or collectively, regulations 
governing the employment of foreign workers; and recognise: (4) the right of 
their nationals to leave the country to engage in a gainful occupation in the 
territories of the other Parties.‖ 
Article 19, by the 12 contained paragraphs, states that once a migrant 
worker is admitted to settle on the territory of a State, then equal rights should 
be acknowledged to them, on taxes, access to justice, expulsion, transfer of 
earnings. Also, the migrant workers may, within the law of the State of 
employment, to join the family, ―(6) to facilitate as far as possible the reunion 
of the family of a foreign worker permitted to establish him in the territory.‖ 
If through the  European Social Charter a first legal document was 
created guaranteeing social and economic rights, by signing and then ratifying  
the European Code of Social Security22, which was revised in 1990, the Council 
of Europe finalyzed a long process regarding the establishment of some social 
security rules, began by adopting of the European Interim Agreement on Social 
Security Schemes Relating to Old Age, Invalidity and Survivors23 and European 
Convention on Social and Medical Assistance24. 
                                                          
22 Total number of signatures not followed by ratifications: 6 states / Total number of 
ratifications/accessions: 7 states;  at 3/8/2011; Source: http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=048&CM=8&DF=03/08/2011&CL=ENG 
23 Opening of the treaty  11/12/1953; entry into force 1/7/1954 
24 Opening of the treaty  11/12/1953; entry into force 1/7/1954 
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The European Code of Social Security establishes minimum protection 
values which the signatory states must assure in nine fields of social security25, 
and for each of them the Code states diverse conditions for iar pentru fiecare 
dintre acestea Codul precizează various conditions of giving the benefits. If 
Minimum standards of social security26 established minimum rules of social 
security mainly focused on low developed countries, The European Code of 
Social Security was elaborated in the spirit of creating a higher standard of 
social security, targeting, also, the harmonization of social security systems of 
member states of the CoE. Given the demographic and geopolitical changes in 
the late 80s, and the renewal of concepts on social security, it was decided to 
review the Code. Thus, the review aimed to improve standards and introducing 
more flexibility in its functioning (Voiculescu, 2009: 107). 
As noted above, CoE regulations have not been developed only for 
migrant workers, unlike the European Convention on the Legal Status of 
Migrant Workers27, which aims only at this category of workers. Even the 
preamble of this document states the main objective: „ Considering that the legal 
status of migrant workers who are nationals of Council of Europe member States 
should be regulated so as to ensure that as far as possible they are treated no less 
favourably than workers who are nationals of the receiving State in all aspects of 
living and working conditions; Being resolved to facilitate the social advancement 
of migrant workers and members of their families; Affirming that the rights and 
privileges which they grant to each other's nationals are conceded by virtue of the 
close association uniting the member States of the Council of Europe by means 
of its Statute.‖ From the perspectives of this Convention, the worker ―shall mean 
a national of a Contracting Party who has been authorised by another 
Contracting Party to reside in its territory in order to take up paid 
employment.‖28, with few notable exceptions: ―a) frontier workers; b) artists, 
other entertainers and sportsmen engaged for a short period and members of a 
liberal profession; c) seamen; d) persons undergoing training; e) seasonal workers; 
seasonal migrant workers are those who, being nationals of a Contracting Party, 
are employed on the territory of another Contracting Party in an activity 
dependent on the rhythm of the seasons, on the basis of a contract for a specified 
period or for specified employment; f) workers, who are nationals of a 
                                                          
25 Medical care; Sickness benefit; Unemployment benefit; Old age benefit; 
Employment injury; benefit; Family benefit; Maternity benefit; Invalidity benefit; 
Survivors‘ benefit 
26 ILO Convention (No. 102), 1952, source:  http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1951/ 
51B09_9_engl.pdf 
27 Total number of signatures not followed by ratifications: 4 states / Total number of 
ratifications/accessions: 11 states;  at 3/8/2011; Source: http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=093&CM=8&DF=03/08/2011&CL=ENG 
28 Art. 1 (1) 
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Contracting Party, carrying out specific work in the territory of another 
Contracting Party on behalf of an undertaking having its registered office outside 
the territory of that Contracting Party.‖29  
The Convention provides for equal treatment of migrant workers 
with the national ones, thus eliminating any discrimination linked to nationality 
or residence. The rule established by the European Convention on the Legal 
Status of Migrant Workers applying the law on the territory where workers 
operate (Ţiclea, 2009: 99).  
For a better compliance with the provisions of this Convention, a 
control procedure was settled in charge of an Advisory Committee composed 
of representatives of Member States ,―a Consultative Committee shall be set up 
within a year of the entry into force of this Convention‖30, which must report 
to the Committee of Ministers  regarding the appliance of this Convention 
―The Consultative Committee shall draw up periodically, for the attention of 
the Committee of Ministers, a report containing information regarding the laws 
and regulations in force in the territory of the Contracting Parties in respect of 
matters provided for in this Convention‖31. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The labour migration phenomenon, although manifested in ancient 
times, today, thanks to new information technologies, the new type of 
corporate management as well as other intrinsic factors of globalization, it tends 
to become not only a result of the present time, but a necessity. Even if the 
migrant worker is a permanent element on the continental areas, the way in 
which the Council has managed to develop a broad set of regulations on the 
rights of European workers can be copied even at international level, either 
through the ILO, the UN, or other intergovernmental organizations with 
continental or global vocation. It is true that the studies made through CoE or 
the EU confirmed the gap, sometimes large, between the regulatory 
requirements regarding the rights of migrant workers and their concrete 
ensurance. Although the CoE convention signatory states undertook, by partial 
or total ratifiance, to ensure equal treatment between the migrant worker and 
the national one, there are numerous cases in which legal bodies notice flagrant 
violations of the Conventions. Although these irregularities appear in the 
application of rules regarding the European worker, the great importance of the 
dynamics of a process determined mainly by the CoE, which can be completed 
in the future by creating a free space of the European worker. 
                                                          
29 Art. 1 (2) 
30 Art. 33 (1) 
31 Art. 33 (7) 
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Abstract. The extent of migration is increasing in the European Union as well as 
in the world in general. This can be both an advantage and a disadvantage for the target 
countries. Many migrants are legal and their presence could help in promoting economic 
development, with the migration of skilled people playing an important part in increasing 
employment and economic growth.    
However, there are many immigrants who are illegal and these people constitute a 
major problem, politically and socially, for the receiving country. These illegal immigrants can 
increase the number of unemployed and homeless people, and can be a significant burden for 
the host country.   
Because of this, countries need to resolve migration issues by implementing a well-
designed integration policy. This policy would be the best solution for this problem. The most 
significant legislation has been the Schengen Agreement, which removed the internal borders 
and at the same time confirmed the external borders. Also, the Schengen Agreement 
introduced the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in order to achieve integration, 
which is founded on the balance of rights and obligations of migrants. The policy should 
include a provision in reference to employment and the requirement of learning the language of 
the host country. 
The primary method of this paper is the documentation of acts and policies regarding 
integration in the European Union. 
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integrated into the EU (EC) population, with improvements in employment as 
well as their standard of living. 
 
1. Migration 
 
Mobility is a position change between units of a defined system; this can be 
social, geographical or regional. The regional change is between units of a regional 
system, and can happen with a residential interchange or without it. If residential 
interchange occurs, we speak of migration. This is caused by the reduction or 
increase of the consequences for economic and social areas. If residential 
interchange does not happen, we can speak of circulating mobility, e.g. between 
home and workplace or school (Mackensen et al. 1975 In: Ekéné, I. Z. 1995). 
Migration can be typed into three groups by distance (local, close and 
afar off), and into two main groups by reason (force- and self-sufficient 
migration). The first important researcher, who worked with migration and 
established laws of migration, was Ravenstein. According to him, we can 
acquire general information about migration, such as the fact that most 
migrants will migrate a short distance; that migration happens periodically; that 
those who migrate long distances will settle in large industrial cities; that people 
from a rural population are more likely to migrate than those from an urban 
population; and that the most important reason for migration is economic 
(Ravenstein, 1885/89. In: Ekéné, I. Z. 1995). 
 
1.1. Push-pull factor 
 
The most important factor in the explanation of the causes of 
immigration is the ―push-pull‖ factor. Economic conditions are certainly a 
determining factor. Whenever we ask individuals about their reasons for 
moving, there is a marked uniformity in the answers. According to them, they 
leave their homes in order to find better job opportunities, to earn a higher 
salary, to raise their standard of living, and to guarantee better living conditions 
for their children (Isbister, 1996). People emigrate from developing countries 
because of poverty, unemployment, disease, and a high mortality rate, hoping to 
improve their lives in the target country (Portes – Rumbaut, 1990). Thus, push 
factors include issues of demography (population growth), low standard of 
living, and lack of economic opportunities. These factors also affect the inflow 
of labor migration. 
 
1.1.1. Economic migration 
 
This kind of migration is based on fund and labour demand, and the 
direction is mainly West-to-East, which means that labour migrants have 
moved East and then transported agricultural products to the West. In the 
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1990s, significant economical investment was directed toward the eastern part 
of Europe (with the involvement of multinational business and entrepreneurs), 
and the movement of agricultural and industrial products to Western Europe 
was prohibited by the European Union. Of particular importance are the 
substantial numbers of people who had begun to move from Poland and 
Hungary as labour migrants by the 1970s (Glatz, 2004). 
 
1.1.2. Political migration 
 
From 1849 to 1990, the direction of political migration was only East-
to-West, but the political reasons for this movement ended with the collapse of 
the Soviet Regime (Glatz, 2004). 
 
1.1.3. Cultural migration 
 
Until 1945 cultural goods could move from West to maintain the flow of 
intellectuals and cultural products into Eastern Europe. However, this is a unique 
kind of migration of those students who have studied at Western universities and 
have then returned to their homelands after graduation. Even so, more and more 
biologists, informatics specialists, and similar intellectuals have migrated mainly to 
Germany where they can increase their salaries, so the process of the ―brain 
drain‖ has accelerated in Western Europe (Glatz, 2004). 
 
1.2. Categories of migration in European Union law and policy  
 
According to European law and policy, we can place immigrants in five 
categories. We can speak of tourists or visitors when people migrate from one 
country to another within the EU, but these travelers do not work, and do not 
engage in economic activities as self-employed persons or otherwise. They 
travel mainly during holidays or for various other recreational reasons (Bigo – 
Guild, 2005). 
Labour migrants have a right to travel within the European Union to 
search for employment. The third group is family members, who have rights 
with respect to the maintenance of family life, and the EU supports them in 
this endeavor. The fourth category consists of asylum seekers, ―who have a 
particularly tenuous position on EU law and policy. In considering the 
economic consequences of being an asylum seeker, a number of initial 
clarifications need to be made‖ (Bigo – Guild, 2005). And finally, the illegal 
immigrants are moving within the European Union without any permission and 
legal documents. A foreign-born person is able to become unauthorized in 
three ways: 1) entering the country without monitoring, or using false 
documents or overrunning conditions of admission of border crossing; 2) 
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residing legally in the country with non-immigrant status (e.g. as a tourist, 
businessperson or student) and breaking a condition of entrance (e.g. after due 
date of visa he/she does not leave U.S.); 3) or if, as a foreign-born LPR (Legal 
Permanent Resident)  he/she breaks a condition of entrance (e.g. committing a 
crime) (Bean et al, 1998. In: Loucky et al, 2006). 
 
1.3. Short history of immigration in the European Union 
 
After the Second World War, the European migration had several 
phases. The first phase began after 1945, when DPA (Displaced Persons), who 
had left their homes during the war, returned, and defeated countries admitted 
escaped and persecuted minorities from neighboring countries. The second 
period was from the 1950s to the 1980s, when the main direction of migration 
was from South-to-North. In this period, many people emigrated from colonies 
(South) into the UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The migration of 
guest workers was also common, with many laborers coming from North 
Africa and the Mediterranean areas into Western Europe. The third period of 
European migration was after the 1980s, when the direction changed and the 
main trend was from East-to-West. The most important sending countries were 
post-Soviet countries and the Balkans, and many of these migrants were 
refugees (Cseresznyés, 1996). 
In the early 1990s, the annual migration from CEE countries to 
Western countries was 850, 000 people. During the Communist period, most 
emigration had been based on ethnic origin, and these were mainly Germans 
and Jews. The largest in-flow is to Germany, with 601,800 persons in 2003. 
Spain is in second place, and the third is the UK. Of the other countries, only 
Italy (2002) and France (2001) had an in-flow of over 100,000. Switzerland‘s in-
flow fell below 100,000 in 2003. The Czech Republic‘s in-flow reached 60,000 
migrants in 2003 (Salt, 2005). 
 In Western Europe in 2003, Germany lost half a million emigrants; the 
UK was in second place with 170,000 people. Russia was the main sending 
country with about 105,000 people, followed by the Ukraine (88,000) in 2001 
(Salt, 2005). 
In consequence, the net gain was of about 953,000 in Western Europe 
in 2003, and 102,000 in CEE countries. Italy had the largest net gain (380,000), 
and the next was the UK (250,000). Of these two countries, only Germany had 
a significant net gain (Salt, 2005). 
 
2. Integration 
 
―Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation 
by all immigrants and residents of the Member States‖ (EU Common Basic 
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Principles, 2004). Thus, integration means that both women and men could 
adapt in a new host country with their own family, who should have the right to 
keep their habits, language, and culture. In addition, the target country should 
ensure social, cultural, political, and economic participation for all immigrants. 
These are some areas of action which are very important for the integration of 
immigrants: 
 employment  
 knowledge of the host society‘s language, history and institutions  
 education  
 access to institutions public and private goods and services  
 frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens  
 safeguard of the practice of different cultures and religions  
 the participation of immigrants in the democratic process, especially at 
the local level (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004). 
 
2.1. Employment 
 
This is the main element of integration, and employment can facilitate 
the immigrants‘ integration into the host society. For this reason, the host 
country must support the recognition of qualifications acquired in another 
country, and must attempt to provide opportunities that ensure the acquisition 
of skills in demand in the workplace. Immigrants should receive the right 
incentives and opportunities for seeking and receiving employment. 
The European Employment Strategy is a very important indication of the 
employment on the integration process. Its aim is that at workplaces fighting 
against discrimination should be supported with cooperation of social partners 
and employers based on ethnic origin (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004). 
 
2.2. “Knowledge of the host society‟s language, history and 
institutions”  
 
Several Member States have begun to emphasize the importance of 
basic linguistic, historical and civic knowledge in the integration process. These 
kinds of programs will allow immigrants to find a workplace, housing, 
education, and health care, and will aid in their adaptation to the host society. 
Nevertheless, with this integration policy, immigrants are allowed to keep their 
own language and culture so that the integration is not a full assimilation but, 
rather, a peaceful coexistence (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004). 
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2.3. Education 
 
Education can give many opportunities to immigrants in a new society, 
because it prepares immigrants and other residents for greater participation in 
all areas of life and for better communication with others. Therefore, education 
has positive effects for the individual as well as for the society as a whole (EU 
Common Basic Principles, 2004). 
 
 
1.  
2.  
2.1.  
2.2.  
2.3.  
2.4. “Access to institutions public and private goods and services” 
 
Immigrants should be allowed to take part fully within the new society 
and they must be treated equally and be defended from discrimination. The 
European Union policy forbids discrimination based on ethnic and racial origin 
in education, social security, employment, housing, healthcare and access to 
goods and services. This aspect of the integration process means that policies, 
housing, institutions and services are open to immigrants. The host country and 
society must ensure these conditions in order to integrate immigrants more 
quickly, easily and seamlessly. Not least, the possibility of the attainment of 
Member State citizenship could be an important incentive for integration (EU 
Common Basic Principles, 2004). 
 
2.5. “Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State 
citizens” 
 
These interactions create a connection between immigrants and 
Member State citizens. Member States have created shared forums, inter-
cultural dialogue, education about immigrants, and living conditions in urban 
areas. The integration process takes place primarily at the local level (EU 
Common Basic Principles, 2004). 
 
2.6. “Safeguard of the practice of different cultures and religions” 
 
Every immigrant group has its own culture and religion, and it should 
be allowed to maintain these, so that the new society could be enriched and 
made more colorful with the customs and cultural practices of newcomers. This 
kind of freedom is guaranteed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and all 
Member States have an obligation to maintain these rights. In addition, 
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European Union law prohibits discrimination against immigrants in 
employment (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004). 
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2.7. “The participation of immigrants in the democratic process, 
especially at the local level” 
 
Member States must ensure participation in the democratic process for 
immigrants, and encourage their involvement in voting, elections and joining 
political parties (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004). 
 
2.8. “Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all 
relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public 
services is an important consideration in public-policy 
formation and implementation.” 
 
In order to avoid decreasing standards of quality in education and social 
services, consideration should also be given to the impact of immigrants at the 
level of local and regional administrations. At the European level, they need to 
ensure the focus on integration which is a mainstream consideration in policy 
execution. However, the integration of immigrants is influenced by several non-
governmental entities (e.g. businesses, political parties, trade unions, employer 
organizations, sport clubs, the media, cultural, social and religious 
organizations). Communication and cooperation between these entities is very 
important because they are able to contribute to effective integration policies 
(EU Common Basic Principles, 2004). 
 
2.9. “Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation 
mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress 
on integration and to make the exchange of information more 
effective” 
 
3. Indicators per field of integration 
 
In the integration process, we can differentiate four categories, which 
are very important to investigate (Entzinger – Biezeveld, 2003). 
 
3.  
3.1. Socio-Economic integration 
 
 Employment  
 Income level  
 Social security  
 Level of education  
 Housing and segregation  
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This is the most significant indicator for successful integration, and 
containing participation of immigrants in the labour market (employment). The 
next point is about incoming levels, which is closely related to employment 
(migrants with higher educational attainment are able to find jobs with higher 
salaries). About social security, we should see that migrants do not have the 
same priority as non-migrants, but they should be protected in order to become 
well-integrated into the host society (with child benefits or pension schemes). 
Levels of education are based on a similar education system in the EU, and it is 
instrumental in finding a better position in the labour market, as well as 
attaining better living conditions. Skilled people are able to integrate more 
successfully. Migrants have the right to choose accommodations as tenants or 
as owners. In some Member States, an elaborate system of social housing is 
typical, but in others, people have more potential to buy homes. Migrants often 
move to only one area of a country or a city, which results in segregation. These 
migrants have greater difficulties in their attempts to integrate (Entzinger – 
Biezeveld, 2003). 
 
3.2. Cultural integration 
 
 Attitude towards basic rules and norms of the host country  
 Frequency of contacts with host country and country of origin   
 Choice of spouse  
 Language skills  
 Delinquency 
 
This indicator refers to contact between residents and immigrants, who 
possess different culture, and since the dominant culture is not uniform, 
peaceful coexistence is complicated process. The first point is an indicator for 
acculturation. It is very difficult to measure because we cannot always easily 
identify the basic rules and the norms of the host society. Immigrants are free 
to marry natives of the host country, but the rate of this activity is higher in the 
second generation. With this procedure, an immigrant marrying a resident is 
able to get resident status. Language skills are a very important indicator for 
integration because migrants are able to better communicate with members of 
the host society and they will act in accordance with attitudes toward 
immigrants in the new society. Immigrants have the right to learn the language 
of the host country, but their language skills depend on their length of 
residency. The last point in this indicator category is delinquency, which is an 
indication of weak integration in the cultural as well as in the socio-economic 
sphere. This rate can be higher when discriminatory practices make access and 
participation difficult or impossible (Entzinger – Biezeveld, 2003). 
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3.3. Legal and political integration 
 
 Numbers of migrants naturalized annually or who obtain a secure 
residence status  
 Numbers of migrants with dual citizenship  
 Participation in politics  
 Participation in civil society 
 
The European Union values equal rights for all citizens of Member 
States, whether they were born as citizens or foreigners. However, full 
citizenship rights can only be granted to those immigrants who have been 
naturalized. The European Commission has defined certain core rights and 
obligations toward migrants. Naturalization can be an expression of loyalty of 
migrants toward their new country. In regard to dual citizenship, some Member 
States are more open, but in others it is not allowed. However it does not mean 
that a migrant is less integrated in the new society. Political participation means 
participation in elections, but, in some Member States, those immigrants 
without resident status do not have the right to run for political office or vote. 
Participation in civil society can be understood as indirectly and inadvertently 
encouraging segregation, but can also create a multi-ethnic society based on 
shared cultural identity or national origin (Entzinger – Biezeveld, 2003). 
 
3.4. Attitudes of recipient countries 
 
 Reported cases of discrimination  
 Perceptions of migrants by the host society  
 Incidence and effects of diversity policies  
 Role of media  
 
Integration is not a one-sided process, because migrants and the 
recipient society both play a very important role and bear mutual 
responsibilities. Political rights and certain entitlements will further contribute 
to integration, and the fight against discrimination and racism is essential in the 
attainment of integration. To monitor incidents of discrimination, the 
European Center on Racism and Xenophobia only keeps records in Vienna. 
The group known as Eurobarometer compares attitudes of various groups in 
the population. Its aim is to acquire knowledge of migrants‘ social conditions, 
and there are questions concerning the blaming of migrants, repatriation, 
restrictive immigration and the need for assimilation. One problem is that the 
respondents give politically and socially desirable answers and not their real 
opinion. The media play a specific part in the integration process, which can be 
seen in the way immigrants are presented (Entzinger – Biezeveld, 2003). 
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4. Schengen Agreement 
 
The Schengen Agreement is the result of a convention of five of the ten 
member states of the European Economic Community (the Governments of 
the State of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the French Republic), and the agreement was signed in 1985. Five years 
later, it was expanded by the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement. These treaties constitute the borderless Schengen Area of Europe, 
which allow travelers to travel in and out of the area without internal border 
controls (Communication department of the European Commission). 
 
4.1. Schengen Area 
 
Twenty-five European countries are contained in the Schengen Area. It 
allows travel within the EU without internal border controls. In 1999, the 
Amsterdam Treaty absorbed the Schengen rules into the European Union law. 
However, there are three non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) 
which are included officially, and there are three European micro-states (Vatican 
city, Monaco, and San Marino). Ireland and the United Kingdom do not belong to 
the Schengen Area, nor do with Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus. Over four hundred 
million people live in this area, which is more than four million square kilometers 
(Communication department of the European Commission). 
 
Figure 1. The Schengen Area 
 
 
 
Source:  http://celestinechua.com/blog/images/posts/schengen_area.jpg 
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5. The Hague Programme 
 
The Hague Program was adopted by the European Council; it works 
out ten priorities for the European Union with a view to strengthening 
freedom, justice and security. Its purpose is to guarantee fundamental rights, 
the access to justice and to minimum procedural protection. It also regulates 
migration flows and controls the European external borders, in order to fight 
organized cross-border crime, and to inhibit the threat of terrorism (Council of 
the European Union, 2004). 
 
5.1. Strengthening fundamental rights and citizenship 
 
Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and settle down 
anywhere within the EU and to attain naturalization in order to become a 
citizen of another Member State. It will devote special attention to children‘s 
rights and to the prevention of violence against women. This will work against 
discrimination and ensure the protection of personal rights (Council of the 
European Union, 2004). 
 
5.2. Anti-terrorist measures 
 
The need for the inhibition of terrorism is very important and the 
Commission must support Member States in this fight by focusing on financing, 
risk analysis, prevention, consequence management and the protection of 
vulnerable infrastructures (Council of the European Union, 2004). 
 
5.3. Defining a balanced approach to migration 
 
The Commission has plans to create a balanced approach to illegal and 
legal immigration. It includes the prevention of illegal immigration and efforts 
to prevent the smuggling of immigrants. Also, cooperation with third countries 
can come into play in the management of migration flows. The measures of the 
Commission contains the ―Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows‖ 
framework program. It expands the creation of an Integration Fund, an 
External Borders Fund, and a European Refugee and Return Fund (Council Of 
The European Union, 2004). 
 
5.4. Developing integrated management of the Union‟s external 
borders 
 
The removal of internal borders has given people the opportunity to 
migrate from one Member state to another. Nevertheless, the external borders 
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must also be strengthened. An effective visa policy should be also created. 
Identity and travel documents will be more secure with biometric identifiers 
(Council of the European Union, 2004). 
 
5.5. Setting up a common asylum procedure 
 
The Commission aims to produce an effective asylum procedure. 
Operational cooperation will be continued by the European Refugee Fund. ―In 
the short-term, it will be submitting a proposal for a directive concerning long-
term resident status for refugees and in the medium-term, once the way in which 
existing legislation is being applied has been assessed, it will propose a common 
procedure and status for refugees‖ (Council of the European Union, 2004). 
 
5.6. Maximizing the positive impact of immigration 
 
Immigrant communities must be integrated if they are not to become 
excluded from society. Member States are encouraged by the Commission to 
develop their integration policies in favor of mutual understanding and 
communication between cultures and religions. It proposes to create a 
European framework for integration and to help to create a structural exchange 
of experiential knowledge and information about integration (Council of the 
European Union, 2004). 
 
5.7. Striking the right balance between privacy and security while 
sharing information 
 
Law-enforcement authorities have to be able to share their information 
in order to combat terrorism and analyze cross-border crime effectively. The 
European Union has to support communication between all interested 
members in order to find solutions for the preserving of fundamental rights 
and the availability of information, as well as protection of data and privacy. 
The European Police Office (Europol) plays a key part in this action (Council 
of the European Union, 2004). 
 
5.8. Developing a strategic concept on tackling organized crime 
 
The cooperation of Member States, such as customs and police 
authorities, should be improved in the combat against organized crime. The 
Commission accepted a communication on prosecuting organized crime in 
2005 (Council of the European Union, 2004). 
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5.9. A genuine European area of justice 
 
The European Union must work to achieve mutual confidence between 
Member States to ensure and safeguard the right of legal defense. By drawing 
up new legislative proposals, the Union will be able to protect family property, 
succession and wills (Council of the European Union, 2004). 
 
5.10. Sharing responsibility and solidarity  
 
―No political objective can be met without adequate funding. The 
Hague Program was adopted at a time when the Commission was preparing its 
proposals for the financial perspective of 2007-13; this made it possible to 
ensure that the objectives of the Hague Program were in line with the financial 
means available for them over the same period. In April 2005, the Commission 
presented three framework programs examining which type of political and 
financial instruments most effectively enable the objectives of freedom, security 
and justice to be met‖ (Council of the European Union, 2004). 
 
6. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 
 
(PACT: ―The Pact is a political document, by which the Member States 
of the European Union have a commitment to each other, their citizens and the 
rest of the world. It contains a set of political objectives and strategic guidelines 
for the development of European immigration and asylum policies‖ 
(Hortefeux, 2008). 
The European Council accepted the European Pact on Immigration 
and Asylum in October, 2008. It is a statement of the political commitment of 
the EU and its Member States (citizens and non-member countries) to an 
efficient common policy for immigration issues. 
The reason for the Pact is the problem of migration. It is a durable 
phenomenon which will remain as long as there are differing levels of 
development between Europe and Southern and Eastern countries. The need 
for regulated and organized legal immigration is important in those countries 
which have both economic development and an aging population. However in 
some cases, the migration is badly managed and illegal immigration causes 
serious conflicts. 
The European Union is convinced that an effective and balanced policy 
can deal with all aspects of immigration (e.g. control of illegal migration and 
management of legal migration). 
The Pact must be executed by the European Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Commissions, and by the Member States 
individually (Hortefeux, 2008). 
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6.1. To organize legal immigration to take account of the 
priorities, needs and reception capabilities determined by 
each Member State, and to encourage integration 
 
Legal immigration must be the main question in cooperation between 
the host country and the country of origin. The responsibility of Member States 
is to effect labor migration policies. The attractiveness of the EU must be 
strengthened in order to attract highly skilled workers. Circular and temporary 
migration must be advanced by avoiding the brain drain from immigrants‘ 
countries of origin. Notwithstanding this, family immigration must be better 
organized with respect to the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the integration possibilities of families. The determining factors 
in integration are learning the language of the host country and gaining access 
to employment (Hortefeux, 2008). 
 
6.2. To control illegal immigration by ensuring the return of 
illegal immigrants to their country of origin or a country of 
transit 
 
Cooperation between countries of origin and transit will be confirmed 
in order to fight against international criminal networks and human smuggling. 
Illegal foreign persons must leave countries by themselves by their own free 
will. Deportation will be approved by all Member States, but assistance in 
voluntary repatriation will be suggested. Cooperation of Member States can 
help more effectively in the repatriation of illegal immigrants (Hortefeux, 2008). 
 
6.3. To make border controls more effective 
 
Each Member State is responsible for checking its own external, land, 
air, and sea borders for its territory in the EU. The issue of visas consisting of 
biometric identification will be expanded across all Member States beginning in 
January 2012. A Visa Information System will be connected electronically 
which will help to control illegal immigration (Hortefeux, 2008). 
 
6.4. To construct a Europe of asylum 
 
In the territory of the European Union, every persecuted person has the 
right to assistance and protection. The Pact supports a common European 
asylum system in order to avoid disparities. By 2012, a uniform asylum 
procedure will be introduced (Hortefeux, 2008). 
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6.5. To create a comprehensive partnership with countries of 
origin and transit to encourage synergy between migration 
and development  
 
―Migration must become an important component part of the external 
relations of Member States and the European Union‖ (Hortefeux, 2008). 
Member States must make agreements with countries of origin and transit. 
Circular and labor migration will be encouraged, because migrant workers can 
help in the development of their countries. For enabling migrants to take part 
in the development of their countries of origin, this pact will support actions 
for combined development. ―Development policy will be more effectively 
coordinated with migration policy to benefit the development of countries and 
regions of migration origin‖ (Hortefeux, 2008).  
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Bean, F. D. – B. Lindsey Lowell – Taylor, L. 1998: Undocumented Mexican 
Immigrants and the Earning of Other workers in the United States – 
Demography 25. In: Loucky, J. – Armstrong, J. – Estrada, L. J. 2006: 
Immigration in America today – An encyclopedia – Greenwood Press. 
Westport, Connecticut, 380 p. 
Bigo, D. – Guild, E. 2005: Controlling frontiers: free movement into and within 
Europe – Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Boswell, C. 2005: Migration in Europe (A paper prepared for the Policy 
Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on 
International Migration) – Migration Research Group, Hamburg Institute 
of International Economics – Hamburg. Pp. 9-15 
Communication Department of the European Commission: The Schengen 
Area and Cooperation (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice 
_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l3
3020_en.htm)  
Council of the European Union – Brussels, 15 October 2004 (http://www. 
statewatch.org/news/2008/aug/hague-programme.pdf) 
Cseresznyés Ferenc 1996: Migrációs potenciálok és trendek Európában – Régió: 
Kisebbség, politika, társadalom 1996. 7. Évf. 4.sz., 16 p.  
Entzinger, H. – Biezeveld, R. 2003: Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration – 
European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations 
(ERCOMER), Faculty of Social Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
Rotterdam. 53 p.  
Integration of Immigrants in the European Union 
 
277 
EU Common Basic Principles 2004 (http://www.pobal.ie/Funding%20 
Programmes/integration/Documents/PIF%20EUCommonBasicPrincipl
es1.doc) 
Európai Bizottság 2009: Lehetőség és kihívás – Migráció az Európai Unióban, 
2010 – European Union, Luxembourg.  
Glatz F. 2004: Migráció a kibővített Európai Unióban. In: Magyar millennium 
Európában. Beszédek, cikkek, jegyzetek 2000–2002. – Budapest, 
Pannonica Kiadó, pp. 400–407.   
Gross, T. 2005: Integration of Immigrants – The Perspective of European 
Community Law – European Journal of Migration and Law 7. Pp. 145–161 
Hortefeux, B. 2008: The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum – Minister 
for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development 
President of the ―Justice and Home Affairs‖ Council of the European 
Union for immigration and asylum matters (http://www.immigration. 
Gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Plaquette_EN.pdf) 
Isbister, J. 1996: The immigration debate – Remaking America – Kumarian 
Press. West Hartford, Connecticut, 262 p. 
Mackensen, R. – Vanber, M. – Kramer, K. 1975: Probleme regionaler Mobilität. 
Göttingen. In: EKÉNÉ, I. Z. 1995: A migráció és nemzetközi kutatása – 
Acta Geographica Debrecina 1995/95, Tomus XXXIII, Debrecen. Pp. 
293-312 
Pogácsás Anett 2009: Az Európai Uniós és a migráció. In: Fónai M. – Pénzes 
M. (ed.) 2009: A migrációs integrált társadalmi megközelítései – Észak-
kelet magyarországi szenvedélybetegségeket megelőző egyesület, Human 
Net Alapítvány – Nyíregyháza, pp. 17-52 
Portes, A. – Rumbaut, R. G. 1990: Immigrant America – A portrait – 
University of California Press. Berkeley, 300 p. 
Ravenstein, E. G. 1885/89: The Laws of Migration – Journal Royal Stat. Soc. 
48. Pp. 167-227, Soc. 52. Pp. 241-301. In: Ekéné, I. Z. 1995: A migráció 
és nemzetközi kutatása – Acta Geographica Debrecina 1995/95, Tomus 
XXXIII, Debrecen. Pp. 293-312 
Salt, J. 2005: Current trends in international migration in Europe (Evolution 
actuelle des migrations  nternationals en Europe) – Council of Europe 
Publishing, Strasbourg. 
Schengen Agreement – unofficial translation (http://www.spjel kavik. 
Priv.no/henning /ifi/schengen/intro.html) 
 
 
279 
Abstract. This article attempts to investigate the phenomenon of migration in Europe 
against the backdrop of the Global revolution for social change, democracy and the effect of the 
social media, the cyber revolution and youth uprisings in changing world politics; with particular 
reference to Africa. The churning wheels of social change, communication and political thinking   
invites intercultural dialogue on the social conscience revolution and its future in addressing the 
changing landscape of constructive intervention and management.   
 
 
 
 
 
MIGRATION IN EUROPE AGAINST THE BACKDROP 
OF THE GLOBAL REVOLUTION – AN AFRICAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
Kobasheni Moopen PARUMAUL* 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A Global revolution is ensuing a new world order as aptly coined by 
Zbigniew Brzezinski `the global political awakening‘. As Brzezinski wrote:  
For the first time in human history almost all of humanity is 
politically activated, politically conscious and politically interactive... The 
resulting global political activism is generating a surge in the quest for personal dignity, 
cultural respect and economic opportunity in a world painfully scarred by memories of 
centuries-long alien colonial or imperial domination... The worldwide yearning for 
human dignity is the central challenge inherent in the phenomenon of 
                                                          
* 12A Herrwood Drive,Umhlanga,Durban,KZN, South Africa, University of Babes – 
Boyai, Cluj Napoca, Faculty of International Relations and European Studies, 
Institute for Doctoral Studies, Str.Mihail Kogainiceanu, nr.1, 400084 Cluj-Napoca, 
Romania, Email address of institution: staff@staff.ubbcluj.ro, Personal            
email: kmooppen@telkomsa.net 
 
 
 Keywords: global revolution, social change, democracy, social media, cyber revolution, 
youth uprisings, changing world politics. 
Kobasheni Moopen PARUMAUL 
 
280 
global political awakening... That awakening is socially massive and 
politically radicalizing...1 
 We are living in a global village where the boundaries that divide us are 
that which we seek to define, understand and through centuries we have killed 
for.  These boundaries whether political, religious, cultural or ethnic have been 
the preserve and delusion of mankind. 
 
2. The African Perspective 
  
In Africa there are approximately 410 tribes with 1500 to 2000 
languages which were divided by colonial powers on the basis of geopolitical 
invasion and imperial domination. 
 The migration of colonial powers from the west to Africa was a process 
of invasion, occupation, colonization and annexation of African territory by 
European powers during the new imperialism period, between 1881 and World 
War 1 in 1914. This marked the beginning of an era of division, dissemination 
of the African culture and bondage of its people. Thus began the European 
migration into Africa.   
 
Figure 1 Map of official and spoken languages of african countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Andrew Gavin Marshall, The Global Political Awakening and the New World Order, 
The Technological Revolution and the Future of Freedom, Part 
1,<http://www.globalresearch.ca/ index.php?aid=19873&context=va> 
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Colonial Africa 
  
―The eight European nations that invaded Africa and established 
colonies there left indelible marks on the language, cultures, and governments 
of each African country. In many cases, the European language and 
governmental systems supplanted the indigenous African language and 
traditional governmental systems or at least curtailed or limited their 
influence… Until about 1870, colonial invasion did not have much in the way 
of intensity as the continent had not presented much economic or political 
value to Europe.  
 After 1875, competition for raw materials by the European powers 
sparked bitter rivalry for conquest and expansion into the African interior. The 
Berlin Conference of 1885 laid down the rules for partitioning of Africa 
between the European powers… The African people, often exploited by this 
expansionism offered valiant resistance which continued into the mid-
Twentieth Century when African Nations, one by one, won freedom and 
independence.‖ 2 
Figure 2 Map of Colonial Africa 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2  Key facts: Africa to Europe migration <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
6228236.stm> 
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 The global revolution which is now permeating the boundaries of 
political dictatorship, colonial domination, cultural constraints, religious dogma 
and ideologies is…simply a revolution of consciousness. 
 This momentous awakening in the history of mankind is viral in its 
social, political, religious and cultural dimensions…simply a revolution of 
humanity. 
 
3. Global Revolution for Social Change and Democracy 
  
As social beings man has always sought to explore and conquer for 
better opportunities and greener pastures. In time immemorial Mans‘ migration 
has mirrored migration in nature and the resultant 21st century activism is as a 
result of hundreds of years of colonial domination, political oppression, tyrant 
dictatorships, fraudulent governments and its corporations, religious dogma 
and fanatical ideologies.    
 There is a hunger to regain human dignity; respect for basic human 
rights, hunger for self-determination of people who have had enough and are 
willing to do whatever it takes to be released from the previous bonds of 
economic disparity caused by corrupt governments and transfer of leadership 
within consanguineous relations. 
 Democracy is our birth right and people are beginning to demonstrate 
their dissatisfaction throughout the world in response to their basic human 
rights compounded by the present economic crisis. The dilemma of migration 
against the backdrop of the Global revolution for social change and democracy 
is a reality.     
The problem does not belong to any one nation or group of people but 
the entire world as its reverberating effect transcends the barriers of all national 
identities and boundaries. The tsunami of the revolution is still to arrive on all 
coasts unless all those in power who have the ability to foresee this reality take 
responsibility.  
Europe is faced with a rising tide of migrants, especially from African 
countries fleeing persecution from the onslaught of civil war sparked and 
fuelled by student anger and uprisings. 
 “Tens of thousands of Africans - men, women and children fleeing their homeland - 
attempt to make the perilous trip from their home countries to Europe every 
year, seeking refuge, asylum and economic opportunity. Some travel thousands 
of miles overland, being handed from smuggler to smuggler, ending up at one 
of many ports in northern Africa, to be packed into makeshift boats and make 
treacherous sea crossings to European soil, to places like Spain's Canary Islands 
and tiny Malta where they hope to either sneak in unnoticed, or, if intercepted, 
be allowed to stay. Many do not survive the journey.  Authorities in southern 
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European nations are still struggling however, to patrol for, care for, to process 
and repatriate this continuing flow of immigrants.‖3 
 However their fate is not guaranteed and many do not survive the 
journey or reach their destination.  
 
Figure 3 Map of Routes to Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 According to the map the main departure points are: 
West coast of Africa: Northern Mauritania, Western Sahara and southern 
Morocco from where most head for the Canary Islands. 
 There is migration from Northern Morocco to cross into Ceuta and 
Melilla or cross the straits to Spain. 
 From Tunisia and Libya people board boats, heading for Italy's island 
of Lampedusa, Sicily and Malta.4 
 ‖Those who make it to Malta face an uncertain future. They are held in 
closed detention centres for up to 18 months while their claims are processed. 
                                                          
3 African Immigration to Europe http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/ 2009/01/ 
african_immigration_to_europe.html 
4 Key facts: Africa to Europe Migrationhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
6228236.stm 
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If they are granted refugee status or humanitarian protection, they are released 
to live in open centres…Malta is struggling to cope and some see the arrival of 
immigrants as an ―invasion‖…Most of them are there by mistake. They wanted 
to get to Italy but were blown off course or were rescued at sea. They do not 
want to be in Malta and Malta does not particularly want them…Malta has been 
appealing for help: more ships, helicopters and equipment to increase border 
patrols. It also wants "burden-sharing": that is, EU countries less exposed by 
geography taking in a share of the migrants.‖5 
 The Council of Europe has had numerous meetings on these burning 
issues ; the European Committee on Migration(CDMG) and the UNHCR 
representation to the European Institutions in Strasbourg attended a ―Round 
table on Durable Solutions: Local Integration and Resettlement of Refugees‖   
 Oliver Beer, the UNHCR‘s representative underlined ―the purpose of 
the round table was to hold a fruitful exchange of views and ideas as to how we 
can best effect the integration of refugees, many of whom remain in the 
margins of society, are the victims of discrimination and are often used as scape 
goats for all the problems affecting Europe‖. 6 
 On the issue of unaccompanied children, the aim was to draw attention 
to the situation and pinpoint action that can be taken at the European level to 
improve their protection. Other issues of grave concern are the protection of 
women and the elderly, their welfare and integration into society. 
 The European Union adopted its first Action Plan in June 2010, to 
assess the scale of unaccompanied migrant minors, combat human trafficking 
and set out measures on reception, return and reintegration. 
 In an article on Migration and the changing face of Europe two paths to 
migration is discussed; reference is made of the world‘s poorest and most 
conflict –ridden  continent Africa and the trafficking of impoverished 
immigrants that has mushroomed into a million dollar business. According to 
BBC news quoting statistics from the UN it is noted that Smugglers‘ prices by 
sea from Africa to Canary Islands could cost 1,000 to 1,500 euros, from North 
Morocco to Spain; 1,000 euros and from Libya to Italy 1,500 to 2000 euros. 
Smugglers‘ prices by land from the Sub-Sahara to Morocco range from 1,000 to 
2,000 euros, through Mali; 1,000 euros and across the Sahara 1,700 to 3,400 
euros. Travel by air, land and sea from South Asia to Africa and then to Europe 
would cost 9,000 to 16,000 euros.  
There are no guarantees of reaching their destination and this often feeds the 
crime of human trafficking. 
                                                          
5 Alix Kroeger, Malta Struggles with Migrants http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ europe/ 
6283736.stm 
6  Council of Europe Migration http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/migration/default_en.asp 
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  The other path of migration according to the article was as a result of 
the addition of eight ex-communist East European countries to the EU in 
2004, which threw rich and poor nations together into one borderless entity. 
Further, that this move sparked a wave of legal migration westward, as the well-
educated (but underpaid) managers and unskilled labourers sought higher wages 
and a brighter economic future. 
 
Figure 4 Graph of Migration Destination Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ―As the closest European country to the African continent, Spain is on 
the frontline for illegal migration. From there, migrants often make their way to 
other European countries… Spain's enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in northern 
Morocco are initial targets for many migrants. Once detained they can be 
expelled, repatriated or sent to mainland Spain, where many are reported to be 
released, pending expulsion… For years, people have risked crossing the sea to 
get to mainland Spain, but in 2006 there was a closer focus on its islands - 
thousands headed for the Canary Islands in former African fishing boats, 
prompting an increase in joint "Frontex" patrol operations by Spain, the EU 
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and African nations. But tightening security at one departure point simply 
seems to shift it elsewhere.‖7 
 A report on migration in 2005 by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) says African migration to developed 
countries is marginal in relation to overall flows. However, these figures would 
be notably different due to the recent influx of immigrants in recent times. 
 The report stated that about two-thirds of Africans in Europe are from 
North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and an increasing number are 
travelling from Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly heading for the former colonial 
powers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. 
 It was also reported that most Sub-Saharan migrants are from West 
Africa - Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, in particular. 
 It would be pertinent to mention that the colonising countries of 
Europe who have influenced the different parts of Africa in enforcing their 
language would in turn attract immigrants of that language to their countries; 
for example, France would attract immigrants from the French speaking 
colonies and United Kingdom would attract English speaking immigrants. This 
has already paved the process of integration. 
 
Figure 5 Graph of Immigrants in Europe by Region of Origin 
                                                          
7 Key Facts Africa to Europe Migration, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
6228236.stm> 
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   Figure 6 Map of Remittances in the Year 2005 
 
This study reported by the BBC indicates figures of what percentage of 
remittances migrants send home to family they have left behind.  
 ―Billions of dollars each year is sent back to Africa from the diaspora 
around the world - in some cases making up a sizeable chunk of the home 
country's GDP.‖8 
 
Figure 7 GDP Europe Vs Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Key facts: Africa to Europe Migration <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
6228236.stm> 
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Table 1 GDP Europe VS Sub Saharan Africa 
 
EUROZONE  SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Life expectancy: 80 years   Life expectancy: 47 years  
Population growth: 0.6%   Population growth: 2.3%  
School enrolment, primary: 98.9%   School enrolment, primary: 65.7%  
HIV prevalence (aged 15-49): 0.3%   HIV prevalence (aged 15-49): 5.8%  
Internet users (per 1,000 people): 439.4   Internet users (per 1,000 people): 29  
Time to start a business: 26.9 days  Time to start a business: 61.5 days 
Source: World Bank 2005 
 
4. Social Media and the Cyber Revolution  
  
 Migration although an age old phenomena is greatly influenced by the 
social media;  advertisements of better job opportunities and working 
conditions in foreign lands; attractions for a better life and the benefit to be 
able to improve quality of life at home by sending remittances are driving forces 
.The role of social media, through Facebook, twitter, blogs and the power of 
major networking forums has taken over national media and become the global 
communication which is fast tracking information and mobility ,thus making 
the world very accessible.  
 Brzezinski on the technological Revolution and its impact on the world 
supports this view as follows; 
“The nearly universal access to radio, television and increasingly 
the Internet is creating a community of shared perceptions and envy that can 
be galvanized and channeled by demagogic political or religious passions. These energies 
transcend sovereign borders and pose a challenge both to existing states 
as well as to the existing global hierarchy, on top of which America still 
perches...”9 
 Andrew Gavin Marshall in an article concludes on this point that;  
“the Technological Revolution has led to a diametrically opposed, 
antagonistic, and conflicting geopolitical reality: never before has humanity 
been so awakened to issues of power, exploitation, imperialism and domination; 
and simultaneously, never before have elites been so transnational and global in 
orientation, and with the ability to impose such a truly global system of 
scientific despotism and political oppression. These are the two major 
geopolitical realities of the world today. Reflect on that. Never in all of human 
history has mankind been so capable of achieving a true global political psycho-
                                                          
9 Andrew Gavin Marshall: The Global Political Awakening and the New World Order 
The Technological Revolution and the Future of Freedom, Part 1  
http://stevebeckow.com/accountability/nwo-essays/the-global-political-
awakening-and-the-new-world-order-%E2%80%93-the-technological-revolution-
and-the-future-of-freedom-part-1/ 
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social awakening; nor has humanity ever been in such danger of being subjected 
to a truly global scientific totalitarianism, potentially more oppressive than any 
system known before, and without a doubt more technologically capable of 
imposing a permanent despotism upon humanity. So we are filled with hope, 
but driven by urgency. In all of human history, never has the potential nor 
the repercussions of human actions and ideas ever been so 
monumental.”10 
 The seeds of the cyber revolution have been sown and as the social, 
political and technological environment develops, new options are explored, 
opportunities seized and the cyber nation is networking globally every 
second…influencing thought, introducing new ideas and sharing information.    
 
5. Youth Uprisings 
 
The youth of Egypt were ignited into an uprising following the words on 
Facebook ―Egypt deserves a better future. On 25 January we will change our 
country. Nobody will stop us if we are united. Young people must speak now‖11. 
These were the words that fuelled the latent anger and dissatisfaction with a 
regime festering in fraud, corruption and tyranny. Dissatisfaction with 
unemployment, lack of job opportunities, inflation and the stirring of youth 
connected to the world by internet facing injustices that can no longer be hidden.        
 ―On the same Facebook page on which the invitation to protest 
appeared were links to where and when demonstrations would take place and 
the numbers of coordinators, lawyers and doctors. By 21 January membership 
of the page had grown to more than 100,000, with many volunteering to lead 
demonstrations in their home towns.‖12 
 "Everything was online and everybody was participating in organising 
the protests," said activist Abdallah Helmi. 
 Two days before the protests youth movements, including the 6 April 
and HASHD, offered online training courses for those organising 
demonstrations on how to avoid clashes with the security forces. 
 "Be ready with masks for the tear gas. Do not insult, talk or provoke 
any soldiers or policemen. This is not personal. They have orders to stop you 
                                                          
10 Andrew Gavin Marshall: The Global Political Awakening and the New World Order 
The Technological Revolution and the Future of Freedom, Part 1  
http://stevebeckow.com/accountability/nwo-essays/the-global-political-awakening-
and-the-new-world-order-%E2%80%93-the-technological-revolution-and-the-
future-of-freedom-part-1/ 
11 Mohamed Abdel-Baky Cyber revolution, Al-Ahram Weekly Online 
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1034/sc30.htm> 
12 Mohamed Abdel-Baky Cyber revolution, Al-Ahram Weekly Online 
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1034/sc30.htm> 
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but we are all Egyptians and one day the security forces will know that we are 
right," said one online guide sent to hundreds of thousands of protesters.13 
 ―While the ensuing demonstrations quickly developed a dynamic of 
their own the role of youth movements in kick-starting the process was 
essential. The 6 April youth movement, created in 2008 to support striking 
textile workers in the industrial town of Mahala Al-Kobra, took the lead, 
focussing on technical assistance, coordination and creating an online 
communication channel between protesters through social networks like 
Twitter, Facebook and UStream.‖14 
 The student uprisings were viral and spontaneous and quickly infecting 
youth who initiated similar uprisings in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and other parts 
of the Middle East and Northern Africa. Syria‘s cyber revolution effectively 
monitored and reported on the events within the country as the uprisings grew 
in numbers and shaped yet another revolution amongst the youth. Through the 
internet they had the power to influence, ignite and inform the youth as well as 
report to world news the events of this revolution even though foreign media 
coverage and information was censored within the country. The uprisings, 
demonstrations and civil war in these countries are still continuing. 
 This has been the cause of the wave of migrants risking their lives to 
cross perilous seas, pregnant women, children, the elderly and men seeking 
better opportunities for their families.  
 Most countries experiencing civil uprisings have attempted to curb 
news reporting and internet access in order to control, brainwash and dispel the 
flames of revolution. However, the power of the technological revolution has 
overcome and with it has ensued the new age; ―the awakening.‖  
 ―The youth of the Third World are particularly restless and resentful. 
The demographic revolution they embody is thus a political time-bomb, as well. 
With the exception of Europe, Japan and America, the rapidly expanding 
demographic bulge in the 25-year-old-and-under age bracket is creating a huge 
mass of impatient young people. Their minds have been stirred by sounds and 
images that emanate from afar and which intensify their disaffection with what 
is at hand. Their potential revolutionary spearhead is likely to emerge from 
among the scores of millions of students concentrated in the often intellectually 
dubious ―tertiary level‖ educational institutions of developing countries.  
 Depending on the definition of the tertiary educational level, there are 
currently worldwide between 80 and 130 million ―college‖ students. Typically 
originating from the socially insecure lower middle class and inflamed by a 
sense of social outrage, these millions of students are revolutionaries-in-waiting, 
                                                          
13 Mohamed Abdel-Baky Cyber revolution, Al-Ahram Weekly Online 
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1034/sc30.htm> 
14 Mohamed Abdel-Baky Cyber revolution, Al-Ahram Weekly Online 
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1034/sc30.htm> 
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already semi-mobilized in large congregations, connected by the Internet and 
pre-positioned for a replay on a larger scale of what transpired years earlier in 
Mexico City or in Tiananmen Square. Their physical energy and emotional 
frustration is just waiting to be triggered by a cause, or a faith, or 
hatred…Brzezinski favours an increased and expanded ‗internationalization‘, 
i.e.; an increased supranational cooperation that should be actively promoted by 
the United States. He explains that ―Democracy per se is not an enduring 
solution,‖ as it could be overtaken by ―radically resentful populism.‖15   
 
6. Case for Migration and Pressures for Restriction 
  
 One cannot discount the value that migration can have to a host 
country. The case for labour migration as proposed by Christina Boswell for 
the Global Commission on International Migration is as follows; 
 ―Unlike the self-proclaimed countries of immigration of the New World 
– the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – Europe has found it difficult to 
come to terms with the fact of immigration. Many sections of European 
societies have been profoundly reluctant to welcome and incorporate 
immigrants, especially those coming from non-OECD countries who are 
perceived to have significantly different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Anti-
immigrant sentiment has manifested itself in public support for restrictive 
immigration and asylum policies, negative reporting on immigrants and asylum-
seekers in the popular press, discrimination against resident ethnic minority 
groups, and racist or anti-immigrant harassment and violence…This hostility 
appears counter-intuitive, given the extent to which European countries have 
benefited from immigration in the past decades.  
 The large-scale, mainly low-skilled immigration of the 1950s and 1960s 
was a crucial component of post-war economic reconstruction in Western 
Europe. Today, labour migration fills critical gaps in the IT sector, engineering, 
construction, agriculture and food processing, health care, teaching, catering 
and tourism, and domestic services.‖16 
 Christina proposes that the economic case for labour migration is likely 
to become more urgent in the coming decades, for at least three reasons.  
                                                          
15 Andrew Gavin Marshall: The Global Political Awakening and the New World Order 
The Technological Revolution and the Future of Freedom, Part 1 
<http://stevebeckow.com/accountability/nwo-essays/the-global-political-
awakening-and-the-new-world-order-%E2%80%93-the-technological-revolution-
and-the-future-of-freedom-part-1/> 
16 Christina Boswell Migration Research Group Hamburg Institute of International 
Economics http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/ 
mainsite  /policy_and_research/gcim/rs/RS4.pdf 
Kobasheni Moopen PARUMAUL 
 
292 
 First, European governments are increasingly recognising the 
importance of skills in generating productivity and growth. Human capital has 
become the most crucial determinant of productivity and growth in an 
increasingly knowledge-based economy. Highly skilled workers are vital for 
ensuring innovation and improving productivity, and therefore for creating new 
jobs. A study on the impact of the Green Card programme for IT workers, for 
example, estimated that each high skilled migrant created on average 2.5 new 
jobs in Germany (Wimmer AG, 2001). This has made many governments keen 
to loosen up rules on labour migration, intra-company transfers and movement 
of service providers, to attract the best skills. Indeed, there are serious concerns 
in many states about whether Europe is attractive enough to qualified workers 
in comparison to North America: the latter appears to be a more powerful 
magnet for high skilled workers, including European scientists and researchers. 
 Second, despite substantial structural unemployment in many European 
countries, European workers are often selective in their choice of occupations 
and locations, and are also more highly qualified than they were a decade ago. 
So although the portion of low- and semiskilled jobs is declining (because of 
new production techniques and outsourcing), there are substantial gaps in a 
number of these occupations – especially in the agro-food industry, catering 
and domestic services. There are also acute shortages in a number of skilled 
public sector jobs, because of inadequate remuneration or low status. This has 
created significant gaps in occupations such as medical care and teaching – gaps 
which are increasingly filled by labour migrants. 
 Thirdly, ageing populations imply an increased dependency rate in 
European countries, i. e. a higher ratio of economically inactive to active 
population. This will place a strain on welfare systems, as health and pensions 
become more expensive. Ageing populations will also generate shifts in 
consumption patterns, in particular increasing demand for healthcare and 
leisure activities, in turn creating additional demand for labour in these sectors.  
 Thus despite continued unemployment, problems of demand-supply 
mismatch and the need to attract high-skilled workers are likely to create 
serious labour shortages. Because labour migration is so politically sensitive, it is 
rarely the first choice of governments for filling these gaps. The first line of 
response is likely to be measures to influence patterns of domestic labour 
supply – through education and training, attracting more people into work, 
lengthening the working age, or encouraging higher birth rates.  
 The EU has also been aiming to increase mobility between member 
states, including the new CEE members (once restrictions on free movement 
have been lifted).  
 However, these measures are unlikely to perfectly meet demand. 
Indeed, there have already been moves to liberalise labour migration policies 
for particular skills, occupational or sectorial categories in almost all European 
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countries. As shortages become more acute, we can expect governments will 
increasingly have recourse to labour migration as a fast and efficient tool for 
filling gaps.17 
 Christina also posits that pressures for restriction is often discerned 
from a range of anxieties in popular media and party political debates as well as 
opinion polls…‖that Europeans are anxious about the ‗ghettoization‘ of ethnic 
minorities in deprived inner cities ,and the corresponding problems of inter-
ethnic tensions and violence;  the apparently poor educational and labour 
market performance of immigrants and ethnic minorities; criminality and even 
terrorist activism on the part of ethnic groups; and ,more generally, the 
perceived fragmentation of social solidarity and collective identities, as a result 
of increased cultural diversity…These fears are exacerbated by the growing 
challenge of migration control. The evolution of this problem over the past 
three decades is familiar.  
 The effective halt to labour migration in the early 1970s encouraged 
many people to try to enter Europe through asylum systems or family reunion. 
The ensuing attempts to restrict access through these ‗humanitarian‘ routes 
gave rise to new patterns of irregular migration and human trafficking. Irregular 
migration flows have also emerged as a response to demand for illegal labour in 
many sectors, including construction, textiles and sewing, catering, and 
domestic work.  
 These forms of irregular movement have fed alarmist tendencies; the 
notion that Europe is being flooded with migrants from poorer regions, and 
that states are no longer able to control access to their territories and 
resources.18 
 
7. Conclusion  
  
 We cannot prevent the events to come nor can we attempt to control it. 
Neither can we hide our heads in the sand and pretend that we are secure as 
long as the problem is not on our shores and not a catastrophe yet. We need to 
find innovative, consultative and pragmatic approaches to the challenges that 
we are faced with.   
 Christina Boswell in her article Migration in Europe proposes those 
policies which appear to offer the most interesting lessons for other regions and 
countries as: 
                                                          
17 Christina Boswell Migration Research Group Hamburg Institute of International 
Economics,http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/ma
insite/ policy_and_research/gcim/rs/RS4.pdf 
18 Christina Boswell Migration Research Group Hamburg Institute of International 
Economics,http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/ma
insite/ policy_and_research/gcim/rs/RS4.pdf 
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 Involving source and transit countries in planning and 
implementing migration policies 
 ―Package‖ approaches to cooperation, which incorporate the 
concerns of source countries 
 Better cooperation between different ministries/departments 
involved in migration policy 
 Encouraging arrangements for multilateral burden-sharing in cases 
of refugee crises 
 Liberalisation of free movement to enhance efficiency and 
integration in regional trade blocks 
 Common legislative guidelines to ensure good practice in less 
experienced host countries  
 More emphasis on language learning and naturalisation to promote 
integration 19 
 The European Commission and the UNICEF met in Rome to examine 
the situation of unaccompanied migrant minors aged 15 years and more and 
discussed the implementation of Life projects; the aim of which is to develop 
the capacities of minors allowing them to acquire and strengthen the skills 
necessary to become independent, responsible and active in society. Although 
this is for a limited duration, Life projects are a lasting solution for both the 
host states and the minors themselves to meet the challenges arising out of the 
migration of unaccompanied minors. At this meeting of member states it was 
proposed that a training manual be prepared and put into effect soon. This 
programme must also deal with the reality that these minors would be faced 
with after the training programme, i.e.; finding productive work, integration 
into a foreign society and how this will be implemented. Especially minors who 
have been victims of human trafficking and have no one and nowhere to go. 
They cannot just be sent back to the country they came from without the 
source country and host country agreeing on a structured integration.  
 A conference on Human Rights and Migration was held in Lisbon on 
31 May to 1 June 2010 , focusing on the interception of migrants a sea, how 
they are detained and treated in receiving countries, the dangers they can face 
such as trafficking and racism, as well as what happens when they are expelled 
or forced to return. This conference was organised by the Portuguese 
Parliament, the Council of Europe and the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 
 At the 58th Meeting of the European Committee on Migration 
(CDMG), the progress of on-going activities within the framework of the years 
                                                          
19 Christina Boswell Migration Research Group Hamburg Institute of International 
Economics, http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/hared/ 
mainsite/ policy_and_research/gcim/rs/RS4.pdf 
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– program (2009-2012) was reviewed and approved. This was to enable as well 
as finalise Draft recommendations on the question of validating migrant‘s skills 
and experiences and make proposals for a manual thereof. Also the prevention 
of vulnerability risks for elderly migrants and the improvement of their welfare 
were to be addressed.  
 Brzezinski notes in Part 1 of his three part series: 
 ―Suddenly, global elites are faced with the reality of seeking to dominate 
populations that are increasingly becoming self-aware and are developing a 
global consciousness. Thus, a population being subjected to domination in 
Africa has the ability to become aware of a population being subjected to the 
same forms of domination in the Middle East, South America or Asia; and they 
can recognize that they are all being dominated by the same global power 
structures. That is a key point: not only is the awakening global in its reach, 
but in its nature; it creates within the individual, an awareness of the 
global condition. So it is a „global awakening‟ both in the external 
environment, and in the internal psychology.‖20 
 Collective conflict management of international security and violations 
of human rights is certainly a way forward in resolving disputes in changing 
world politics. There is potential for multilateral military action in the post-cold 
war era…potential for collective responsibility and respect for the future of the 
world and global consciousness.  
I would like to elaborate on this further, as I believe that contemporary 
world foreign policy making deserves to be explored in greater depth and not 
for the purposes of this research.   
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Abstract. Situation with interethnic relations on the border of Romania and 
Ukraine is subjected to changes, especially after Romania accession to the EU. The most 
characteristic features of it could be analyzed on the example of Ukrainian part of Bukovina. 
This article considers first of all two aspects of Bukovynian regional phenomenon of ethnic 
tolerance: historical and contemporaneous ones. First part of the article proposes a brief 
historic retrospect, evaluating main stages of this multiethnic regional society phenomenon 
formation and evolution. And the second part regards current challenges of culture of tolerant 
relations amidst deferent ethnic groups, which leave together in this region. The data collected 
and points expressed in the article reflect surveys done with the author himself and 
summarizes mainly but not exclusively results of scholarship representing researchers of Yury 
Fedkoych Chernivtsi National University.  The author does not pretend to cover all the issues 
related with making ethnic situation and ethnopolitics in the regions better. But these aspects 
of securing ethnonational stability into the given region could be taken into account by all 
parties concerned with the improvement of this very important sphere of social and political life 
alongside with the current border of the EU.   
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Ethnic relations widely depend on variety of changeable factors. Among 
them leading role play historical past, with the positive or negative experience 
of interethnic relations. When the latter are predominantly defined by samples 
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of the mutual cooperation, inherited from the previous periods respectful 
stances and attitudes towards ‗others‘, they contribute towards a formation of 
the tolerance culture, which might be treated as a great asset in nowadays 
Europe, including the regions and countries of the EU.  
Regarding this kind of the historic heritage, Bukovyna is well reputed as 
a peculiar region, distinctive not only because its multiethnicity, but a 
widespread here culture of ethnic and religious tolerance.  As of the context of 
East European history, level of ethnic tolerance among local communities and 
their members seemed to be pretty high. If to choose, what period of the 
regional history had been formative one as far as regional tolerance in 
Bukovyna is concerned, than the Austrian period is to be chosen as the starting 
point for emergence of the regional model of ethnic relations. This article is 
composed of two principal parts. The first one delivers historical outline of 
Bukovina phenomenon of polyethnic community, regards its main stages of 
evolution, from Austrian period towards the today‘s reality of Ukrainian part of 
former region of Bukovyna. The second part is dealt with the ethnopolitics of 
Ukraine vis-a-vis of Romania policy towards Ukraine at whole and Chernivtsi 
region in particular, keeping an eye on problems which were or are still 
unresolved in bilateral relations of both countries. The author relies on variety 
of sources concerning chosen topics and systematically represents his own 
researcher, reflected in his articles on Bukovina as a multiethnic society, which 
were published earlier.         
         
1. Bukovyna as a lucky case of polyethnicity  
 
Territory of the current Chernivtsi Region and, before that, all of 
Bukovyna was not monoethnic ever. Tracing back the history, this region was 
inhabited by representatives of different ethnic groups. However, it‘s important 
to stress, evidence of their developmental and ethnocultural legacy, even 
though meaningful, may hardly be related to the modern situation in their 
ethnic relations. Under Austrian emperors‘ rule, the Bukovynian multicultural 
society as polyethnic mosaic started to be formatted. Processes of economic 
and ethnocultural evolution of region, which possessed a peripheral place into 
imperial state‘s administrative and economic structure, were influenced by 
relatively favorable external conditions. Austrian Empire could ensure more 
efficiently, as being compared to Ottoman Empire, the previous hegemonic 
master of the whole region of South-East Europe for ages it‘s more peaceful 
existence. Borderland position of Bukovyna predisposed Vienna to pay a special 
if not a strategic attention to the regional stability. That‘s why Vienna pursued a 
consolidation policy which was to guarantee Habsburg sovereignty over acquired 
territories (Petrea Lindenbauer, 2003: 239).  
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That required well-controlled system of subordination in relationship 
between ethnic communities of the region and the provincial as well as the 
central government. Hereby the key importance belonged to relations between 
the Ukrainian and Romanian communities as the biggest ones. Alongside with 
them German, Jewish and Polish communities has been playing stabilizing and 
sometimes integrating role in social and political life of Bukovyna. This policy 
coordinated with the demographical situation in the region. Statistics for the 
Bukovina population show nearly 800,000 people living there in the mid-19th-
century, including: 38% Ukrainians, 33% Romanians, 13% Jews, 8% Germans, 
4.5% Poles and a number of other smaller minorities (Ewa Rzetelska-Feleszko, 
2006: 5). Regional specificity of Bukovyna in sense of the local ethnonational 
climate evolved from the mid-19th century. Since then this region had been 
granted with the status of the Dukedom of Bukovyna attributed with 
administrative autonomy. That change enabled it to deal independently with a 
wide range of political and cultural issues. While Ukrainians to a slight extend 
outnumbered the Romanian population here, in turn leaders of the latter 
community represented mostly hereditary dynasties of medieval Moldova. They 
were lucky to preserve some  privileges and enjoyed, in comparison with the 
Ukrainians, greater opportunities in their cultural and social development (Luceac 
I.,2000: 26 – 34).  
Gradual consolidation of the young Romanian state, following up 
Romania‘s full independence in 1878, gradually strengthened influence of this 
ethnic group in the region. The very existence of the Romanian state, and 
moreover governed by the elites, inspired by the ideals of Romania Mare, 
constituted a certain threat of the Romanian irredentism emergence in Bukovyna. 
This urged the official Vienna to implement check and balance policy regarding 
key actors of the regional Romanian community.  Contrary to the Romanians of 
Bukovyna, the Ukrainian community did not have the corresponding and 
neighboring kin state. Because of intensifying tensions with the Russian Empire, 
in the framework of Vienna and St. Petersburg competition over the Balkans, the 
‗Ukrainian vector‘ in the Austrian domestic and foreign policy would have been 
gradually gaining prominence. These reasons were changing Vienna‘s treatment 
of the Ukrainian population in the Empire, its leaders and institutions. Hence, the 
Austrian government was compelled to conduct the policy of balancing interests 
of particular national communities and rely on inter-ethnic conflict prevention 
management. Under circumstances regional decision-makers masterfully 
counterpoised their interests, and supported or persecuted some social and 
political movements, and later political parties, which in turns were aspiring at 
representation and lobbying interests of major ethnic groups. This kind of policy 
brought about some fruitful results, contributing into preservation of ethnically 
fragmented state integrity. Both the Romanian and Ukrainian social and political 
milieus in Bukovyna did not engender nationalist or separatist movements up to 
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the breakdown of the Danube Empire. Leaders of these ethnic groups succeeded 
with building up the formal and informal communication with Vienna, shoving 
their sincere loyalty towards the Emperor, and only after that cherishing their 
distinctive national and political ideals, and subsequently ethnic identities. 
Noteworthy is the outstanding role played by the German, Jewish and 
Polish communities into regional polity. The German community 
representatives were in charge of the imperial political, administrative and 
cultural policies execution, and they ensured bureaucratic support for the 
existing regime. Nonetheless, their modest number and limited resources for 
local sociopolitical clout did not allow the central power to rely on this 
community only and satisfy demands of the local Germans as the top priority 
(Осадчук С., 2002: 2 -17). The Jewish in fact possessed peculiar status in the 
communication of the different ethnic cultures of Bukovyna. They numerically 
prevailed upon other ethnic group in the cities and towns of Bukovyna 
(Corbea-Hoisie A., 2003:29 – 42). In the region local Jews targeted at 
performing the role of the values of high-level European urban subculture 
proponents. And they were most active in spreading, consuming and 
supporting the German-Austrian culture and traditions of that time indeed1. 
Well-educated local Jews were agents of the imperial culture; they were ready, in 
their most part, to abandon voluntarily, for example, their own traditional 
language – Yiddish. At the same time, their efforts were noticed from Vienna. 
Their zeal was rewarded with the support by the authorities not witnessed in 
neighboring Russia and other European empires (Ingrao Ch., 1996: 10). 
To a very extend, successful formation of interethnic relations, based on 
the values of tolerance, might be explained by slowed down urbanization 
process in the region (Добржанський О., 1999: 76 – 77). As a result of that 
‗belated modernization‘, processes of ethnic consciousness transformation into 
modern national identity in Bukovyna underwent with less dynamics than in the 
neighboring regions. It helped avoiding of sharp social antagonism and ethnic 
confrontation. The regional system of economic labor distribution and relevant 
social roles emerged in Bukovyna led to the complex system of relations and 
interdependencies among the citizens of its towns and villages. Within this 
interdependencies network, the polarizing effect of ethnic differentiation has 
been partially mitigated by religious cohesion, while social and class conflicts 
were dampened, to some extent, by ethnocultural solidarity and concomitant 
appreciation of common identity. 
This system of intricately intertwined, socially important and 
economically determined connections ensured a rather stable, albeit somewhat 
                                                          
1 Lichtblau A. & John M. Jewries in Galicia and Bukowina, in Lemberg and 
Czernowitz. Two divergent examples Jewish Communities in the far east of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. – http://www.sbg.ac.at/ges/people/lichtblau/ 
cape.html [Last accessed 10.03.2009]  
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shaky, balance among major social and ethnic groups of population in the 
urban environment of the Bukovynian region. Thus, the region inhabitants 
collectively created Bukovynian ethnocultural traditions as predominantly 
tolerant ones. Deficiency of numerical representation for some regional 
communities was compensated by their high social activity which rested on 
quality education (surely, by the then standards) and prestigious social ties. For 
example, local Poles were far from being numerous, yet they exerted 
considerable influence in the administrative and educational spheres of the 
Bukovynian society (Strutinski W., Jaceniuk F., 1999: 118 – 129). Relatively low 
social mobility, as well as somewhat outdated placement of social and economic 
roles at the regional labor market reduced competitive tension with regard to 
primary resources among members of various ethnic groups. Its prevented 
formation and subsequent social and political articulation of their conflicting 
interests. In these circumstances, desperate somehow tough completion among 
the local elites for regional resources via political mobilization of their fellow 
citizens and impending confrontation among members of different nations and 
ethnic groups was hardly possible (Ostafi-Ost G., 1995: 45 – 58). 
The most characteristic is the fact that local dwellers were not only 
bearers of ethnic and later national identities, but also widely regarded 
themselves as Bukovynians, proudly emphasizing this regional identity of theirs. 
Such informal consensus on the common regional identity by members of 
different ethnic and religious groups crowned foundations of the regional 
ethnic and religious equilibrium. One should not underestimate Vienna‘s well-
thought policies towards Bukovyna. They actively contributed to ensuring the 
local ethnopolitical climate in which threats to regional and national security 
were circumvented as usually (Попик С., 1999: 32 – 36). Local ethnic tolerance 
was supported by the central and regional authority‘s right because it was an 
efficient tool matching both domestic and foreign interests of the Empire. 
Simultaneously, this position was in compliance with the prevailing mindset and 
needs of regional populations, members of Bukovyna‘s major ethnic and 
religious communities.  
However regional phenomenon of ethnic tolerance was not granted 
forever to Bukovynians. WWI started undermining the foundations of 
Bukovynian regional identity. War cruelties and crimes initiated the ‗beginning 
of the end‘ to this remarkable regional identity and solidarity. Reprisals and 
dangers of the wartime forced exodus of generations of local public figures. 
These people were proponents and bearers of the ‗Bukovynism‘ culture, which 
was a rather viable regional synthesis of imperial patriotism and local 
ethnosocial conformism (Добржанський А.В., 1997: 74 – 83). Later on 
Austrian era left behind rich legacy of legends and myths about regional 
prosperity and conformity. Images of the lost Golden epoch would have been 
reviving in contemplations of the local intelligentsia and bolstered by nostalgia 
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of ordinary citizens (Буркут І., 2004: 194).  In reality, the end of Great War 
burned dreams and hopes for fair and peaceful resolution of the issue of the 
Bukovynians‘ national self-determination, envisaging partition of the region 
into the Ukrainian and Romanian territories. Idea of dividing the territory of 
Bukovyna in 1918 by the ethnodemographic criterion, i.e. into the Romanian 
and Ukrainian parts, was supported by he many of local ethnic communities 
leaders, including some of Romanian stock. Would such a plan be 
implemented, instances of ethnic confrontation, typical of later periods of the 
regional history might be prevented, for sure. 
 
2. Bukovynian multiethnicity versus Romania Mare ethnic policy 
 
Romanian period of Bukovyna‘s history requires much more activity of 
researchers, and this deficit of academic scrutiny is not overcome in the modern 
Ukrainian academic literature, despite some attempts made. This statement 
concerns of scholarly acquaintance with the ethnic policies of royal Romania in 
the interwar period. Local academic tradition divides the time of the region‘s 
inclusion in Great Romania into two main periods – the ‗First‘ and ‗Second 
Romania‘. The first period lasted from late 1918 until mid 1940, while the 
second period – from June 1940 until August 1944.  
Romania‘s annexation of the territory of Bukovyna did meet 
expectations of dominant majority of Romanians, leaving in Bukovina. 
Ukrainians and representatives of other national groups did not fell themselves 
equally happy because of that radical sharp change of region political, social and 
economical shift. Royal Romania failed to fulfill its international commitments 
with regard to voluntary plebiscite of the Bukovynian population, as well as 
ensuring favorable conditions for the national and cultural development of 
ethnic minorities leaving on newly acquired territories. Moreover, consolidation 
of the Romanian rule upon Bukovyna led to gradual deterioration of the 
administrative and territorial status of the region, which lost its autonomy in 
1923. Together with a process of administrative centralization and cultural 
unification of Greater Romania, extended towards new lands went losses with 
regard to domestic politics and sociocultural atmosphere, reflected in the status 
of its citizens of different ethnic origin (Буркут І., 2004: 235 – 236). New (as 
for the region) Romanian authorities launched the policy of Romanization of 
this multiethnic region, in a resolute and oftentimes uncompromising manner.        
Romanian authorities tried to justify annexation of proving the 
historical and ethnic ―Romanianness‖ of the Bukovynian region. 
Accomplishment of this goal met with the presence of the numerous and well-
organized Ukrainian communities in the region, which demographically 
dominated in the northern and eastern parts of Bukovyna. Bucharest official 
stance on Bukovynian Ukrainians was ideologically formulated by Prof. Ion 
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Nistor, who declared that autochthonous Ukrainians of Bukovyna were in fact 
Romanians who had ―forgotten‖ their true ethnic roots. That‘s why Romania 
should take all necessary steps to help them be freed of that national amnesia 
and restore their lost consciousness (Livezeanu I, 1995: 65).  
And this policy started to work in a number of ways, primarily with the 
help of elaborated information, educational and cultural policies based on all-
comprehensive Romanization. Material stimuli have been used for bearers of 
the agrarian and patriarchal culture. For instance, in the time of the agrarian 
reform Romanians were given priority in receiving land lots. Census results of 
the interwar period proved that direct police coercion and systematic use of 
other degrading instruments resulted in disowning their national identity by 
some segments of the non-Romanian population. Obviously, this remark 
equally applied to those Ukrainians who were receptive to persistent 
explanations of their true national affiliation by the new rulers. Other measures 
of direct and latent discrimination were also put into force, including limitations 
for enrolment in gymnasia and higher educational institutions for non-
Romanians, denial of access to public service etc. 2. Undoubtedly, such ethnic 
policies negatively affected minority ethnic groups, especially after ascent of the 
extreme right in the late 1930s. Being worried about the problem of internal 
stability and territorial integrity of the state, which borders reached well beyond 
ethnically homogeneous ethnic territories of the Romanian people, Romanian 
political elites conducted the model of the ethnic policies bringing about an 
opposite effect. The general remark about Greater Romania‘s ethnic policy is 
applicable to the case of multicultural Bukovyna at a full stand. Insecure 
international stage as well as internal tendencies for authoritarianism and, later, 
totalitarianism within the Romanian political system made conditions of 
national minorities getting worse and worse. They were often exploited, 
discriminated and falling victim to the growing ethnic and political intolerance, 
which was spreading in Romania in the 1930s.  
Many of Bukovynians, comparing new State‘s order with the previous 
one were nostalgic about the Austrian times. Thus, ethnic Germans of 
Bukovyna underwent through considerable losses of their status, which were 
somewhat eased after rapprochement between Bucharest and the leadership of 
Nazi Reich based on geopolitical priorities. The Jewish community position 
could not be compared with the Austrian period, either. Jews were not only 
ethnically, but also economically discriminated. Romania of that time was the 
country which widely tolerated, if not politically cultivated, wide-spread anti-
Semitism (Штейн І., 1997). Conditions of the Polish community equally 
exacerbated in comparison with the Austrian period. Because these and other 
reasons, official Bucharest‘s permanent efforts at pursuing ethnic policies which 
                                                          
2 Hausleitner M. Romanization of the Bukovina, 1918 – 1944. – 
http://www.BukovinaJewsWorldUnion.org [Last accessed 23.11.2008] 
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would guarantee internal stability and external security of the country, went a 
failure. It resulted not only of chauvinist intentions and arrogant attitude 
towards minorities of the political elite, as well as aggressive Romanization. In 
fact, Romania was not exclusive with regards to its ethnopolitics, pandemic of 
xenophobia and ethnic intolerance clouded political atmosphere practically all 
over Central and Eastern Europe. 
Romania‘s second occupation of Northern Bukovyna is attributed with 
much more brutality of intolerant ethnic policy. The local population 
remembered that period as a regime of military and police terror, policies of 
ugly oppression and ethnocide, in particular with regard to the Jewish 
population (Alexandru F., 2010: 207 – 217). Jews, Ukrainians, Poles and other 
national minorities suffered from such policies (Маначинский А., 2000). Local 
Romanians were no exception either, as far as they suffered also from the 
regime brutality. That position has been even worsened by the fact, that they 
were treated by other national groups as accomplices in these misdeeds at least, 
and therefore carried the burden of responsibility for such myopic policies 
(Жуковський А., 1994: 188 – 190).  
By the late 1930s liberal freedoms remained surviving in the previous 
decade had been trampled. Political, institutional and socio-cultural foundations 
of traditionally cherished polyethnicity and cultivated by the society and 
authorities ethnic tolerance, inherited from the previous spell of Bukovynian 
history were seriously deformed. Locals and in the first place regional 
intellectuals had been trying to resist these negative processes in order to 
preserve the traditional Bukovynian multiculturalism. Now it was not so much 
reminiscence of the bygone empire, as affiliation with the genuine and high 
European culture3. Nevertheless, social and intellectual defiance from could not 
overweigh the impact of other destructive factors. Being deprived of intellectual 
and moral impulses sent by the regional elite, Bukovyna‘s ordinary citizens‘ 
culture was even less capable of resisting negative influences which depraved 
traditional ethnic tolerance. Finally, chauvinism of Great Romania provoked 
and strengthened reactive nationalism of other national communities, thus 
drawing the vicious circle of mutual antipathy, suspicions and persistent 
prejudices. Mutual offences and ethnonational conflicts resulted in gradual and 
inevitable loss of the culture of ‗Bukovynism‘ and subsequently synthetic 
identity of Bukovynians, which fall victim to historical circumstances of the 
‗Great politics‖ of two World Wars. Social and political environment of that 
time was hostile towards national and cultural peculiarities, ignoring protection 
of minority rights. Bukovyna did not constitute any untouchable island in 
stormy ocean of dramatic chances.   
 
                                                          
3 Ауслундер Р. Спогади про одне місто.  Ї. – 1997. - № 9. – 
http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n9texts/auslender.htm  [Last accessed 2.06.2009]  
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3. Soviet Internationalism: another „ideal‟ modeling of the inter-
ethnic relations 
 
The Soviet period of the history of ethnic relations started with 
partition of Bukovina into two parts. A new region and constituent part of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in the north-western part of 
historical Bukovyna, plus northern part of Bessarabia and the former Hertsa 
cinut of Romania, which were arbitrarily included into a new territorial unit. 
This led to profound changes in the all aspects of the population life in newly-
formed Chernivtsi Region. Besides change in the political and territorial status 
of the region, social and cultural dimensions of newly formed Chernivtsi 
Region of UkSSR were changed too. Another crucial factor as for the new 
region must be taken into consideration is active migratory processes which 
transformed ethnonational features of the local population and earlier 
proportions of major ethnic communities of the region (Холодницький В., 
2001: 42 – 50). First of all, early 1940s witnessed exodus of the traditionally 
important ethnic group of the Bukovynian population – the Germans. 
Secondly, the number of Polish residents decreased considerably. Thirdly, the 
ratio of ethnic Romanians also diminished (less dramatically), primarily due to 
their emigration to Romania, and sometimes even farther away. Fourthly, the 
Ukrainian segment of the local population similarly underwent tangible 
transformations. In the aftermath of WWII and guerilla fighting of the 
Ukrainian nationalist groups, the local Ukrainian population was decimated, and 
local intellectuals were those who suffered most severely. Reprisals practiced by 
the Soviet regime were not directed against any particular ethnic group, and 
affected almost all ethnic communities of the region. The quantity and structure 
of the Jewish population underwent most considerable changes. Exterminated 
or forced to emigrate, local Jews of Chernivtsi and the region were replaced by 
Soviet Jews who resettled from Bessarabia and other far distant regions of the 
USSR after the WWII. Thus, ethnic and cultural character of the region was 
suffered serious and perhaps irrevocable qualitative and quantative losses. The 
ethnic structure of the region was significantly socially simplified and culturally 
impoverished. 
As the outcome of USSR migratory policy ethnic Russians replaced, to 
some extent, the German community, at least numerically in the new region. At 
the same time, some local residents, primarily Ukrainians, Romanians and 
Moldovans, were recruited voluntarily or forcefully for the sake of industrial 
and agricultural grant plans of Kremlin. From that time till now migratory 
processes play an important role in shaping the ethnonational situation in the 
region, defining its cultural and social transformations (Курс України, 2002: 16 
– 17).  Simultaneously, Soviet regime exterminated or imprisoned bearers and 
creators of national consciousness or bribed and neutralized some of them 
(Марусик Т., 2002: 134, 141, 144). Ethnocultural associations were dismantled; 
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local national and cultural life was constrained to official state institutes of 
Soviet education and culture. 
This situation resulted in ignoring specific ethnonational aspirations and 
interests of regional citizens. Because of institutional devastation, systemic 
reprisals and consequent vehement ―preventive‖ measures against ―relapses‖ of 
bourgeois nationalism, conscious and open activities of national communities at 
that time were next to impossible.  The Soviet experience of the region was also 
marked by processes of forceful if not aggressive industrialization. These 
processes made a pronounced impact on socio-cultural life of the regional 
center – Chernivtsi. First and foremost, they ensured formation of the local 
working class whose representatives were regarded as a social and political 
support to the regime, the only and true representative of proletarian and later 
on soviet internationalism. At the same time, this process of harshly developing 
working class was an effective instrument of Russification of the local 
population. No other language but the Russian – not Ukrainian – as language of 
the majority of the population in the region and the UkRSSR was increasingly 
used as the main means of official and everyday communication, supported by 
all means with authorities. But even so, the ethnopolitical situation in the region 
differed significantly from flagrant discrimination and national humiliation of 
the Romanian period. 
The new political realities of 1950s-1980s minimized dangers of ethnic 
tension accumulated in the previous periods and the first afterwar years. In 
such environment, with legal social and cultural channels of aggregation and 
expression of ethnonational interests absent, the importance of ethnic factors 
both at the regional level and in citizens‘ social and personal life, gradually 
diminished on the surface. These tendencies were supported with everyday 
official propaganda, which permeated and thoroughly affected all spheres of 
people‘s lives in USSR.  
Despite all this policy all-union ‗melting pot‘, designed to engineer the 
Unique and Single Soviet nation proved to be a failure, in a final run. 
Specifically, as far as Chernivtsi region is concerned Soviet authorities does not 
invent and imply any kind of regional ethnic policy model, adapting towards 
local circumstances all-Union ideology and subsequent practice.      
 
4. Regional Ethnic Mosaic rediscovered and simplified 
 
At the beginning of the Perestroika period long-time silenced problems 
of ethnic relations in Chernivtsi Region reappeared on the public scene. Open 
debates on pros and cons of the Soviet history, as well as about crimes of the 
regime against citizens and larger social and ethnic groups, led erosion of the 
enrooted in consciousness Soviet myths about the wise national policy.
 Late period of Perestroika is marked with revival of national 
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communities and fellow institutes of the civil society. These transformations 
inclined to patterns which were remained unforgotten by the older generation, 
whose representatives were experienced of partaking in these organizations 
(Буковина, 1996: 298 – 299). Perceptions of the ‗ideal period‘ in national and 
cultural life of Bukovyna differed significantly among different ethnic 
communities. Leaders of the Romanian community were unhesitant about 
virtues of the interwar period, which in fact ensured the dominant status to this 
ethnic group (Герман К., 1991). However, the majority of other national 
groups, namely Ukrainians, Poles and Jews, were more eager to agree on the 
region‘s inclusion in the Austrian Empire as the ‗golden era‘ of Bukovyna, when 
the region provided numerous examples of high culture of ethnic tolerance. This 
time the myth of Austrian and European Bukovyna, which until recently has 
been cherished only in the émigré circles far abroad started receiving enthusiastic 
support of the local intellectuals and to a lesser extend of ordinary citizens. 
Ethnonational rival has been characterized by tolerant behavior 
dominating upon radical and extremist modes. Antipathy towards Soviet 
national policy united regional leaders and neutralized dangerous spread of 
xenophobia and intolerance, propagated by some radicals of different ethnic 
origin. Severe political and socioeconomic crisis which began in 1990, 
increasing street protests bred apprehensions about the future. Local 
manifestations of radical Ukrainian nationalism resonated with and went 
together with the first public symptoms of Romanian irredentism. Their 
representatives justly condemned the infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and 
at the same time questioned the afterwar peace arrangements, including 
territorial integrity of the UkSSR and USSR4 making claims on the ‗historical 
justice‘ of returning Northern Bukovyna to Romania. Contradicting not only 
with the historical circumstances, which are always debatable, but also the 
standards of international law, those demands ignored the evident 
ethnodemographic composition of the Chernivsti oblast region, where 
Romanians comprised about 10% of the region population, according to the 
1989 census (Національний склад…, 2003: 4).  
After the USSR breakdown in 1991, the young independent Ukrainian 
state faced with hardships with regard to official Kyiv‘s domestic and foreign 
policy as well as with the lack of experience and knowledge in the sphere of 
ethnonational policy and administrative management. This was exacerbating the 
ethnopolitical issues inherited from the previous periods of regional history. 
Since the time of Ukraine becoming independent the ethnic situation in the 
region continued to change. Substantial difficulties in the regional ethnic 
                                                          
4 Кіпіані В. Від русофілії до русофобії один … перепис. Декілька дуже 
політизованих поглядів на одну проблему // Українська правда 7.12. 2001. – 
http://www.pravda.com.ua [Last accessed 23.10.2008] 
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relations system functioning have begun in the early 1990s. Looking at collapse 
of the USSR as the great chance for Romanian foreign policy and considering 
Ukraine as a much weaker new state, Bucharest started making the official 
claims to the territory of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. The regional 
‗Cold War‘ period between official Bucharest and Kyiv poisoned not only 
bilateral relations of both neighbouring countries but also inevitably victimized 
relations of the Romanian and Ukrainian communities in Chernivtsi Region. 
One the eve of Independence some leaders of local Romanian Societies 
supported from Bucharest orchestrated campaign of boycotting of the National 
referendum on Independent, accompanying with other open manifestation of 
separatism (Bugajski J., 2000: 178). These and other events took place in the 
region some years more, seeding a alienation and confrontation in relations of 
ethnic groups of Chernivtsi region.      
Fortunately, the influence of the factor has been diminishing upon 
entering an interstate Treaty of 1997 which considerably decreased the 
contradictions between Bucharest and Kyiv, however not eliminated them 
completely until now. Another factor, contributing to the destabilization of the 
regional ethnic politics was further dynamics of emigration processes which 
resulted in disappearance of the Jewish population of the territory which, 
according to the 2001 census, amounted to just over 1,000 persons in the 
almost one million population of the territory. Simultaneously the region 
became a source of active labour migration which permitted emigration of the 
Ukrainian as well as Romanian and Moldovan population abroad. Vacated 
room of the traditional population is replacing with the afflux of the so-called 
new minorities formed by persons who left former Soviet republics of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia for economic and political reasons. They challenge 
the ethnocultural character of the territory and these problems have not been 
resolved yet. 
Finally, the EU enlargement makes opened for the border region of 
Chernivtsi oblast facing with both challenges and advantages of the new 
neighbourhood. Whine enlargement of 2004 – 2007 included Romania but left 
the citizens of Moldova and Ukraine outside borders of the EU; it has 
influenced the ethnic situation in the border region directly and indirectly. 
Positive aspect is that the regions is getting closer to standards and politics of 
the EU, covering delicate issues of interethnic relations. But the policy of 
grating to the citizens of Ukraine of the Romanian origin or whose ancestors 
lived in the territory of Romania prior to 1940 with the Romanian citizenship 
(and, automatically, of the EU) whatever way it is justified by official Bucharest 
represents not only an attempt to overcome the new economic cleavages and 
political divisions generated by the gradual and selective process of European 
Union‘s enlargement in the regions of CEE (Iordachi, 2002: 139). It results also 
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in new wave of distrust of Kyiv in Romania, and contradictory effect the 
relations of the main ethnic groups of the region. 
More important challenges originated from the slow pace of 
transformation processes in Ukraine, its lagging behind its western neighbours 
in the conducting policy of reforms required. Still, ethnonational relations in 
Chernivtsi Region remain mostly balanced and non-conflicted ones. In the 
same time, obvious is that the region of bygone Bukovyna has undergone 
radical changes of its ethnonational relations and experienced several models of 
ethnopolicy implementation, which resulted in challenging heritage, collective 
memory and individual practices sometimes not in compliance with norms and 
attitudes of true tolerance. The region has been changed from the historically 
polycultural one, distinctive because effective system of tolerant ethnic relations 
amidst ethnic groups without any kind of comprehensive domination into a 
region with one dominant ethnonational group, represented by the Ukrainian 
population and other significantly smaller national groups. On the other side of 
the new, more polarized system of ethnic relations, the Romanian population is 
present. This population undergoes the painful processes of identity change of 
the local Ukrainian citizens of the Moldovan ethnicity to the Romanian identity 
(Круглашов, 2008: 30 – 31). It means that the territory of Chernivtsi oblast 
(Ukrainian part of the former Bukovyna) with no doubt evolves towards loses 
of its earlier polycultural and multiethnic character gravitating, reshaping into a 
region with rather a bipolar model of ethnic relations. That results in braking 
down the logic of continuity, substituted with new risks and opportunities not 
inherent previously.     
 
5. Romania and Ukraine discords about minorities  
 
Final part of the article makes an attempt to propose wider political 
framework of the topic considered. The Ukraine and Romania‘s relations are 
significantly influenced by the issue of ethnic minorities. During the initial 
period of Kyiv and Bucharest‘s relations the two postcommunist countries had 
different if not contradictory approaches to their resolution. Due to the new 
country‘s being deep in an economic and political crisis, Kyiv could neither 
support appropriately the Ukrainians in Romania nor monitor efficiently their 
development in the post-Communist Romania. At the same time, then-time 
Romania political elite cherished the hopes to resolve issues of Romanians 
abroad by fight for reconsideration of those borders first of all in order to 
return ―historical Romanian lands‖. It is obvious that such a situation 
determined mutual distrust at least. 
Problems in this field of the bilateral relations began from the parties‘ 
discussion about the quantity of the relevant minorities in the both countries 
already. According to the 2001 population census 151 thousand Romanians 
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reside in the Ukraine, however the Romanian party believes that their number is 
twice as high. Romanians densely reside in Chernivtsi, Odesa, and 
Transcarpathia Regions. In its turn, 61 thousand Ukrainians reside in Romania 
according to the 2002 census, 250-300 thousand according to some other data. 
Ukrainians mostly reside in the northern part of the country, namely in 
Maramureş, Suceava, Timiş counties which are immediately adjacent to the 
Ukrainian border5. 
Such territorial contingence required the relevant simplified visa regime 
between the both countries. Thus, the Agreement on Cancellation of Visa 
Regime between the Government of Romania and the Government of the 
USSR signed in the city of Bucharest on 11 March 1991 was the first step in 
this direction. On 19 December 2003 the Agreement on the Terms of the 
Citizens Mutual Travel was signed between the Cabinet of Ministers of the 
Ukraine and the Government of Romania which provisions stipulated a 
simplified procedure of visa issue for the citizens of the both countries. This 
agreement entered into force on 16 July 2004. According to this agreement, the 
Ukrainian citizens could receive visas in the Embassy of Romania in Kyiv as 
well as in the Consulates General of Romania in Chernivtsi and Odesa. 
According to the terms of the Romanian legislation, the whole procedure of 
visa issue took 3-5 (transit, short-term) to 30 days (long-term). Depending on 
the visit to Romania purpose, the visa application should have been confirmed 
by various sets of documents which list could be found in the diplomatic 
missions of Romania. Certain categories of citizens also had to prove the 
possibility of their upkeep in Romania in the amount of 100 euros per day at 
the Ukrainian-Romanian border immediately (Чорній, 2004). 
The relevant visa regime for the Romanian citizens was also established 
by this agreement. According to it, Romanian citizens could receive visas at the 
Embassy of Ukraine in Bucharest or at the Consulate General in Suceava. In 
January 2007 upon Romania and Bulgaria‘s accession to the EU the Romanian 
and Ukrainian presidents stated that Bucharest would introduce free visas for 
the Ukrainians and Kyiv would abandon the visa regime for the Romanians as 
well as for all the EU members. The Ukraine and Romania hold active dialogue 
concerning further liberalisation of the visa regime which is heavily dependent 
on the success of negotiations between Kyiv and Brussels concerning gradual 
transition to visa-free regime for the Ukrainian citizens. This negotiation is 
framed with wider process of completing the Association Agreement between 
the EU and Ukraine which finalization has not got defined terms as yet.   
Besides ensuring the possibility of free contacts with relatives and 
representatives of own nation abroad, the both states attempted to regulate and 
                                                          
5 Ucrainenii din România/ Wikipedia. Enciclopedie libera. – Available from: 
http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki. Last accessed at 12.6.2010 
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resolve other issues of their minority policy, namely of the ethnic policy. 
Among the priorities determined which are absolutely understandable in their 
importance there is securing the rights of the Romanian minority in the Ukraine 
and of the Ukrainian minority in Romania (Петров, 2006: 94-95). During the 
whole period of the bilateral interaction the countries were able to reach 
significant progress in resolution of the issue. In particular, during 1991-2007 
such regulatory acts were entered into as the Agreement on Co-operation in the 
Field of Culture, Science, and Education between the governments of the 
Ukraine and Romania, the Agreement on Simplified Procedure of Crossing the 
Common State Border by the Citizens Residing in Near-Border Areas and 
Counties between the governments of the Ukraine and Romania6, Agreement 
on Co-operation in the Field of Science and Technologies between the 
governments of the Ukraine and Romania, Treaty on Friendship and Co-
operation Relations between the Ukraine and Romania (Договір про 
відносини…, 1997), Consular Convention between the Ukraine and 
Romania7 etc.  
Establishment of two Euroregions should be added to these interstate 
co-operation resources, namely Lower Danube and Upper Prut (Патраш, 
2002:324). Following the joint decision, an intergovernmental commission was 
established, the activity objective of which commission are harmonisation and 
monitoring of securing the rights of Ukrainians in Romania and of Romanians 
in the Ukraine. 
In spite of functioning of such a vast regulatory basis which 
corresponds to the current requirements of the international and European law 
as well as to implementation of interstate programmes, representatives of the 
Romanian community in Chernivtsi and Odesa Regions still assert systematic 
violations of their rights, laying a number of claims at the same time. For 
instance, at the beginning of the 2000s it was a persistent demand to open a 
multicultural university in Chernivtsi with the Romanian and a number of other 
languages taught following the example of the University at Cluj-Napoca. Upon 
consideration of the issue, the Ukrainian party postponed its resolution 
indefinitely while the Romanian suggestions mostly considered its dominant 
Romanian component of receiving higher education in Romanian more than its 
multicultural nature. This would create serious employment problems for the 
specialists having Romanian as the language of special higher education, in the 
Ukrainian experts‘ opinion. The issue of establishing Romanian theatre 
societies, creation of book collections in Romanian at the expense of the 
                                                          
6 Договір між Урядом України та Урядом Румунії про співробітництво в сфері 
науки та технологій // www.rada.gov.ua/ cgi-bin/ laws/main.cgi ?nreg=642_014 
(last accessed on 7.09.2006] 
7 Консульська конвенція між Україною і Румунією // www.rada.gov.ua/cgi-
bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=642_007 (last accessed on 7.09.2006] 
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Ukrainian state is also being discussed. Besides, the request to return to the 
Romanian community the building of the former Romanians‘ Palace of Culture 
in Chernivtsi should be mentioned as well (Буркут, 2005: 249). 
While the necessity of meeting and satisfying legitimate ethnic 
minorities claims is very important in order to gain more stable and democratic 
development of any democratic country which is not ethnically homogeneous, 
this process has faced with some obstacles and invoke certain reservations on 
the practise. Quite often, those requests were of the take-it-or-leave-it nature, 
which caused certain tension in the relations of the local ethnic communities. 
The policy of the neighbouring country was one of the reasons for tension of 
the ethnonational situation in the region. According to the governmental Basic 
Programme of Romania‘s Development in 1996-2000, the priority tasks of 
Bucharest‘s foreign policy were guarantee of the national security by the 
country‘s integration to the security or joint defence institutions and 
development of peaceful relations with the neighbouring countries. At the same 
time, significant attention was paid to strengthening relations with Romanians 
leaving abroad and to their support in order to preserve their ethnic, cultural, 
language, and religious identity, to reaching the national ideal by ensuring 
conditions for reunification of all the Romanians from the historical territories 
within the United Europe. However, persistent propaganda of great-power, 
revisionist ideas via the mass media not only in Romania itself but also beyond 
its borders, first of all in the Ukraine and Moldova, was one of the most often 
methods of integrating Romanians into the single cultural space (Буркут, 2005: 
249). That as well as the policy of illegal passportisation of ethnic Romanians, 
especially in the Ukraine, which provocative nature as well as dangerous 
consequences were on numerous occasions indicated by the Ukrainian party, 
however to no avail, complicated resolution of the existing problems, hampered 
search for the ways of harmonisation of the ethnonational policy of the both 
countries, did not enable to free them from quite a ―traditional‖ for them but 
forced position of hostages of the geopolitical and regional environment. 
Certain hope for betterment in the aspect of two countries relations arose from 
a fact that responding to EU criticism about its overexpansive external 
citizenship policies, Romania has recently narrowed down the circle of those 
eligible for Romanian external citizenship8.  
It is imperative to mention that upon ratification of the basic political 
Treaty with the Ukraine by the Romanian parliament in October 1997 efforts 
of the political circles which insistently favoured reconsideration of borders and 
restoration of Greater Romania, including as the most favourable method of re-
                                                          
8 Szabolcs Pogonyi, Mária M. Kovács, Zsolt Körtvélyesi. The Politics of External Kin-
State Citizenship in East Central Europe. October 2010. www.eui.eu/RSCAS/ 
Publications. [Last Accessed at 1.07.2011] 
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integration of the Romanian nation in the single national state, decreased 
significantly. This influenced very positively the atmosphere in which the issues 
of the minority policy were discussed in a more business-like and politically 
balanced manner later.  
Considering Romania's influence on the ethnonational situation in near-
border regions the role of radical national organisations should be paid attention 
to. The most influential ones among them are For Bessarabia and Bukovina 
international association, Bukovina society, League of Romanians from 
Everywhere, Union of Bukovina Romanians, League of Forcedly Dissolved 
Counties etc. There are also a number of small parties and organisations which 
activity is less known to the public at large but they don‘t have significant 
influence. In fact, certain politicians and political organisations did not reject the 
above efforts later on, stating great dissatisfaction with the very fact of 
recognising the present borders by the president and government of Romania. 
However, the attempts to exert pressure on the Ukraine were transferred 
by them to biased position as to the Ukrainian party's performance of certain 
provisions (first of all, of article 13 concerning provision of rights of national 
minorities) of the interstate document, demands to monitor closely concerning the 
above issues (Programa de bază.., 1996). The fact and practice of such mutual 
monitoring by Bucharest and Kyiv may be only greeted. At the same time, 
however, consolidated proposals of researchers of the both countries to make this 
monitoring scientific and all-purpose in its methodological and instrumental bases, 
to begin such actions in the territory of Upper Prut Euroregion as a pilot project 
were aired at the international research conference in June 2001, Ethnic Relations 
in the Territory of Upper Prut Euroregion (Ethnic relations.., 2001: 397 – 398). 
They were made known to all official power institutions of the parties concerned 
but remained unanswered since then. And this causes a rightful question 
concerning objectivity of the monitoring tools as well as the possibility of 
arbitrariness of certain interpretations of is certain parameters remained opened.  
These manifestations occur in the foreign policy also. The proof of the 
fact is that the official statement by the Romanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
dd. 27.01.2006 concerning provision of interests and rights of Romanian 
communities in the Ukraine, preservation of their ethnic, cultural, language, and 
religious identity is quite harsh. Referring to the position of the Consultative 
Committee on National Minorities of the Council of Europe concerning the 
Ukraine‘s report about fulfilment of the Framework Convention, the foreign-
affairs body noted problems in the field of education in Romanian. It was also 
stressed that Romania would follow how the Ukraine abides by the standards in 
the field of protection of national minorities, including with the assistance of 
international institutions which can influence the Ukraine on the issues of 
improvement of the national-minorities policy. Taking into consideration the 
fact that Romania has not exceeded the limits of dialogue with the Ukraine, the 
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issue of using a confronting position in relations with the Ukraine was not 
posed. Upon establishment of the independent state of the Ukraine, activity of 
the major cultural organisations of Romania obtained more obvious traits of 
Bukovina-directed trend. At the same time, nationalistic socio-political 
organisations become especially vivid before or during signing of important 
interstate treaties (Петров, 2006: 94-95).  
One of the principal points of the associations‘ programme documents 
is propaganda of the idea of Greater Romania restoration, namely assertion of 
the following provisions: 
1.  Romanian lands have never belonged to the Ukraine ex gratia; as a result 
of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact Romania forcedly evacuated the 
administrative bodies and army from its historical territories in 1940;  
2. The Snake Island was annexed in 1948; upon dissolution of the USSR the 
above territories were groundlessly left within the Ukrainian state; 
3. Acceleration of the process of Romania's integration to the Euro-
Atlantic institutions by losing part of own territory is intolerable 
etc. (Петров, 2006: 562). 
The analysis of the document and literature sources available proves 
that not only radical national parties (Greater Romania People‘s Party, Party of 
Romanians‘ National Unity etc.) but also centre-right parties (National Liberal 
Party, Democratic Party, Conservative Party) and right parties willingly turn to 
the issue of sovereignty over North Bukovina, South Bessarabia, and Hertsa 
territory, violation of the rights of the Romanian national minority in the 
Ukraine etc. It is quite obvious that radical national socio-political associations 
negatively influence the political stability in the region acting in such a manner. 
Moreover, as the report of president Traian Băsescu on 31 March 2008 
demonstrates, such pressure has bears its fruit and the higher authorities of the 
Romanian state sometimes responds to it, at least partially satisfying the 
expectations of the pressure organisers9. Pitiful is, that kind of revisionist 
statements have been made and in the latest time10. Following up with course, 
expressed by president Basescu declaration that ―the minimal policy of Romania 
is for the unification of the Romanian nation to take place within the EU‖, the 
phrase minimal policy allows to imply the existence of a maximal policy that goes 
way beyond unification with Moldova. Its reality is apparent in the decision to 
grant Romanian citizenship to all residents of the territories belonging to the 
pre-1940 Greater Romania and their descendants up to the third generation – 
                                                          
9 Traian Basescu: Nu voi ingenunchea in fata Rusiei. 
//http://civicmedia.ro/acm/index.php?option= 
com_content&task=view&id=684&Itemid=77 [Last accessed 01 April 2008] 
10 (―Do Medvedev and Yanukovych plan to sign a ‗secret protocol‘ on  
Transdniester?‖ http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/67633/pri
nt [Last accessed 14 April 2011]  
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including the denizens of Bukovina and southern Bessarabia11.  Of course, they 
kept away of mutual trust Ukrainian-Romanian relations, proving the 
preservation of certain threat towards territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Ukraine and thus contributing negatively towards the climate of interethnic 
relations in the border regions of two neighbouring countries. 
Summarizing the condition of ethnonational relations in the near-
border areas of the Ukraine and Romania at present, it is possible to make 
conclusions about certain evolution of this situation and of the respective 
policy of the neighboring countries. At the beginning of the new period in the 
Romanian history in the first half of the 1990s its ruling circles laid territory 
claims against the Ukraine. However, with assertion of the country‘s European 
and Euro-Atlantic course of the country its ruling elite began reconsideration of 
the foreign-policy priorities, in particular concerning the position on the 
Romanian minority in the territory of the Ukraine. Bucharest approved the 
decision to strengthen relations with the Romanians abroad and to support 
them in order to preserve their ethnic, cultural, language, and religious identity. 
Fulfilment of such a government programme made the Romanian influence on 
the ethnonational situation in the near-border regions of the Ukraine gradually, 
first of all in Chernivtsi, then in Odesa and Transcarpathia Regions. Among the 
methods of such influence it is possible to mention circulation of certain 
information in the regional and central mass media of Romania and the Ukraine 
(Петров, 2006: 206 – 211).  Active efforts of Romanian socio-political 
associations, constant visits of near-border Chernivtsi and Odesa Regions by 
the Romanian politicians etc. should also be mentioned. 
The Ukrainian party took up an absolutely reactive station, expressing 
its surprise concerning the fact that the Romanian party laid a number of claims 
to the ethnonational condition of the Romanians in the Ukraine. In the opinion 
of the official Kyiv, it had created better conditions for preservation and 
development of the national distinctiveness and culture than the conditions of 
Ukrainians in Romania. For a long time the discussion on this issue had 
accusatory and even hostile key notes and was underproductive, in my opinion. 
At the same time, in those really sensitive spheres in the territories of the both 
countries there are still problems of overcoming the heritage of the previous 
periods, establishing mutual understanding and bringing the minority policy, in 
particular ethnonational policy, not only to the formal and legal but also to the 
actual level in general by which the united Europe is characterised. It looks like 
mutual readiness for constructive co-operation in the humanitarian field asserts 
itself in the Ukraine as well as in Romania more and more; in this field 
assistance of the EU, and of the European Commission in particular, including 
                                                          
11 Srdja Trifkovic. Greater Romania Redux? The problem, the prospects. – Lord Byron 
Foundation for Balkan Studies.  http://www.balkanstudies.org/articles/greater-
romania-redux-problem-prospects. [Last accessed 24.03.2011] 
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within the New Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, provides new 
resource potential, creates framework of co-operation. This enables the both 
parties to reach mutual understanding and weighty consequences of co-
operation across common and, we hope, more friendly and open borders. 
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Abstract: The present paper brings into discussion the role and importance of identity 
and cultural variables in the construction of a European security culture. The main points are 
related to a conceptual and theoretical framework that can provide the methodology for 
investigating security perceptions and to understand the limits of preference formation. For 
exemplification, we use certain data from Eurobaromenter that suggest an increasing common 
perception that all the fears and expectations are commonly shared by the Europeans and in this 
terms we can talk about a security culture. 
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Since the beginning of humankind the security-insecurity relationship has 
influenced the development and behaviour both of individuals and groups and 
consequently, has deep implications in the present structure of the contemporary 
world. Within social interactions each entity, regardless of the form and content of 
assuming its identity in relation with others, starts with several basic interrogations that 
are not necessary formulated directly. Who/what am I? Who/what are the others? 
How we differ? What we have in common? Inevitably, a major question arises: is the 
other one a threat? These interrogations determine the social, political, economic and 
cultural relations of human interactions. In the moments or contexts where the 
answers were not convergent it leads to conflicts and the strongest one imposes its will 
over the weaker or less prepared ones (Dolghi, 2010: 75). This view can be easily 
extrapolated at international level, where the range, diversity and complexity of actors 
as well as the levels of interaction can determine a better understanding of security 
dynamics within the international and regional systems. 
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Within this paper we propose to evaluate to what extent the theoretical 
perspectives of international relations, security and European studies can be adapted in 
order to explain the perception of security within the European Union and implicitly 
contributes to preference formation, taking into consideration the variables of culture 
and identity. Our approach of security is related with the following definition: security 
represents the perception of an actor that there are no direct or indirect vulnerabilities, risks or threats 
that can affect its existence, status, interests, preferences or image. The keyword is perception. A 
wrong or incomplete perception of security can be translated into insecurity. 
Therefore, each entity is in a permanent search for accurate information and data 
about the surrounding environment and the potential threats and challenges for its 
own security. Perception of security leads to the development of particular defense 
mechanisms that are designated to respond to the sources of insecurity identified. Also, 
in case of major international actors such as nations, organizations or corporations we 
can clearly identify security policies and strategies.  
Within contemporary societies the security policies and strategies suffered 
essential transformations generated not only by the mutations in the international 
system but also by major mutations in the way that people perceive the issues related 
to security (Hlihor, 2009: 2). Within any analytical framework, a good understanding of 
security must start from the observation, research and analysis of its triple condition: 
objective reality; a reality constructed through discourse and as a policy and strategy 
(Hlihor, 2009: 2).  
The early literature in security studies employed a narrow definition of politics 
and the field tended to ignore the nonmilitary of international tensions and to focus 
solely on military balances (Walt, 1991: 215). Within the new approaches of security 
studies in the past two decades there is a clear transcendence from ―narrow‖ to ―wide‖ 
approaches or from military to non-military perspectives. This ongoing debate 
emphasizes the increasing importance of non-military security aspects for the regional 
and international system (Kirchner, Sperling, 2007: 2). Also, another major turn in 
security studies underlines the importance of constructivist explanations, especially if 
we consider identity as a variable for preference formation and as a spectrum of 
perceiving security and insecurity within and among groups. Before analyzing these 
aspects it is necessary to reevaluate the conceptual framework we use, having in mind 
the interdisciplinary nature of security studies. 
 
Conceptual and theoretical background 
 
When culture, identity and security are taken together into consideration for 
the understanding of social groups‘ behaviour there is a direct observation that culture 
and identity is influencing the perception of security. Still, there are different 
interpretations about what a group means, how it may be defined and analysed.  
Generally, a social group might be understood as a two or more people who 
interact with one another, share the same values and recognize themselves as a distinct 
social unit. Large groups that share the same culture, traditions, beliefs, customs and 
specific norms of interaction can be recognised as the most stable and enduring of 
social units and might become important variables within the understanding of 
regional and/or international social interaction. The self-awareness and the sense of 
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belonging are the key elements that define the group. This perception allows the 
members of the group to recognize each other and to differentiate from other groups. 
In this perspective, the group might represent the most secure environment for its 
members because of the well-known, stable and predictable behavior within the group 
and of the group. Therefore, from a sociological and anthropological perspective, 
social groups with strong cultural identities can be identified as one of the most driving 
forces of present security dynamics around the world. Indeed, the condition of a 
nation and the nation-state created around the national identity is the ultimate/highest 
level where culture, identity and security can be associated in a context where 
international politics and security are influenced by the group‘s identity, preferences 
and expectations. What is structured and institutionalized beyond the state 
(international organizations and alliances) is only a contextual and functional 
construction where the associated states share the less common denominator of their 
expressed, mutually recognized, negotiated and shared preferences. 
Social groups may be understood as the basic levels where security perceptions 
are formulated (either is family or community) due to the interaction with other 
groups. The historical experiences consolidate the group‘s identity and therefore there 
is an accumulation of practice and experience about the perception and distinction 
between security/insecurity. This may lead to a certain degree of predictability of their 
behavior. In this way, recent approaches of security made use of the knowledge of 
anthropology in order to enhance the better understanding of other groups (especially 
ethnic and religious groups). In this perspective, behaviorist and constructivist 
approaches implicit agree that if it is a true human essence, that one must be 
discovered and not postulated (Kolodziej, 2007: 281). That is the main reason for the 
security studies to consolidate the anthropological approach. 
The variables for group self-awareness and identity can be distinguished as 
race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, language, traditions, customs, territory, symbols, 
etc. The association of these elements and the historical experience of the group allow 
the members of the group to associate, define themselves and in relation with other 
groups by using the identity differentiation. 
 The preference formation within a group is bringing into attention two 
perspectives. A realist assumption will emphasize the need of survival, the assurance of 
welfare, the promotion of group‘s interests and inevitably the assurance of a secure 
environment (through specific security policy and correspondent military capabilities). 
The constructivist explanations suggest that the preferences of a group are determined by 
the ability of the group to respond and adapt its interests according to the dynamics 
within the surrounding environment and perception‘s effect on the security culture of 
the group will dictated the action of the group. We believe that an association between 
these theoretical approaches cannot be translated into a new theory, but for sure can 
help in the design of analytical models for particular case studies, such as EU. 
With no doubt, we can say that any group has, more or less aware, a certain 
degree of security culture having in mind the above arguments. It is the issue of how 
and to what extent this culture of security is influencing the behaviour of the group in 
the way of setting security policies and addressing proper resources and capabilities in 
order to fulfil the perceived degree of security of the group. Applying anthropological 
and sociological methodologies on these perceptions, the group‘s expectations, 
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preferences and behaviour can become are measurable, quantifiable and predictable, 
and represents a source that allow the researcher to evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of the group. And why not, the conclusions may be a resource for an 
outsider (other group) to manipulate the target group. For example, there is no secrecy 
that the US intelligence services made appeal to cultural anthropologists from 
universities in order to use their expertise in the fight against terrorism and the conduct 
of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and led to a debate over the ethics about to what extent 
the expertise on universal issues – such as cultures and identities – might be used for 
actor oriented interests. Therefore, identities can be manipulated both to engage 
different groups into conflict but also to engage different groups into cooperation. 
This perspective has a special relevance when a dominant group (actor) is trying to 
control other groups according to a self-interest strategy. It becomes more interesting 
when we take into consideration similar groups that are aware about their position, 
interests and capabilities and they found a convergence in their perception on mutual 
cooperation as a way to fulfil their interest and to acquire security. Within this 
approach we can better understand the beginning of the European integration as a 
security project. But from this proposition to the statement that EU represents also a 
security culture we should bring some other clarifications. 
According to Peter Burgess, security culture might be understood as a way that a 
certain idea of security orders and structures what we understand to be the dangers to 
our lives, the threats to our values and the most apparent defenses against these. In 
addition, security culture participates in shaping what is valuable for us. It regulates our 
moral, economic and political priorities. It sets the limits and possibilities for what 
declaring, for what is important and not important, valuable and not valuable, worth 
protecting or not protecting (Burgess, 2010: 3).  
Much earlier, in the context of Cold War, Jack Snyder proposes the 
collocation of ―strategic culture‖ that can be defined as the sum of total ideas, 
conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a 
national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitations and share 
with each other with regard to nuclear strategy (Snyder, 1997: 8; Biscop, 2007: 13). 
More than that, Snyder suggests that ―sub-culture‖ is a very useful notion and defines 
it as a subsection of the broader strategic community with reasonably distinct beliefs 
and attitudes on strategic issues, with a distinct and historically traceable analytical 
tradition, with characteristic institutional associations, and with more or less distinct 
patterns of socialization to the norms of the subculture. At the same time, members of 
subcultures are also members of the broader strategic culture (Snyder, 1977: 10). 
The security culture can be seen also as communication framework within the 
group that allows the sharing and development of particular attitudes, motivations and 
behavior needed for personal or group self-defense reactions toward internal or 
external aggressions, threats, risks and vulnerabilities. From an institutional approach 
the security culture promotes the issue of security among the political leadership and 
its relationship with security structures within the political structure, according to the 
rule of law, specific decision-making procedures and legitimacy constrains. 
From the above definitions we can deduce that there is a direct relationship 
between the interdependences and sharing patterns of the values of a group (either is 
homogeneous or heterogeneous, formal or informal, but perceived as such a group 
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from others from outside the group). The EU‘s security identity and its role in the 
international security environment can be framed as an analytical tool, having in mind 
both the overall process of European integrations, the formal construction of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the perceptions of different actors 
within the EU.  
Within the European integration theories, there are two relevant models that can 
offer a set of very useful variables in order to define and analyze the EU as an emerging 
―security culture‖ or a ―strategic culture‖ in the terms of the above definitions. 
Firstly, we have in mind the propositions of neo-functionalism that agrees the 
political differentiation among the members and explains that the integration process 
starts by the integration of those economic sectors that are very important for the 
military capabilities (coal and steel) but the specific industries can be isolated within the 
―low politics‖. Preferences and loyalties can easily adapt to supranational integration 
and the recognition of the new centers of power and also the pressures of the spill-over 
effects on other economic sectors will gradually strengthen the integration. Security 
and defense politics are too important for the nation states and therefore are subject to 
―high politics‖. The political integration of these sensitive sectors are seen by the neo-
functionalists as the ultimate steps toward a complete supranational integration and the 
assurance of a long-standing peace in Europe (Dolghi, 2003: 30). This perspective is 
the synthesis of the Ernst Haas initial approach on the first decade of the European 
construction. After the first challenges of the integration (produced by internal or 
external factors) it was clear that especially in times of crisis the dynamics of the 
integration process can be affected. In this perspective, other theorists are talking 
about the spill-around or spill-back effects (Dougherthy, Pfaltzgraff, 1990: 443). 
Therefore, only positive experience will deepen the integration to such extent that a 
common security policy would be functional and comparative with similar policies of 
other global powers. The ―integration gradualism‖ variable is affected when 
fundamental issues that belongs to the basic levels of EU (states) do not consider that 
their fundamental interests are well defended and promoted at the EU level and the 
governments choose to manage themselves the issues in question, especially if is about 
nation‘s security or welfare.  
Secondly, the transactionalist perspective makes a distinction between a 
European society and a European community, some delimitation was made by the 
German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, between Gemeinschaft and Geselleschaft. 
Gemeinschaft (community) denotes a situation when people are held together by 
common sentiments and common loyalties. Relationships with non-members of the 
group are considerably less significant than the sense of kinship that develops within 
the group. Geselleschaft (society) is a condition binding people less through trust and 
more through a mixture of self-interest, division a labor and contract (Rosamond, 
2001: 43-44) (such a social contract or formal agreements). From this perspective, Karl 
Deutsch was interested on the transactions between the Geselleschaft to the Gemeinschaft. 
As a result, the transactionalist approach of the European integration states that a 
sense of community among states would be a function of the level of communication 
between states and the route to European community is conditioned by the mutual 
transactions (Rosamond, 2001: 44). If the mutual transactions within a society will 
increase the confidence, basic identity values will be shared and in time, those who 
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were related within social, political or economic contracts will accept each other as 
members of the same community. The main variable consists in responsiveness defined as 
―the probability of getting an adequate response within an acceptable limit of time‖ 
(Rosamond, 2001: 44). According to this perspective the European security culture is 
defined by the perception of the Europeans, either as a regulated society, and either as 
a shared common sense of belonging within the community, depending on the context 
and the issue that implies security related reactions. 
Other theoretical models of integration, as well as theories of IR can provide 
more arguments that the EU cannot be understood within a single theoretical 
framework. Still, all the theoretical contributions can offer, through a selective 
analytical research design, different tools in order to have a comprehensive image upon 
the dynamics of the perception of security as well as the patterns of behavior and 
responses to European common security challenges. 
 
The European Union security culture 
 
 The issue of identity of European Union is an unsolved case due to the lack of 
acceptance of a complete common set of cultural variables perceived and used by all 
different actors within the community, having in mind the conservative nature of 
identity. But the sharing process of common values among the Europeans represents a 
positive example of the transcendence from intergovernmental relations toward the 
benefits of supranational integration. The identity similarities of the Europeans as well 
as differentiations that occur during the integration process raise questions on the 
continuity, change and adaptation of the identities. Therefore, when we associate 
European identity with security, we assume that a European security culture is 
changing as the objective conditions change. 
 Until 1945 the historical experiences of Europe that implied security issues 
underline the negative impact of war and violence on the Old Continent and the 
engagements of the Europeans in regional wars, one against another. Each European 
state has its own security culture and the recognition of other similar security cultures 
led to the creation of alliances. The extensive literature on this issue emphasizes the 
security interdependences among the Europeans, based on the preferences and 
interests derived from cultural identities. 
European integration process is a security project. This statement is probably the 
most comprehensive definition of the integration, if we have in mind the conditions that 
led to the emergence of EEC/EU and the present situation. The main goal – to ensure 
peace in Europe – was achieved and in these terms we can talk about a success of the 
integration. Even in terms of intergovernmentalism we can distinguish that the member 
states are engaged in a mutual interdependency in such manner that if any member state 
will act against other member states, will actually act against its own interests. Still, the issue 
of common identity remains unresolved. 
Any political construction should find its own democratic legitimacy as the main 
resource for its functioning. Within the European Union the basic challenge is to find 
those elements that can allow the Europeans to express a sense of belonging and to 
identify within a common set of values. If we refer to European identity we must apply the 
notion of collective identity which assumes that people tend to defines themselves on the 
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basis of a set of ideas to which they can relate positively and which they share with others. 
These ideas help to define the community they belong to. The formation of such a 
community will not only lead to a definition of the Self, but also of the Other, and thus to 
inclusion and exclusion of people (Schot, 2004: 2). 
Often, a European identity is considered in opposition with national identity, the 
first one trying to surpass the last one. We believe that there is no need for an extensive 
explanation in this matter because since the beginning the issue has a wrong formulation. 
Still, many scholars mention the approach used by Benedict Anderson on nationalism as an 
imagined community (Anderson, 1991). What is often described as the ‗search‘ for 
Europe‘s identity is not so much a search as a construction or an ‗imagination‘ of Europe 
(Diez, 2004: 320). Within an ―imagined community,‖ members have a shared conception 
of an embodied political space, a horizontal political communion where people have a 
sense of belonging despite never knowing each other personally (McNamara, 2011: 2). The 
European Union has been and is being constructed not only through economic and 
political dynamics but culturally, through social dynamics that are creating an ―imagined 
political community‖ of Europe and Europeans (McNamara, 2011: 5). 
This perspective can open the path for investigating the European security 
culture as an imagined one, and constructed through the political speech. The main 
arguments that indicate this approach are related to the formal engagements of the 
European leaders in different official documents. The developments within the treaties 
as well as in the policies of the EU are to a great extent related to the previous 
successes of integration. The security dimensions of EU were developed as an 
opportunity within the new international context after the collapse of bi-polar world. 
Europe had the chance to redefine itself as a global actor not only economically, but 
also from political and security viewpoints, having in mind the geopolitical settings at 
the end of the 20th Century.  
Beyond the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU had 
the chance to contribute to the securization of the continent through the engagements 
with Central and Eastern European stated in the perspective of integration. This 
strategy was well politically designed but it cannot isolate the crucial role of NATO‘s 
same view and the trans-Atlantic interests in Europe. 
In this perspective, the European security culture is strongly tightened to the 
US strategic culture and the relationship between EU and NATO is underlying the 
importance of both organizations on security approaches in Europe. EU is seen as a 
―soft power‖ and NATO as a ―hard power‖. The ―soft power‖ of EU is mainly related 
on the EU‘s capacity to express common views on the security challenges around the 
world and to engage a large part of its members in the support of the ―international 
community‖ toward the enforcement of the specific measures of conflict management.  
The main components that support the idea of a European security culture 
lays on the provisions set in the Title V of the Maastricht Treaty (1992): safeguard the 
common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen 
the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and 
strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of 
the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms. The mechanisms agreed were common positions and joint actions presented 
in general terms, without referring about clear instruments, mechanisms, resources or 
capabilities needed to enforce such a policy. The practice of the application of CFSP 
demonstrated the lack of the EU member states to assume measures in order to 
develop the Union as a ―hard power‖. This led to an effective failure of the initial 
presented and expected project. Still, humanitarian missions or police missions across 
the world are saving the image of Europe as a security actor. But if we consider the 
potential of EU and the achievements in the present, it is clear that beyond the 
political disagreements there are also the procedural implications that take too long 
within the EU decision making process. 
Beyond this politically constructed culture of security, the imagination of 
Europe rest also on the role of the public opinion and the perceptions among the 
citizens. The main instrument of measurement is the Eurobarometer (the Standard 
one, issued twice a year, as well as special ones, issued occasionally, according to the 
importance and relevance of certain subjects).  
In the process of development of a CFSP/CSDP, the public opinion 
represents a strategic variable of primary importance. The perception of security, of 
threats and risks can offer an image about the fears and expectations of the citizens. 
According to a Eurobarometer survey in 2000, the three things Europeans fear the 
most are non-military risks, specifically organized crime (77 %), an accident at a 
nuclear plant (75 %), and terrorism (74 %). At the other end of the scale, the three 
risks cited least often (but nonetheless by more than four respondents out of ten) are a 
nuclear conflict in Europe (44 %), a conventional war in Europe (45 %), and a world 
war (45 %) (Manigart, 2001: 4-5). 
 According to the same survey, more than four Europeans in ten (43 %) are of 
the opinion that decisions concerning European defense policy should be taken by the 
European Union. Only 17 % thought it should be NATO and 24 % the national 
governments (Manigart, 2001: 11). This fact underlines the expectations of the 
Europeans toward the integration‘s results. Preferences and expectations are addressed 
to the community level which overpasses the national level. Also, the security identity 
is highlight in relationship regarding the perception of NATO (17%) which led us to 
the conclusion that the European security is not necessarily perceived within a trans-
Atlantic framework.  
 With regard of the 1999 Helsinki European Council decision on the 
establishment of a rapid reaction force of 50-60,000 men by 2003, capable of being 
deployed within 60 days and for a period of at least a year, able to cover the whole 
spectrum of the so-called ―Petersberg missions‖ (humanitarian and evacuation 
missions, peacekeeping, and restoring peace) over seven Europeans out of 10 (73 %) 
believe that the establishment of a rapid reaction force of 60,000 men is a very good 
(23 %) or rather good (50 %) thing (Manigart, 2001: 14). Therefore, the perception on 
a distinct European army is positive, a fact that suggest also the common perception of 
the security within the EU. Some opinions were in favor of a permanent European 
Army that would replace the national armies (19%) while 37% agreed a permanent 
European Army in addition to national armies. Over seven Europeans out of 10 (71 
%) are of the opinion that a European army should be used to defend the EU's 
territory, including their own country (Manigart, 2001: 18). 
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Another special Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2006 approaches the role 
of the EU in justice, freedom and security policy area. Respondents believe first and 
foremost that there should be more decision-making at EU level regarding the fight 
against organized crime and trafficking, as well as against terrorism (both 86%). This 
indicates that interviewees are concerned about their security and hence believe that 
EU-wide action could provide them with a higher level of security (European 
Commission, 2007: 3). 
A great majority wants more decision-making at European level regarding the 
promotion and protection of fundamental rights (73%), the control of external borders 
(72%), as well as asylum and migration policy (65%). In security terms, the fight against 
organized crime and terrorism should be EU priorities. Respondents cited as the two 
top priorities for the Union those areas in which they also wished to see an increase in 
supranational decision-making. The areas in question are the fight against organized 
crime (56%) and terrorism (55%) (European Commission, 2007: 14). 
 A significant majority of EU25 citizens consider that in all the areas covered 
by the survey (the fight against organized crime and trafficking, the fight against 
terrorism, the fight against drugs abuse, the exchange of police and judicial information 
between Member States, the promotion and protection of fundamental rights, the 
control of external borders, as well as asylum and migration policy) more decision-
making should take place at EU level. This indicates that EU citizens perceive the EU‘s 
presence in the fields of justice and home affairs as legitimate and they thus want to 
see the EU‘s role evolving in this area. 
This survey was applied also in 2008 in all 27 member states and concludes 
that EU citizens are most supportive of more EU influence in areas of justice and 
home affairs where they may expect a higher level of security from EU action than 
from national action (European Commission, 2008: 32). 
These data suggest the gradually, a common perception among Europeans is 
already formed and seems that the state is no longer perceived as the main or single 
provider of security for the citizens. An European security community is obvious 
because all the fears and expectations are commonly shared by the Europeans.  
 
Conclusion 
  
Our conclusion rests on the arguments that the theoretical approaches of 
European security should be reevaluated according to interdisciplinary perspectives 
that must criticize the optimism of the models of integration and accept that the 
security implications can also have a negative impact on the perceptions and sharing of 
security. Still, further investigations can better define the variables needed in order to 
clarify the European identity and culture. Such efforts will definitely underline the 
security oriented expectations as well as the weaknesses and strengths of the present 
status of EU. It is obvious that the Europe‘s security culture not only builds upon a set 
of standard values, but generates values and modifies them. An important role is 
played by the political elites in the establishment of the EU security agenda, but the 
possibility of failure of their engagements and the lack of clear results can led to a 
rejection of EU‘s role as a security actor. Also, Europe‘s cultural diversity may point 
out certain limits in the consolidation of the security culture. 
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Abstract. Western and Eastern European national identities developed and differed 
due to the disparate historical contexts (both recent and distant) that they were exposed to. 
Often, it is seen that Western civic nations are more ethnic than is usually recognized, and 
Eastern nations are more civic and less ethnic than their Western counterpart. Conceptually, 
some scholars have even attacked the logic of the civic/ethnic distinction. Most say that states 
and nations contain both ethnic and civic components in their national history. Smith (1991), 
for example, writes that “every nation building has civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees 
and in different forms… Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it 
is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized. France and Germany, and all of 
Western and Eastern Europe, have faced the international discourse on nationalism-including 
both ethnic and civil claims of popular political participation”. 
 
 
 
 
 
RE-INTERPRETING THE CIVIC-ETHNIC  
DIVIDE ON THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
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Despite the rigid civic-West/ethnic-East characterization of nationhood 
and nationalisms in Western Europe/North America and Central/Eastern 
Europe, a lot needs to be empirically evaluated in order to justify the civic-
ethnic dichotomy on determining national identity. 
The distinction between civic and ethnic nations is one of the most 
widely employed conceptual building blocks in the study of ethnic relations and 
nationalism. A closely related distinction is that between Western and Eastern 
nations, according to which Western Europe and the United States developed 
primarily as civic nations and Germany and Eastern Europe primarily as ethnic 
nations. Unfortunately, few analyses challenge these dichotomies theoretically 
or empirically. Survey data from 15 countries reveals that the standard view 
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greatly exaggerates the current differences in national identity between the West 
and East. Western civic nations are more ethnic than is usually recognized, and 
Eastern ethnic nations are more civic. Furthermore, on some measurements, 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe are more civic and less ethnic than 
Western countries. 
 
The civic/ethnic and west/east conceptual dichotomies 
 
For much of the 20th century, scholars of nations and nationalism have 
commonly argued that (a) there are many different traits that can provide the 
foundation for national unity and identity, and (b) nations differ in the mix of 
the traits that form the basis of their unity and identity. A simple classificatory 
scheme has arisen that distinguishes nations as civic, political, or territorial on 
one hand, versus ethnic or cultural on the other. Parallel with this conceptual 
distinction is a geographic one in which civic components of nationhood are 
dominant in Western Europe and the United States, whereas ethnic 
components are dominant in Central and Eastern Europe.  
In his 1907 work ―Cosmopolitanism and the National State‖, German 
historian Friedrich Meincke (1970) became one of the first scholars to assert a 
fundamental difference between political and cultural nations. However, it was 
Czech scholar Hans Kohn who developed and popularized the dichotomous 
framework in his 1944 book ―The Idea of Nationalism‖ and in his later works 
(Kohn, 1944, 1946, 1949). Kohn argued that in the West, particularly England, 
France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States, nationalism was 
primarily political. They were based on the political ideas of revolutionaries who 
fought for the ‗sovereignty of the people‘. There, ideas of the nation and 
nationalism arose within preexisting state structures that encompassed 
populations with a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity, or developed 
simultaneously with those structures. Inspired by Enlightenment ideas of liberty 
and equality, Western nationalism struggled against dynastic rule and equated 
citizenship with membership in the nation. The membership of the community 
was thus defined primarily in political terms; civic virtues were more important 
for the new republic than ethnicity, common culture, or even common 
language. Members of the nation were unified by their equal political status and 
their will as individuals to be part of the nation. Thus in the Western model, the 
state temporally precedes (or coincides with) the development of the nation. 
According to Hutchinson, civic nationalists tend to create a ―polis‖ of educated 
citizens united not by a common historical descent but by current common 
laws and interests. To mobilize a political constituency, they may adopt specific 
ethno-historical identities within a given territorial homeland and may become 
ethnicized or re-traditionalized. But their objectives are, however, essentially 
modernist: they are concerned with a functional entity, the state.  However, in 
Re-interpreting the Civic-Ethnic Divide on the European Identity 
 
333 
the more socially and politically drawn areas of Central and Eastern Europe and 
Asia, nationalism arose in polities (Roudometof, 2002: 16) that are very poorly 
coincided with cultural or ethnic boundaries (e.g., Russian, Austro-Hungarian, 
and Ottoman empires). In these regions, Kohn (1944) argues, nationalism 
struggled ―to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic 
demands‖. The ethno-cultural nationalism was a movement interested in the 
uniqueness of the nation, its ethno linguistic specificity and its historical roots. 
Thus, in the Eastern model the nation precedes, and seeks to create, the state. 
Nations in the East consolidated around the common heritage of the people 
rather than on the notion of citizenship.  
Many contemporary scholars employ the analytical distinction between 
civic/political and ethnic/cultural nations originated by Meincke and Kohn, 
although they differ in their precise characterization of these concepts. Alter 
(1994) contrasts cultural nations, based on common heritage, language, distinct 
area of settlement, religion, customs, and history, with political nations, 
composed of politically aware citizens equal before the law. In Smith‘s (1991) 
Western or civic model, national unity arises from a historic territory, laws and 
institutions, the legal-political equality of members that expresses itself in a set 
of rights and duties, and a common civic culture and ideology. Smith‘s non-
western ethnic nation is based on descent or presumed descent, and thus is 
seen by its members as a ―fictive super-family.‖ In addition, vernacular culture, 
especially language and customs, is a key element of the ethnic nation. 
Ignatieff (1993) characterizes the civic nation as a ―community of equal, 
rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political 
practices and values‖. In contrast to this notion, which originated in Great 
Britain, France, and the United States, Ignatieff explains that for the German 
Romantics of the 19th century, national unity sprung not from ―the cold 
contrivance of shared rights but [from] the people‘s preexisting ethnic 
characteristics: their language, religion, customs, and traditions‖. 
In addition, he asserts that ethnic nationalism tells people to ―only trust 
those of your own blood‖. 
Regardless of the differences in definition, the assertion that Western 
Europe and the United States developed primarily as civic nations and Eastern 
Europe as ethnic states is common. But it is not just a historical argument; 
many scholars see the continuation of historical patterns in current national 
identities in the West and East. Particularly with the collapse of communism in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the conceptualization has become a 
standard point of departure for many studies of ethnic relations and nationalism 
in the post-communist ―New Europe.‖ According to Brubaker (1996), the 20 
or so new post-communist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union were ―conceived and justified, in the nationalist movements preceding 
their independent statehood as well as after statehood was achieved, as the state 
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of and for a particular ethno-national group‖. Brubaker thinks that civic 
notions of nationhood have little chance of prevailing in the new states of 
Eurasia, given the ―pervasively institutionalized understandings of nationality as 
fundamentally ethno-cultured rather than political, as sharply distinct from 
citizenship, and as grounding claims to the ownership of polities‖. 
Another expert on Eastern Europe, George Schopflin (1996), also 
stresses ―the strongly ethnic character of nationhood and state legitimation‖ in 
the region. Following Kohn, Schopflin argues that the West citizenship arose 
before or concomitant with nationalism, whereas in Eastern Europe, elites 
mobilized nations around ethnicity in an attempt to carve states from the empires 
that subjugated them. But in addition to this relatively distant historical source of 
current ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe, Schopflin underscores the role that 
communist rule played.  Schopflin links communism and ethnic nationalism in 
the region in several ways. First, because communism was associated with foreign 
oppression, opposition to communist rule became a national project. ―In these 
circumstances,‖ Schopflin (1996) writes, ―it was very difficult for any civic 
dimension of nationhood to emerge‖. Second, communism destroyed civil 
society in the region, turning communities there into ―civic deserts‖ characterized 
by mistrust and atomization. Consequently, ethno-national identities were the 
only ones in the public sphere that could become salient. 
Finally, communism pushed out other competing ideas and values, 
making it ―much easier for an undiluted nationalism referring solely to ethnicity 
to survive more or less intact‖ (Schopflin, 1995). As a result, many national 
disputes from the pre-communist era were swept under the carpet, only to 
reemerge with the end of communism. A final argument for the alleged 
predominance of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe concerns the newness 
of the states and regimes that are constructing from scratch democratic political 
and legal institutions. Echoing Gellner (1992), Snyder (1993) contends that 
ethnic nationalism fills an institutional vacuum. Thus ―ethnic nationalism is the 
default option: It predominates when institutions collapse, when existing 
institutions are not fulfilling people‘s basic needs, and when satisfactory 
alternative structures are not readily available‖. In the context of wholesale 
institutional transformation in Eastern Europe, with its attendant economic 
malaise, widespread corruption, and high crime rates, one would expect 
ethnically based conceptions of nationhood to be very strong in the region.  
 
Critique of the civic/ethnic and west/east dichotomies 
 
Conceptually, some scholars have attacked the logic of the civic/ethnic 
distinction. Yack challenges the notion that a civic identity must be freely and 
rationally chosen, whereas an ethnic identity is inherited and emotionally based. 
Civic identities can be inherited too, Yack (1999) argues. Furthermore, both 
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Nielsen and Kymlicka note that it is a mistake to equate ethnic with cultural 
nationalism, because they differ according to their openness to outsiders.  
On the empirical side, most states and nations contain both ethnic and 
civic components. Smith (1991), for example, writes that ―every nationalism 
contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. 
Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the 
ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized‖. Calhoun (1997) writes 
that although France and Germany are commonly seen as civic and ethnic 
nations, respectively, ―France and Germany, and all of Western and Eastern 
Europe, have been shaped by the international discourse of nationalism-
including both ethnic claims and civil projects of popular political 
participation‖. Kuzio argues that nationalism in the West and East has never 
been as divergent as scholars have argued. Indeed, the transformations that the 
East  (Central-Eastern Europe and the three Baltic states) has undergone and 
its integration into NATO and the EU affirm that the convergence of Western 
and Eastern nationalism is based on a far narrower gulf than has been 
traditionally articulated by scholars. The ability of the East to fulfill the 
requirements of the Membership Action Plan for NATO membership and the 
Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership over two decades would also affirm 
that nationalism in the East was never fundamentally different to that found in 
the West. Thus nationalism in the West and East is not radically different. 
Western nationalism emerged as a civic variant after two centuries of gestation, 
conflict and evolution. Eastern nationalism evolved into a civic variant during 
the course of the twentieth century, first under communism and secondly 
during the post-communist transition to a democratic-market economy. The 
democratization of Eastern European post-communist states took place 
relatively quickly in the decade following the collapse of communism and the 
Soviet empire. North American and Western European nation-states matured 
into civic states only in the second half of the twentieth century. The West and 
East therefore evolved into civic states during the same century separated by 
only a few decades. 
The major difference between the West and East was that the arrival of 
a consolidated democracy in the West came after a journey that had begun in 
the late eighteenth century whereas the East transformed into civic states 
during a "big bang" following the collapse of communism. The East undertook 
its transition to a civic state at a faster pace than the West because of external 
pressure from the OSCE, globalization and the desire of the East to "return to 
Europe" through membership of the Council of Europe, NATO and the EU. 
The main problem with the civic/ethnic dichotomy is that it collapses too 
much in the ethnic category. As Kymlicka, Nielsen, and Nieguth correctly point 
out, ethnic and cultural components of identity should be distinguished. 
Superior to the current dichotomy is a scheme with three variants of what can 
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be called the content of national identity-factors that people in a nation believe 
are, or should be, (Parekh, 2000: 263.) the most important in uniting and 
distinguishing them from others and that become the basis for defining 
membership in the nation. The main variants for the content of national 
identity are civic, cultural, and ethnic. The existing literature on civic nations 
produces five main components of the civic identity, according to which 
national unity and membership in the nation derive from attachment to a 
common territory, citizenship, belief in the same political principles or ideology, 
respect for political institutions and enjoyment of equal political rights, and will 
to be a part of the nation. Cultural identity is based on nonpolitical cultural 
traits. The key components here are language, religion, and traditions. Finally, 
for ethnic national identity, shared ancestry and race are the dominant criteria 
by which membership in the nation is defined.  Beside refining the civic/ethnic 
framework, evaluating the civic-West/ethnic-East argument requires measuring 
and distinguishing types of nationhood. 
Two main options exist: examining the policies of states or the attitudes 
of members of the nation. Scholars often interpret a state‘s policies as supportive 
of the construction of ethnic versus civic nations, and to some extent belief in the 
civic-West/ethnic-East pattern is based on analysis of these policies.  
Primarily, a problem is seen when scholars conflate civic nationhood 
with cultural assimilation policies. For example, Brubaker (1992) argues that a 
policy of cultural assimilation ―presupposes a political conception of 
membership‖ in the nation. In a similar vein, Kymlicka (1999) describes how 
ethnic conflicts often result from the attempt by civic nationalists to forcibly 
incorporate and assimilate ethnic minorities into the dominant culture. The 
weakness of such claims is that no theoretical or logical link is made between 
civic nationalism and cultural assimilation of minorities. These scholars simply 
label France and other Western nations ―civic‖, recognize that they engaged in 
assimilation, and therefore conclude that civic nationhood demands or lead to 
assimilation. But a truly civic conception of the nation entails no need for 
cultural unity. People in a purely civic nation are united by such traits as 
common citizenship, respect for law and state institutions, belief in a set of 
political principles, and so forth. Similarity in language, religion, and other 
cultural markers is not necessary for the development of such traits. 
Theoretically, the idea of civic nationhood leads to one of two policies in the 
cultural sphere. The first option is a laissez-faire approach in which the state is 
as culturally neutral as possible and promotes individual, not collective rights. A 
second option is a policy of multiculturalism. Here the state recognizes 
collective rights and promotes the maintenance or development of minority 
cultures in an attempt to buy ethnic minority attachment to the state and its 
institutions and territory. Such an attempt is predicated on the (civic) 
assumption that will and consent are central aspects of national identity. In 
Re-interpreting the Civic-Ethnic Divide on the European Identity 
 
337 
contrast, nation building under a cultural concept of nationhood requires that 
the state pursue cultural assimilation of minorities, because cultural unity is the 
foundation for a strong nation-state in this formulation. Here the state will 
actively promote the majority ethnic group‘s history and culture in education 
and language policies as the core around which to build a national culture. 
Finally, an ethnic conception of the nation also logically leads to the promotion 
of the dominant ethnic group‘s culture, because the state is conceived here as 
the state of and for a particular group, and a group‘s common ethnic identity is 
expressed through its culture. But assimilation is not encouraged because even 
if other ethnic groups acquire the majority group‘s culture, they can never be 
part of the latter group, and the ethnic nation would not be strengthened or 
expanded in any meaningful way by such assimilation. 
For instance, in the realm of immigration, a civic nation should be 
relatively open to foreigners of any background. The civic nation has a large 
capacity to absorb new members because it makes few demands on the 
nonpolitical beliefs and characteristics of its population. For those immigrants 
who live in the country long enough, or their offspring, it is relatively easy to 
meet the criteria for national membership. A purely cultural nation should also 
admit immigrants, but only conditionally. Adopting a new culture is not easy and 
is sometimes resisted. Therefore immigration should proceed only as long as 
immigrants and their offspring are willing and able to assimilate into the 
dominant culture. Furthermore, a cultural nation will have a bias in accepting 
immigrants from culturally similar countries, precisely because this will facilitate 
their assimilation into the national culture. Finally, ethnic nationhood calls for a 
highly restrictive immigration policy. Immigrants cannot be true members of the 
nation because they lack the ―proper‖ ancestry. Therefore any ethnic nation that 
permits large numbers of immigrants decreases the numerical dominance of the 
majority ethnic group and risks fueling discord and disharmony. The exception 
here is immigrants who are of the same ethnic stock as the dominant group in 
the ethnic nation. The state should permit easy entry to such immigrants.  
 
Assessing the Civic-West/ Ethnic-East Stereotype 
 
Current conceptions of the civic-West/ethnic-East stereotype lead to 
the prediction that civic national identities should be strongest in the West and 
weakest in Eastern Europe, with Central Europe; the two halves of Germany 
falling somewhere in between. Similarly, ethnic and cultural national identities 
should be strongest in Eastern Europe and weakest in the West, with Central 
Europe again in the middle. Germany should, on the whole, be less 
ethnically/culturally nationalistic and more civic than Eastern Europe not only 
because its Western part did not experience communism, which is alleged to 
increase ethnic nationalism but also due to the greater political institutional 
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strength and economic prosperity of Germany (its Eastern part included) than 
Eastern Europe. In addition, Western and Eastern European National identities 
should not just differ, but differ greatly given the disparate historical contexts 
(both recent and distant) that are alleged to influence national development. 
Finally, arguments on the influence of communism on national identity led to 
the prediction that Western Germany should be substantially more civic and 
less ethnic/cultural than Eastern Germany.  
When respondents from several European countries were asked to rank 
the following traits for national membership, 
-to have been born in (respondent‘s country) 
-to have citizenship in (respondent‘s country) 
-to have lived in (respondent‘s country) for most of one‘s life 
-to be able to speak (the dominant language in respondent‘s country) 
-to be a (believer in the dominant religion/denomination of 
respondent‘s country) 
-to respect political institutions and laws of (respondent‘s country) 
-to feel (British, Spanish, Hungarian etc) 
 of the seven items, those on religion and language evaluate support for 
cultural national identity, whereas the rest tap into support for civic identity. 
Interestingly, the respondents‘ supporting a cultural or ethnic notion of national 
identity, considered citizenship to be an ―essential component of national 
identity‖. To counteract the high levels of corruption and political disorder, the 
East Europeans felt that the presence of law and political institutions were 
important for the stability and effectiveness of national membership.  
Another factor Territory was seen to be basis for national unity in both 
the civic and the ethnic state. In his description of civic nation building in the 
Third World, Smith (1991) explains that ‗living together‘ and being ‗rooted‘ in a 
particular terrain and soil become the criteria for citizenship and the bases of 
political community‘. Presumably those who have lived a long time in a state 
are more rooted in the territory and thus are more ―authentic‖ members than 
new residents. Similarly, someone born in a territory may be seen as more 
attached to it than an immigrant. Using territory as a criterion of national 
membership is inclusive in that anybody who is born or lives a long time in a 
country meets this criterion-regardless of ethnicity, religion, class, race, and so 
forth. It is exclusive, however, in that some (those who are newly resident) or 
all immigrants are not considered fully part of the national community. The 
dominant ethnic groups in the Eastern European states were generally more 
supportive of a territorial notion of national identity than in the Western states, 
although both regions were supportive in an absolute sense. In fact, only one 
country, Canada, has majority of respondents who do not stress the importance 
of one of the two types of territoriality. In addition, both regions of Europe 
place slightly more importance on length of residence than on birth, the latter 
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of course being the harder standard to meet as it is more exclusive. Another 
important factor determining nationhood is language. It is a country‘s dominant 
language that shapes its‘ nationality and it is a factor that is constitutive of one‘s 
national identity, be it civic or ethnic. Because language has historically played 
such an important role in German identity, this is particularly good evidence of 
the depth of culturally grounded national identities in the West.  
There are strong ongoing debates and instances about the role of 
culture as a basis for national identity in the West. Smith‘s (1986) argument that 
nations have ancient ―ethnic cores‖ around which nations are constructed 
clearly demands a great role for the cultural components of national identity. A 
nation founded on the culture, symbols, myths, and memories of a dominant 
ethnic group is likely to retain its 
Cultural based identity for a very long time. Smith writes that the 
earliest cases of the Western model (England, France, Spain, Holland, Sweden, 
Russia) were ―ethnic states‖ that were gradually transformed into nations 
through economic unification, territorial centralization, provision of equal legal 
rights, and growth of mass public education. It is interesting that Kohn‘s 
argument begins with assumptions similar to Smith‘s. Recall that in Kohn‘s 
Western model, the state encompassed a relatively culturally homogeneous 
population, which the state then forged into a nation. The strong match 
between ethnography and political boundaries in Kohn‘s Western model is akin 
to Smith‘s ethnic core of modern nations. But Kohn did not follow his initial 
assumption to its logical conclusion-that relative cultural homogeneity in a state 
would be a strong force binding the people together into a nation. By the logic 
of (Sugar, 1995: 369) both Kohn‘s and Smith‘s approaches, since the Western 
nation‘s inception, culture has been prominent in uniting and distinguishing a 
large proportion of the population of a state. Gellner (1983) and other 
―modernists‖ disagreed with Smith‘s contention about the ethnic origins of 
nations. Gellner instead explained the rise of nations through a functional 
argument whereby states intentionally forged national unity to meet the 
demands of industrial development. The state, primarily through public 
education, pursued cultural homogenization of its population to create a mobile 
workforce able to communicate with strangers. Another modernist, Benedict 
Anderson, focuses not on industrialization but the rise of print capitalism in 
forging national consciousness. In Anderson‘s (1983) view, mass 
communication stimulated the diffusion of a common culture based on a 
vernacular language. In each theory, culture plays a key role in uniting a large 
proportion of a state‘s population, just as in Smith‘s version. The difference is 
primarily one of timing. If Smith‘s argument meant that cultural and civic 
elements should coexist from the start of Western states‘ national development, 
Gellner‘s and Anderson‘s arguments implied that the cultural elements should 
be weak at the start of national development and then gain strength as 
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industrialization and mass communications developed over the 19th and 20th 
centuries.  
A second explanation for the current strength of the cultural 
components of national identity in the West enters on the inability of civic 
components of national identity to provide sufficient unity in a state. To the 
extent that a civic identity is rationalistic and voluntary, it is unlikely to cultivate 
an attachment to the nation with the great emotional resonance that ethnic and 
cultural elements provide. But the main reason that civic components of 
nationhood fall short in their ability to evoke emotional attachment to the 
nation is because most civic components of nationhood are external to the 
individual, whereas ethnic and cultural components are internal. Territory, 
political institutions and rights, and citizenship exist outside the individual, 
whereas ancestry, race, religion, language, and traditions are a direct part of a 
person‘s physical and psychological makeup. As a result, the intensity of 
attachment to communities founded predominantly on the latter will likely 
exceed those founded predominantly on the former. The dismal record of 
civic-territorial nation building in many postcolonial multiethnic states in the 
Third World is a testament to the weakness of civic nationalism unsupported by 
elements of ethnic or cultural nationhood at the statewide level. Using 
functionalist logic similar to Gellner‘s, a case can be made that Western states 
for most of the past two centuries have promoted a homogeneous linguistic 
and cultural identity precisely due to the ability of culture to provide cohesion 
for populations in an environment in which civic elements of nationhood alone 
were not up to the task.  
Finally, all social identities, including national ones, require that the 
social unit be differentiated from other units. Purely or predominantly civic-
based national identities are unable to provide a sufficiently high degree of 
differentiation in the modem world. The very universalistic nature of civic 
nationalism that many applaud is a reason for its inability to provide the sole or 
even overwhelming basis for identification in the West. Not only is it relatively 
easy for states to make citizenship an important criterion for national 
membership, but it is exceedingly common. Similarly, all states have territory, 
and making attachment to that territory a criterion for national membership is 
also easy and ubiquitous. There is more room for national variation in political 
rights and institutions, and belief in political principles. However, the spread of 
democratic government and ideology in the past two centuries has greatly 
reduced this variation. In this context, culture, which varies substantially from 
place to place, grows in importance for its ability to distinguish one Western 
nation from another and from non-western nations.  
However, there is a lot of support for civic components of national 
identity among majority ethnic groups in Eastern Europe. Those observers who 
expect nationalism in Eastern Europe to be mostly of the ethnic variety neglect 
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to take into consideration the enormous influence and prestige of the civic 
model of the nation. Whereas Western nations have long been based on 
culture, the rhetoric emanating from these countries stressing the centrality of 
territory, citizenship, and political institutions to nationhood has been strong. 
This civic conception of the nation diffused to the non-West, in large part due 
to wealth and power of the West. Western ideas at the end of the 18th century 
about the state being the representative and embodiment of the nation had 
become commonplace, precisely because of the military and economic success 
of what is presented as the civic-nation- state model. In this context, ethno-
national groups look to statehood, or at least a degree of political autonomy 
within an existing state, as a means of defending and promoting their culture, 
identity, and interests. Thus as soon as Hungarians, Czechs, Latvians, and so 
forth became majority and titular groups in independent states, free of Soviet 
domination, attachment to and membership in the nation quickly became 
measured against a person‘s relation to the state-its territory, institutions, laws, 
and the like.  
A second, and related, reason for the strength of civic-based national 
identities in Eastern Europe was the historical experience of many of these 
countries with statehood. Of the many Eastern European titular groups, five 
have enjoyed independent statehood prior to indirect or direct Soviet 
domination: Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, and Latvians. The other 
two groups, Slovenians and Slovaks, attained nominal sovereignty in territorial-
administrative units of the Yugoslavian and Czechoslovakian federations, 
respectively. Consequently, contemporary national identity did not develop 
solely in the context of struggle against political borders in Eastern Europe, the 
dimension stressed by Kohn and others. It also developed around political 
borders that overlapped to a large degree with ethnic and cultural borders.  
Furthermore, Eastern European ethnic groups‘ national mythologies 
celebrate their earlier periods of statehood as golden ages. With the collapse of 
communism, the independent state and its institutions and territory are looked 
to as vehicles of national renaissance. Another aspect of Kohn‘s original 
argument provides an insight into the strength of civic national identity in 
Eastern Europe. Kohn wrote that nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe 
developed in reaction to the French invasions during the Napoleonic Wars and 
the Universalist ideology of Western liberalism. To counter this, Central and 
Eastern Europe looked to their own unique historical and cultural heritage as 
the basis of national identity. 
This same argument can be adapted to post-Communist Eastern 
Europe to explain the strength of civic components of national identity there. 
Modern national identities in this region developed in opposition to Soviet 
domination and its universalist communist ideology. As Soviet and communist 
rule weakened and finally collapsed, people in the region again rallied around 
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their heritage, but now they interpreted this heritage as fundamentally 
democratic-in contrast to that of their imperial overlord. In constructing 
national identity and asserting national autonomy, most titular ethnic groups in 
the region consequently underscored democratic principles flouted during the 
communist period-the rule of law, political equality, and minority rights. 
Therefore, whereas the reactive nature of Eastern European nationalism in the 
19th century may have led to a stress on ethnic and cultural components of 
national identity; in the late 20th century it led to a stress on civic components.  
 
Concluding Perspective 
 
The traditional civic-West/ ethnic-East argument is a gross 
simplification of concepts of nationhood in the West, Central Europe, and 
Eastern Europe. Although some survey measures support the argument, an 
equal number do not. Furthermore, even when the argument is true, it is only 
weakly true, as the differences in national identity between the regions are small 
and there is a substantial degree of diversity within each region. Overall, the 
data suggests that the imperial and communist rule have not pushed Eastern 
European nationhood in a strongly cultural direction while greatly weakening 
civic-ness. And whereas most of the West has a long tradition of democracy 
and relatively strong and stable political institutions, cultural conceptions of 
nationhood are alive and well, and support for multiculturalism is relatively 
weak. Data also revealed an interesting tension between policies adopted by 
many of the states in the sample and the identities of their inhabitants. For 
example, although Canada has adopted an official policy of multiculturalism; 
Anglophones, they are more supportive of minority assimilation than are 
majority groups throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Likewise, although 
Germany until 1999 had a citizenship law more ethnically discriminatory than 
that of any Western democracy, ethnic Germans themselves place greater 
importance on developing minority cultures and less importance on language 
and traditions as criteria of national membership than do most other Western 
majority groups. This suggests that one must be careful not to overestimate the 
ability of states to shape mass national identities. 
On the patterns of national identity, it is seen that support for 
ethnic/cultural versus civic notions of national identity may systematically differ 
for masses and elites, with elite views more consistent with the civic-West/ 
ethnic-East pattern. Further study of a wide range of political elites in each state 
will tell if there is a mass-elite gap in identification on this score. A lot is left to 
speculation as because the limitations of the survey data did not permit a 
rigorous assessment of the differences in support for the strictly ethnic content 
of national identity in the cases under study, or analysis of the role of political 
principles in generating civic identities. Additional multi-country surveys should 
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be conducted to ascertain whether ancestry, race, and political ideology play a 
different role in national identity in the West, Central Europe, and Eastern 
Europe. Still, much work remains to be done in explaining the differences in 
national identity found amongst individual countries in the region.  Factors 
such as the settlement patterns of a nation‘s main ethnic groups, the cultural 
distance between these groups, the existence and size of diaspora groups 
outside the country, and levels of immigration all may affect the strength of 
ethnic/cultural/civic conceptions of national identity.   
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Abstract. In the context of European integration of the countries of 
Eastern Europe problem of ethnic relations remains the key issue. At the present stage of its 
development Ukraine is actively trying to bring its legislation in conformity with 
major European norms in the field of interethnic relations. However, there are several problems 
nowadays in Ukraine that could potentially affect this branch of relations. Ethnic stereotypes 
play an important role in the formation of inter-ethnic tolerance. In order to study the impact 
of ethnic stereotypes on the sphere of interethnic tolerance the author cites the results of 
monitoring of periodicals of the Chernivtsi region of Ukraine. In spite of the fact that there 
is some information that involves inter-ethnic intolerance, the author concludes that in 
general the press materials of the Chernivtsi region are dominated by neutral character or there 
are those which have no significant influence on the formation of ethnic stereotypes and 
which over some time might serve as a basis of conflict on the interethnic grounds. 
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to be afraid of (Малюська, 2010: 381). All this once again foregrounds the 
problem of security, especially in the field of international relations. 
Interethnic relations are considered to be among the most difficult 
problems in international relations. The issue of forecasting and preventing the 
emergence of ethnically motivated conflicts and territorial disputes certainly 
remains valid for any multi-ethnic state. After all, only according to official 
UNO data there are about 1 billion people in the world who belong to national 
minorities, which is 15 – 20 % of the population of the planet. Ukraine isn‘t an 
exception in this context with the territory bordering on 2 international 
organizations - the EU and the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). 
It is commonly known that one of the peculiarities of the population of 
Ukraine is its multinationality. According to the Ukrainian population census, 
over 130 nationalities and ethnic groups lived on the territory of Ukraine in 
2001, whose share in total population of Ukraine was 22% (11 million people). 
According to the same information, 85% of these 11 million citizens of Ukraine 
have identified themselves as representatives of bordering on Ukraine 
countries, in particular members of the CIS: Russian Federation (8.3 million 
citizens of Ukraine), Belarus (276 thousand) and Moldova (259 thousand) and 
also representatives of countries which are members of the EU: Hungary (157 
thousand), Romania (151 thousand), Poland (144 thousand) and the Slovak 
Republic (6 thousand). Thus, about 9.3 million people belonging to national 
minorities coming from bordering on Ukraine countries lived in Ukraine in 
2001, representing 19% of the population of our country. 
Today, Eastern European countries undergo some pressure from 
European institutions concerning the minority rights‘ protection. There exists 
an assertion that the requirement to adopt Western standards or models of 
multiculturalism and minority rights has been raised in reference to the 
countries of postcommunist Europe. Rating and ranking of the countries-
candidates depends on how well these countries follow the relevant standards 
(Johnson, 2004: 118-119).  
World-wide experience indicates that the opportune and optimal 
improvement of national minorities‘ protection may be the key to strengthening 
democracy, tolerance, and positive social organization development. 
Of course, Ukraine, having claimed about its European integration 
strivings, joined the supporting initiatives and legislation on regulation of inter-
ethnic relations. As the examples of such actions may serve the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the adoption of certain legislative 
acts regulating issues of ethnic relations: The Declaration of Rights of 
Nationalities of Ukraine, Law on National Minorities in Ukraine and the 
Concept of the Language Policy. It should be noted that among many 
researchers there is a debate around the issue who should be considered 
representatives of national minorities, because in European legislation there 
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remains no clear interpretation of this concept, which causes some confusion, 
even after the ratification of European documents. In this regard, existence of 
such a law in Ukraine is very important. Apart from that, regional support 
programs of national cultural societies should be adopted. 
It must be admitted that for the past 20 years, lawmakers have done 
little to ensure minority rights, although the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 
submitted dozens of bills, but none of them was adopted. The declared aim of 
the changes was to reform and update the existing legal framework to protect 
the rights of minorities, for harmonization of legislation of Ukraine to 
European norms of international law on minority rights. The need for 
reforming interethnic legislation in the status of minority rights and ensuring 
these rights is a long period of time overdue, but a comprehensive approach to 
the problem of minority rights is absent. Bills lobby for the interests of 
particular minorities, offer the Crimean Tatars the status of native people etc., 
and this violates the well-known principle of equal meeting of the interests of 
all national minorities. However, during these years the legal status of national 
minorities in Ukraine has been formed, including ratifications of the mentioned 
above international treaties governing the protection of minority rights. 
The main task of Ukrainian ethnic policy is to ensure ethnic harmony 
and prevent conflicts involving an ethnic factor. For this purpose, at the state 
level regulation of ethnic relations and processes is carried out, which is based 
on legal principles laid down in ethnic legislation (Майборода, 1995: 78). The 
internal legal framework of national ethnic policy is based on the following 
international legal documents: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Language 
Minorities, The Hague Recommendations on National Minorities in Education, 
the Recommendations regarding the Language Rights of National Minorities, 
adopted in Oslo; the Declaration on Principles of Tolerance, the Framework 
Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. Most of these documents 
Ukraine also ratified and they became a part of Ukrainian legislation, on the 
basis of which the state ethnic policy was formed and which also regulates 
mechanisms and principles of its implementation. Declared Ukrainian policy 
towards European integration directs the state to reach the Copenhagen criteria 
for the EU membership, including also the political ones, which provide 
stability of institutions, democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights, respect 
and protection of national minorities. These are the goals which can be fulfilled 
only in democratic model of ethnic policy. 
The main documents which guarantee the realization of national 
minorities‘ rights also include: a system of national legislation acts, international 
legal documents in this field, signed and ratified by Ukraine; acts of state 
authorities representing executive power, targeted sectoral programs of spiritual 
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revival of national minorities; government organs of general and special 
competence, responsible for implementing state ethnonational policy; public 
organizations on national minorities (Трощинський, 2001: 379). 
Important role in these processes played a Law of Ukraine ―On national 
minorities‖. It guaranteed the protection of national minorities, namely their 
rights at the first stage of building the state. The appearance of this legal act was 
also determined by the need for further development of international 
cooperation in promoting and protecting the interests of minorities by 
concluding multilateral treaties in this field (Зварич, 2009: 47). The preamble of 
the Law specified that the Verkhovna Rada adopts the Law in order to 
guarantee the national minorities the right of free development, following the 
international obligations as to respect of national minorities. Despite the fact 
that current wording of the Law of Ukraine ―On national minorities‖ now is 
mainly criticized, in the early years of forming a model of ethnic policy of 
Ukraine, it was very progressive for the post-totalitarian country. The document 
defended representatives of minorities from any form of discrimination based 
on nationality, which took place in the USSR. 
Existing problems in interethnic policy and hindering of their solution 
don‘t give any grounds to assert unequivocally that political and legal basis of 
ethnic policy, formed during the years of independence, has created a solid 
foundation for the harmonious combination of interests of all ethnic 
communities of the Ukrainian society and has ensured equal opportunities for 
ethnic development and active participation in the state processes. Problems of 
Rusyns, Crimean Tatars indicate inadequate legal framework of ethnic policy. 
First of all, the policy fails to respond adequately to the challenges that some 
minorities and ethnic groups make with the support of other countries. The 
priority objectives of Ukraine as a lawful, democratic country in ethno-politics 
are support of the atmosphere of tolerance, elimination of the factors of ethnic 
tension and conflicts. The situation in which the main mechanism of inter-
ethnic tensions‘ and conflicts‘ deprivation eventually becomes the Criminal 
Code of Ukraine is abnormal. 
Rational position on implementation of national ethnic policy should 
acknowledge the improvement of existing mechanisms. This structure of 
mechanisms becomes effective only if there is a coordinated interaction of its 
elements. For such mechanisms as local authorities and public administration is 
important to clearly delineate their powers in decision-making and 
responsibility for implementing these decisions. It is desirable to achieve 
analogous regulatory powers of the organs of management of ethno-national 
sphere on the international and local levels, thus in the decision-making, 
budgeting etc. According to Ukrainian researcher O. Maiboroda, Ukraine 
should introduce some monitoring mechanisms judging from ethno-political 
sphere and control of realization of the national ethnic policy. Mechanisms of 
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this kind can be both public and communal (Майборода, 2008: 24). Therefore, 
the need for specialized governmental organs that would carry out a systematic 
and coherent national ethnic policy is relevant both on the national level and 
for the state administration and local authorities. 
Despite the adoption of several legislative acts on regulation of 
international relations, in our opinion, today there are two main problems 
affecting the ethnic policy of Ukraine: 
• Providing legislative regulations as to the rights of national minorities‘ 
representatives to be elected into the legislative and local authorities; 
• The right to freely use a mother tongue (mother tongue of minorities). 
Speaking of the impossibility of securing legislative laws concerning the 
representation of minorities in state legislatures, in the first place, this problem 
is connected with the peculiarities of Ukrainian election legislation. The current 
format of the electoral system is focused upon the party vote, rather than 
personal, in other words, voting in parliamentary or local governmental 
elections people choose among Ukrainian general (regional) party list. Typically 
the party lists are formulated in such a way that the first 10, 20, 50 candidates 
who have an opportunity to get into elective bodies (it depends on the rating of 
each party), are chosen without any regard to the ethnic factor (it should be 
mentioned that sometimes regional office isn‘t taken into account either). Areas 
of compact residence of national minorities are sometimes not interested in 
supporting the parties that do not support their interests, which results in 
ignoring the elections, and as a result (at least theoretically) non-recognition of 
government elected without their participation. This, in turn, can cause internal 
conflicts, which can theoretically give rise to separatist movements. 
Naturally, such situation is undesirable and dangerous for any country. 
Taking into consideration this danger, representatives of the most influential 
parties in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine working with regions 
of compact residence of national minorities resort to such solutions of the 
problem: they appoint a candidate from their own list, who undertakes the 
obligation to represent the region. Moreover, advisers and assistants among 
minority are appointed; they can pass to the lists of elections to the local 
governmental bodies. Of course, such measures are insufficient to fully satisfy 
the interests of ethnic communities, because the mechanisms of the advisers‘ 
appointment remain outside the general discussion that almost minimizes the 
effectiveness of their activities for the community. Therefore the most effective 
solution is to enable people to choose not a party, but specific people on the 
basis of majority. It should be mentioned that in local elections in October 
2010, this possibility has been provided (though legislative introduction of such 
a standard pursued other goals). 
Speaking about the problem of a free use of mother tongue, it is worth 
mentioning that this problem has several aspects. First of all, a household level 
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– that is native speakers‘ opportunity and desire to communicate with each 
other using their native language. Usually no problems occur there. When 
monitoring the press of the Chernivtsi region concerning formation of ethnic 
stereotypes (monitoring was being conducted from September 2010 to April 
2011) there weren‘t any articles, which would refer to the impossibility of free 
choice of language in everyday communication. Some publications in Romanian 
were talking exclusively about Romanian being not prestigious among 
Romanian youth community, which is connected primarily with the timidity to 
communicate in their native language. But such problem is solely internal, it is 
within the community and the country cannot solve it. However, there is a 
number of positive articles (not only in publications in Romanian, but also in 
Ukrainian) concerning the celebration of a holiday ―Our Romanian (language)‖ 
organized by the national and cultural community named after M. Eminescu in 
September 2010. Apart from describing it, there information has been provided 
about the Chernivtsi region students from schools where everything is taught in 
Romanian who took part in competitions of the knowledge of Romanian in 
Bucharest and took first places. The second aspect of the problem is a political 
one. At this level, this problem can be supported by both the representatives of 
national minorities and also by neighboring countries which act on behalf of 
their communities in Ukraine. 
Among the language problems which are often discussed is the inability 
to study using native tongue at school, although the government tries to provide 
such an opportunity. In the Chernivtsi region there exist several schools teaching 
in Romanian, in the Zakarpatskyi region – some schools with Hungarian as a 
language of instruction, in eastern Ukraine there is a large number of schools 
with Russian as a language of teaching. However, representatives of national 
minorities react immediately if there are any restrictions related to the closure of 
schools of such kind. But on the other hand, there are a lot of schools closing 
with Ukrainian as a language of teaching. Just as an example there is the fact that 
this year in Ukraine there are more primers (ABCs) printed in Russian than in 
Ukrainian (a few thousands more) (Генпрокуратура підтвердила факт..., 2011). 
In other words, problems exist, but they are systematic and aren‘t always based 
on ethnic issues, so taking into consideration everything said above, the problem 
of inter-ethnic tolerance acquires a significant importance as a prerequisite for 
ensuring stability in the region. 
Ethno-social and ethno-cultural situation in the Chernivtsi region is 
undergoing some changes. In the interethnic region complex and potentially 
tense ethno-contact situation has been historically formed, characterized by a 
conglomerate of ethnic and cultural communities, on the basis of which 
multicultural environment of the region with growing differences between "us" 
and "them" is being formed. The situation is complicated by considerable social 
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differentiation and marginalization of large groups from the community of the 
majority. 
Even though in the Chernivtsi region there exist no evident ethnic and 
religious conflicts, relations between ethnic groups are characterized by the 
relative instability in the ethno-social and socio-psychological terms. Socio-
psychological background of ethnic relations is characterized by tendency to 
ethnic phobias‘ growth. It should be noted that an alarmed worldview is 
inherent not only to adults, but also to the majority of youth. Many teenagers 
and young people show persistent pessimism, irrationalism, distrust of others, 
especially if their behavior, speech, appearance and so on somehow differ from 
common perceptions. A rather friendly attitude to specific representatives of 
ethnic groups in the mass mood can change to the negative if they are 
perceived as a cohesive, potentially dangerous unit. 
The speed at which the process of overestimation of historical knowledge 
and events of the past of our country and nation in the difficult conditions of 
economic reforming, political instability and ideological chaos is being carried 
out, makes a profound impact on public consciousness, significantly complicating 
the process of socialization, encouraging the search of the most persistent social 
patterns, symbols, standards, samples for self-identification. 
Problems of investigation of causes and mechanisms of emergence and 
formation of ethnic stereotypes have been recently paid much attention to, due 
to both the aggravation of interethnic relations and the growth of national 
consciousness. Functioning in a particular environment, ethnic stereotypes unite 
the human community in a socio-cultural system. However, in the moments of 
crisis, consolidating "our own", stereotypes to the same extent can differentiate 
the "alien". Under such conditions the people grow concentration on the 
problems of their own ethnic group due to impairment of the rights and freedom 
of other ethnicities. 
Highlighting the positive and constructive role of maintaining of ethnic 
stereotypes in the preservation of traditional features and characteristics of 
national culture, we cannot but mention the negative effect of those stereotypes 
that are upheld by scornful attitude towards other ethnic groups and usually 
lead to nationalism in the worst of its forms. 
Modern mass media makes a multi-aspect impact on the growing 
manifestations and general level of tolerance in society and, simultaneously, acts 
as a powerful factor influencing the mass consciousness and is a source of all 
sorts of stereotypes, particularly ethnic. In the terms of presence of the 
objective conditions (illegal migration, terrorism etc.) for the emergence of 
intolerance as to the representatives of "other" ethno-cultural and ethno-
confessional groups in the environment, the mass media plays a crucial role in 
disseminating and increasing xenophobia (while the potential of the mass media 
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could be successfully used in the reverse process aimed at overcoming negative 
ethnic and cultural stereotypes and upbringing of tolerance). 
The problems of interethnic relations, particularly those associated with 
acute conflict situations, criminal incidents, splashes of mass emotion, engaging 
both the journalists concerned about the resonance of their publications, as well 
as the owners and editors who are interested primarily in the increase in 
circulation of their publications‘ editions. Therefore, description of ethnically 
colored processes and events in mass media, targeted at a mass audience, often 
becomes tendentious. To improve reliability and availability of relevant 
information, journalists tend to rely on the opinion of the reader, representing 
the majority of ethno-cultural population of the region, and as a result 
deliberately or involuntary mimic the stereotypes of mass consciousness. 
Recent mass media, owing to the increased capacity of the virtual 
impact on the consciousness and sub-consciousness of mass audience, are 
ready to offer value-significant and behavioral models to the society. These 
models can consolidate the society, rather effectively remove social tension and 
psychological stress, but they also can undermine the positive consolidation and 
psychological stability of society via creating and promoting in the stereotypical 
images to the masses, splitting the emotions of spectators, listeners, readers to 
the level of ordinary ones. 
As a factor of formation of cultural and political identity the mass media 
in modern conditions can affect not only public opinion but also the content of 
interethnic relations, creating social settings and behavioral models of 
communication, language, communication, strategy, interaction (cooperation, 
competition, alienation) etc. This means that mass media can be a direct 
participant in the interethnic conflicts. Moreover, journalists can aggravate 
ethnic tension and bring it to the level of resistance by incompetent, unethical 
image of ethnic differences in lifestyle and manner of behavior, by creating 
negative ethnic individual and group images. Purely destructive forms of mass 
media in ethnic relations can include false propaganda of ethnic myths, 
stereotypes formation, one-sided and tendentious image conflicts on ethnic, 
racial or religious grounds, the use of words and expressions with incriminating, 
sarcastic and derogatory overtones. 
Monitoring of a press, organized by our department, was dedicated to 
all the problems mentioned above. But we would like to focus on it in detail. 
Selection of information units (articles, notices, chronicles) which are a 
subject to the analysis was carried out on the basis their containing such 
elements: 
o ethnonyms (Ukrainians, Russians, Romanians, Moldavians etc.); 
o toponyms, that were used in interethnic context (―Fascism is 
Prospering in Moldova‖); 
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o meta-enthic (the Slavs, Russian world etc.) or sub-ethnic (Guzuls, 
Gagauzes etc.) markers; 
o pointing out the race (Asians, Negroes); 
o pointing out the confession in the ethnic context (Orthodox, 
representatives of Russian patriarchate etc.); 
o idiomatic expressions, that have ethnic loading (hard-working 
people, fascist aggressors etc.); 
o contemptuous and offensive expressions that are used to indicate 
enthic, ethno-cultural and ethno-confessional and racial groups 
(―niggers‖, ―hohly‖, ―churky‖ etc.). 
During the logical analysis of the totality of selected materials positive 
materials on interethnic relations in the Chernivtsi region (it should be noted 
that these materials are quite common) as well as neutral materials which have 
no potential for the creation or destruction of ethnic stereotypes were put aside. 
During the secondary processing of information the brightest and most typical 
publications that demonstrate the most common reasons for the formation of 
ethnic stereotypes were selected. 
As a result of the analysis conducted on the basis of printed and 
electronic mass media, there were distinguished groups of mass media 
according to their impact on the mass consciousness of citizens: 
 Regional mass media in Ukrainian (Час, Молодий Буковинець, 
Доба, Свобода слова, Буковина, Версії, Погляд, Ва-Банк, 
Буковинське віче); 
 Rigional mass media in Romanian (Libertatea Cuvântului, Zorile 
Bucovinei, Gazeta de Gerţa, Meleag natal, Cuvântul adevărului, 
Timp nou); 
 Electronic (Internet) regional mass media (БукІнфо – 
bukinfo.com.ua, BukNews – buknews.cv.ua, Головне.net – 
golovne.net). 
While systematizing the chosen material we used the following criteria 
inherent to the researches of such kind: 
1) appeals to violence (genocide, murders, repressions, deportations) 
or the menaces of violence as to any ethnic group, its fragments or 
separate representatives; 
2) appeals to ethnic cleansings on the certain territories, calls to the 
filtration of migration flows on the basis of ethnic indication; 
3) appeals to discriminations (breaking the people‘s rights and liberty, 
limitation of civil rights, deprivation of social status and 
professional positions) of any ethnic group, its fragments or 
separate representatives, altogether with demanding the perks and 
privileges according to the ethnic indication; 
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4) assertions as to the historical and contemporary crimes of any 
ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives; 
5) assertions as to the existence of some conspiracy, dangerous 
intentions of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate 
representatives; 
6) propaganda of historical and contemporary cases of violence and 
discriminations concerning any ethnic group, its fragments or 
separate representatives; 
7) conscious forgery of information, which questions the historic and 
contemporary facts of violence and discrimination concerning any 
ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives; 
8) pointing out the connection of any ethnic group, its fragments or 
separate representatives with any criminal structures, separatist 
organizations, illegitimate and illegal political actors; 
9) accusation of negative impact of any ethnic group, its fragments or 
separate representatives on the economic, social and political 
processes; 
10) assertion as to the existence of persistent negative ―features of the 
national character‖ or ―ethnical peculiarities of mentality‖ 
concerning any ethnic group; 
11) mentioning the name of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate 
representatives in a disdainful context; 
12) assertion as to the physical, intellectual, spiritual and moral 
inferiority of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate 
representatives in a disdainful context. 
For the lack of time, I cannot analyze all of the items from the 
mentioned posts (I‘ll try to describe them in detail while preparing this report 
for publishing). But it should be noted that the monitoring of the mentioned 
mass media during the period of eight months gave us no examples of 
publications that contained open calls to violence, ethnic cleansings, 
discrimination on ethnic grounds. In the examined materials there were no 
publications, which would promote historical or contemporary examples of 
violence against a particular ethnic group or its representatives. It is also worth 
noting that there were no allegations/statements of physical, intellectual, 
spiritual or moral inferiority of any ethnic group in the examined materials. 
Thus, we can state that the analyzed empirical material contains no intentions 
relating to items 1 - 3, 6 and 12 of our classification. 
The problem of calls for discrimination against an ethnic group is not 
raised in the mass media of the region in the period under investigation is 
undoubtedly a good tendency. But if you analyze this feature in the mass media 
materials, it should be noticed that it presupposes not only appeals to 
discrimination, but also demanding of benefits and privileges based on ethnic 
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origin. Taken into consideration this point, to publications that fall into the 
range of interests of the 3rd post, with certain restrictions, we may include 
publications as to the evaluating by individual representatives of Romanian 
community of the condition of the Romanian language in the Chernivtsi region. 
Orientation on the formation of stereotype of "restricting the rights of 
national minorities" can be determined as a common feature for these 
publications, but at the same time the authors of these articles don‘t use enough 
arguments, and sometimes disclaim them, which in its turn leads to the lack of 
interest in these problems from public. However, following fears and phobias 
which exist in the mass consciousness, journalists involuntary or deliberately 
make a situation ethnical, motivating the problems, which exist in the socio-
economic and political spheres, by ethno-confessional factors. Common in 
Ukrainian local and regional mass media publications are devoted in particular 
to the adoption of the bill "On the languages in Ukraine", the result of which 
will be introduction of Russian as a second official language and its formal use 
in preschool, professional-technical and higher education, in courts, social and 
economic activities, in the field of science etc. As a result, in the minds of 
readers of popular mass media editions phobic attitudes towards the members 
of other ethnic groups are fixed. 
Conducted monitoring noted a significant share of ethno-conflict 
publications in periodicals, which are considered popular by a common region 
reader. As showed by the research, ethno-conflict publications with the greatest 
frequency occur in the criminal chronicles‘ sections, as well as in analytical 
articles that are concerned with the issues of balanced ethnic relations in the 
Chernivtsi region. Production of xenophobia (ethnophobia) often occurs 
through selective designation by journalists of ethnicity of criminal plots‘ heroes 
(pointing out the ethnicity of mainly "non-Ukrainian" criminals, such as 
Moldovans, Romanians and Gypsies) which, in our opinion, objectively 
contributes to the formation in mass consciousness of representatives of ethnic 
majority of the negative ethnic and cultural stereotypes of others. These 
materials in most cases fall under the indication of "historical and current 
crimes of a particular ethnic group, its fragments or individual representatives." 
Attention should be drawn to the fact that some publications, in the 
absence of open verbalized calls for discrimination on ethnic grounds, 
contained certain elements of conspiracy and pressure, which primarily 
concerned the right of self-determination. This problem is vividly presented in 
a number of publications which highlight the relationship of Romania and the 
Romanian community in Chernivtsi region to the question of independence of 
Moldova and discussions around the issue of state language in Moldova. 
In similar mass media monitorings one of the most common is the 
problem of specifying the relationship of ethnic groups, its fragments or 
individual members with criminal organizations, separatist organizations, illegal 
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and illegitimate political actors. It should be noted that during the monitoring it 
was revealed that similar themes in the studied media practically weren‘t touched 
upon, especially in the context of identifying ethnic groups with representatives 
of criminal structures. The absence of publications of such kind can be regarded 
as a very positive trend. Spreading of the fact that over the last year in the 
Chernivtsi region no crime on ethnic grounds has been committed by almost all 
mass media is the confirmation of this trend which ruins the stereotypes of 
identification of the representatives of an ethnic group with the crime. 
According to the analysis of collected materials, replicating of 
stereotypical settings is often a result not of the position of an editorship or 
other mass media, but on the contrary, of ethnological incompetence and 
incorrectness of professional journalists who often mention ethnic groups, their 
fragments or individual representatives in the contemptuous context. 
Conducted monitoring has also manifested examples of positive 
perception of interethnic relations. The most positive materials include articles, 
which form the tolerant acceptance of a particular ethnic group aimed at 
overcoming the negative ethnic stereotypes or containing examples of 
constructive intercultural interaction and cooperation. It is worth noting that 
such publications are typical for almost all investigated media, but among all of 
them Romanian publications of the region are in the lead by the number of 
positive material, especially in the field of intercultural interaction. 
Need of formation of a real and effective mechanism of  preventing 
interethnic conflicts, based on monitoring, scientific analysis and forecast of 
ethno-social and ethno-political processes, structures, tools and procedures that 
can ensure a positive dialogue from various ethnic communities among 
themselves and with authorities in modern terms comes to the foreground. 
Solving this problem is impossible without a comprehensive study of 
the impact of mass media on the formation of tolerance in multiethnic 
environment. The urgency of such studies is determined by the need to 
optimize the impact of media on social processes in general, and on the ethnic 
ones in particular. Meantime this impact cannot be characterized as optimal as 
it is often negative. Some notes of stereotypical prejudices are ―heard‖ from 
time to time even in the top socio-political periodicals. Journalists and editors 
often just do not pay any attention to the fact that these or other statements, 
estimates, manner of presenting the material have a shade of ethnic intolerance, 
and do not contemplate how this may affect the state of interethnic relations. 
Exotism of the cultural and behavioral peculiarities of the ethnic communities 
is commonplace for the mass media representatives. Understanding of the fact 
that all this facilitates the emergence of negative ethnic stereotypes is lacking. 
As a conclusion I would like to note that despite all the difficulties in 
the ethnic policy of Ukraine, nowadays we can speak about a potential to 
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interethnic tolerance existing in Ukrainian society, which in appropriate 
conditions could be a good foundation for stability in the region. 
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Abstract. This paper aims to describe the phenomenon of the feeling of belonging to 
ethnic groups and how this influences the behavioral patterns and attitudes, manifested in the 
social groups. Also draw attention to the needs related to the adoption and implementation in 
the social space of general values designed to make compatible interaction between different 
ethnic groups. The material also brings a series of processing data that are developed as a result 
of social research, designed to motivate state of affairs related to the interaction between ethnic 
groups and to show how is conduct the intercultural communication. In the last part we try to 
develop a set of suggestions about possible strategies for implementation of social values 
necessary for intercultural communication and social spaces multinational construction. We also 
mentioned a number of advantages that Romanian society has social areas from construction 
and multicultural membership of the European social space. 
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Multiculturalism is a social phenomenon of tradition, manifested with 
different intensity, depending on the frequency of specific interactions between 
different nations, ethnicities, religions. Multiculturalism is manifested existence 
since the dawn of human civilization and has been driven by the needs of 
exchange of knowledge, exchange of products and markets and not least the 
need for alliances to ensure social security. 
Multiculturalism today knows a new dimension in terms of functionality 
that the phenomenon of interaction between civilizations is expressed in the 
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construction of large social structures. Continuing trend of human communities 
was increasing in size and geographical demographic. This provides stability, 
strength, and access to resources. Socio-economic and political mechanisms of 
complex 21st century, great civilizations have imposed the need to reorganize 
and effort building mega social spaces. Trends in construction of a European 
unit has existed since the time my old, but the success of this approach was 
always placed on the coordinates of unstable social and political construction. 
One reason for the lack of perennial principle in connection with the European 
space reasons is the lack of internal social structures. Roman Empire, the 
Habzburgic, Napoleonean Empire or German expansionism, are just some 
examples of failed attempts to build united European space. These failures are 
due to non-constructive arguments of force and intentions related to social 
perspectives of communities which have been extended unification plan. 
Because of these shortcomings, often imposed by aggression, such political-
military actions with a strong social impact were assessed and adverse events 
with known abusive. They assumed norms and rules imposed from outside, 
that daily burden of a large number of social communities. In this context, 
multiculturalism often represents a potential threat, and ethnocentric and 
nationalist practice - a form of resistance and a means to caution against any 
tendency to expand the social space. (Krivis, Lucks 2009) 
The new model brings some significant differences in social 
reorganization, because motivation is based on an inner construction of the 
new social space. This rationale is supported by transnational media attention 
and assistance to improve and strengthen the social problems of a better 
lifestyle. We see so very social construction technique based on internal 
motivation requires compatibility need social spaces. Multiculturalism becomes 
an undeniable value and binding towards building a global social space. 
  
1. Multiculturalism and the public institutions 
 
The field of the public relations has recently become a subject of great 
interest that is more and more often met in the discourse of the social studies in 
Romania. Books and items have been written, meetings have been organized, 
lectures have been voiced, being all directed towards the theme of the public 
relations.  
From experience, the fields of first priority of the social studies are not 
at random. On the contrary, we can stand that the interest for a certain theme is 
in correlation with the needs of the society in witch they show themselves. So, 
if it were fulfilled an inventory of the approached subjects, in the last years by 
means of the social studies, it is quite probable that in Romania, on the firs 
places, there would be the studies liked to the problem of poverty, the problem 
of corruption or of the difficulties existing in the social integration of different 
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categories of population. Meanwhile the social studies in USA approached 
more intensively the problems liked to the family dissolution or those in the 
field of immigration. What we want to stand here is that the scientific interest 
for a certain theme could be at a certain moment an indicatory for the kind of 
problems the respective society is confronted with. (Cutlip, Brown 1999) 
The natural questions arising from this context are referring to the more 
or less functional aspects that should be correlated with the interest for the field 
of the public relations. Is this interest really justified by the problems with 
which the Romanian society is confronted, or it is rather a fashionable subject 
coming out of an international perspective? 
One of the most important difficulties we are confronted with in 
treating such a subject is that the term of ―public relations‖ is often met under 
the form of some ambiguous acceptances and exaggeratedly generalizing. In 
that case we sometimes very closely come up to the extreme situation of 
confounding the public relations with any process of communication. In the 
work that was coordinated by S. Cutlip, A. Center and G. Brown, they show 
that the idea of public relations designates the managerial function that 
identifies, establishes and maintains mutual advantageous relations between an 
organization and different categories of public, relations on which the success 
or the failure of the respective organization depend. Analyzing this definition 
some conclusion can be clearly attached. They are meant to suggest and sustain 
the place and essence of this concept: 
1. We firstly think that there must be specified the idea of the link 
between the institutional field and the specific activities of the 
environment of the public relations. Thus we can make a clear-cut 
distinction between these activities and the other types of 
communication. Modern institutions are characterized by a complex net 
of links with other institutions and the performance of the institutions 
is dependent of the functionality of these relations. This is the cause of 
the development of the public relations.  
2. As long as the departments of the public relations represent 
professional media specialized in the building up of a proper relational 
climate between an organization and different categories of public, one 
can stand that the real relationship manifests itself one more levels. 
Thus, we can speak about an inner level of the public relations (the 
relations between the persons who do the different jobs in an 
organization are attentively had in view), but also by an external level of 
public relations (thinking of the relations that are held by the 
organization towards the beneficiaries of the services and goods that are 
offered. From another point of view, thinking of the importance held 
by the organizational activity, we can speak about institutionalized 
public relations (specialized in the links that must be maintained with 
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other institutions) and non institutionalized public relations (specialized 
in the relations of the organization with physical persons, having the 
quality of being either the beneficiaries or the employed ones). 
3. We also consider as being important some short considerations about 
the fields in which the activities of public relations find themselves 
again. We can easily notice that, in fact, the services of the public 
relations can be adjusted to any field of any social institution. This 
phenomenon is very important from the point of view of the 
consequences it has upon the social level. As long as the citizens‘ 
relations with the public institutions represent a daily phenomenon, we 
have the right to conclude that the way of going on of these relations 
will greatly influence the social behavior, the degree of involvement in 
the public problems and the civic spirit proved by the member of the 
collectivity. 
 The hypothesis we formulate and put into analysis is the fact that there 
exists certain specificity of development of the relations between the members 
of a human community and the social institutions on which they directly 
depend.  In their turn, these social institutions, being organisms with formal 
structures, are obliged, at a certain length, to build up strategies of relationship 
and implicitly of communication with the social categories which they serve. 
The good organizing of these activities depends on a corresponding vision that 
is specific for the public relations. This organizing has to impose specific 
solutions in order to optimize the institution‘s relations with the beneficiaries of 
the services offered.  
 On the part of the beneficiaries of the public services, if there are well 
introduced and if they correspond to the interests of those who ask for the 
services of the social institution, we will see a positive attitude towards the 
organization in case. This fact will draw to the creation of a favorable imagine 
that the institution should have on the public consciousness. On the contrary, if 
the modalities of relationing and the offer services don‘t correspond to the 
standards imposed by the beneficiaries with their interests, the impression of 
that social institution, no matter the problem, will mark a descendent evolution. 
And the climax could be the discreditation and loss of authority (Samovar, 
Porter,  Mc Daniel 2008). 
 From the perspective of the relations between the social institutions and 
the members of the society, in the period after 1989, there have been detached 
some specific situations in Romania and they, as we will later present, came to 
influence and determine a certain type of social behavior promoted at the level 
of large social segments. In other words, we will see that the persistence of a 
dominant type of manifestation in public relations will significantly influence a 
set of behavior attitudes and models of the social order (Giddens, 2000). 
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 A first idea in this respect is linked to the passing on from a central 
social system to a system based on free strategies of organizing, at least from 
the point of view of declared perspective of desirability of the new models to 
organize the institutions. Yet social and institutional liberalism did not offer a 
comfortable dimension at the moment of breaking off from the centralized 
regime. So it is necessary for an institutional system to work an ensemble of 
internal relations (the organization of the institutions). The matter that stood 
against the institutional liberalism, beyond the practical unknowing of what such 
a system is supposed to be, was exactly the characteristics of this internal and 
external relations that we rather going on in accordance with the old centralized 
system. In this respect we want to point out the transformational phenomenon 
of the specific character of the social relationships. It is a necessary and normal 
matter in the context of the transformation of the Romanian society by adopting 
the occidental methods. The all ensemble of the communist society, by 
centralizing all social systems, succeeded to exclude the beneficiary out of the 
economical equation and not only. In other words production and the quality of 
the services did not depend on the beneficiaries‘ evaluations regarding quality. 
This fact was caused by the lack of competition on one side, and by central 
authority on the other side. This authority was in fact only possible threatening 
for the functioning of the social institutions, so that central authority was the real 
beneficiary that had to be satisfied by all means. We think unimportant to insist 
here upon the nature of the central authority of the communist society, organized 
in an oligarchic and unitary way and having as a last and universal argument the 
Communist Party. Thus we have here an evidence of refusing the responsibility, a 
defalcation of authority, from the real beneficiary represented by the population 
towards the political and politicized structures of the state. The motifs of this 
model of social relationing used to be firstly linked to the need of social control, 
being exchange at that time any situation that could have been used as an 
instrument for that goal. 
 After 1989 the Romanian society was confronted with the powerful 
phenomenon of perpetuation of the patterns of social relationing, patterns that 
include economical, political, administrative and even educational dimensions. 
Thus we find ourselves in the situation in which the declination of 
responsibilities that should have become history became independent with an 
even greater force inside the vital bodies of the society. Happening like that, we 
can see once more how the rightful beneficiaries of the social products and 
services are avoided by history, being forgotten in a disconcentrating lake of 
authority. It is seen how Romania, in fifteen years, has experimented with 
success a democratic pattern build and perpetuated by elimination of the 
population from almost all decisional context, thus being built up a social 
system that wants to be democratic but in reality it continues to elude the 
essence of liberal democracy that is the phenomenon of social control. Still, the 
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mechanism of eluding the social control is different from the one of the 
communist period; the social control is not minimized by oppression, as in the 
former form of government, bur by omission and poverty. The phenomenon 
of omission is in fact a poor offering of instruments for social control, which 
was created and promoted by the political systems of post Decembrist 
Romania. A suggestive example in this respect is represented by the vote-on-list 
system, by which is defalcated the senators‘ and deputies‘ responsibility for their 
electors. This responsibility is directed towards the political parties and 
institutions that promoted them on the voting list, in a period in which the 
Romanian population was supposed to have understood and learned the 
mechanism of liberal democracy. The pauperization of the population was a 
powerful argument which succeeds to generate a weak social reaction and a 
diminution of the interest for a strengthening of a civic consciousness. In free 
societies there finally appear different modalities for the creation of the 
instruments for the social control, bunt only under the circumstances of a 
suitable civic education meant to stimulate the social participation. But if the 
population develops some rather atomizing models, where each individual 
looks only after his/her interest, ignoring the collective one, it is quite 
improbable to appear coherent instruments of social control, especially in a 
medium in which the political power deliberately discourages that control.  
 On the other side, on the background of population‘s pauperization, 
society is dealing with the structures of the communist pattern. The historical 
evolution of American population and of that of the European Occident 
permits us to consider that the liberal democracy goes hand in hand with the 
society of consumption, In other words it is seen that the level of the social 
control increases directly with the power of consumption of the population for 
offered goods and services, which in their turn get diversified and increase their 
quality, generating a positive process in social evolution. Unfortunately the 
Romanian population is still far enough to consider themselves as a consuming 
force and the fact diminishes its authority, both directly and indirectly. In the 
direct relations the goods and services offered on the market are either of a 
poor quality or incomplete, usually to permit their selling at prices, or to be 
profitable when the phenomenon of consumption is reduced. From an indirect 
perspective the duties and taxes to the local and central authorities being 
reduced, we have to face the reality of a reduced budget which implies small 
salaries in the budgetary fields and on organizational substructure insufficiently 
developed. This brings with it a poor quality of services or even their 
inexistence. From another point of view we draw attention to a phenomenon 
of getting sometimes deliberately, more difficulty in the ways of access to 
different services that are usually compulsory for a citizen. This phenomenon is 
motivated by the practice of the preferential services that generate tips, the 
respective practice being very often meet among the office workers. Although 
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for a certain point of view we could consider that such phenomena have the 
role of protecting and conserving a certain category by a mechanism of auto 
protection against a prolonged state of crisis, all this things diminish the social 
authority because they become extremely noxious factors for the formatting 
process of a social ensemble.  
 
2. Public relations and the citizen‟s belief in social institutions 
after 1989 
 
 The field of the public relations in the communist society was 
practically useless and thus existing as a dimension of a superficial formula. 
That was mostly due to the specific of the depending relations of the different 
social institutions. In the situation of a competitive economy the depending 
relations of an organization become manifest at the level of its relations with 
the sources materials or with the necessary services for the private activity and, 
what is very important, of its relations with the potential beneficiaries. With no 
constraints generated by a competitive medium, the social institutions remained 
with no motivation in the direction pf having proper relations with the 
beneficiaries. Thus, without direct responsibilities for their beneficiaries, the 
institutions of the totalitarian form of government in Romania, promoted a not 
evolved, not elaborated and an incoherent relation towards the citizens, who, 
with no competitive field, had no other alternative. In the economical, 
commercial and even administrative surroundings of the communist period the 
relations of dependence manifested themselves at other levels; avoiding, as we 
have seen, the aspects of public‘s satisfaction, which was in rather ideological 
goal than a real necessity in the activity of an institution. 
 The strategies of the public relations develop and make evolutions in 
accordance to the necessities imposed by a social and economical context at a 
certain moment. The centralized economy of the communist period imposed 
efforts of relationing with the party structures and with the contractors of raw 
materials, materials and services. Even in the case of the services, the political 
arguments had an important role. As a result, the specific activities of the public 
relations were directed towards the social factors that could influence the 
activities of the institution by means of their authority. In most of the cases the 
relations where individualized and they were based on links with key characters 
who used to facilitate the interest of the institutions in exchange of some 
services of social and personal nature, thus strengthening their own positions. 
Due to the personal character of the professional relations and due to the 
restricted spheres of reference points of responsibility, the departments of 
public relations had no object of activity (Regnault 2009). 
 The poor quality of relationing between the social institutions and 
population implied certain results at the level of some behavioristic and 
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atitudinale models of population. On one side, the trust in public institutions 
decreases, the collective mentality being feed continuously on the negative 
aspects of the activities of these institutions. On the other side the model of the 
institutional relations got very quickly to be adopted by population and it was 
also considered from the point of this efficiency. It was like that, that at an 
individual level, there was developed the idea that the standard of living 
depends on one‘s net of ―acquaintances‖ that should facilitate and promote the 
personal interests in different fields. Thus the defalcation of the social 
responsibilities and the lack of any direction of social control became accepted 
and naturalized relations in the Romanian society.  
 The process of passing to a competitive economy has not brought great 
changes in the field of the public relations, fact that was generated both by the 
low competitive context and by the small power of buying. From another point 
of view the system of personalized relations was maintained at all levels, which 
determined the economical, administrative and political surroundings (having 
no external authority like that of the former party) became more and more 
hermetically for those who had come from outside the system. On the other 
side, due to a very poor market of working force, the society had to face a 
phenomenon of hermetization of the guilds, crafts-man-ships and fields of 
activity passed on from one generation to another. All these brought their 
contribution to the perpetuance of a lack of trust of the population towards the 
social institutions and to the maintaining of a bad relationship with those. 
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Abstract. The present paper analyzes the concept of security, emphasizing the 
difference between political security and societal security, referring to the different types of threats 
to security, depending on the traits that social groups will define as essential to their identity. 
Our paper aims also to draw attention upon the significant facts of culture and civilization 
in a region situated at the confluence of Central and South-Eastern Europe, it aims to reflect the 
understanding of the plural character of the historic development, and it also aims to pin-point the 
intercultural character of the Banat region as an example of inter-regional tolerance. The chosen 
case study - the region of Banat - proves balance between various religions, traditions, customs and 
between various lifestylesThe intellectual work and the improvement in the degree of civilization 
conveyed by Romanians, Serbs, Hungarians, Jews, Bulgarians and Slovaks in Banat have 
become a common inheritance. Another important feature of the culture of this region would be 
that it was promoted by the entire community, and one can notice the interactive feature of the 
inter-cultural phenomenon as an outstanding approach of a peaceful living together.  
Our research can be considered a synthesis regarding the relationship between the 
coexistence of different ethnicities and cultures and the economic and social performance and, 
respectively, the setting up of an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual assistance, in fact a 
manifestation of inter-territorial solidarity aiming towards a better life and in which the 
diffusion of historical experiences becomes factor of development and economic growth. 
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1. The European Union – space of liberty, security and justice  
 
The European Union is a union of states and not of individuals. The 
European Union is a construction which is unprecedented in time and space, 
which began in the 50s of the twentieth century, which has not ceased to 
develop given the adopted treaties. Since its origins two background processes 
have marked it - one of deepening (increasing the EU competence) and another 
of extension, in order to increase the number of members. The founding 
member, and those that have joined later, have agreed to partly replace the 
traditional intergovernmental cooperation, within which each state is sovereign 
in decision-making, given the organization of supranational institutions with 
their own legal rules. The EU is therefore a political structure based on 
national-state interests. 
 According to the Treaty of Amsterdam the European Union should be 
maintained and developed as an Area of freedom, security and justice. The 
setting-up of an area of freedom, security and justice has been decided on in 
order to allow truly free movement of persons within the European Union and 
in order to undertake effective actions to fight organized crime and fraud. By 
the Treaty of Maastricht the fields of justice and internal affairs were included 
in Title VI of the EU Treaty (third pillar). The decisions were taken under 
intergovernmental procedures. 
 The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force at 1decembrie 2009 the three 
pillars‘ system was annulled, and the judicial and police force cooperation in 
criminal matters was also set up at communitarian level. Even if it was set up at 
communitarian level, the role of the Member States does not disappear.  For these 
sectors the states‘ intervention is possible more than usual in communitarian 
sectors. Special exemption clauses remain in force for the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark. The Lisbon Treaty improves the EU's ability to act in various areas of 
priority for the today's Union and for its citizens, such as freedom, security and 
justice (the fight against terrorism and crime). The Lisbon Treaty promotes the 
Europe of rights, values, freedom, solidarity and security, as well as the 
fundamental values of the Union, it introduces the Charter of fundamental rights in 
the European primary law, it provides new mechanisms of solidarity and ensures a 
better protection of the European citizens in a space of freedom and security. This 
last objective is achieved through closer cooperation between police forces and 
customs authorities both directly and through Europol. 
Our geographical position places us at the European Union's eastern 
border. The enlargement which took place in 2004 and 2007 raised the EU27 
border issue and also the meaning, essence, durability and the sustainability of 
the European project. It is necessary, first, the analysis of the European border 
concept considering the new reasons due to the maintenance of Europe‘s 
borders, the mechanism to ensure the EU security, decisional transparency at 
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the level of the EU‘s supranational institutions regarding geographical and 
political borders and the specific relationships between the member countries 
on these issues, which despite the quality of members of the same organization, 
are the classic diplomatic relations.  Subsequent to the enlargement in 2004 and 
2007, the EU has new states as neighbors, some of them lacking history as 
independent states and also lacking appropriate diplomatic experience and 
facing outstanding sensitivity especially in the neighborhood of major powers. 
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) provides a framework for relations 
with neighboring states – old and new, in the east or south – to which the EU 
has not granted any prospects regarding integration, but still wants to have 
closer ties with. The European Parliament supports the ENP. The legal backing 
of this policy is Title V of the EU Treaty, on foreign policy and common 
security policy (FPCS) articles 133.3 (trade) and 300 (international agreements) 
in the EU Treaty. 
For bilateral relations with East European countries the EU has 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. The pursued objectives are: 
increasing the degree of stability, security and prosperity of the EU and of 
neighboring countries in the East and South, especially offering the Eastern 
neighboring states a closer relationship with the EU.  ENP should prevent the 
emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighboring 
states.  The policy is based on commitments to common values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and 
for the economic principles on the free trade market and sustainable 
development and poverty reduction as well. Based on the ENP, the EU aims to 
counteract or prevent threats to ―direct security‖ such as large-scale illegal 
immigration, stopping imports of energy, environmental degradation, terrorism 
and organized crime dissemination. 
 
2. Reflections on the concept of security. the significance of the global 
balkans concept 
 
The concept Security is a complex concept. Paradoxically, while 
everyone talks about security, a very small number is made up of those who 
wonder what security really is. The concept of security is now the center of 
numerous political and media debates. Security is in Europe and elsewhere 
―pervasive‖ in the everyday concerns of individuals; security influences almost 
all aspects of life. 
Defining security can take two ways – firstly, in a very general and 
condensed way, and secondly giving it a broader content and undoubtedly more 
complex one. This second meaning has been adopted to the extent that the 
conceptualization of security has allowed exploring the debates triggered by the 
EU's security policy. 
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 The security concept is currently used, but little analyzed, because it 
brings forth a number of analytical difficulties. The term ―security‖ is a dual 
term because it means not only being free (to have escaped, to have been 
released) from a threat, but also suggests that there has to be a means, an 
instrument, to avoid or limit danger. Some say that ―strengthening security 
measures reduces the freedom and rights. But it was always argued that 
strengthening security measures is not done for the sake of security, but exactly 
to protect and promote freedom‖. But does security itself stand for freedom? 
Security teaches us, makes us look to identify a danger (a threat), such as 
terrorism, bird flu, energy dependence, and to define – at the same time – the 
necessary means to face the arisen danger.  
We should emphasize that there is still no consensual definition of 
security. Some define it as opposed to insecurity – negatively when it opposes 
insecurity, and positively when it is considered a means of maintaining integrity 
of the national territories and of the accepted institutions. Others define 
security in relation to threats on individuals and institutions. Other tentative 
definitions present it as a lack (absence) of threats to fundamental values. Such 
a view is considered as an objective point of view. Other statements view it 
subjectively, considering it the absence of fear (it does not raise fear) that these 
values can be threatened, so there is no insecurity. In other situations the 
concept of security is challenged – ―essentially contested concept‖, and to the 
extent that it is subject to contestation there are known several meanings: 
National security implies the existence of the state and its ability to 
exercise power in a given territory. Collective security, on the other hand, is 
based on intergovernmental cooperation and interdependence in international 
relations. And human security, this concerns satisfying the basic needs of 
individuals and the primacy given to the state and its defense to achieve 
―societal security‖ which refers to identity, culture and the survival of society in 
changing conditions and in the case of actual or probable threats. Following the 
above it is clear that security has many meanings. Therefore, security represents 
a relative value, tributary to the national culture, to traditions, concepts and 
political options as well as theoretical options adopted by different authors.       
The realistic understanding of security is state-centered. The state - which refers to 
security, which is actually reduced to the issue of protection and defense.  This 
way security is conceived as a response to existing threats to which the state must 
answer and is obliged to respond to.  Realistic understanding is related to 
geopolitical and geostrategic understanding, basically studying the links between 
space and power relations (including military) allowing the state to ensure control 
upon its territory, both inside and outside, on international level.  According to 
this concept security is seen as deriving from the power of the state as well as an 
indicator of strategic success of states in their economic and military competition. 
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The idealistic understanding of security is individual-centered. This was developed 
after World War II and gives primacy, as previously mentioned, to individual 
rights and freedoms emphasizing the conflictual human nature in a natural way, 
hence the need for security arises. The followers of this approach, which is also 
called ―Peace Studies‖, are convinced of the possibility of progress towards 
international cooperation between states within international institutions. 
But the question to be asked is, which is the dimension of political and 
societal security? The security concept is familiar to social and political sciences, 
because it refers to groups, societies or individuals. 
A security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security 
perceptions and concerns are linked together so that their national security 
problems cannot be treated differently. Security complexes generate 
regionalization within the international system. The security theory says that the 
existence of security complexes represents a natural characteristic of the 
international system. Security always has been considered in political terms.  
Political security has been linked to the state and defined primarily in terms of 
sovereignty, being associated with the military security. 
The literature in the field refers to the political security by the phrases 
―community of security‖ (the states are to be found in similar conditions), 
―security system‖ (those principles, rules and norms that make nations behave 
moderately, starting from the belief that the other nations will follow suitably), 
referring mainly to issues of political security in the EU‘s enlargement towards 
Central and Eastern Europe on the grounds that ―Europe is currently the field 
which faces  different visions regarding the political space‖ (each considering 
also a security paradigm) and ―the EU enlargement is an expansion of the 
security space for both the EU and the Central and Eastern European states" 
On the other hand, societal security (the security of the society) is often 
considered related to threats to the societal security, i.e. related to the society‘s 
identity, and may include: the destruction of the entire population as such, the 
destruction of the community‘s specific lifestyle, banning the possibility of 
cultural expression, the use of own language and / or religion, the occupation 
of a territory filled with historical significance for the respective group, and also 
permissiveness towards minority rights and practices, for example, may be 
perceived as a threat factor to the uniformity - and therefore - to the identity of 
the majority society. 
Given that we are dealing with societies that have no state or at least do 
not correspond to existing states, societal security concerns the society's ability 
to maintain its essential character in changing conditions and under actual and 
potential threats. Specifically, we refer to persistence, under conditions allowing 
the evolution of traditional models of language, culture, association, as well as 
identity and religious and national customs. For the securitization process in 
this field reference can be made to ―collective identity‖, the ―we‖ - that is 
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exactly what society considers to be vital in order to exist as such. If something 
threatens the central symbol of this ―we‖, if there still is this ―we‖, it is expected 
to launch a call to their defense. 
Clarification is required here, stressing that the notion of society with 
which the ―Copenhagen School‖ is operating is similar to that commonly used 
in sociology and social theory, and it does not represent the society of a state or 
the national society. In this case, society simply represents ―large identity 
groups, which stand for themselves‖. The authors of ―Copenhagen School‖ use 
the term ―societal‖ for communities which people identify with (being treated 
especially in Europe, the emphasis falls on national identity as a form of 
political and social identity on large scale, but - the authors write - it may take 
the forms of tribes, clans, nations and entities similar to nations, called 
minorities, the civilizations, religions or races). Simultaneously, the authors also 
specify clearly that ―nation‖ and ―religion‖ remain the most comprehensive and 
robust types of social identity in the contemporary world. 
Societal security has as main element the one of identity (state security 
having sovereignty as a criterion, societal security being concerned with identity 
issues). The survival of the state is fundamentally bound with its sovereignty 
while the survival of the society is related to identity. 
To conclude, political security refers mainly to the state's role in 
international relations and the possible threat to state security.  States can be 
differentiated - in terms of their internal stability and cohesion - in powerful 
states and weak states and internationally they are differentiated by the types of 
relationships which are established between them. Societal security theory 
shows that the state cannot always constitute the central objective of security. 
Some argue that the state can sometimes threaten the security for different 
groups in society so it is necessary to analyze the security from the identity 
perspective. This means that any coherent social entity - not just the state - may 
perceive threats to the elements which they consider crucial to their own 
identity. Depending on the traits that social groups will define as essential to 
their identity, there can be highlighted different types of threats to security. But 
the basic problem remains the conceptualization of identity. 
Also, this part of the European Union is considering the ―new 
neighborhood‖, considered ―close foreign countries‖ by Russia. These two 
perspectives generate divergent opinions regarding the behavior towards the 
populations and ethnic groups in the area. And, especially, the Eastern part of 
the EU - in macro-spatial terms – is part of the global Western Balkans 
concept, which represents major importance in the context of NATO 
enlargement and globalization. 
The Romanian Banat Region – An Example of Peaceful Interethnic Cohabitation at the Eastern Border…  
 
373 
 
3. Case study – the uniqueness on the intercultural environment in the 
Banat area  
 
In the era of globalization, sustained by a widely spread technology, 
there are constantly set up multiple relations between continents, countries, 
regions, groups and individuals. For these relations to be set up a common 
denominator is – or must be – found, usually of economic nature. These 
procedures, unparalleled in history, sometimes challenge strong reactions from 
particular cultures which, by rights or not, feel threatened, tending to consider 
these procedures as inconsistent with their essence and existence. In this very 
sensitive context it is quite easy to resort to ―multicultural tolerance‖. Although 
the tolerance among cultures is a mere necessity, it will not offer a definite 
solution to issues that might occur. To reach a satisfactory outcome, we need a 
thoroughgoing study of cultures and their values.  
The UNESCO Commission for 21st century education, led by Jacques 
Delors, promulgated four pillars for the future education: 
- to learn to know 
- to learn to learn 
- to learn to be 
- to learn to live together. 
This way, the challenges of intercultural education are strongly backed 
up by ―learning to live together‖. The important task of intercultural education 
and intercultural learning is not restricted to the formal system of education but 
it unfolds upon individuals, allowing them to change their present beliefs, 
values and judgment, assigning them ―towards others‖. 
The work of the European institutions is based on the values which 
play an important role in the building of a peaceful Europe, in overcoming the 
gap between East and West, in promoting the participation of minority groups, 
in supporting the forming of an intercultural society. Everyone should be able 
to fully and equally participate to the building of Europe. Therefore, it is 
important not only for the European politics, but also for an objective reality at 
both national and local level that people should learn to live together. One 
should only think about the relations between the intercultural learning and 
human rights, minority‘s rights, solidarity, equality of chances, participation and 
democracy. These are the values of intercultural learning, as well as the avowed 
values of the European institutions, as the base for European cooperation and 
integration.  
Geographically placed at the cross-roads of commercial paths which 
bind Central Europe to the Mediterranean South, placed between two worlds 
often differently organized, the Banat area is a frontier area, and it was exactly 
this quality which significantly contributed to the making of the multiple 
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language environment, alongside the shared presence of different religions – 
orthodox, catholic, protestant, Lutheran, Mosaic and Moslem. There are also to 
be found forms of private and public administration inherited from the Roman 
and Byzantine Empires, from the Hungarian Royalty, the Ottoman Empire, the 
Habsburg and Austrian-Hungarian monarchies, as well as from the former 
Kingdom of Romania.  The region of Banat was always conferred a distinct 
identity, with a reflective meaning of economic, social and political privilege, 
and having this frontier culture as background, the economy of the region 
advanced towards higher standards compared to the other regions of the 
country. 
      The uniqueness of the intercultural environment in Banat can be 
defined on hand several aspects: 
1. compared to the Western Europe, where the intercultural phenomenon 
has arisen as a reaction to the cultural patterns of emigrants, often 
accepted with withheld hostility because of their destabilizing potential 
and considered as being a factor which might contaminate the identity 
of the community‘s perception, in the region of Banat the intercultural 
phenomenon was based on a very original nonjudgmental behavior 
which allowed each ethnicity to integrate into the history of the 
community, without any aggressive reaction from the local inhabitants, 
represented either by the majority or minority. The constant bearing of 
the same daily issues made them jointly look for practical solutions to 
the community‘s issues, a fact which led to a natural social cohesion, 
with no institutional interference. The ethnic diversity was perceived as 
a source to increase the choice of solutions to the communitarian 
issues, basically identical; the intercultural phenomenon has always been 
interactive in this respect.  
2. the school-system has included teaching in the mother-tongue of all 
minorities, ensuring them a financial support which was equal to what 
the Romanian population  ought to have. 
3. the Romanian state supported cultural institutions with performances in 
the mother tongue of the minorities, Timisoara being the only 
European city with state theatres in the Romanian language, the 
German language and the Hungarian language. 
The use of two, three, even four languages in the Banat region is a very 
seldom feature to be found in other regions in Europe. The multi-linguistic 
feature of a significant percentage of the population can be traced back to the 
19th or even the 18th century, being very visible during the whole period, in spite 
of the pressures exerted by the national languages, which had hoped to extend 
their area of use in the minority languages‘ disadvantage. The need of 
communication, the economic interests, the understanding and acceptance of 
the other‘s needs and values led to the learning of the other languages in use, 
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besides the mother tongue. So, the speaking of many languages has been 
alleged as a wealth belonging to every inhabitant; it was perceived as a way to 
bring people closer together. The use of many languages – supported by 
schools, cultural associations, political organizations, minority groups and the 
church – has properly been understood by the communities in Banat, because 
the efforts were collective, urging the rise of the values of civilization and 
cultural inheritance accepted by everybody, as a team of equals. The speaking of 
several languages – strongly related to the historical course of modernization – 
was considered as being a result of the fact that the Romanian majority was 
sharing the same territory with several minorities – German, Serbian, 
Hungarian, Bulgarian, Jewish, Slovak and Romany. And there has to be put an 
emphasis on the fact that this did not happen as a result of an outer 
intervention, but as a natural consequence of the fact that the local population 
has taken upon itself the multiple identity.  
The Banat area reflects a variety of encounters and proves the chance of 
survival for diverse languages and different cultures. Though today we can refer 
to this experience as inter-cultural relations, it has never brought forth 
misunderstandings, but it proved ability to encourage and motivate the building 
of a community of people to whom the common interest regarding order and 
progress were more important than ethnic affiliations. It was therefore possible 
to show concern towards innovation, at least more efficiently than other 
neighboring regions did. Practically, the life of every individual was enriched, 
gaining importance by avoiding conceptual ideologies. To what concerns the 
ethnic traditional values, these were shared and preserved as an outcome of the 
manifold identities‘ input. The intellectual work and the improvement in the 
degree of civilization conveyed by Romanians, Serbs, Hungarians, Jews, 
Bulgarians and Slovaks in Banat have become a common inheritance. 
Generally, the culture of bordering areas of a country has a pluralistic character, 
so the Banat region of today cannot be considered focusing on the cultural 
outcomes highlighted only by the Romanian language. Multiple literary and 
historical studies written in the Romanian language entered a channel of 
communication and exchange of ideas with the Transylvanian School, reflecting 
esthetical and political values promoted by scholars in the most important cities 
of Europe. In addition, using the Hungarian and German languages, many 
Romanian scholars in the Banat region promoted themselves more than one 
language to make themselves easier heard and better understood in the cultural 
and political circles of the former Hapsburg Empire. There were as well many 
scholars of German, Hungarian or Serb ethnic origin, whose contribution – in 
spite of being written in their mother tongue –can neither be denied nor 
declined. The same degree of importance can be associated to the outcomes of 
various other domains like art, architecture and music, the identity of which can 
definitely not be defined or referred to from an ethnic-cultural point of view. 
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The authors themselves could often not be able to undergo a particular identity, 
many of them descending from mixed marriages, but they easily made 
themselves at home speaking diverse languages and entering various cultures, in 
many communities. 
Communication among ethnic minorities in Banat has always been 
outstanding, and it is based on its pluralistic character, as every community 
where ethnic minorities are to be found uses more than one language to 
communicate. The Germans, for example, speak – besides their mother tongue 
– Romanian and Hungarian; the Serbs and Bulgarians speak two languages, the 
Romanian language being always the first second choice in their families; the 
Jews are known to speak many languages. In Nadlac, besides the Slovak 
language, most of the inhabitants speak Romanian and Hungarian as well.  
There were many links between the ethnic minorities, most of them being 
triggered by the cooperation among the linguistic communities in various 
domains, like culture, science and technology, and common issues with regard 
to defending their rights. To respect the religious belief of the other has always 
been characteristic for these communities. The use of three to four languages in 
the region of Banat is seldom to be found in other areas of Europe, this feature 
having defined the population in this area for centuries.  
The language can be considered an important factor, being 
hierarchically prior as an identification criterion. Most of the inhabitants speak 
more than one language. To speak Romanian, Hungarian, German and Serb, or 
at least two or three of these languages, has always been considered a matter of 
pride and certainly a particular feature of the regional or local identity. Even 
though there were times when the population had to learn and accommodate to 
another language because of less favorable historical circumstances and not 
because of practical means, the inter-cultural phenomenon was retrospectively 
appreciated, as a form of development and cosmopolitism. Of course, the 
younger generations show more interest towards modern languages – German, 
English and French – but it is important that families consider the learning of a 
modern language as an important and valuable asset. There are also situations 
where the common spoken language is not a solid enough feature to describe 
ethnic affiliation. The catholic Bulgarians in Banat stress the importance of their 
being catholic to portray the difference from the orthodox majority of 
Bulgarians in Bulgaria. With regard to the Jews in Banat, most of them speak 
Hungarian and their religious tradition is the only one to undoubtedly indicate 
their belonging to the Jewish community. 
Once the ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural diversity was accepted, 
many of the local population would adopt the distinctive features of this region, 
they tend to exchange and borrow religious traditions, cuisine or the house 
building techniques; there were also exchanges between languages, as the ethnic 
Romanian dialect in Banat included various terminology of Hungarian, German 
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or Serb origin. The most interesting finding was that many people adopted such 
expressions from the various languages that were being spoken in the region; 
many of them would prefer mixed marriages; and that many would think of 
professional relationships with the Hungarians, the Germans or the Serbs as a 
start of a future friendship. Most of the Romanians in Banat continue their 
admirable bond with the ethnic minorities, defending their relationship if 
needed, and showing this way their awareness of the common origin of their 
regional civilization. 
Compared to other areas of the country, the region of Banat is a real 
proof of steadiness, proving balance between various religions, traditions, 
customs and between various lifestyles. A very important feature of the culture 
of this region would be that it was promoted by the entire community, and one 
can notice the interactive feature of the inter-cultural phenomenon as an 
outstanding approach of a peaceful living together. This sort of intercultural 
society based itself mainly on the variety of languages that were being spoken 
and as well as on the degree of broadmindedness with regard to the variety of 
beliefs. This is easily to be seen in the every-day life of the community, as most 
of the people take part in each other‘s celebration – either social or religious 
ones. There have also been registered mixed marriages – between people of 
different ethnic belonging – and these might be considered as a living proof of 
an intercultural society and in the same time it led to the speaking of several 
languages. In this regard, the Banat region may offer effective solutions which 
might help avoid possible misunderstandings or conflicts started by the lack of 
knowledge and by perceiving the others as being different. To be different and 
to be accepted like this may lead to the development of creativity, and – from 
this point of view – the Banat region may be considered a role model. 
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Abstract. The subject in this study is part of a broader theme in sociology, that is 
dealing with ethnic relations. Data analysis provided by the concrete research carried out in the 
Bihor-Hajdú-Bihar euroregion, aimed at measuring the social distance using Bogardus scale, 
through which we intend to identify the degree of acceptance / social tolerance manifested by the 
majority ethnic group in relation to minority groups. We submitted for validation the 
hypothesis that, given the long-term coexistence between the Romanian and Hungarian in the 
region, attitudes of acceptance and tolerance of minority groups will prevail in both areas. Also, 
permissive attitudes will be significantly influenced by a high level of education of individuals, 
by the frequency of social contacts between members of the group and by the  area of residence, 
meaning that in the urban environment - characterized by more pronounced modern attitudes – 
the degree of tolerance towards minority groups will be higher. 
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1. Introduction 
The research shown in this study fits into a broader theme, that on 
social tolerance, in general and ethnic tolerance, in particular. 
Tolerance is an important factor in forming connections between 
different social groups, facilitating daily interaction among their members. In 
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today's society the concept of tolerance includes a much broader spectrum of 
behavior and attitude patterns towards distinct groups, beside the religious or 
political ones. Individuals are forced to adapt to a new reality characterized by 
ethnic and cultural diversity and by a diversity of life styles. To meet the 
requirements asked by the new society, scientific approaches have changed the 
way the tolerance concept is understood; it is highly connected with notions 
such as liberalism and social identity (Horton, 1993). Today, tolerance is 
explained also by its correlation with justice, human rights and democracy 
(Kymlicka & Opalski, 2001). 
The concept of tolerance is understand by most scientists of modern 
society as representing the individual willingness of the persons to motivate 
themselves to take part in public life even if, personally, they disagree with the 
views of the others who are distinct from them in various ways. Tolerance is seen 
as an orientation towards social and political life, assuming a specific negotiation of 
opinions and attitudes based on certain norms and values (Mutz, 2001). 
A special category of relationships between individuals in society, often 
interrogated by the scientific literature, is the tolerance between different ethnic 
groups. 
In the analysis of the individuals relation with their ethnic groups, which 
appear to them as assigned groups, of particular relevance is the concept of social 
identity defined as "the individual conscience that is part of a particular social 
group, along with a certain axiological and emotional significance, related to the 
fact that the individual is a group member" (Hogg şi Abrams, 1990: 7, apud 
Chelcea, 1998: 11). It`s relevant to retain that the production and assertion of 
identity is achieved through identity process (through which the social actor is 
being distinct, tends to become autonomous, and asserts its individuality) and 
identification process (which means the reverse process by which the actor tends 
to integrate itself into a larger ensemble - social group, community, class, nation) - 
(Chelcea, 1998: 11).  
Ascultaţi 
Citiţi fonetic 
  
Dicţionar 
The interactionism interprets the social reality as a negotiated order that 
builds continuously social identities that transcend the immediate situation and 
individual biography. The manifestation of social identity is behavioral limited 
by abilities and disabilities, structurally limited by the number and quality of 
social agents and dialectically limited by the social context that predetermines 
the socio-cultural expectations set of the historical reference period. These 
identity limitations are conceptualized as sources of identity and are socially 
constructed through symbolic interaction. Thus, terittorial boundaries, 
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ethnicity, gender or occupation are both limitations and sources of social 
identity (Weigert, 1986: 170). 
 
 
 
             In an attempt to identify the social factors with "limited" role in 
identities assertion we will refer to the theories of identity, which are subsumed 
to the symbolic interactionism perspective. (the one called inter-group social 
identity developed by Henri Tajfel (1981) and the auto-categorization theory, 
developed by John C. Turner (1987). In summary, it is to be remembered that 
in the construction of social identity overlap "the self" (as a reflection of society 
and to be regarded as a multifaceted and organized construct), on the one hand 
and social structure, on the other hand. People are living in relatively small 
networks of social relations which are specialized in roles that ensure the 
participation in these networks. Interaction and social relations patterns bring 
on stage one of the symbolic interactionism argument: the probability of 
entering in a specific social network is influenced by broader social structures of 
which this social network is being part of. Thus, social structures give the 
networks the role of "borders" for potential new participants. Cognitive 
approach shows that identities are constructed and are determined by structural 
social contexts. Both approaches have understood that identities are related to 
the social roles or to behavioral manifestations through meanings. The 
principles of the interpretative paradigm were systematized by E. Morin 
(Mucchielli, 1986: 5-12) in his theory of complexity, for humanities in 
particular, emphasizing that: there is no objective reality given; human reality is 
a reality of meaning (of meanings) and is constructed by social actors; there 
isn`t a ―single reality" but multiple realities constructed by different actors 
which coexist at the same time, neither of which is "more real" than others 
(they do not exclude and deny themselves mutually by coexistence); a reality of 
sense does not have a cause or several causes, but several sets of causal 
references among which the reality itself has it`s own contribution (the denying 
of the positivist  principle of linear causality).AscultaţiCitiţi 
fonetic AscultaţCitiţi fonetic AscultaţiCitiţi fonetic 
   
In building intolerant attitudes would be appropriate to be taken in the analysis 
also the process of stereotypes construction (as a set of shared beliefs regarding 
the personal characteristics, personality and behavioral traits specific for a 
group of people) and which are used by individuals as an identity strategy 
(Liiceanu in Badescu and others, 2005: 74). The author moves in line with the 
constructivist perspective - the thesis regarding the polar stereotyping based on 
membership – according to which in the social interaction environment the 
individual meets competing identity offers, launched in accordance with the 
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structure of social processes that characterize a society at a certain time. The 
person chooses a single combination of identity sources, which builds its 
multiple identity in a certain moment. To rationalize the choice, the individual 
claims, in correlation with multiple acts of affiliation, a set of polar stereotyping 
processes which are positive for the affiliation groups (in-groups) and negative 
for the out-groups. (Liiceanu in Badescu and others, 2005). Similarly can be 
explained also the construction of the manifested intolerance attitude, in our 
case towards neighbourhood.  
 
The Social Frameworks of the Neighbourhood Relationships` Construction in the Cross-Border...  
 
383 
2. The Social Frameworks of the Neighbourhood`s Acceptance in 
the Context of Interethnic Relations. Sociological Survey in 
Euroregion Bihor- Hajdu-Bihor 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In this fase of analyzing the resulted data from the ENRI survey, we 
will highlight the respondents self-placing in relation with relevant 
neighbourhood groups. Our investigation outlines the Bihor (RO) - Hajdu 
Bihar (HU) inhabitants tolerance towards the ethnic groups that are most 
commonly encountered in the region and in relation to three other significant 
social groups. The double perspective, given by the hetero-identification of 
Romanians and of Hungarians, both inhabitans of the Bihor - Hajdu Bihar 
geographical area, provides a detailed overview of the Romanian-Hungarian 
ethnic relationship and shows how the two communities relate to the 
neighborhood context. 
The purpose of the study presented is to identify the social frameworks 
that help building the tolerance attitudes of the population in Bihor (RO), 
Hajdu-Bihar (HU) euroregion in relation to the social groups which interact in 
this social space. 
 
2.2. Objectives 
 
 indentifying the intolerance attitudes of the subjects in relation to the 
out- groups that interact in the analyzed social space, by measuring the 
frequency of their members acceptance as neighbours 
 surpising the ethnic intolerance degree manifested between romanians 
and hungarians; 
 highlighting the significant social factors which determine the 
construction of the ethnic intolerance attitudes. 
 
2.3. Research methodology  
 
The used method was the sociological survey based on questionnaire 
applied to the population of the cross-border area Bihor (RO)-Hajdu-Bihar 
(HU). To achieve our objectives we have processed and analyzed one question 
from the questionnaire which aimed to obtain answers about the subjects 
acceptance of the interconnected out-groups members neighbourhood being 
present in the social space: "If your neighbour would be a member of one of 
the following groups, what would be your opinion about that?" 
We used the question to measure attitudes of tolerance towards 
members of other groups based on the idea of E.S. Bogardus – measuring the 
social distance by means of "social distance scale" or "Bogardus's scale", as 
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known in the scientific literature. Social distance is defined as "the degree of 
understanding and affection that people feel for each other" (cited Chelcea, 
2001: 325). It is measured by subjects' answers to seven questions ordered from 
highly positive attitude (7), to the one intensely negative (1), requiring the 
agreement with the following statements: to be in kinship by marriage, to be in 
the club as an intimate friend, on my street as neighbour, as employed in my 
profession, as a citizen in my country, only visitor in my country, I would exclude 
him/her from my country (cited Chelcea, 2001: 325-331). We considered that the 
agreement regarding the out-groups members neighbourhood is a sufficiently 
relevant indicator for social tolerance attitude, standing in the middle of the scale, 
if we exclude its extremes. We calculated the response frequency, considering 
them a degree of tolerance towards various groups indicated as answers for the 
question. 
 
2.4. Sample description 
 
The sample used in the research consists of a number of 1824 
respondents, structured in two sub-samples, the one from Hungary consisting 
of 1.000 respondents (484 respondents from Hajdu-Bihar and 516 respondents 
from Szabolcz-Szatmár-Bereg) and 824 respondents from Romania (528 
respondents from Bihor, 296 respondents from Satu-Mare). 
From the sample, in terms of the subjects` residence, 1.156 are urban subjects 
(63.4%) and 666 are from rural areas (36.5%) and by gender, there are 1.064 
female (58.3%) and 760 male (41.7%). By educational level, the sample 
comprises 1.528 people with high education (83.8%) and 296 without high 
education (16.2%). Depending on ethnicity, 507 respondents are Romanian 
(27.8%), 1.225 Hungarians (67.2%), 40 stating themselves as being Romanian 
and Hungarian (2.2%) and 18 respondents of other ethnicities (1.0%). 
 
2.5. Research premises 
 
Based on theoretical data presented in the context of identity theory, 
according to which the personal and social identity is constructed in the process 
of personality formation under the influence of the social frameworks, we 
postulate that the studied subjects will mostly manifest tolerant attitudes 
towards the out-groups to which they have a long relationship history and 
which are situated in their proximity. 
We advanced the hypothesis that in expressing attitudes in relation to 
neighbourhood, Romanians and Hungarians will occur, commonly, attitudes of 
high tolerance. The foundation of the statement is based on the long experience 
of cohabitation between the two ethnic groups. Despite some inconsistencies 
and even acute social conflicts in some historical moments, the Romanians and 
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Hungarians ethnic groups predominantly developed collaborative relationships, 
surpassing common difficulties arising from the experience of communism and 
other vicissitudes of the history. 
The study aims to test several hypotheses that concern the influence of 
some socially subsumed factors in which individuals included in the sample 
have built their intolerant attitudes as identity strategies: 
The residence of the subjects will significantly guide the attitudes of 
intolerance in relation to the neighbourhood, meaning that the rural area will 
generate more intolerant attitudes, given the higher role invested in the 
neighbourhood, as being an important factor in helping, networking in most 
areas of life, based on similar values and behavior. 
We postulate that women, through a stronger affirmation of the 
emotional dimension, will be more tolerant than men; Higher levels of 
education will generate more tolerant attitudes than lower ones as fosters the 
acquisition of specific values of democracy and multiculturalism; respondents 
from ethnically mixed families (Romanian-Hungarian) will mostly state tolerant 
attitudes, the acceptance of marriage with a member of an out-group assuming 
a higher degree of tolerance than accepting him/her as neighbour (also in the 
social distance scale); a higher income of the subjects, as a high social status 
indicator, will lead to more tolerant attitudes. 
 
2.6. Research results 
 
2.6.1. Subjects` tolerance degree towards the out-groups to which 
they relate in the same social space 
It should be noted that the analyzed responses were expressed by the 
entire sample from Hungary and Romania. 
The clusterial analyze of the intolerance manifestation in relation to the 
mentioned groups, outlines three classes as follows: 
 drug addicts and homosexuals; 
 gypsies, arabs, chinese and people with disabilities; 
 the rest of the ethnic groups. 
This overview shows that there is a positive correlation between the 
level of knowledge, of interaction with others and the tolerance level, meaning 
that individuals tend to show a high tolerance towards proximate and known 
out-groups, with which they have frequent social interactions. Basically, 
reporting to the other, determines in the social context the social distance and 
establishes inclusion and exclusion relations between individuals and groups. 
The mentioned social groups which are little known by the respondents 
and with which they do not have interactive social relations are less tolerated 
because in defining these out-groups normative stereotypes for the in-group 
occur and intergroup behaviours acquire competitive and discriminatory 
Floare CHIPEA, Raluca MICLEA 
 
386 
properties in various degrees depending on the size of social distance between 
groups. Thus, marginal social groups, which usually do not assert their identities 
in everyday social interactions, such as drug addicts, homosexuals or ethnic 
groups, few as number in the ethnic configuration of the region are normally 
perceived as being at the greatest social distance. 
 Regardless of the ethnic group, subjects expressed the highest degree of 
intolerance (73.6% of respondents) towards drug addicts, with whom they 
would not interact in their spatial proximity, for the reasons mentioned above 
but also because they, perhaps, appreciate the drug addicts` presence near their 
residence as a possible factor of contamination of the social environment 
through exhibited behavioral examples. They can be seen also as a potential 
threat by exhibiting potential deviant or criminal behavior, aiming at the 
neighborhood`s resources to purchase drugs, to which they usually become 
addicted. Public intolerance against drug can be interpreted as a success of 
policies adopted by institutions in order to prevent drug use in two social 
spaces (Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar region). The message against drug consumption 
enforces individuals` beliefs based on traditional values, generating negative 
stereotypes in relation with the real or virtual drug addicts` group. 
 The next group in line that is being intolerated are the homosexuals, 
which registers though a higher acceptance degree than drug addicts, 57,2% 
from the subjects affirming that they would be disturbed by their 
neighbourhood. The deviant sexual behaviour according to the socially 
accepted norms prescribed by the religious communities and in general by 
traditional culture, generate negative hetero-stereotypes for in-groups. The 
openness to diversity and multiculturalism creates many attitudes of acceptance 
and tolerance, including in the neighbourhood proximate social space, the out-
groups from this category not being considered dangerous, even if they share 
different values on one dimension of social networking (42.8% are not disturb 
by the neighborhood with homosexuals). 
Among ethnic groups included in the analysis, the gypsies register most 
intolerant attitudes of the subjects (38.3%) and Hungarians the fewest 
intoleramt attitudes (4.8%). Perhaps in building gypsies` rejection an important 
role is attributed to the universal hetero-stereotypes about this ethnic group, 
causing, in many situations, intergroup conflicts (Levine and Campbell, 1972, 
p.183 cited Chelcea (ed.), 1998: 270). 
There is an interesting situation in terms of intolerance attitudes 
towards arabs and chinese (22, 2% and 19.7%), which are placed after the 
gypsies according to manifested intolerance; these attitudes could be explained 
in the same register - universal hetero-stereotypes and low awareness and 
networking. On the other hand, arabs are suspect, especially after the events of 
September 11, of attacks and revenge and the chinese - of the invasion of other 
groups` social space for their survival. Along with these elements there can be 
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added also the differences in religious beliefs compared with the subjects from 
the sample which are mostly Hungarians and Romanians.  
 
2.6.2. Tolerance aspects between romanians and hungarians 
 
Next we will try to deepen the attitudes expressed only between the two 
ethnic groups in the sample, namely that of the Romanians and Hungarians, 
which actually is our main object of interest. 
 As shown in the data presented in table no. 1, the total population 
sample (of Romania and Hungary) expressed much more intolerant attitudes 
towards Romanians (11.7%) than to Hungarians (4.8%). Therefore we will 
attempt to detail the analysis to capture possible explanations. 
 
2.6.3. Expressed attitudes towards the ethnic group of Romanians 
 
Table 1. Tolerance towards romanian manifested by the subjects from 
Romania and Hungary (total sample) 
 
  
 
  Total sample 
Hungary 
Total 
sample 
Romania 
  
Tolerate 
romanian 
Values 791 785 1576 
% tolerate romanian 50.2% 49.8% 100.0% 
% sample 79.7% 98.5% 88.0% 
Adjusted residuals -12.2 12.2  
Do not 
tolerate 
romanian 
Values 202 12 214 
% tolerate romanian 94.4% 5.6% 100.0% 
% sample 20.3% 1.5% 12.0% 
Adjusted residuals 12.2 -12.2  
 
The neighbourhood relationship with Romanians is perceived 
significantly different from the Romanians and Hungarians (2=149.0 
sig=000)1. From 224 subjects who have responded that they would be 
disturbed to have romanian neighbours (expresses the intolerance towards 
Romanians) 20.3% are part of the sample from Hungary, compared with 1.5% 
of respondents living in Romania. The conclusion that  could be directly 
inferred from the mentioned data would suggest that the population of 
Hungary are more intolerant with romanians than the population from 
                                                          
1 (2=149.0 sig=000) represents the values resulted from the Significance Test 
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Romania (which is made up of romanians and hungarians, obviously in 
different weights). 
 If we consider only the sample from Romania, the data reveals that the 
two ethnic groups do not show significantly different attitudes in accepting a 
romanian in their neighbourhood (2=3,43 sig=0,064). However, the data 
suggest little difference in the detriment of the romanians, meaning that the 
hungarians from the romanian sample show more intolerant attitudes against 
the romanians (2.5%) compared with the romanians (0.8%). 
We analyzed the significance of the relationship between hungarians and 
romanians` intolerant attitude from the entire sample towards the ethnic group of 
romanians. The significance test (2=84,9  sig=000) indicates a significant 
relationship between the two variables, meaning that hungarians have more 
intolerant attitudes towards romanians (17.0%), compared with the romanians 
from the total sample (0 8%). 
 
2.6.4. Expressed attitudes towards the ethnic group of hungarians 
 
Analyzing the relationship between tolerance towards hungarian 
manifested by the respondents from Romania and Hungary, we find that the 
relationship is not statistically significant (2=0,8 sig=0,363). However, the data 
shows a sensitive difference between respondents from the two sub-samples in 
the sense that respondents from Hungary show more pronounced attitude of 
intolerance towards hungarians (5.3%), compared to respondents from 
Romania (4.4%), which would raise additional explanation.  
             If you submit to analysis only the sample from Romania, we find that 
the relationship between the tolerant attitudes expressed by romanians and 
hungarians towards the hungarian group is statistically significant (2=8,3 
sig=0,004), the hungarians from Romania being more intolerant with the 
hungarian group (5.9%), compared with the romanians - only 1.3% of cases 
declare that they would be disturbed by the proximity of the hungarians (see 
table 2). 
 Unfortunately we can not verify the attitude of the romanians from 
Hungary towards hungarians, because the number of romanians from Hungary 
in the sample is totally insignificant (only 2 subjects in the sample are 
romanians). 
The conclusion generated by the analyzed data suggests that the 
hungarian ethnic group, both from Romania and Hungary, is characterized by 
more intolerant attitude, including towards its in-group members. 
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Table 2. Tolerance towards hungarians manifested by the respondents from 
Romania 
  Sample Romania Total 
  Hungarian Romanian  
Tolerate 
hungarian 
Values 443 235 678 
 % Tolerate 
hungarian 
65.3% 34.7% 100.0% 
 % sample 94.1% 98.7% 95.6% 
 Adjusted 
residuals 
-2.9 2.9  
Do not 
tolerate 
hungarian 
Values 28 3 31 
Tolerate 
hungarian 
% Tolerate 
hungarian 
90.3% 9.7% 100.0% 
 % sample 5.9% 1.3% 4.4% 
 Adjusted 
residuals 
2.9 -2.9  
 
The intolerant in-groups are being created only based on ethnic 
criterion? 
 
Table 3.  The relation between the tolerance towards romanians and towards 
hungarians 
 
  Total sample Total 
 
 
Tolerate 
romanian 
Do not 
tolerate 
romanian 
 
Tolerate 
hungarian 
Values 1522 29 1551 
 % tolerate romanian 98.1% 1.9% 100.0% 
 % tolerate hungarian 90.8% 33.3% 88.0% 
 Adjusted residuals 16.1 -16.1  
Do not 
tolerate 
hungarian 
Values 154 58 212 
 % tolerate romanian 72.6% 27.4% 100.0% 
 % tolerate hungarian 9.2% 66.7% 12.0% 
 Residuals -16.1 16.1  
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The relationship between the attitudes of tolerance / intolerance 
expressed mutually by romanians and hungarians is highly significant (2= 
558,3,  sig=000), meaning that the most intolerant subjects (66.7%) say they do 
not tolerate both romanians and hungarians. This relationship suggests that 
negative stereotypes associated with intolerant attitudes are built not only in 
relation to ethnicity because identity is multidimensional. Romanians and 
hungarians from the analyzed region interact not only in the context of ethnic 
in-goups, but also in the professional and political context, entertainment, 
sports, economics, etc. Perhaps in this context can be explained also the 
intolerant attitudes manifested by the hungarians from the hungarian sample 
towards hungarians. 
 
2.6.5. The role of social frameworks in identity cnstruction  
 
Next we proposed to distinguish the social frameworks which might 
influence the construction of intolerant attitudes against members of ethnic groups. 
The study starts from testing some sub-hypothesis targeting the 
influence of some factors subsumed to the social environment in which 
individuals included in the sample have built their intolerant attitudes as identity 
strategies. In this context, it was tested the relationship of tolerance with the 
following variables involved in the hypothesis we made (area of residence, 
gender, income, education level, occupation, age and ethnicity of the partner). 
 
2.6.6. The influence of the residence in building the intolerance 
between romanians and hungarians 
 
Table 4. Tolerace towards romanians manifested by subjects according to their 
residence 
  Total sample Total 
  Urban Rural  
Tolerate 
romanian 
Values 1029 545 1574 
 % Tolerate romanian 65.4% 34.6% 100.0% 
 % sample 90.0% 84.5% 88.0% 
 Adjusted residuals 3.5 -3.5  
Do not 
tolerate 
romanian 
Values 114 100 214 
 % Tolerate romanian 53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 
 % sample 10.0% 15.5% 12.0% 
 Adjusted residuals -3.5 3.5  
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First is to note that, by applying significance tests, few relationships 
were found to be insignificant (variables: gender, income, age). Data showed 
that these variables do not significantly differenciate the attitudes of tolerance 
towards ethnic groups, which means that they are not "social limits" in shaping 
tolerance based on ethnic criterion. 
Attitudes towards romanians proximity is significantly different based 
on the residence of the subject (2=11,96 sig=0,001), 15.5% of the subjects that 
would not like to have romanian neighbours come from the rural space, 
compared to 10% coming from the urban area. 
 
Table 5. Tolerance towards hungarians manifested by subjects according to 
their residence 
 
  
Total sample 
 
Total 
  Urban Rural  
Tolerate 
hungarian 
Values 1099 579 1678 
 % Tolerate hungarian 65.5% 34.5% 100.0% 
 % sample 96.7% 92.1% 95.1% 
 Adjusted residuals 4.4 -4.4  
Do not tolerate 
hungarian 
Values 37 50 87 
 % Tolerate hungarian 42.5% 57.5% 100.0% 
 % eşantion 3.3% 7.9% 4.9% 
 Adjusted residuals -4.4 4.4  
 
Intolerance towards hungarians also differ significantly depending on 
the residence of the respondents (2=10,01 sig=000). Of the ones intolerant 
registered, most are from rural areas (7.9%) than urban (3.3%). 
The two situations give us clues to support that intolerant groups, 
which we have identified in our previous analysis, are mainly recruited from the 
rural areas. We advance for now the explanatry hypothesis of this difference by 
invoking the characteristics of the current rural, consisting in the predominance 
of  awareness relations, in establishing competing in-groups and out-groups, 
which mutually convey self-stereotypes and polar hetero-stereotypes, which 
they reproduce in order to rationalize their attitudes of mutual intolerance. In 
the social rural area also, competing offers are displayed among which the 
ethnic ones have an important perhaps even a central role, around which there 
can be configured other dimensions of identity, as kinship, profession, religion, 
politics, etc. The speech of political leaders from romanian and hungarian 
transition imbued by ethnocentric attitudes, with visible marks of nationalism 
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revival and asertion of ethnic separation tendency, as a way of networking, 
could be perceived better in rural areas considered to be more traditional. 
Correlating the data with those provided by the distribution analysis of ethnic 
intolerance attitudes between romanians and hungarians, we could say that the 
hungarian ethnic groups from the rural areas express attitudes with the highest 
degree of intolerance, establishing in-groups that tend to build positive self-
stereotypes along with negative hetero-stereotypes against out-groups with 
which they interrelate in the same social and geographical space. 
Among ethnic and racial patterns of interaction, the literature states 
assimilation, as a change in lifestyle and of distinctive characteristics of a group 
to comply with the dominant group model; ethnic pluralism, the model in 
which all racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinctive identities and enjoy 
relatively equal social position; segregation involves the physical and social 
separation of different racial and ethnic groups, in a context in which the 
dominant group uses its power to maintain the control over minority groups, 
giving them limited power and freedom; population transfer - population 
displacement belonging to one of the rival parties; annihilation – the extreme 
model of relationships between different racial and ethnic groups, where the 
dominant group annihilates the minority group and the genocide, which 
represents the extermination of a group of people by another. (Goodman, 
1992: 203-206). 
 
2.6.7. The role of the variable "level of education" in the 
construction of ethnic tolerance attitudes between romanians 
and hungarians in Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar euroregion 
 
The analysis of the mentioned relationship started from the hypothesis 
according to which a high level of education will encourage in building a 
tolerant attitude. 
The significance test indicates a significant difference of the tolerance 
towards romanians according to the high level of education (2=13,35  
sig=000). From the total of intolerant subjects, most of them are recruited from 
among those that do not have a high education level (13.2%), compared with 
those that have a high education level (5.6%), which is equivalent to the 
assertion that the high educational level favors building more tolerant attitudes. 
Although the relationship between tolerance towards hungarians and 
level of education (2=3,25 sig=0.071) is not significant, the trend is 
maintained, meaning that people with high level of education express lower 
intolerance attitudes (2.8% ) towards hungarians, compared with those who do 
not have a high level of education (5.3%). 
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Table 6. Tolerance towards romanians accordng to the educational level 
 
  Total sample Total 
    
Without 
high 
education 
With high 
education 
 
Tolerate 
romanian 
Values 1304 272 1576 
 % Tolerate romanian 82.7% 17.3% 100.0% 
 % sample 86.8% 94.4% 88.0% 
 Reziduri ajustate -3.7 3.7  
Do not 
tolerate 
romanian 
Values 198 16 214 
 % Tolerate romanian 92.5% 7.5% 100.0% 
 % sample 13.2% 5.6% 12.0% 
 Adjusted residuals 3.7 -3.7  
 
 
Table 7. Tolerance towards hungarians accordng to the educational level 
 
  Total sample Total 
  
I do not a 
have high 
education level 
I have a 
high 
education 
level 
 
Tolerate 
hungarian 
Values 1403 277 1680 
 
% Tolerate 
hungarian 
83.5% 16.5% 100.0% 
 % eşantion 94.7% 97.2% 95.1% 
 
Adjusted 
residuals 
-1.8 1.8  
Do not tolerate 
hungarian 
Values 79 8 87 
 
% Tolerate 
hungarian 
90.8% 9.2% 100.0% 
 % sample 5.3% 2.8% 4.9% 
 Adjusted Residual 1.8 -1.8  
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2.6.8. Interethnic tolerance attitudes shown by ethnically mixed 
family members (families consisting of Romanian and 
Hungarian partners)  
 
In building the hypothesis regarding the presence of high tolerance 
attitudes at married respondents towards partners from other ethnic groups, we 
started from the hypothesis that accepting the other as a partner of the couple 
assumed its location as being situated at a lower social distance than the 
neighborhood relationship (assumption involved also in Bogardus's scale). 
To test the hypothesis we analyzed the structure of the sample based on 
the rules of family couples` construction. We found that most married 
respondents have chosen their partner based on ethnic endogamy principle; 
only 5.6% of romanian respondents are married to hungarians and 2.9% of 
hungarian respondents are married with romanian partners. 
The relations between the attitudes of tolerance towards romanians and 
hungarians and the membership of a joint romanian-hungarian family are 
insignificant. Therefore belonging to a ethnically mixed family do not constitute 
a significant factor to increase ethnic tolerance as we assumed by the initial 
hypothesis, primarily because of the small number of mixed families in the 
sample. However, of the four tested relations (tolerance towards romanians and 
romanian-hungarian or hungarian-romanian joint families on one hand and 
tolerance towards hungarians and being member of a romanian-hungarian or 
hungarian-romanian joint family), we identified a single situation of intolerance 
expression - 2 subjects, representing 1.3%  of romanian-hungarian mixed 
families from the sample (the subject is hungarian and the partner is romanian) 
said they would be disturbed by the neighborhood with the romanians. In all 
other cases, subjects from mixed families showed attitudes of tolerance towards 
the romanians and hungarians. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
- The study aimed to identify the degree of tolerance manifested by the 
population living in the Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar cross-border euroregion in relation 
to the out-groups located in the same social space and aimed to capture the 
significant social factors that influence the construction of intolerant attitudes. 
We measured the degree of tolerance by quantifying responses to a single 
question from the questionnaire, the one that interrogates the attitudes of 
subjects in relation to the neighborhood of other groups; 
- The population of the Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar euroregion mainly manifests 
high tolerance attitudes in relation to the out-groups living in the same social 
space; 
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- Respondents tend to show an increased tolerance towards proximate 
well-known out-groups, with which they have frequent social interactions; 
- Regardless of the ethnic group, subjects express the highest degree of 
intolerance (73.6% of respondents) towards drug addicts, with whom they 
would not like to interact in their spatial proximity, followed by homosexuals 
(57.2% ); 
- In relation to the ethnic groups, the most intolerant attitudes are 
expressed towards gypsies (38.3%), and towards hungarians are manifested the 
fewest intolerant attitudes (4.8%); 
- From the analysis of the relation between romanians and hungarians 
results that the hungarian group is more intolerant than the romanian one, at 
the level of the entire sample and at the level of the sub-samples from Romania 
and Hungary. Moreover, hungarians express the most intolerant attitudes also 
towards the hungarians; 
- The relationship between the attitudes of tolerance/intolerance 
expressed by romanians and hungarians is highly significant in the sense that 
most intolerant subjects (66.7%) state that they do not tolerate both romanians 
and hungarians. This relationship suggests that negative stereotypes associated 
with intolerant attitudes are built not only in relation to ethnicity -Identity is 
multidimensional (economic, political, cultural, etc.). Romanians and hungarians 
from the analyzed space interact not only in the context of ethnic in-groups, 
but also in the professional, political, entertainment, sports, economic ones etc. 
Perhaps in this context can also be explained the intolerant attitudes declared 
by hungarians from the sample in Hungary towards hungarians.  
- The most common intolerant attitudes towards both the romanians 
and hungarians are located in rural areas and they are manifested mainly by 
people with no high education level.  
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Abstract. Using data from a survey with 1824 subjects from four counties at the 
Romanian-Hungarian border, this paper focuses on levels of personal subjective well-being and 
the relationship that this has with satisfaction with neighbourhood, locality, region, country and 
EU. We found that Hungarians in Hungary are the most satisfied with their lives, and also 
with their places of residence. Romanian majority and Hungarian minority in Romania display 
similar levels of personal well-being, and are equally satisfied with their neighbourhoods and 
localities. However, the Hungarian minority is less satisfied with Romania, but also with EU. 
Satisfaction with neighbourhood, locality and region predicts the best personal well-being of the 
citizens from both countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING AND SATISFACTION WITH 
PLACES OF RESIDENCE IN THE COUNTIES AT THE 
CROSS-BORDER BETWEEN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA 
 
 
 
Sergiu BĂLŢĂTESCU* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the present paper I will explore the variations in subjective well-being 
in the counties at the cross-border between Hungary and Romania. The field 
research was conducted within the ENRI (European, National and Regional 
Identity) project1. I will start with a theoretical discussion on the signification, 
measures and determinants of subjective well-being. Then I will explore 
comparatively the levels and the determinants of subjective well-being in these 
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regions, in relationship with satisfactions with variations places: personal house, 
neighborhood, locality, region, country and European Union. 
 
2. Subjective well-being: theoretical approaches 
 
Defined as the overall evaluation of life (Andrews, Robinson, 1991), 
subjective well-being is the operationalization of the concept of happiness. It 
has a multidimensional concept, which comprises a cognitive dimension and an 
affective one (Andrews, Robinson, 1991; Diener, 1994). The cognitive 
dimension is measured by ―life satisfaction‖, or ―satisfaction with life as a 
whole‖ and is defined as a general evaluation of the way the personal life match 
the personal aspirations, in domains such as work, family, relations, leisure, etc. 
(Cummins, 1996). Life satisfaction is measured either by simple scales (answer 
to the question ―taking all your life into consideration, how satisfied are you 
with life as a whole?‖ (Andrews, Withey, 1976), or by scales with multiple items.  
 
3. Subjective well-being in Hungary and Romania 
 
Both neighbouring societies share common characteristics concerning 
the levels and correlates of subjective well-being, which are the product of 
similar experiences as post-communist countries. Most important, the average 
happiness level of their citizens are among the lowest in European Union, 
which is not surprising, giving their communist legacy, the fall of the economy 
in the early nineties, and that they a type of society plagued by lack of trust and 
optimism (Bălţătescu, 2002; Orsolya, 2002). Another remarkable aspect is that 
not only global satisfaction, but also satisfaction with different domains is 
usually lower than in the rest of EU. It is the case not only for income, but also 
for more intimate domains such as satisfaction with family or friends is not so 
straightforward. Delhey (2004: 28) explains that economic hardship matters in 
their case, making their citizen‘s life more stressful, and lowering their level of 
satisfaction with, for instance, social and family relations.  
As displayed in World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven, 2003), 
people report generally higher values in Hungary than in Romania. For the 4 
point life satisfaction scale, used in the Eurobarometer surveys from 1998 in 
Romanian and since 2001 for Hungary, the average for Hungary is 2.5, which 
correspond to an average of 5 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the average for 
Romania is 2.23, which corresponds to an average of 4.4 on a 0-10 scale. 
Giving these results, we can anticipate that we would find higher levels of 
interpersonal subjective well-being in the investigated Hungarian region than in 
the Romanian counterpart. 
 
Subjective Well-Being and Satisfaction with Places of Residence in the Counties at the Cross-Border…  
 
401 
4. National satisfaction and happiness 
 
While being experienced mostly at individual level, happiness is not a 
strictly personal phenomenon, and has strong causal links with the physical, 
economic and social environments of our lives. It‘s because - Morrison, Tay 
and Diener (2011) discuss with reference to countries – living in a specific 
territory affect many personal circumstances such as job opportunities, health 
care, crime victimization.  
There is not a single factor that matters here: living in certain territories is 
associated with a sense of social identity, with a potential of enhancing or lowering 
the personal well-being. National pride and identification is a predictor of 
subjective well-being in countries like Romania (Bălţătescu, 2009), Poland (Hamer, 
in press), as well as in Europe (Bălţătescu, 2010) and Asia (Jagodzinski, 2010). 
But living in a certain nation is only a part of the experience that the 
individual has with ―places‖ or ―territories‖. Closer areas such as neighborhoods, 
localities, regions may also have influence on personal well-being. 
 
5. Satisfaction with housing, neighborhood, locality, region, 
nation and Europe 
 
Among the places we live, our house is an important part of our individual 
quality of life. Determinants of housing satisfaction are not individual, but linked 
with factors such as the network of relationships that members of the household 
develop over time, or the characteristics of neighborhood and localities where the 
house is situated (Vera-Toscano, Ateca-Amestoy, 2008). 
Neighborhood is the closest instance of a community. Satisfaction with 
neighborhood is also a very important component of community satisfaction. 
An array of characteristics determines individual satisfaction with it, among 
them being the quality of neighborhood itself (e.g. security, pollution, and 
utilities), frequency of interaction with neighbors, and also sociological qualities 
such as social capital of the individuals or families involved, and collective 
efficacy (Allen, Bentler, Gutek, 1985; Hur,  Morrow-Jones, 2008; Oidjarv, 2010; 
Sirgy, Cornwell, 2002). 
Satisfaction with localities and regions are less discussed in the literature. Here, 
however, the ethnic differences seem to matter more than for the satisfactions with 
housing and neighborhood. Finally, satisfaction with EU is important for the 
citizens of this supra-national entity, and should be linked with personal 
satisfaction, although there are scarce evidences in the literature. 
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6. Objectives and research questions 
 
In this study I will explore the links between satisfaction with all the 
above-mentioned instances and personal satisfaction. I will start with the 
supposition that satisfactions with neighborhood, locality, nation and EU are 
correlated with the personal satisfaction of the interviewed persons. We chose 
to explore these relationships in the Romanian counties of Bihor and Satu-
Mare, and in the neighboring Hungarian counties of Hajdu-Bihar and Szabolcs-
Szatmar, multiethnic neighboring regions in which the three most important 
ethnic groups (Romanians and Hungarians in Romania, and Hungarians in 
Hungary) are supposed to have different levels of satisfaction, depending on 
the socio-economic development of their countries and counties, their minority 
status, local and national attachments. 
Thus, my research questions would be the following: Is membership in 
these three groups associated with different levels of subjective well-being? Is it 
associated with different levels of satisfaction with neighborhood, locality, 
region, country and EU? And finally, which of these satisfactions are associated 
with the evaluation of personal wellbeing? 
 
7. Method 
 
In the survey conducted within the ENRI project, 1824 subject were 
interviewed at their homes on both sides of Romanian-Hungarian border. The 
sample was stratified and is well represented. We were interested in variations 
of the studied variables by the three most important ethnic groups Hungarians 
in Hungary (n=979), Hungarians in Romania (n=246), and Romanians in 
Romania (n=506). The questionnaire includes different measures of attachment 
and satisfaction with locality, region, country and European Union, as well as 
various measures of subjective well-being. 
Subjective well-being was measured by the Personal Wellbeing Index, a 
scale composed on 8 items, asking the respondents to rate their satisfaction 
with: Standard of living, Health, Achievements in life, Personal relationships, 
Personal safety, Community connectedness, Future security, Spirituality or 
religion (Cummins et al., 2004). The summative scale shows a very good 
reliability (Cronbach alpha over 0.8). The sum of the eight items has been 
linearly transformed on a 0-100 scale. 
Additionally, 7 items measured the satisfaction of the respondents with 
their home, neighbors, neighborhood, locality, region, the country of your 
residence, and the European Union. The items have been introduced in a 
Principal Component Analysis. Results were rotated using Varimax method 
with Kaiser Normalization. For the Hungarian in Hungary subsample we 
computed a single factor solution. For the rest of the samples, a 2 factors 
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solution emerged, the second factor explaining satisfaction with country 
(Romania) and satisfaction with European Union. As a result we computed an 
index of ―regional well-being‖ from the following four items: your home, your 
neighbourhood, the locality where you live, the region where you live. The 
index shows a very good reliability for all the samples, with Cronbach alpha‘s 
varying between 0.797 and 0.816. The scale PWI was constructed as a sum of 
unweight items, and linearly transformed to a range from 0 to 100.  
 
 
8. Results 
 
8.1. Personal Wellbeing Index 
 
Overall, there are serious differences between the three groups in what 
concerns the average levels of Personal Wellbeing Index. This is in perfect 
concordance with most country averages in subjective well-being, measured by 
international surveys. 
 
Table 2. Average levels of personal well-being for the three samples, standard 
errors and sign of significant differences between the means (using 
Bonferoni test). 
 
Ethnicity by country 
Sign of 
significant 
differences 
Hungarian in 
Hungary  
Hungarian in 
Romania 
Romanian in 
Romania  
1-
2 
  
1-
3 
  
2-
3 
  Mean Std. 
Error 
of 
Mean 
Mean Std. 
Error 
of 
Mean 
Mea
n 
Std. 
Error 
of 
Mean 
Personal Wellbeing 
Index 
67,30 0,51 63,41 0,86 62,84 0,61 + +  
 
 
8.2. Satisfaction with places 
 
We can see that the samples have significant differences in what regards 
their evaluations of satisfaction with places. The ethnic majority in Hungary 
reports higher satisfaction with all domains than the Hungarians in Romania, 
and also from the ethnic majority in Romania (with the exception of 
satisfaction with European Union). Members of Hungarian minority in 
Romania are less satisfied than the majority population with nation, but also 
with European Union. 
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The fact that Hungarians from Hungary are the most satisfied with the 
majority of the above mentioned domains proves there is a correlation between 
social well-being and personal well-being. People in richer countries/regions 
(Hungary, in our case) are the most satisfied with their neigborhood, locality, 
region, nation and even with European Union. 
We compared average levels of items that compose by sub-samples. 
Results are shown in the following table: 
 
Table 3. Average levels of satisfaction with places for the three samples, 
standard errors and sign of significant differences between the means 
(using Bonferoni test). 
 
 
Ethnicity by country 
Sign of 
significant 
differences 
Hungarian in 
Hungary  
Hungarian in 
Romania  
Romanian in 
Romania  
1-
2 
  
1-
3 
  
2-
3 
  Mean Std. 
Error 
of 
Mean 
Mean Std. 
Error 
of 
Mean 
Mea
n 
Std. 
Error 
of 
Mean 
Local & regional 
satisfaction 
73.7 0.55 65.1 0.82 55.3 0.89 + +  
National satisfaction 65.3 0.90 38.3 1.44 47.1 1.31 + + - 
Satisfaction with 
European Union 
67.9 0.64 52.1 1.07 53.8 0.96 +  - 
 
Another line of interpretation of these results is the difference within 
minority and majority. In the Romanian counties investigated, the minority 
population reports equal satisfaction with the local & regional places, while they 
report lower satisfaction with nation while even with EU. The lesser attachment 
with the nation would explain the lower satisfaction with nation. However their 
lower satisfaction with EU is somehow hard to explain, giving the fact that 
Hungarian minority in Romania sees European Union as a guaranty for their 
cultural autonomy.  
 
8.3. Unique contribution of local, regional, national and EU 
satisfactions to personal well-being 
 
I regressed Personal Well-being Index against the three satisfactions 
variables (i.e. local & regional, national and EU), in order to compare the 
unique contribution of these satisfactions with the global subjective well-being 
indicator. The next table shows the results of this analysis for all the items. The 
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overall fit is very good: variations of PWI items explain around 50-60 % of the 
variation of the dependent variable. 
 
Table 4. Regression of satisfaction with places against life satisfaction for the 
three subsamples 
 Hungarian in 
Hungary 
Hungarian in 
Romania 
Romanian in 
Romania 
 β Sig(t) β Sig(t) Β Sig(t) 
Local & regional 
satisfaction 
.525 0.00 .505 0.00 .436 0.00 
National 
satisfaction 
-.067 0.82 .058 0.38 .015 0.78 
Satisfaction with 
European Union 
.173 0.00 .046 0.50 .133 0.01 
Adj. R2 .584 .549 .508 
 
A first conclusion is that all sub-samples are very similar in what concerns 
the structure of the predictors. Local and regional satisfaction has the largest 
contribution to the prediction of life as a whole for, with beta = 0.44-0.52. The 
other domain that also predict the dependent variable is satisfaction with 
European Union, with β= .13-0.17 (except for Hungarians in Romania). Contrary 
to the findings in the cited literature, national satisfaction has no contribution to 
life as whole. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
In four counties at the Romanian-Hungarian border, the ENRI survey 
measured personal well-being and satisfaction with local & regional instances, 
country and EU. We found that, in concordance with other results, Hungarians 
from Hungary are the most satisfied with their lives, and also with 
neighbourhoods, localities, country and EU. Romanian majority and Hungarian 
minority in Romania display similar levels of personal well-being, and they 
report they are equally satisfied with their neighbourhoods and localities. 
However, the Hungarian minority is less satisfied with the country in which 
they live, which is explainable by the lower attachment to the national state. 
They are also less satisfied with EU, which is somehow surprising. Finally, I 
found that there is an association between personal well-being, local & regional 
satisfaction, and satisfaction with EU. Against the previous results, national 
satisfaction does not seem to be correlated with subjective well-being. These 
results confirm that places of residence have an impact in people‘s happiness, 
which may be explained by variations in living conditions that these different 
places provide, but also by people‘s attachments to them. 
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Abstract. The evolutions in the final years of the twentieth century in the Soviet 
Union and in all the Communist area led to significant changes in the Eastern Europe area, 
changes that continue until today. Some countries of the former Soviet bloc have been able to 
define a clear orientation to the west, to “Europe”, while others are still searching for a 
direction, and have passed through different orientations depending on their own temporal 
interests or strong external influences. Our subject research is focused on the case of 
Transnistria, the conflict and its core elements, the main actors involved, the characterization of 
the conflict and its peculiarities compared with other “frozen conflicts” and the attempts to 
create an identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRANSDNIESTRIA. ETHNIC CONFLICT 
OR GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS? 
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The methodology used for this research is the following: after a brief 
geographical, socio-political and economic area description, with references to 
some historical facts that we consider important for understanding the problem 
in its complexity and in its totality, we will make a synthesis of the points of 
interest which will then be analyzed. We consider relevant to make a 
description and an analysis of the developments in Moldova, generally, and of 
the conflict, particularly, but not to isolate excessively the problem of 
Transdniestria.  
From the documentary sources that we used we mention: official 
documents (treaties, declarations, speeches, etc), reports of international 
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organizations or bodies, books, articles, press, information issued in media 
channels, web sites of various institutions, organizations, missions, etc. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The developments which took place with the fall of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), have had effects on the borders in Eastern Europe. 
The emergence of New Independent States has changed the geopolitical 
context in the region. The national borders appear as places of speeches on 
security and identity, when new entities are appearing there. 
The changes taking place in the Eastern European area are the product 
of the conflicts between the interests of the global and/or the regional powers 
(Enciu, 2001: 167). 
The current Transdniestria is the successor of the Moldavian Soviet 
Socialist Autonomous Republic, created in 1924 by Stalin in the Soviet Ukraine, 
after the loss of Bessarabia at the end of the First World War. The capital was 
established at Balta, and then moved to Tiraspol. After the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, Bessarabia was incorporated into the Soviet Union, then 
proclaiming the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic with the capital in 
Chisinau, and in its composition entering also the western part of the 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic, the eastern part entering in 
the composition of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Transdniestria declared its independence on September 2, 1990, 
established its capital at Tiraspol, but is not recognized internationally. 
Transdniestria‘s population is about 555.000 inhabitants of which Moldavians 
account for 40%, Ukrainians 28%, Russians 24% and 8% others1. The area is 
about 3567 square kilometers and its territory is divided into six different 
administrative regions. 
After the conflict of 1992, the separatists organized as a state: 
Transdniestria has a president, a parliament, a bank, currency, customs, border 
police, declares persona non grata, etc.   
The relations between Moldova and Transdniestria and the resolutions 
of conflicts has been mainly influenced by internal factors and external factors 
such as geopolitical interests and the policies of other actors on the 
international scene: Russia, European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), Ukraine, Romania etc. 
                                                          
1 We chose data from the 1989 referendum, because they are recognized (official) data, 
other data are taken by leaders from Tiraspol and are not recognized because they 
come from not recognized authorities. Another reason is that this data is from just 
one year before the conflict. The same data are used by the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
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Transdniestria's economy has the following main features: dependency 
on imported raw materials from Russia, high energy dependence; it is a 
declining economy, with a high rate of emigration due to economic difficulties. 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union – a global super-power - Russia has been 
trying to retain the legacy of the USSR and the status of the Soviet Union, but with 
the loss of territory and influence Russia is going through a delicate moment in its 
history and is obliged to reduce its status to that of a regional power. 
However, by late 90, as Romania had made progress toward EU 
membership, the Romania-Ukraine-Moldova border had come into the center 
of EU attention. The persistence of conflicts in the Moldavian separatist region 
of Transdniestria turned the territory into an area of illegal activities, along with 
the potential to export political instability and immigration from the members 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the EU states, factors 
that forced the EU to participate more actively in the region. 
 
2. The Origin of the Conflict 
 
The origin of the conflict is to be found in the emergence of the 
language laws that established the Romanian language as the official language -, 
thereby enhancing the Romanian-Moldavian identity and denouncing the 
forced distinction made in the Soviet period through the use of the Russian 
language and the Cyrillic alphabet.  This was the perfect excuse to shake, since 
1990, the ghosts of the reunification. 
Regarding the causes of the separatism in Transdniestria, the historian 
Enciu N. (2001: 167) presents three essential elements: 
a) the expansion of the Kremlin policy, which tried to maintain the ex-
Soviet countries in its sphere of influence. 
b) the echoes of the national pro-Romanian revival movement of the 
majority of the population in Moldova in 1989-1991. 
c) the political reaction in the opposite direction of the Russian 
population from Transdniestria. 
Since 1991, Moldova has been trying to find his identity, distancing 
itself from its Soviet half-century, but without a real decision to adopt its 
Romanian history and heritage. 
It should be mentioned that the Transdniestrian separatist intentions 
have their roots in the Soviet Union, but the problem must be solved inside the 
new state of Moldova. In Transdniestria there also live people who accept the 
sovereignty of Moldova, but the regime struggles to assert a full independence. 
The Transdniestrian regime, which is a totalitarian and oppressive regime, could 
be changed only by the action of external factors. 
It is very clear that this is a Russia-Moldova dispute, caused by Russia's 
desire to play an important role in the political, social, and economic life of the 
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former Soviet space, trying to defend its interests in the region and to maintain 
control in the area. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and later with Moldova's 
independence, the political elites from the left bank (Transdniestria) feared that 
the new independent country (Moldova) will unite with Romania. The fear that 
this might happen led to the separation of Transdniestria from Moldova. Most 
of the leaders of Transdniestria are old members of the Communist Party of 
Moldova or of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and are opposed to 
any rapprochement to Romania.  
The Pro-Russian elites have fought in the war of 1992, supported by the 
Russian 14th Army, led by the Russian General Lebed. In 1992 President Yeltin 
engaged in negotiating a peace agreement between the two parties, the 
agreement that ended the fight, but supporting the maintenance of the region 
outside the control of the Moldavian authorities. Since then there is an 
uncertain peace, while negotiations for a political agreement have had no 
tangible results.  
After signing the Agreement of June, 21, 1992, the Russians decided to 
install in the area 6,000 peacekeeping troops, but far from being independent, 
they have helped to strengthen the separatist regime, including the loss of 
authority in the area by the legitimate government of Chisinau. 
In 1994 an agreement was signed between Moldova and Russia related 
to the exit of Russian troops from Transdniestria, but the Russian Duma has 
not ratified it. During the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999, Russia promised 
again to withdraw troops from Transdniestria, but has not done so to this day. 
 
3. The Peculiarities of the Conflict 
 
There are different opinions on the type of conflict and its similarities 
with other frozen conflicts. 
Some authors characterize the conflict as an ethnic civil war, ethnic 
conflict (Kaufman, 1997: 171; Urjewicz, 1993: 9-25; Chinn, 1997: 43-51). The 
general conclusion is that the conflict in Transdniestria is based on political and 
ideological reasons. 
The conflict was very different from the war in the Balkans and the 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in the manner that it was not based on ethnic 
identity, but was motivated by economic and political issues: a mixture of 
economic interests, a Soviet nostalgia and a Russian influence. There are no 
ethnic tensions between the main groups living in Moldova and those living in 
Transdniestria (Boonstra, 2007: 1). 
The conflict in Transdniestria cannot be described as an ethnic conflict. Its 
motivations are political, as are its elements and everyday actions (Weissman, 1992: 
17). The confrontation on the Dniester is essentially a political struggle (Waters, 
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1997: 4). In fact this secessionist movement is made up of old communists and 
Russian militaries, driven by the idea to restore communism in a renewed Soviet 
Union, starting from Transdniestria (Simon, 1994: 39). 
A report by the OSCE Mission in Chisinau emphasizes the idea that 
this conflict cannot be described as an ethnic conflict, because it is purely 
political and ideological. 2 
Although the role of the conflict from Transdniestria was to constitute 
a weapon to influence the policy of the Republic of Moldova, it turned into an 
instrument of Russia to manage the geostrategic balance in the region, to 
influence the foreign policy of Ukraine, Georgia, Romania and to stop the 
eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO.  
Over time, the conflict has come to represent a problem of organized 
crime and to enter on the agenda of the political actors in the area. Changes and 
developments that have taken place require a vision and approach under 
different aspects: 
a) geopolitical: NATO and EU enlargement have changed the 
geopolitical map of Europe, Transdniestria gets closer to the borders of the 
Member States, resulting in greater interest in its bodies and institutions. Wider 
international actors with greater weight and power on the scale of international 
relations can only be beneficial to find a peaceful, fair, sustainable and effective 
solution for the conflict. It is important to emphasize the difference between 
the Transdniestrian conflict and other conflicts in the Balkans or the former 
Soviet territories. In Transdniestria there is not an entity, a subject that wants 
free self-determination (Abkhazia, different ethno-cultural entity, Nagorno-
Karabakh, mono-ethnic minority group). 
b) Regional: changes towards a homogeneous political space, composed 
by states that have adopted common values, and moves with different speeds in 
a common direction - towards the EU and NATO. All these changes become 
particularly important if we are looking at the developments in Ukraine, 
Moldova, and Georgia in recent years. 
c) national level: given that none of the regional actors (Moldova, 
Ukraine, Romania) have the necessary tools for tackling the crisis, requires the 
cooperation and involvement of all actors for finding a negotiated solution, and 
then to promote and support this solution at the national level. 
d) Local: illegitimate authorities have made efforts to consolidate their 
power and control in Transdniestria and to acquire the characteristic attributes 
of a state. So the breakaway region has president, parliament, judiciary power, 
security and police organs, currency, flag, anthem, etc. 
The position of the Transdniestrian authorities remains to achieve some 
objectives that are considered favorable for Transdniestria: 
                                                          
2 Report No. 13 by the CSCE Mission to Moldova, November 13, 1993, http://www.osce. 
org/moldova/42307 , accessed at 16.05.2011. 
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1. Maintaining the tension in the conflict of Transdniestria using tactics 
of intimidation and inciting, Tiraspol succeeding to tension relations 
with Chisinau, using the thesis of ―the impossible compromise‖ as 
justification for its separation from Moldova. In defending their 
position the Transdniestrian authorities took the following steps: 
maintenance of peak demand in the negotiations, supporting the need 
for a referendum to determine the future of the two entities, 
developing direct relations with other CIS auto proclaimed 
independent republics (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh) 
including military cooperation, promoting the maintenance of the 
Russian peacekeeping troops and rejecting the introduction of the 
Western peacekeeping forces etc. 
2. Making every effort for Russia to strengthen its political-military 
presence in Transdniestria; Desiring to strengthen its interests in the 
region, the Russian Federation takes every opportunity to support the 
demands and the actions of the separatist regime from Tiraspol, using 
diplomatic tricks to project the image of an independent mediator and 
guarantor of conflict resolution. 
3. Maintaining the ambiguous position of Ukraine on the issue of 
Transdniestria. 
4. Preserving and consolidating the power of the separatist regime of 
Tiraspol. 
5. Reinforcing the existence of an important human presence in military 
leadership and in the separatist administration from Tiraspol, 
coordinated by Moscow. 
The conflict in Transdniestria, changes often from the political to the 
economic dimension, because the authorities from Tiraspol want to demonstrate 
and to convince Chisinau that they have sufficient instruments to influence the 
economic situation and the security of the Republic of Moldova and to guide the 
negotiations towards the ―necessary direction‖.  
The stability in Moldova, in the South and the North Caucasus is 
important for the enlarged EU, because it is close on its borders. There are 
considerable differences in the status of the three entities. First, the conflict in 
Transdniestria is almost dead while in Abkhazia and Ossetia the situation is 
very hot, and fighting continuous in Chechnya. Second, Russia's interests also 
vary - Moscow has its heart in the events in Chechnya and is keeping its finger 
on the pulse in Abkhazia, but Moldova appears to be not a priority, even within 
the CIS policy of the Kremlin. 
The EU is very concerned about the problem of Transdniestria and has 
a general interest in Abkhazia (part of the South Caucasus). The European 
vision about Chechnya has not changed substantially, even in light of the war 
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on terror although the statements on this issue have become milder; Europe 
continues to exploit the Chechen issue as a lever to influence Russian policy. 
The prospects for an intervention in the case of Moldova are favorable, 
while Abkhazia is unlikely to fall under the auspices of the European Union or 
of a European-Russian joint force. Regarding Chechnya, there is no chance that 
Moscow would allow some kind of international involvement in this region. 
Moreover, it will depend on Russia's help and the ability of the parties 
to overcome the rivalries of the Cold War and to come back to the post cold 
war mentality. 
The Transdniestrian case is different from that of Kosovo because the 
state (Moldova) respects laws and international rules and that which does not 
respect is the separatist region (Transdniestria), whose leaders are not allowed 
to enter the territory of the European Union or the United States. In 
Transdniestria there isn‘t a dominant minority different from the state (from 
the ethnic point of view) and the international community has not sanctioned 
the state‘s behavior, but there has been a confrontation between the separatist 
region - supported by another state - and the internationally recognized state. In 
conclusion, no Kosovo solution exists and there is no basis to support such a 
solution in the case of Transdniestria. 
 
4. The Intention to Build an “Identity” 
 
In Transdniestria there was no conflict before 1989, which makes this 
conflict different from that of other post-Soviet conflicts. It is not possible to 
build an identity based on conflict alone, especially in the case of the 
"Transdniestrian people" which did not exist before the conflict (Sofransky, 
2002: 293-296). There is a strong intention and activity of the leaders of 
Transdniestria to create a Transdniestrian identity, and that identity could be a 
significant barrier in the way to solving the conflict, a brake on the reintegration 
of Transdniestria with Moldova. 
The leaders of Transdniestria have argued that Transdniestria has the right 
to be independent. Creating or converting an ethnically heterogeneous space into 
an identity of its own was a priority for the authorities from Tiraspol. The intention 
is to create even a new "nation". 
The political propaganda insists to create a type of loyalty to the 
"republic", especially for the new generations, developing campaigns in schools 
for the young people to consider themselves citizens of Transdniestria and to 
believe they have nothing in common with Moldova, to ensure that in future 
they will preclude reunification with Moldova and that Transdniestria will insist 
on the idea of independence. Most students consider that the separation into 
two countries is artificial and that there is no difference between the population 
of Moldova and Transdniestria especially because for a long time they have 
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lived together in the same country and because the Transdniestrian people has 
no historical roots as a different people (Cojocaru, 2006: 6). 
In the ideological sphere, Transdniestria has consolidated its separatist 
positions and has developed obligations for the political factors. The doctrine 
of the authorities from Tiraspol is based on two essential elements. The first of 
them is the strengthening of the region/province statehood in order to oppose, 
what they call, "the aggressively nationalistic politics of Chisinau‖. The second 
element is Russian economic, political and cultural support. 
In Transdniestria the term Russian-speaking (Russian speaking) is used to 
refer to Russian, Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz people living in Transdniestria, 
to show that the Russian-speaking population can be considered as a majority. The 
term is challenged by Romanian speakers in Transdniestria because they speak 
Russian also, but they are not Russians, and in the same situation are the 
Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz (Chinn and Roper, 1995: 306-307). 
According to the Tiraspol regime‘s data (which are not considered 
official data), in recent years the number of Russian citizens who are established 
in the region has grown significantly. In 1999 in Transdniestria were 
approximately 50-55 000 Russian citizens, in 2000 the number grew to 80 000, 
in 2004 to over 125 000. If the rate of growth remains in the next few years 
then it is possible that people with Russian citizenship to become a majority3. 
Transdniestria has developed an educational system based on a startling 
combination of Soviet relics and innovations such as ―History of 
Transdniestria‖ or ‗"Literature of Transdniestria‖. All school programs are 
loaded by ideology centered on Transdniestrian patriotism talking about the 
―President of Transdniestria‖, Smirnov, in a similar manner to the personality 
cult during Stalin. It promotes values that have nothing in common with 
European values and human rights, but are very similar to those of the Soviet 
regime (Roper, 2005: 1-14). 
The official discourse tends to rewrite history; many historical events are 
presented differently from what happened in reality and in a strong pro-Russian 
and anti-Moldavian manner. It tries to create a common identity for the 
population of Transdniestria, developing Transdniestrian patriotism based solely 
on opposition and condemnation of identity or similarity with Moldova and 
based on a Moldavian and Transdniestrian difference, an approximation between 
Transdniestria and Russia or Soviet – Transdniestrian nearby. 
From religious point of view, the predominant practice is orthodoxy with 
91%, then Catholic with 4%, and others. 
                                                          
3 According to the website http://www.geopolitic.ro/actualitati.htm  accessed 
10.01.2009, deserves emphasize that most of those who established in 
Transdniestria are former military officers of the Soviet army. 
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The national identity is defined in terms such as: our land, our language and 
in opposite terms such as: aggressors-victims, invaders-victims. But there is a difference 
between what is identity for the leaders and what it means for the people, the 
leaders are trying to create an identity different, opposite, contrary to Moldova, 
while the population believes that there are no differences, they lived in the same 
state, have the same history and that the distinction is artificially created. 
The ideological and political orientation of Transdniestria is much deeper 
and more complicated than those of its neighbors (Ukraine and Moldova). In 
contradistinction to Moldova, the rhetoric of the political regime from 
Transdniestria is linked to search of an ideology that could unite the people living 
in Transdniestria around authoritarian power. The leaders from Tiraspol consider 
appropriate an idea that is a mixture of concepts that express traditions of Soviet 
totalitarianism with some kind of community of race and on this basis to be 
restored the Soviet Union. So it attempts to propagate an idea of ―the glory of a 
mythical Slavic union‖. 
The International Commission of Jurists4, in a report on Moldova and 
Transdniestria, shows that the region of Transdniestria remains firmly placed in 
the Soviet period, which could be equivalent to trying to live in the past, and the 
failure to adapt to new realities. 
 
5. The Geostrategic Importance of the Area 
 
The Dniester River is a strategic line that separates two large 
geopolitical spaces, the Slavic world of the rest of Europe. For the Ottoman 
Empire, the Dniester had marked the northeastern border for nearly 400 years.
 The same fortification line created by the Turks was used by both the 
Russian Empire and the Soviets. The separation of Ukraine and the loss of Odessa, 
and then the orientation of Moldova to Europe makes Russia want to maintain 
Transdniestria in the Russian influence area due to its strategic importance. 
Russia provides support for Transdniestria, both economic and 
political. The Russian Duma decision to declare the Transdniestria region as a 
geostrategic interest zone to Russia was received with great satisfaction in 
Tiraspol. This decision clarifies the meaning for maintaining Russian troops in 
Transdniestria and their role. The Transdniestrian leaders have publicly stated 
that they have a historical mission to resist Western expansion and they have 
promised to continue to defend Russia's geopolitical interests in the heart of the 
Balkans (Marakuta, 2005).  
The conflict of Transdniestria with Moldova is the fundamental 
problem of Moldova, affecting the territorial integrity and at the same time a 
                                                          
4 www.lhr.md/rapoarte/justitie/raport.icj.2004.pdf  , accessed 22.05.2009,  Courts of 
the International Commission of Jurists following its mission to Moldova in 
February 2004.  
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potential risk for the security in South-Eastern Europe. Russia uses the 
economic issues for political purposes. Gazprom sells gas to Transdniestria at a 
price below market price and this price is negotiated with Transdniestrian 
leaders, without consulting the Moldavian authorities. 
Russia's interest is to maintain its sphere of influence in the former 
Soviet bloc countries. In its area of interest, Transdniestria is only a small part 
of the problems and we have to add other areas that are in similar situations 
such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Chechnya. 
The increasing trend of Russian nationalism in Russia has been 
translated into greater involvement in the conflicts that take place on the 
outskirts of the old Soviet Union. In Russia, many political forces believe that 
Russia must assume the role of regional gendarme, and this is reflected, for 
example, in the proposal for the creation of Russian blue helmets. The Russian 
military doctrine from 1993 sets forth a genuine right of interference in internal 
affairs of CIS member countries (Taibo, 1995: 32). 
A solution to Transdniestria can be identified with a broad international 
participation. Legitimacy in international relations is not absolute, it can be 
negotiated if there is interplay of interests, and in this case there is an 
interweaving of the interests of Russia, European Union, Ukraine and, of 
course, Moldova.  
The problem of Transdniestria remains without solution because of the 
lack of involvement of the great powers and great bodies, organizations, 
international institutions which are the main and most powerful actors on the 
international scene and because of the lack of real dialogue between them. The 
conflict can be interpreted as a conflict between Russia and the West (EU, 
NATO, USA), as a continuation in another form of the cold war. 
The main problems are the presence of Russian troops in the region and 
the lack of attitude, decision and action from the EU and the West in general. The 
Western position is due to the interest of the West to maintain good relations with 
Russia, mainly for energy reasons. 
Russia's main objective was to maintain the Moldavian political under 
the tutelage of the old center of decision (post) Soviet, using the 
Transdniestrian region as a wick which can be aflame at any time. Tiraspol, the 
―capital‖ of Transdniestria has become the key of the region and of the Russian 
domination system. The separatist leaders have established with the Russian 
military support, an army with modern military equipment, equipped with 
tanks, rocket installations, engineering troops, including aviation capability 
(Marcu, 2007: 85). 
Regionally, Russia manages to keep two very important points in terms 
of geopolitical and strategic: Kaliningrad, in the Baltic zone, and Transdniestria, 
in the Black Sea region. Russia is concerned about the concentration, in the 
south-western part of the old soviet area, of states with possible future NATO 
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bases, and tries to keep Moldova in the area of Russian influence, with 
Transdniestria help. The Russian presence in Transdniestria brings the 
opportunity to exert pressure on Ukraine's southern flank also. 
The geostrategic value of Transdniestria results also from the fact that 
Transdniestria became the first area where peacekeeping forces were deployed 
after the meeting of the CIS on July 6, 1992, and so ―the provocation of 
Moscow was taking place with a silent conspiracy of the Western States‖ 
(Gabanyi, 1993: 98-107). 
  Why is Transdniestria so important to Russia and its proximity to the 
Black Sea? First, for the resources it offers, because it is a transit zone, and for 
the geostrategic position between Europe and Asia. Second, for what it could 
be, there is the risk of becoming a hotbed of terrorism, drug traffic and human 
traffic, which will affect Western Europe too. This is affecting EU and NATO 
members in addition to the neighboring countries. 
Any discussion about Transdniestria leads to Russia; a country that does 
not welcomes changes in the area and feels that she loses control of the Black Sea 
area and Eastern Europe, areas which were in its zone of influence. The changes 
in Georgia and Ukraine, leading to much debate in Moscow about the possibility 
of Russia being isolated behind the "orange zone", and mean that Russia tries to 
maintain close links with the areas that are still oriented toward it.  
We also have to mention the fact that the political elites and the citizens 
of Moldova have agreed that the priority for the country is European 
integration, while in Transdniestria there is a clear orientation towards Russia. 
The European Union is keen to create a space of security and democracy at its 
borders. On this line has been established a Border Assistance Mission 
EUBAM5. Another tool could be joint projects and regional cooperation 
involving Ukraine, Moldova, Transdniestria and Romania. 
The conflict is purely geopolitical. There is a difference between a 
political and geopolitical conflict. In a geopolitical conflict comes into play a 
space, not just a political regime. The controversy of Chisinau - Tiraspol is a 
kind of cold war in miniature. Transdniestria has no importance compared to 
Kaliningrad or Gibraltar for example, because of geographical location or area, 
but it has strategic importance in a military crisis. So, Transdniestria has 
geopolitical importance (Serebrian, 2001: 32-38). 
Russia's position, effective military presence in Transdniestria shows the 
importance of the region and the response of Russia in the conflict with 
Georgia in 2008 is relevant for understanding the importance Russia places on 
those areas where it has interests. For Moldova, Transdniestria is a geopolitical 
factor determinant for its stability, development and strengthening. 
                                                          
5 For more details see the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and 
Ukraine web page http://www.eubam.org/.  
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All parties are interested in finding solutions and resolving the conflict 
as soon as it is possible. Lately, Russia has interests in economic and 
humanitarian projects, in addition to their geostrategic interests. The EU is 
interested in creating spaces for their border security and democracy. Lately 
appears a new idea. An instrument for such concepts could be the euro cross-
border projects or euro regions. The benefits of the regional cooperation would 
be real in the sense that it is possible to create a euro region with the 
participation of Ukraine, Transdniestria, Moldova and Romania. 
The main problems of security or insecurity of Moldova are related to 
Transdniestria. Both, for the state and for its citizens, the main threats and risks 
are directly related to the conflict or its results: the inability to control its 
territory, the problems with drug traffic and arms traffic, illicit economic 
activities, weakening the authority of the state etc. (Chifu, 2005: 24-32). 
Why did the United States begin to show interest in the area? The U.S. 
has interests in the Black Sea area to gain access to the oil and gas resources of 
the Caspian Sea and the North Caucasus. The U.S. is interested in establishing 
an area of long-term stability in the context in which things are not clear about 
Iran for example. It is possible for a large part of American interests to be 
focused on southern Caucasus and to form a Europe-Middle East axis via the 
Black Sea and its neighborhoods. 
The conflict in this region can be seen as a problem that hinders the 
development of Moldova, as well as a challenge that could lead to some 
opportunities. The external influences in Moldova are much larger than the 
capacity of Chisinau to solve problems. For the EU for example, Moldova is a 
singular event – it is an unresolved conflict at the EU border, there is the 
Russian military presence in the territory of Moldova and Transdniestria‘s 
economy is controlled at a rate of 80 percent by Russia. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Transdniestria has a big geopolitical and strategic importance for Russia 
and this is an obstacle to progress towards a final solution to the conflict of 
Transdniestria. 
Russian foreign policy, especially in close vicinity and particularly in 
Moldova can be described as interventionist. 
The ultimate goal must be to ensure the stability in the entire region. 
The economic development, changes and investments depend on stability. 
Furthermore, economic development is an important generator of democracy.  
The economic, political, national, military and social problems, as a 
result of the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent developments, are 
combined and constitute an obstacle in finding a solution to Transdniestria. 
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Transdniestrian separatism is supported by Moscow, through a lot of 
pressure instruments, military or not: political-diplomatic, informational, 
psychological and economic.  
The conflict in Transdniestria is not an ethnic problem but it is in 
essence a political issue, and the possibilities of settlement can be found 
through greater involvement of international politics. 
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Abstract. The most of the modern states, including the Republic of Moldova, are 
poly-ethnic; according to their political forces it is necessary to solve the problem of formation 
and realization of the internal policy reflecting interests and prospects each, from an ethnic 
group occupying them. The political parties play a special role in this process, their variety on 
the one hand displays ethnic diversity existing in a society, and on the nother they can influence 
interethnic relations through the competent policy. During existence of Republic of Moldova as 
an independent state a fairly rich experience of party‟s ethno policy including both positive and 
negative examples of influence of the parties on interethnic relations has been collected. 
Experience of the developed European states has shown that overcoming of ethnic 
discrimination in activity of parties became an important factor for harmonization of 
interethnic relations in a society and the precondition of its progress in the future. Level of 
representation of interests of various ethnic groups in the Moldavian society by political parties 
and the outlined tendencies of development of parties‟ ethno policy allow us to draw a 
conclusion on prospects of our state in this direction. 
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Today the most countries are multinational, poly-ethnic and therefore 
harmonization of interethnic relations becomes very important being always a 
topical problem. The ethnic structure of population of any country with 
minority groups, relations between titular ethnic group and ethnic minorities 
throughout history - recent or distant one - have been always considered as a 
difficult and delicate issue. Difficult, because the legal status of ethnic 
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minorities even now are in full development and permanent change; the 
delicate nature of the problem always provoked violent passions, resentment, 
suspicion, animosity and, beyond these factors of emotional nature, has been 
complicated by interference of political calculations (Carbune, 2001). The 
efforts of inter-ethnic relations theorists are aimed at developing strategies and 
tactics of coexistence of titular ethnic group with minorities in order to ensure 
progress of the society and avoid conflicts between its component parts. 
Achieving these goals depends on the key actors of the political process. Actors 
are those institutions, organizations or subjects, which are involved in the 
process of regulating inter-ethnic relations. It remains for us to identify the 
main actors in this process. 
The state is a key player in the process of balancing ethnic relations 
within a society. Through its institutions, it coerces other actors, developing, 
promoting and exercising the control in all areas of social life, using political, 
economic, legal and informational resources. In what concerns with Moldova, 
we can certainly speak also about the existence of legal as well as institutional 
framework designed for protection of ethnic minorities. For a newly 
independent state this is crucial since minorities constitute approximately 25% 
of the population. 
Legal framework, which refers to the rights of national minorities in 
Republic of Moldova, includes more than 30 documents, 10 of which are of 
international importance. Engaging itself to respect the rights and freedoms of 
citizens disregarding their ethnicity, Moldova adhered to several international 
UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, documents, it signed on 10/22/1996 the 
Framework Convention for National Minorities Protection; on 19/07/2001 the 
Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted the Law on the Rights of 
Persons, belonging to ethnic minorities and to legal status of their 
organizations. Creating the legal framework for managing interethnic relations 
involves the creation of institutions that would implement and take the control 
on exercising these legal rules. Such institutions became the Office of 
Interethnic Relations of Moldova, Inter-Ethnic Research Institute of the 
Academy of Sciences of Moldova, The Committee of Parliament for Human 
Rights and National Minorities, Human Rights Centre of Moldova. However, a 
number of difficulties still remain in this regard which require to be addressed 
primarily by increasing efforts of authorities and representatives of national 
minorities. 
Another actor, which inherently affects interethnic relations, is the civil 
society, which through its ethnic organizations contributes to the development of 
minorities and their rights. The democratization of society, freedom of speech, 
political pluralism has led to the awakening of national consciousness not only 
in the titular ethnic group, but also in ethnic minorities. The first non-
governmental ethnic organizations appear during the 1980s-1990s. Today in 
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Moldova already exists 85 ethno-cultural organizations accredited to the Inter-
Ethnic Relations Office, among them: 8 Ukrainian Public Associations, 9 
Russian Public Associations, 4 Gagauz Public Associations, 5 Bulgarian Public 
Associations, 4 Hebrew Public Associations, 10 Roma Ethno-cultural 
Associations, the Belarus Community from Moldova, 2 German Public 
Associations, 5 Polish Public Associations, Public Associations of National 
Less Numerous Minorities (2 Tatars, 4 Armenian, 3 Azeri, Georgian, 
representatives of Central Asia, Ossetian, the Uzbek, Chuvash, 3 Lithuanian, of 
Estonian,  2 Greek, Korean, Italian, the natives of African Asian countries) and 
other public organizations of minorities (Interethnic Cultural and Protection of 
Human Rights Society "Conciliation-Soglasie", Charity Centre for Refugees, the 
International Association of Ethnics, Association for the Harmonious 
Development of Children JUNIOR and others) (Lista organizaţiilor 
etnoculturale pe lîngă Biroul Relaţii Interetnice, 2010). Some of these 
organizations, associations, ethno-cultural minorities have registered missions in 
Moldova. The existence of wide network of ethnic organizations is largely due 
to loyalty and tolerance towards ethnic minorities existing in the Moldovan 
society. Those organizations are important because of their contribution to the 
socialization and development of national culture of ethnic minorities, as well 
as to the harmonization and balancing of ethnic relations. 
A third actor designed to influence relations among ethnic groups are 
political parties, whose participation in politics and promotion of certain policies 
contribute to harmonization or de-harmonization of interethnic relations. The 
actions undertaken by the parties play an important role in building relationships 
within a poly ethnic society at different stages of its existence. Moldova, which 
proclaimed its sovereignty on June 23, 1990 and state independence on August 27, 
1991, for the first time in its history, faced issues related with ethnic coexistence. In 
these conditions, its political forces had to implement internal policies which would 
reflect the interests of all ethnic groups living in that territory. 
Before the nineteenth century the ethnic composition of population in 
Bessarabia has changed slowly and insignificantly. During the twentieth century 
there have been some changes in the ethnic composition of Bessarabian 
population: if at the beginning of the century Moldavians constituted 78.2% of 
the entire population, then by the end of the century we may notice a decrease 
to 52.1%; the percentage of other nations increased (Ukrainians by 4.6%, 
Russians - 4.4%, Jews - 10.6%, Germans - 1.5%, Bulgarians and Gagauz - 
4.3%). This change is explained by intense colonization policy pursued by the 
Russian Empire which annexed Bessarabia. After the unification of Bessarabia 
with Romania in 1918 the ethnic structure of Bessarabia has been the following 
in 1930: Romanians accounted for 56.2%, while the Ruthenians - 23.3%, Jews - 
5.7%, Bulgarians - 5.7%, Turkish - Tatars - 3.5%. After the annexation of 
territory between the Prut and Dniester to the USSR in 1940, demographic 
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composition of population changes essentially due to deportation, removal, 
mass evictions and the Russification of national minorities. The census 
conducted in Moldova in 1989 revealed the following ethnic structure: 
Moldavians - 64,5%, Ukrainians - 13,8%, Russians - 13%, Gagauz - 3.5%, 
Bulgarians - 2%, Hebrew - 1.5%, Belarusians - 0.5%, Germans - 0.2%, Roma - 
0.3%, Poles - 0.1%, other nationalities - 0.6% (Morozan, 2005: p.10). The 
national structure of population of Moldova, registered by the census in 2004, 
showed that the Moldovan majority population constitutes 75.8% of the total 
population, marking an increase over 1989. Besides Moldovans, there also live 
Ukrainians who represent 8.4%, Russians with a share of 5.9%, Gagauz - 4.4%, 
Romanian - 2.2%, Bulgaria - 1.9% and other nationalities - 1.0% of the total 
population. Population structure by nationalities reflects the changes occurring 
in our society over the past 15 years due to intense emigration which influenced 
the decrease in the proportion of people of Ukrainian and Russian origin 
(Rezultatele Recensămîntului Populaţiei 2004, 2006: 16). 
The collapse of the USSR revealed especially, a whole complex of 
problems which have sought for their solution for a long time. The second half 
of the twentieth century is characterized by increasing of ethnic and national 
consciousness. Not accidentally, the national factor have been one of the main 
reasons the Soviet Empire collapsed (Carbune, 2010). After the collapse of 
USSR and the obtaining state independence and sovereignty by the former 
soviet republics, the situation changed dramatically: the main ethnic groups 
once governed and marginalized became ruling along with promotion and 
development of national culture, spirit and language. 
As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Empire the new states appear, 
some of which for the first time in the twentieth century get their 
independence, such us the case of Republic of Moldova. Countries of the 
former socialist bloc, most of them established as nations, faced two problems: 
that of national identity and of ethnic identity (Andrieş, 2001: 9). In the first 
case it deals with increasing national feelings, once attenuated by the former 
communist regime, as a result of obtaining state independence. In the second 
case it has to do with the rise of ethnic identity among minority groups within 
the state. Like the other states, Moldova has faced these problems, but specific 
for our country had been the acuity of issue of national identity of the 
Moldovan population. We had to find the answer to question so simple for our 
neighbors, but so complicated for us: who we are, where do we come from, and 
what do we all who live on this territory share together (Carbune, 2010). 
Searching for answers to these questions practically coincided with the 
emergence of new political formations in our country, which first of all began 
to look for their electorate basis. In 1988 "the Democratic movement in 
support of Perestroika" and literary-musical club "A. Mateevici" were created, 
which members founded the Popular Front of Moldova at the congress in May 
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1989. As a social base of the Popular Front there served the big part of the 
Moldovan people, who took hard the loss of functions of mother tongue and 
who had fears about the process of denationalization caused by Russian-Soviet 
assimilation. Reflecting the views and opinions of its supporters, the Popular 
Front declares aims related to national revival of the Moldovan nation; its 
starting point became the language problem (giving the Moldovan language an 
official status, the reintroduction of Latin script, confirming its identity with the 
Romanian language, etc.). The struggle for language, which started back up to 
independence proclamation, has become a symbol of the beginning national 
rebirth for a good part of population. This struggle, unfortunately, contained 
not only a huge mobilizing potential, but also a disintegrating one. In the late 
1980s – early1990s changes in language policy have aroused a wave of 
complaints from people who didn‘t speak the new state language. The language 
issue, in other places and times a linguistic one, became a political issue in 
Moldova (Tulbure, 2001: 249). Later, it led on the one hand to national 
cohesion and consolidation of society (in what concerns the titular ethnic 
group), and de-harmonization of interethnic relations, generation of armed 
conflict on the left bank of the Dniester river and the Gagauz ethnic conflict, 
on the other hand. 
In response to processes of national consolidation, in July 1989 the 
"Unitate-Edinstvo" international movement appears, reflecting the opinions of 
people, who saw in the claims of Moldovan national rebirth an attempt to 
change the soviet national linguistic status, to narrow the space of Russian 
language, so it stood up for equal rights for all languages and nations. In the 
south of the country, with mostly gagauz localities, a social-political movement 
"Gagauz Halc" is formed, focusing on the revival of Gagauz ethnicity. These 
two parties, whose electoral base represented ethnic minorities, were supported 
by population from the left side of the Dniester River. 
Ethno-political reality created in most countries in post-soviet space, 
especially in Moldova, has divided imminently the population into two 
categories: titular and not-titular ethnic groups (Bulova, 2001: 24). The 
movements for independence in former soviet republics have fixed as their 
main task the establishment of national states where the political nationality 
would coincide as much as possible with cultural nationality, so that all the 
citizens of these states will belong to the titular ethnic group, the state being 
called to serve only the interests of this group. However, in almost all of the 
new independent states (with few exceptions), national minorities made up 
important segments of the population, and their simple presence "hindered" 
substantially the achievement of establishment of national states (Carbune, 
2001). Therefore, in order to achieve the major goal there should be liquidated 
the existing obstacles. In this regard the older injuries, supported by not 
Russian nationalities during the Soviet Power, began to be exploited, even till 
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the power itself has been artificially associated with the Russians and national 
minorities, or, as they have been also named - the "foreigners ". The 
Russophones guilt was not only that they did not speak the language of the 
titular nationality, but even the fact of their presence in the ex-soviet states. In 
order to stimulate their migration process and exclusion of them from 
important social positions there were adopted laws giving the status of state 
language to the titular ethnic group language. The slogan "Cemodan - Vokzal - 
Russia" ("Suitcase - Station - Russia") was addressed not only to Russians, but 
also to all Russian language speakers. This slogan, along with the circumstances 
of its appearance, has contributed to a significant percentage of the non-titular 
population who left the countries. Although, the most effective it appeared to 
be in Central Asia and Caucasus, and in the European part of USSR this slogan 
had an effect below expectations, causing resistance of various degrees in the 
part of the population who increasingly began to be called "national 
minorities", because of implementation of new language legislation, narrowing 
the space of the Russian language in public education system, excluding Russian 
speakers from state structures (Carbune, 2001). 
Thus, change of roles (transformation of the former minority in the 
dominant nation) has led to a new conflict. Given the lack of experience, the 
new majority appeared to be unprepared for the task of strengthening the 
society, using in order to promote its interests the coercive means successfully 
applied by the past regime. National movement leaders did not take into 
account feelings, attitudes and ideals of minorities, which, in turn, gave up to 
support the aspiration of titular ethnic group to achieve state independence 
(Carbune, 2001). 
In various republics the events developed following in fact, one and the 
same scenario, although with some specific caused by the particular local 
colour. This specific consisted, in Moldova, primarily in the fact that resistance 
of minorities to the tendency to constitute an "ethnic democracy", as of a 
democracy whose defining principles are addressed only to the titular majority, 
leaving "outside" ethnic minorities, led finally, to the establishment of two 
autonomous entities - Transnistria and Gagauzia, with later full separation of 
the first and recognition of the special status of autonomy within the Moldovan 
state, for the latter (Carbune, 2001). 
Another feature was emerged by existence of Romanian factor: the 
common ethnic roots of Moldovans and Romanians and the manifested 
tendencies by some political forces from Moldova in favor of using the 
independence as a step towards unification with Romania in a single unitary state 
(Carbune, 2001). The new program of the Popular Front of Moldova declared as 
a strategic goal the unification of Moldova with Romania, recognition the 
Romanian identity of Moldovans, etc., but these ideas have played partially a 
negative role, leading to alienation of masses of people and narrowing its electoral 
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base. The party tried to build national state with a mono-national society, without 
taking into account the specifics of the newly formed multi-ethnic state, which 
caused conflicts in interethnic relations, in some cases even hatred based on 
ethnic belongings, and as a consequence has transformed this movement, in the 
fullest sense of the word popular, in marginal right side force. 
In 1994 the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova (PDAM) comes to 
the power, its electoral platform was based on ideas of the existence of 
Moldovan identity and creation of an independent Moldovan state. Mass 
support of this party has shown willingness of ethnic minorities in Moldova to 
consensus in terms of consolidation of society based on the principles of civic 
nation. The PDAM attempts to implement in practice the concept of 
Moldovan identity encountered some difficulties. Romanian identity paradigm 
has been supported by local intelligence, which constituted the result of ethno-
national socialization, and did not allow the complete change of mentality of 
people (Moşneaga, 2001: 153-154). After all a more or less consensus formula 
there have been found: Romanian language -Moldavians - The Republic of 
Moldova. This step can be evaluated as a real progress in building interethnic 
relations, because it reconciles both sides of the society, titular nation, which 
obtains its own identity indicating the common roots with Romanians; and 
ethnic minorities giving them a common identity regardless of ethnicity, given 
that the term "Moldovan" carries not only ethnic connotations but also the 
state ones therefore belonging to the nation was determined by the citizenship. 
Thus the common goals for these groups of population emerge: strengthening 
Moldovan state, progress and prosperity of consolidated society and Republic 
of Moldova becoming a common house for all its citizens. Other political 
forces, who ruled the country, promoted permanently the idea of an 
independent state with a poly-ethnic society, although even till today there are 
more forces that put under the question the existence of Moldovan state, 
troubling the interethnic relations.  
During the formation of party system in Moldova the three basic 
orientations, reflecting the ethnic relations in terms of political parties: 
Moldovan, Romanian and Soviet, could be seen. Analysts consider that these 
visions of social and political formations, practically determined their activity 
and function further on.  
Adherents of the first orientation (Moldovan) stood up for 
strengthening the republic's independence, for territorial integrity, for further 
development of democracy and implementation of new democratic ideas, 
creation the rule of law state and a social-oriented market economy. This vision 
was characteristic for the Social Democratic Party of Moldova, Republican 
Party of Moldova, the Party of Social Progress, the Democratic Agrarian Party 
of Moldova, the Democratic Labour Party of Moldova, Moldova Women's 
Association, National Youth League of Moldova, Renaissance of Economy 
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Party of Moldova etc.  (Carbune, 2001). These political forces have played an 
important role in the harmonization of interethnic relations, because in their 
electoral platforms they focused on developing a prosperous Moldovan state 
and the entire society; and issues concerning with ethnic differences were left 
outside the proposed goals. 
The second orientation (Romanian) of some political parties on the 
abovementioned issues projected the possible unification of Moldova and 
Romania. In turn, this trend was also divided in two: the partisans of immediate 
unification (Christian Democratic Popular Front, Democratic Christian League 
of Women of Moldova, Christian Democratic Youth Organization, the 
National Christian Party of Moldova and other socio-political and public 
national-cultural and religious organizations, which in the early '90s formed 
Christian Democratic Alliance) and the supporters of the moderate wing who 
pleaded for gradual unification with Romania made up of the following political 
parties: Christian Democratic Party from Moldova, the Ecologist Party "Green 
Alliance‖, the National-Liberal Party of Moldova, Reform Party, the Congress 
of Moldovan Intellectuals, etc. (Carbune, 2001). The role of these parties in our 
society can be measured by their contribution to national identity, and in what 
concerns with interethnic relations, they always have contributed to their 
disharmonization, because of policies pursued by them, being at the 
governance; the existence of ethnic minorities have been ignored, and they were 
not given special rights. 
The third orientation (Soviet) of political parties in the state-national 
and ethno-national aspect is supported mostly by elderly people who may still 
believe and aspire to restoring the USSR (Movement for equal rights "Unit-
Edinstvo", communist parties and United Council of Labour Collectives from 
Transnistria, Popular Movement "Gagauz Halki", etc.). (Carbune, 2001). Their 
supporters consider themselves soviet rather than Russians, Ukrainians, 
Moldovans, etc. They gradually come to understand that the past can not be 
returned, for this reason these parties don‘t enjoy a high popularity and don‘t 
play any role in building relations between ethnic groups. 
Currently in the division of political parties, the ethno-national aspect 
has less importance, the priority being given to the socio-economic one 
(Carbune, 2001). Although it was maintained the principle of placing the parties 
on political scale depending on their identity orientations, which constituted 
one of the main criteria for the positioning of political forces in Moldova 
during the first decade of independence. Thus, the political right side is 
represented by parties that advocate for ―Romanian‖ ideas, protecting the 
interests of titular ethnic group, and the left side - those who work under the 
anti-Romanian slogans representing the interests of ethnic minorities; in the 
centre being placed parties with intermediate positions. Currently these two 
forces share political influence in the country. At the last parliamentary 
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elections the right side parties have won 44 parliamentary seats (Democratic 
Liberal Party with 32 seats, Liberal Party-12 seats), the Left parties - 42 seats 
(Communist Party of Moldova), the centre having fewer seats - 15 (Democratic 
Party of Moldova). This picture of political representation in some way satisfies 
the interests of ethnic groups of Moldovan society, because traditionally the 
political left parties are voted by ethnic minorities, while the right is supported 
by the titular nation. 
In terms of representativeness, the situation can be considered 
satisfactory, but the practical realization of ethnic policies pursued by the ruling 
political forces makes some ethnic groups believe that they are disadvantaged 
compared to the others. Here opinions are divided: there are opinions that 
Moldovans have the advantage because of the number, (the majority) and that 
their language has official status (Bogdan, 2007:6). Because of this in the early 
90s Moldovans replaced representatives of other ethnic groups in 
administration and state apparatus. This seems to be natural, as soon as the very 
democracy means rule of majority. Another set of opinions claims that 
Moldovans are disadvantaged compared to other ethnic groups, even though 
they represent the majority (Bogdan, 2007: 6). This is possible due to the 
advantages Russian-speaking ethnic groups, especially Russians and Ukrainians 
had compared to Moldovans in early 90's. These minorities living mainly in 
urban area as opposed to Moldovans were rather rural population, were more 
educated and had representatives in key economic and political positions. While 
the political situation has turned in favour of representatives of Moldovan 
ethnicity due to the introduction of Romanian as state language, economically, 
the Russian and Ukrainian minorities dominated the country. Moreover if the 
language of politics and administration became Romanian, the language of 
economy was Russian. There are also some opinions that consider Gagauz, 
Bulgarians or Roma as disadvantaged minorities (Bogdan, 2007: 7). This is 
because Gagauz and Bulgarian minorities have been living in poorer rural areas 
in southern Moldova. As for the Roma that ethnic group hardly adheres to 
social norms and values of the majority, and not much had been done for their 
integration so far.  
The relations of minority groups with majority population are reflected 
by relations between Romanian/Moldovan and Russian, and the larger is the 
minority, the more chances it has to defend its rights, to fight for its political 
advancement status, more opportunities to be heard by the international 
community, yet we see that in this case relations between minority and majority 
groups become more tensed. Tensions within the majority–minority relationship 
are motivated not only by cultural, political, economic factors, but also by the 
psychological ones. The psychological tensions are caused by conflict between 
the dominant system of values that is required in the social environment and the 
one that tries to resist pressure of assimilation. Minority ethnic groups believe in 
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uncertainty of their security (Anghel, 2004: 70). They feel threatened by the 
quantity dominant value system of the majority representing a real danger for 
these ethnicities. The behavior of ethnic majority is interpreted by the ethnic 
groups as the one of dominant community. Verbal and action pressures of the 
minority annoy the national majority, who realize that cultural and political status 
of titular majority is neglected. The inter-group distances within Moldovan 
society are motivated by positive or negative stereotyped attitudes and prejudices 
of the majority and minority representatives which may be supported by some 
political forces, with especially during electoral campaigns. The hostile 
competition to redefine and preserve the ethnic values reduces the chances of 
integration of population. Dichotomy of "we" - "they", characteristic for 
relationship between majority and minority raises the mutual hostility and 
represses the improvement of interethnic relations. Groups that are included in 
"we" category share the same feelings of belonging to common identity and 
exclude other groups assigned to the category of "they" (Anghel, 2004: 72). The 
encouragement of this mentality by political parties can provoke a ranking of 
cultural-ethnic values in society.  
Initial inter-ethnic conflicts in Moldova still exist, they just moved into 
another phase. Relations between ethnic minorities and indigenous population 
over the years have been based on tolerance and loyalty. Therefore ethnic 
differences that arise can be considered as a result of activity of various political 
forces; ethnocentric orientation in Moldova is speculated and politicized. 
Political representation of minority makes it possible to lessen the tension of 
ethnic relations only by political dialogue, through authorized representatives of 
ethnic minorities. Launching a dialogue between political parties as institutions 
representing among others ethnic interests makes possible to find those 
institutional and constitutional remedies to pave the way for coexistence of 
ethnic groups in a multiethnic state in the spirit of mutual understanding.  
For ruling parties there are two methods for solving national problems: 
the policy of assimilation and coexistence policy. The followers of the first way, 
assimilation, argue that democracy and non-conflict development are impossible 
without the establishment of the national homogeneity through assimilation of 
minorities (Macovei, Svetlicinîi, 2001:19). The possibility of realization and 
effectiveness of this policy have been demonstrated by international practice, 
for example the experience of the U.S. But in the Republic of Moldova the 
interethnic relations have some peculiarities largely due to policy of Communist 
Party promoted over half of a century. If in the U.S. ethno-cultural variety was 
the result of individual and family migration of people, who speak different 
languages, profess different religions and belong to different cultures and races, 
the ethno-cultural variety of the former USSR, largely resulted from the 
expansion of people on large territories that were inhabited by other people 
who were at different stages of economic development, spoke different 
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languages and belonged to different cultures. This is only one peculiarity of the 
situation. But there is another aspect: in the former USSR it was propagated a 
policy of denationalization, organized and carried out by the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and on the other hand, granted a status 
of superiority to Russian "minorities" (people of Russian origin ). As a result of 
such policy, other minorities, trying to preserve their national character, were 
"secluded", as a response to propagated policy. "Seclusion" had been more 
profound, the more insistent had been the effects of propagated policy. As a 
result, during the transition to a democratic society, ethnic minorities in 
Moldova could not or did not want to get rid of the shell in which they have 
been preserved for several decades, demonstrating reluctance to integrate into 
the new society (Macovei, Svetlicinîi, 2001: 20). 
In Moldova there are heated debates also on issues of "state language", 
"second mother tongue", "communication language" related to the status of 
Russian language. These debates have always been placed in the context of the 
rights of persons belonging to national minorities (Bogdan, 2007: 7). 
International standards developed in the second half of the twentieth century 
show a special concern for the linguistic rights of national minorities in order to 
eliminate discriminatory policies pursued against them. At the same time these 
rules encourage the assimilation policies of the states and the studying the state 
languages by persons belonging to national minorities as an element of 
integration. As long as the policy of integration is not transformed into a policy 
of linguistic terrorism and grammatical hegemony and is made with respect for 
human rights, benefits and advantages of knowing official language by the 
persons belonging to national minorities are undeniable. Studying official 
language is the premise of social unity and social cohesion and integration factor 
(Bogdan, 2007: 7). The compulsory knowledge of official language is not 
discriminatory because it does not necessarily require people to communicate 
with each other all the time in that language. The official language is the language 
of public authorities, the language in which the state exercises its authority. 
The above listed peculiarities complicate the achievement of effective 
assimilation policies in Moldova. But in a democratic society this process may 
take place more rapidly, being supported by an appropriate policy of coexistence. 
The adherents of policy of existence demonstrate, citing the experience of 
Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands that democracy and multiethnic 
state phenomena can be compatible. Analysing the case of Moldova we can see 
the attempts of carrying out policy of coexistence that despite its attractive and 
"democratic" character creates enough problems to ethnic minorities, giving 
them the inferior position compared with the titular population (Macovei, 
Svetlicinîi, 2001: 23). 
In the case of Republic of Moldova an attempt to implement the both 
methods would have a wholesome effect. In order obtain a positive result the 
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collaboration of the both parties is necessary, accompanied by a desire to live in 
a democratic society. And state policy towards ethnic minorities is only 
effective if along with the protection of their national, linguistic, religious 
identity the political naturalization of minorities is promoted, so they can fit 
more effectively in the national community. Political parties can become a 
catalyst for integration of national minorities in the local environment, 
effectively combining the interests of titular ethnic group with those of ethnic 
minorities, putting emphasis on democratic developing of the country, aimed at 
prosperity and welfare.  
In conclusion, we find the fact that the main problem of national 
minorities remains a priority for the Moldovan parties. Political parties do not 
only express the interests of certain ethnic groups, but also form and coherently 
consolidate these interests. They are practically the only institutions designed to 
ensure civic consensus, the development and implementation of national 
policies in practice depending especially on them. Harmonization of interethnic 
relations is the goal of national policy, a strategic necessity for peaceful 
coexistence of titular ethnic group with minority ethnicities, the main task of 
governance, failure of realizing which may constitute a threat for stability and 
an obstacle to European integration of the country. Multicultural character of 
our society should contribute to enhancing local cultural values, but in no case 
interethnic conflicts. Development and implementation into practice of a 
balanced ethnic-national policy, based on mutual respect, where the national 
features are preserved and developed should be kept always on the agenda of 
local political party activity. 
The success of democratic transition in Moldova depends on the 
affirmation of civic values and identity, representing the dynamics of adaptation 
to new social and political conditions, the capacity to form a favourable 
psychological climate for people, the awareness of value and common norms 
system which would guide their behaviour (Anghel, 2004: 73). This process 
requires consolidation and solidarity of these general civic interests of people, 
putting them above those of the group, without any imputation of the latter 
ones; it must be led by political forces, since they are the institutional 
mobilizing force. Reality shows that Moldova's national policy has evolved 
from mono-ethnic concept of nation-state society (early 90s of XX century) to 
the concept of nation state with poly-ethnic society (mid-90s of XX century), 
that today we have multinational state with a poly-ethnic society (Moşneaga, 
2001: 152). National identity got a civic dimension, which means the awareness 
of individuals as citizens of the state, being the base of common goals. The 
formula "all citizens of Moldova are Moldovans" is a successful one, and its 
prospects of construction depends directly on the success of the reform in the 
economic, political, social domain, because the desire to be a citizen of this 
state means the willingness to be a part of this nation. 
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During the existence of the Republic of Moldova as an independent 
state we have managed to accumulate a lot of experience in development and 
implementation of ethnic policies. The political parties‘ activity contributes to 
the harmonization of interethnic relations when they reflect the whole variety 
of interests in society, and are based on constitutional mechanisms of achieving 
these interests. If the party's ideological component is replaced with an 
emphasis on ethno-national differences, its activity leads to unfrozen of inter-
ethnic relations within a poly-ethnic society. Nowadays we need a strong idea 
that will be able to integrate the national society. Such ideas can become 
European integration, which in turn can provide a national identity, widely - 
European, that do not support exclusion, xenophobia and repression untitled 
groups, it will contribute to harmonization of interethnic relations, reconcile 
different parts of the society interests. Experience shows that European 
countries balanced relations between ethnic groups in a multiethnic state are the 
condition of prosperity and social progress. Functioning democracy, human 
rights, a decent life, economic and political stability are as the civic consensus, 
which can only be achieved firstly through political consensus between existed 
political forces. 
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Abstract. This article is dedicated to the main issues of national minorities being in 
Ukraine. The author analizes the Ukrainian law in the sphere of protecting of national 
minorities rights, the level of implementation of international agreements in this direction by 
Ukraine. The problems and perspectives of national communities of Bukovyna region and 
Crimea peninsula are observed in the article. The author points out that the position of such 
national communities as Romanian, Moldovan and Russian in named regions is veru good. 
They are protected by Ukrainian state and have wide possibilities for realization their 
national-cultural, educational etc. rights. At the same time, Crimean Tatars need more 
attention from Ukrainian state, especially in educational sphere. 
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1. The Scientific Base of Research. 
 
1.1. The state of scientific research development issues. 
 
The current position of Ukrainian science development is characterized 
by a number of studies dedicated to the implementation of Council of Europe 
standards in national minorities‘ protection in Ukraine. 
It‘s necessary to make some fundamental observations about the state 
of scientific development of the problems. When the Council of Europe was 
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founded and European Convention on Human Rights was drafted, its authors 
decided not to include economic, social and cultural rights. That was done 
because the most part of experts considered that the state should play a much 
more active and offensive role in those spheres, than it was required for the 
realization of civil and political rights. 
Such differentiation stimulated the developing in the Council of Europe 
frames few special conventions and agreements, directed to the protection of 
the wide spectrum of national minorities‘ rights. From the early beginning it 
was obvious that the rights proclaimed by the European Social Charter or by 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, will not 
receive legal status in the sense that individuals will not be able to defend them 
in court on international level.  
In fact, international legal regulation of minority rights protection is 
reflected in the legal base of the Council of Europe. These are three European 
Charters: European Social Charter (1961), and European Social Charter [Revised] 
(1996); European Charter of Regional and National Minority Languages (1992); 
European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985); and two conventions: 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), and the 
Framework Convention on National Minorities Protection (1995).  
The aim of scientific research is to analyze the comprehensive study of 
international aspects of national minorities‘ protection, the peculiarities of 
national minorities‘ status in Ukraine and, consequently, public policy‘s analysis 
on ensuring national minorities‘ rights and freedoms. The historical aspects and 
current trends of development of international legal protection of minority 
rights; the implementation level of international legal principles and norms in 
the national legal system of Ukraine; and the position of national minorities and 
the prospects of their development in Ukraine are analyzed in the research. 
The methodological basis of the study is the modern theory of 
knowledge of social phenomena, and the basic provisions of international law 
doctrine. General theoretical principles and approaches to determining the 
constitutional-legal status of national minorities are used in the research. 
Ethno-political science provides research of such aspects of social and 
political life. Ethno-politics and related to it sciences are intensively developed by 
scientists of the Russian Federation, like A.Abashidze (Абашидзе, 1996), R.Valeev 
(Валеев, 1996), S.Glotov (Глотов С., 1998), A.Tiunov (Тиунов А., 1991) etc. 
Noticeable impact on research of European standards implementation 
in Ukraine was done by Ukrainian researchers B.Babin (Бабін Б., 2002), 
C.Verlanov (Верланов С., 2005), D.Kytsenko (Киценко Д., 1996). 
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Such researchers as G.Paly (Палій Г., 2005), A.Kolody1, I.Losiv2 and 
others have done the analysis of the problems of national self-determination. 
Peculiarities of Russian national identity in the Crimea, its main 
problems are fully disclosed in the works of Russian authors 
O.Volkohonova and A.Polunova (Волкогонова, Полунов, 2008: 144-163). 
After Ukraine joined the Council of Europe and ratified the Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, its legal system has undergone 
significant changes in the direction of democratization, rule of law, and human 
rights protecting. After independence one of the biggest achievements of 
Ukrainian state was the preserving of international peace and harmony, the 
avoidance of potential threats to international conflicts. Public ethno-political 
management can be evaluated as successful. It‘s obvious that without the 
proper attitude of society, which is formed by citizens themselves, this result 
would be difficult to achieve (Котигоренко, 2002: 64-111).  
The purpose of international legal regulation of national minorities‘ 
protection is, particularly, protection of cultural diversity as the common 
heritage of human civilization and preventing inter-ethnic conflicts, resolving 
them peacefully. Practice shows that the implementation of minority rights can 
be guaranteed by effective interaction of international and national law, rules 
which are designed to ensure their protection.  
Problems of national minorities have not only domestic but also 
interstate meaning for Ukraine. Considerable attention in international relations, 
particularly with neighboring countries is paid to this issue not only by 
politicians, but also by many domestic scholars. V.Evtukh, L.Aza, 
V.Troschynsky, I.Prybitkova and many other social scientists are examining the 
ethnic-conflict problems. Russian scientists L.Drobyzheva, A.Aklayev, 
V.Koroteyeva, G.Soldatov, J.Bromley explore the institutional solutions, the 
behavior of ethnic and ethnic-regional subjects of their country. 
The necessity of research is escalated by insufficient degree of scientific 
development of the theme. Theory of nations, ethnic relations and nationalism 
is now an interdisciplinary field of knowledge, which is covering philosophical, 
sociological, political, legal, psychological and other studies. A number of issues 
in studying of these problems are not illuminated. Thus, relatively little 
attention is being paid to the problems of national minorities integration into 
the Ukrainian society, to the formation of national identities of ethnic groups 
living in Ukraine, particularly in Crimea and in Bukovina. 
 
                                                          
1 Колодій А. Радянська ідентичність та її носії в незалежній Україні, on May 26, 2009, 
http://www.politics.lviv.ua/nations/soviet3.html 
2 Лосів І. Українське суспільство сьогодні: явище духовної залежності. Спроба культурологічного 
діагнозу, on May 20, 2009, http://www.ukrlife.org/ main/ minerva/losiff.html 
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1.2. Analysis of the source base. 
 
Study and analysis of the Ukraine‘s constitutional obligations on 
national minorities‘ protection, their status in Ukraine, peculiarities of their 
integration into Ukrainian society is impossible without a broad source base. 
Ukraine formed a thorough political and legal framework guaranteeing 
the rights of national minorities. It includes such basic documents as the 
Constitution of Ukraine, the Declaration ―On State Sovereignty of Ukraine‖, 
Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ―On national 
minorities in Ukraine‖, the Law of Ukraine ―On Citizenship of Ukraine‖, the 
Law of Ukraine ―On local government in Ukraine‖. 
―The Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities", and European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages have 
recently become an important component of the current national legislation in 
the field of interethnic relations. Collection of legal acts is containing the above-
mentioned documents and the relevant provisions of other laws of Ukraine 
(Збірник нормативно-правових актів держкомнацміграції, 2003). It also 
includes the texts of decrees, orders of the President of Ukraine, legal acts of 
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.  
The problem of the language situation in Crimea was analyzed by the 
researcher A.Emirovа (Емірова, 1998: 121-126; Еміровa, 1994: 60-63). To the 
studying of the experience of language policies in the world and Ukrainian 
prospects in it L.Lazarenko has devoted his research (Лазаренко, 2002: 3-22). 
V. Mushkeresh in his article ―Language Tolerance in the Crimea as a 
cultural phenomenon of the multiethnic Ukrainian society‖ tried to make a 
theoretical analysis of the content of the notion of tolerance, to outline 
guidelines for the development of language tolerance in Crimea as part of inter-
ethnic relations3. 
In this article the author made an independent attempt to analyze the 
experience of Ukraine in implementation of the declared principles of the 
Framework Convention. The author has also analyzed the status of national 
minorities in Bukovyna and the Crimea, the main problems of their integration 
into the Ukrainian cultural, social and political life. Analysis of the source base 
and used literature shows that this area is actual theme for scientific research. 
On our opinion, the issue on status and prospects of national minorities 
in Crimea and in Bukovyna is not fully developed. This problem remains 
relevant and requires thorough research. 
 
                                                          
3 Мушкереш В. Мовна толерантність в Автономній Республіці Крим як феномен 
розвитку полі культурного українського суспільства, on April 23, 2010,  
www.academy.gov.ua/ej3/ txts/ POLITICHNI/06MUXTEREM.pdf 
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2. Legal Aspects of National Minorities Position in Ukraine 
 
2.1. Legislative base of national minorities‟ rights in Ukraine 
 
The formation of Ukraine as the independent state required a 
transformation of governance in all spheres of Ukrainian society, including 
ethno-political. As a result, ethno-political system of state administration was 
formed. The basis of state national policy, including its legal basis, is 
represented by the Parliament of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 
and Ukraine's President and his Administration. These state institutions 
approved a number of important legal documents in ethnic policy-making 
(Котигоренко, 2002: 64-111). 
On November 1, 1991 the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the 
―Declaration of Rights of Nationalities‖. In the preamble to it was stated that 
―on the territory of Ukraine live more than 100 nationalities‖4. 
In article 1 of the ―Declaration of Rights of Nationalities‖ ―Ukrainian 
State guarantees to all peoples, national groups, citizens living on its territory 
equal political, economic, social and cultural rights‖. And ―discrimination based 
on nationality is prohibited and punishable by law‖. This ―Declaration...‖ 
proclaims the equality of citizens of Ukraine before the law regardless of 
national and ethnic origin. In the following articles of the ―Declaration of the 
Rights of National Minorities‖ Ukraine guarantees to the representatives of all 
national minorities and ethnic groups living on its territory the right to freely 
use their language in all spheres of life, including education, manufacturing, 
media. In addition, the ―Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine‖ 
guarantees to all national communities living in Ukraine, the ability to freely 
practice their own religion, to use national symbols, to follow their own 
national traditions, the right to create their own national-cultural societies, and 
the right ―to free contacts with their historic homeland‖. 
In June, 1992 the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk signed the 
Law ―On national minorities in Ukraine‖5. It was previously adopted by the 
Parliament of Ukraine. This law consists of 19 articles. It is intended to regulate 
ethnic relations in the contemporary Ukraine. The law establishes the equality 
of citizens before the law of Ukraine, ―regardless of national origin‖. This Law 
places before them the same requirements – ―citizens of Ukraine of all 
nationalities must respect the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, protect state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect language, culture, traditions, 
customs, and religious identity of the Ukrainian people and all minorities‖. The 
                                                          
4 Декларація прав національностей України, on April 23, 2009, 
http://www.kngu.org/KongUkr/Zakon/Zakon.htm 
5 Закон України „Про національні меншини в Україні”, on June 15, 2010, 
http://www.kngu.org/KongUkr/Zakon/Zakon.htm 
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law guarantees to all national minorities the right of national-cultural autonomy, 
i.e. the right to freely use, study the language through cultural associations and 
public institutions, preserving and developing national traditions, to profess 
their own religion etc. 
National, non-government and cultural associations are entitled to have 
a free and full development of their right in establishing and maintaining 
relationships with their national associations outside Ukraine, including 
obtaining financial assistance from them.   
Thus, from 1991, Ukraine adopted a number of legislative acts, which 
consolidated the basic provisions of state policy on national minorities in 
Ukraine. National minorities received state guarantees of their rights and freedoms. 
 
2.2. The implementation of international standards for protecting 
minority rights by Ukraine 
 
According to UN and UNESCO documents, the nation state is the 
state in which title nation covers 67% of the population. According to the 
National Census in Ukraine (2001), the overwhelming majority of citizens are 
Ukrainian (37,541.7 thousand, or 77.8% of the total population). The remaining 
22.2% of the population belongs to ethnic minorities. Therefore, satisfaction of 
ethnic and cultural needs of citizens of Ukraine, who consider themselves as the 
members of national minorities, is the important part of state policy (Збірник 
нормативно-правових актів держкомнацміграції, 2003: 286). 
Nowadays, every fourth citizen of Ukraine belongs to national minorities 
(Стріха, 2000: 23-25). On February 1, 1995 Council of Europe adopted the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (later – the FC)6, 
which Ukraine signed on September 15, 1995. On December 9, 1997 it was ratified 
by the Parliament of Ukraine. From May 1, 1998 it came into force. 
Ukraine has signed many international multilateral treaties concerning 
the protection of national minorities. It consistently implements the European 
and world standards of ethnic policy in the life (Полешко, 1999: 23). Thus, 
Ukraine has gradually introduced to life not only the provisions of the FC, but 
also the Hague Recommendations regarding the rights of national minorities to 
education, the Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of 
National Minorities, Lund Recommendations on Effective Participation of 
National Minorities in Public Life etc.7 
                                                          
6 Рамкова конвенція Ради Європи про захист національних меншин, on June 27, 2010, 
http://www.kngu.org/KongrUkr/Zakon/Zakon.htm 
7 Гаазькі рекомендації щодо прав національних меншин на освіту та пояснювальна записка 
on February 1, 2010, gaazki_recommendations1996[1].pdf; Ословські рекомендації 
щодо мовних прав національних меншин і пояснювальна записка, on February 1, 2010, 
oslovski_recommendations1998[1].pdf; Лундські рекомендації про ефективну участь 
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It should be noted that substantive provisions of the FC on ensuring 
political, social, cultural and linguistic rights of national minorities are reflected 
in national legislation of Ukraine (the Constitution of Ukraine, the Declaration 
of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, different Ukrainian laws). It is necessary 
to note that Ukraine adopted so-called ―zero option‖: its citizens are all citizens 
of the former USSR, which at the time of independence of Ukraine (August 24, 
1991) were living on its territory and all persons regardless of race, color , 
ethnicity, socio-demographic and other characteristics, which at the time of 
entry into force of the Law of Ukraine ―On Citizenship of Ukraine‖ 
(November 13, 1991) permanently residing in Ukraine and were not citizens of 
other states. Thus, all non-Ukrainian nationality citizens of Ukraine have the 
right to make decision on their own about their citizenship. 
In order to prevent the spread of xenophobia, racist and anti-Semitic 
information through computer systems in April, 2005 Ukraine has signed the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cyber crime. The President of 
Ukraine introduced a separate unit for detecting and stopping activities aimed 
for inciting racial or national hatred in the structure of the Security Service. 
From April, 16 to April, 20, 2007 experts of the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) made a regular cycle of monitoring of 
Ukraine in the context of the draft of third report of the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance. In Article 35 of the conclusions 
on Ukraine, the Advisory Committee noted that in general a spirit of tolerance 
and interethnic dialogue is spread in Ukraine. However, the debate on language 
issues have caused tension in Ukraine and led to statements and actions 
(including government officials) that contradict the principles laid down in 
Article 6 of the Framework Convention. In particular, it refers to the debate 
over the Ukrainian and Russian languages, as well as to legislative initiatives in 
this area (including the Crimea)8. 
FC provides broad rights and freedoms of national minorities, including 
the religious. According to experts, Ukraine kept peaceful interfaith relations 
(Доповідь Міжнародної організації релігійної свободи за 2004 рік, 2004: 67).  
The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees the ―free development, use and 
protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine‖ 
(Article 10), the right for education in their native language or study their native 
language (Article 53); forbids privileges or restrictions on linguistic grounds 
(Article 24). Article 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Article 6 of the Law 
of Ukraine ―On national minorities in Ukraine‖ guarantee citizens belonging to 
national minorities the right to educate in their native language or to study their 
                                                                                                                                                     
національних меншин у суспільно-політичному житті з пояснювальними примітками, 
on February 1, 2010, lundski_recommendations1998[1].pdf 
8 Рамкова конвенція Ради Європи про захист національних меншин, on June 27, 2010, 
http://www.kngu.org/KongrUkr/Zakon/Zakon.htm 
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native language in state and communal educational institutions and through 
national cultural societies. The language issue in Ukraine is also governed by 
Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine ―On ratification of the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages‖ (Гіждіван, 1999: 27-29). 
The right of writing sign, inscriptions and other information in minority 
languages is guaranteed by Articles 35 and 38 of the Law ―On languages in 
Ukraine‖. The right on education of national minorities is declared by Article 
12 of FC (paragraphs 1, 2, 3). It is fully implemented in Ukraine. Ukrainian state 
provides and funds training of teachers for schools with the education in 
minority languages. These specialists are studying in 15 state universities of the 
country. In addition, training teachers for ethnic minorities‘ schools in Ukraine 
is also provided by private higher education institutions - the International 
Solomon University, other private universities.  
The letter-instruction of the Ministry of Education and Science of 
Ukraine (October 7, 1996) established the procedure of creating classes and 
groups for studying in minority language by the request of parents. It 
determined that the group should consist of groups of students from at least 8-
10 persons in urban areas and 5 persons in rural areas. The right for education 
in national minorities‘ languages is impossible without the support of the 
educational process by relevant textbooks and manuals. During recent years 
about 200 titles of official publications, textbooks and manuals were published 
to meet the cultural and educational needs of pupils from national minorities. It 
was done on the basis of the annual State Program on issuing literature in 
minority languages. In particular, for pupils of 1-2 classes 26 titles of textbooks 
and manuals in Polish, Romanian, German, Hungarian languages were 
published. Common with the Romanian and Hungarian sides there were also 
published books on the history of Hungarian and Romanian peoples 
(Українська книга, 2005: 47).   
After the declaration of sovereignty and independence of Ukraine the 
returning of the persons deported in the 1940s (the Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, 
Greeks, Armenians, ethnic Germans, Romanians) and their peaceful 
integration in Ukrainian society can be considered as an example of Ukraine's 
compliance with human rights, regardless of ethnicity and nationality. The legal 
basis for the returning was the Bishkek multilateral agreement (1992). The 
famous fact is that the decision to deport these people was taken by Soviet 
power. Ukraine has done an act of goodwill by turning back its former 
compatriots. Ukraine made a series of laws aimed to protect the rights of 
formerly deported peoples. Ukraine has provided to persons who have 
returned, citizenship, housing, assistance in solving socio-economic problems. 
Minorities in Ukraine have the opportunity to create a variety of social, 
cultural, educational organization. At the national level there are the following 
non-governmental organizations as the Association of National Societies and 
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communities of Crimea (15 organizations), Confederation of national-cultural 
societies of western Ukraine (about 10 organizations) etc. 
Ukraine ratified the FC without any reservations. At the same time 
Ukraine is trying to improve its ethno-national policy, to develop new projects 
to ensure a high level of tolerance and mutual respect in Ukrainian society. 
 
3. Peculiarities of the Position and Prospects of Ethnic and 
Cultural Communities of Bukovyna and the Crimea 
Development. 
 
3.1. Ensuring the rights of ethnic communities in Bukovyna: 
Problems and Perspectives. 
 
According to the census 2001, Chernivtsi region is inhabited by 80 
nationalities, the largest of which are Ukrainian (75%), Romanians (12.5%), 
Moldovans (7.3%), Russians (4, 1%). Poles, Jews, Belarusians, and Germans are 
about 1% of the population. 
Statistics of 2006 confirmed that the number of Romanians and 
Moldovans in Chernivtsi region remained unchanged (12.5% of the population 
consider themselves Romanians, 7.3% - Moldovans)9. 
The area, densely populated by the Romanian and Moldovan 
population (which together makes up 19.8%) is Hertsaiv, Glyboka, Storozhinets 
and Novoselytsya districts. There are 11 Romanian national-cultural societies in 
Chernivtsi region, in particular the Regional Association of Romanian culture 
named after M.Eminesku, which has 10 thousand members. It is the founder of 
media organ - the newspaper ―Play rominesk‖ and the bilingual edition of ―Bell 
Bukovyna‖. 
In the information space Romanian and Moldovan communities have 
12 periodicals, including ―Concordia‖ and ―Zorile Bukoviney‖ financed from 
the state budget. There are also some districts newspapers, like ―Gazeta de 
Hertz‖, ―Native Land‖, ―New Day‖, ―Word of truth‖ (bilingual). 
426 hours of annual television broadcast and 230 hours of radio 
broadcast are preparing by Romanian edition of Chernivtsi Regional State TV 
and Radio Company (which has national ownership) (Нечаєва-Юрійчук, 
Юрійчук, 2011: 90). 
One of the most important needs of each national community is the 
possibility to study their native language. In Bukovyna the representatives of 
the Romanian-Moldovan communities have no problems with education in 
their native language. From 450 schools operating in 2005/2006 school year, 81 
were Romanian and 10 - mixed (with the Romanian and Ukrainian language of 
                                                          
9 Хто розбудує Буковину?, on May 12, 2010,  http://www.2000.cv.ua/2008/27/08?print  
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education). In percentage terms this represents about 20% of the total number 
of schools and covers the common interest of Romanian and Moldovan 
population in Chernivtsi region. In total over 20 thousand pupils are studying 
Romanian language, learn it, and also Romanian and Moldovan literature, 
history, culture. 
On May 26, 2008 Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine 
Vakarchuk signed a decree № 461 ―On approval of the program of 
improvement Ukrainian language learning in secondary schools with minority 
languages of study in 2008-20011‖10. By this degree, from September 1, 2008 in 
secondary schools with minority languages of study the number of hours of the 
Ukrainian literature and language was increased. This program provided a 
number of measures designed to help graduates from schools with minority 
languages of education to join any higher education institution in Ukraine, to 
search themselves in future professional activity in Ukraine. 
However, this order has caused a huge response from the staff of 
secondary schools, national public and cultural societies, especially 
Romanian. And the consensus in their assessments of this order was not 
observed. The teachers of schools with Romanian language of study adequately 
assess the situation and realize how difficult for their graduate exams, how 
problematic for them is studying and realization in professional life without 
knowledge of Ukrainian (state) language. G.Popescu, school director in the 
village Bukivka (Hertsa district) said: ―This is very good. Now our pupils will 
better understand the Ukrainian language, because it is so necessary. When I 
said to parents, children and teachers that the number of hours in learning 
Ukrainian language would increase, it sounded positively for everybody‖11. 
But some representatives of Romanian societies of Bukovyna believe 
that the draft document was prepared by government ―without the involvement 
of linguistic minorities‖. Moreover, on their opinion, this order of the Minister 
of Education and Science of Ukraine was directed ―against national and cultural 
rights of national minorities and contradicts the European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages‖12. Member of the Chernivtsi Regional Council B. 
Terytsanu during the press-club discussion (held on December 23, 2008), 
announced the open letter to the president of Ukraine, Prime Minister, Speaker 
of Ukraine, the Parliament of Ukraine Commissioner for Human Rights N. 
Karpachova on the draft Concept of State language policy, which, according to 
his opinion, violated their constitutional rights. The letter was signed by leaders 
                                                          
10 http://www.mon.gov.ua/laws/MON_461_08.doc, on May 2009. 
11Румунські школи згідні додатково вивчати українську, on May 12, 2009, 
http://www.molbuk.com/news/5286-rumunsk-shkoli-zgdn-dodatkovo-
vivchati.html 
12 Українські румуни вимагають відставки міністра освіти, on April 23, 2009, 
http://www.unian.net/ukr/news-291806.html 
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of the Romanian community of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Council of Russian 
Compatriots, All-Ukrainian Council of the Democratic Union of Hungarians of 
Ukraine13. 
According to the opinion of the mentioned above representatives of 
national cultural societies, this order shows an almost violent Ukrainization. 
Position of Romanian teachers and public-political figures shows the versatility 
of this problem. While for parents and teachers learning Ukrainian language by 
national communities‘ representatives is logical, necessary and very positive 
phenomenon, for representatives of national-cultural societies this degree 
contains a political dimension. They use it for their own PR as ―defenders of 
their native language and culture‖. 
Representatives of Ukrainian authorities believe that this order ―is 
intended to help pupils from schools with minority languages education‖. As 
the Deputy Head of Education and Science of Chernivtsi Regional State 
Administration, Head of the pre-school, secondary school education and the 
Chernivtsi Regional Administration B.Poturnak said, ―this order only aims to 
help pupils with school in minority languages education. For now, wherever 
you go, everywhere you need official language‖14. 
The language issue was and remains relevant in Ukraine till now. On our 
opinion, the main problem is its politicization. On the one hand, the part of the 
Romanian population of the region supports the idea of a deep study of the 
Ukrainian language. They understand that for Romanian and Moldovan young 
people it becomes increasingly difficult to find them in Ukrainian social, political 
and economic life without knowledge of the state language. It's not a secret that for 
many students from Hertsa, Glyboka districts of Chernivtsi region it is difficult to 
study in Ukrainian language the specialty because of lack of language practice (both 
written and oral). This, in turn, affects on the quality of knowledge acquired by 
them. It also affects on their future professional level.  
As for higher education, from 2002/2003 academic year in 
Y.Fed‘kovych Chernivtsi National University at mathematic, physics, chemical, 
biological, geographical and other departments mini-groups in Romanian 
language are opening (in the recruitment of 10 or more students of Moldovan 
and Romanian origin). There is also Romanian language and literature 
department in Chernivtsi University, which in 2006-2007 academic years 
enrolled 102 students. 
The Pedagogical College of Y.Fed‘kovych Chernivtsi National 
University is enrolling around 100 students, which are going to be teachers in 
Romanian and Moldovan schools. 
                                                          
13 Чернівецькі румуни не хочуть вчити історію та математику українською мовою, on 
April 24, 2009, http://zik.com.ua/ua/print/2008/12/23/163351 
14 Степан Хмара: „Румунія має відмовитися від імперської зовнішньої політики щодо України”, 
on April 25, 2009, http://www.unp-ua.org/ua/bodycomments/10517.htm 
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Each year graduates from Y.Fed‘kovych Chernivtsi National University 
go on their studying in higher education institutions of Romania and Moldova. 
If we analyze and summarize all financial support provided by the 
Ukrainian authorities to national-cultural development of the Romanian and 
Moldovan ethnic community, it becomes obvious that Ukraine has allocated 
funds to support the Romanians in Chernivtsi region much more than 
neighboring states. Including Romanian language and mixed language schools 
of the region, the sum is over 51 800 thousand USD.  
At the same time there is a disharmony in the social life of the 
Romanian and Moldovan minority in Bukovyna. According to 2001 census 
52% of Romanians did not know Ukrainian. In most localities Hertsa, Glyboka 
and Storozhets‘ districts bilingual signs are established. All Romanian secondary 
schools, village councils have bilingual signs. That‘s why the part of the 
population (10%) is detached from social and political life. They are limited in 
professional and career development in Ukraine. Taking into account the fact 
that any person who wants to be realized in any country, should study the 
official (or state language) of the country, the question arises, where do the 
representatives of Romanian and Moldovan community who refuse to study 
the state language in Ukraine see their future and the future of their children. 
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a similar situation in neighboring Romania, 
which is very concerned about the Romanian community and ensuring their 
rights in Ukraine.   
Thus national and cultural rights of the Romanian and Moldovan 
communities of Bukovyna are provided at the appropriate level. On our 
opinion, these communities have positive prospects for the preservation of 
their national and cultural identity in Ukraine. 
 
3.2. Crimea: the specific features of ethnic situation 
 
Crimea is the most controversial and ethnically diverse region of 
Ukraine. Crimea is the most multiethnic region of Ukraine. It is home for over 
125 ethnic groups. About 58% of the population is Russians. The last in general 
in Ukraine are representatives of national minorities. Ukrainians in Crimea are 
only 24.3%, Tatars - 12%, Armenians - 0.4%, Azerbaijani, Moldovans, Jews – 
0.2%, Greeks - 0.1% (Кривицька, 2005: 52-53). 
Specific feature of ethno-political relations in Crimea is the belonging of 
population to different religious faiths. By data of 2002, in Crimea 972 religious 
organizations, including 847 religious communities, 48 denominations and several 
different religious confessions, were functioned. The number of religious 
organizations has increased in 20 times and religious diversity – in 4 times 
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compared with 198915. Dominant position in the Crimea is taken by Orthodoxy 
and Islam, which unite under 43 and 30% of all religious organizations. 
Returning and resettlement of Crimean Tatars in Crimea, their 
integration into Ukrainian society is a unique precedent in the world. According 
to the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Crimea the number 
of repatriated citizens reached 265.5 thousand by 2004. Tatars are 243.4 
thousand of them16. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that Ukrainian state left alone-
on-one with this problem: neither Russia nor Uzbekistan is concerned about 
the fate of their immigrants, although previously in Bishkek it was agreed on 
joint participation in the resettlement of immigrants. 
Crimean Tatar problem for Ukraine is a certain political and socio-
economic triad – the repatriation, the adaptation (social improvement) and the 
integration of Crimean Tatars into Ukrainian socio-cultural and political 
space. The Parliament of Ukraine has adopted the necessary legal framework to 
solve this problem (including Regulation and Laws of the Supreme Council of 
25 December 1990, May 13, 1992, June 30, 1992, 6 April 1995, etc.). 
An important aspect of this problem is the ensuring of ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity of Crimean Tatars, guaranteed by the 
Constitution of Ukraine. But from 606 schools, which operate in the Crimea, 
only 16 schools and 133 classes are with the Crimean Tatar language of 
learning. They enrolled 5,872 pupils. However, the problem of teachers is not 
fully solved in these schools.  
The opening of Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University with 
more than three thousand students of different nationalities (although 
preference is given to the Crimean Tatars), the Crimean Tatar Republican 
Library and the reconstruction of the Crimean Tatar Music and Drama Theatre 
became the important events in the social life of the Crimea. The research 
center of the Crimean Tatar language and literature was established on the basis 
of the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University. 
There are exhibitions on history and culture of national minorities in 
Ukraine in Crimean Republican museum, Simferopol Art Museum, in many 
city, district, and regional museums, located in peninsula. Recently, the new 
museum institutions were opened. Among them an important place occupies 
the Crimean Republican Museum of Art. Dozens of monuments of history and 
culture of Crimean Tatars are under the protection of the state. 
                                                          
15 Григорьянц В. О некоторых вопросах государственно-церковных отношений в Украине и 
АРК, on May 20, 2010, http://www.niss.gov.ua/crimea/files/cerkov.htm 
16 Інтеграція кримських татар в українське суспільство: проблеми і перспективи 
(Аналітичні оцінки Національного інституту стратегічних досліджень), on 
May 15, 2010, http://www.niss.gov.ua/book/krim.htm 
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There are the national TV and radio stations in state TV Company 
―Crimea‖. Crimean Tatar version has three hours of radio air time per week. 
The state also supports the print edition of the Crimean Tatars. In late 1991 the 
Council of Ministers of Crimea moved to Simferopol the edition of the 
newspaper ―Yanъy Dun‖ (―New World‖). The first issue of this newspaper 
came out in January, 1992. The publishing of other magazines and newspapers 
(including the children's magazine ―Yыldыzchyk‖) in Crimean Tatars‘ language 
was started that year (Нечаєва-Юрійчук, Юрійчук, 2011: 82). 
In November, 1990 state budget laboratory for preparation of 
textbooks and manuals on Crimean Tatar language and literature was 
established. In 1993, according to the decision of Council of Ministers of 
Crimea, an educational publishing house ―Krymuchpedhyz‖ was created. It was 
opened for preparing textbooks and teaching literature for schools and 
specialized secondary educational institutions of the Crimea. 
The cultural events of national cultural societies and communities in 
Crimea, including the Crimean Tatars are supported on a regular basis from the 
national budget since 2001. 
Crimean Tatars are Muslims by their faith. As it was noted above, 
Muslim communities are rather active in the Crimea. Ukrainian state has 
returned the ownership of around 40 religious buildings and about the 20 - in 
free use. Since independence, Ukraine built 50 religious buildings in the 
Crimea17. Thus, the Crimean Tatars have sufficient conditions for exercising the 
rights of citizens to freedom of conscience and faith. 
Crimean Tatars actively participate in social and political life not only in 
Crimea but also all over Ukraine. For example, during the election campaign of 
2002 the Crimean Tatars have gained indisputable political success. In 2002 
they received Deputy Chairman of the Parliament of Crimea, Deputy Chairman 
of the Commission on international relations and problems of deported 
citizens, and Secretary of the Commission on Agricultural and Land Affairs, 
Environment and Natural Resources. During the election campaign of 2002 the 
Crimean Tatars significantly changed the ethnic composition of the deputies of 
the councils on all levels. 
The Russian community of Crimea has the best opportunity for 
implementation of their ethnic and cultural needs. In total 177,863 159,359 
schoolchildren are educated in Russian (which is 89.6%). Among college 
students this percentage is even higher - 96 (4% remaining in the Ukrainian 
language study, and nobody in Crimean Tatar language). In higher education 
                                                          
17 Щерба О. Релігійний фактор у політичному житті кримських татар в умовах 
трансформації державотворчих процесів в Україні, on June 1, 2010, 
www.nbuv.gov.ua/portal/soc_gum/Unir/2008_20/37.pdf 
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institutions of III-IV accreditation levels 89.5% of students are studying in 
Russian (and nobody in Crimean Tatar). 
The information space of autonomy is clearly dominated by Russian and 
pro-Russian ideology. Total (once) circulation Russian-language printed materials 
issued in the Crimea is more than 1.5 million copies. TV and radio in the Crimea 
are in the Russian language mostly (Нечаєва-Юрійчук, Юрійчук, 2011: 86-87). 
According to the Committee on Monitoring of Press Freedom, 
Crimean journalistic corps consists of 90% of Russian journalists working in 
Russian-language press. The analysis of the situation in Crimea suggests that 
there is a competition in autonomy between Russian-speaking population (so-
called Slavic community) and the Crimean Tatars for the symbolic-values space 
and historical rootedness on the peninsula. The most significant examples of 
such confrontation are controversy surrounding the figure of Parthenius 
Kyzyltashskoho and the situation around the construction of the Cathedral 
memorial mosque (Juma Jami) in Simferopol. 
A variety of civic organizations play the important role in the socio-political 
activity of Russian Community of Crimea. They began to appear on the peninsula 
in the turn of 1980-1990‘s. From the beginning the main objective of such 
structures was the protection of national cultural, historical and linguistic identity of 
the Russian population of Crimea. In 1989 branch of the All-Union Society 
―Memorial‖ where worked prominent politicians in the future, including future 
Crimea president Yuri Meshkov was officially registered in the Crimea. 
Today in the Crimea there is a lot of NGOs that have pro-Russian position 
and express the interests of the Russian community (for instance, the Popular 
Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖, ―Russian Community of Crimea‖ etc). 
Analysis of Russian organizations in Crimea showed that the policy of 
unity with the historical homeland - Russia, the preservation of historical memory, 
a sense of belonging to Russian culture is the most important part of their activity. 
Thus, the position of the Russian community in Crimea is stable. It has 
the opportunities to secure national rights and freedoms. It has the full support 
of the Crimean government, much of which also belong to this ethnic 
group. Representatives of the Russian community in Crimea are the ethnic 
majority of population of the peninsula. 
  
Conclusions  
 
Summarizing, we can conclude that the basic documents managing the 
status of national minorities in Ukraine are the ―Declaration of Rights of 
Nationalities of Ukraine‖ and the Law ―On national minorities in Ukraine‖. These 
are legal instruments of European standards of ethnic policy towards ensuring the 
rights and freedoms of national minorities. As a member of the Council of Europe, 
OSCE, UN and other international organizations, Ukraine has adopted a number 
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of international legal instruments designed to harmonize ethnic relations in the 
state, protect them from firing up ethnic conflicts. 
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
was one of the basic international documents adopted by Ukraine. Ukrainian 
government is trying to fully implement the assumed international obligations 
with respect to the rights of national minorities in all spheres of life. Ukraine 
finances (as much as possible) the activities of national cultural societies, 
including publishing newspapers and airtime on radio and television, education 
in minority languages. 
At the same time Ukraine is trying to improve its ethno-national policy, 
paying attention to new projects of ensuring of high level tolerance and mutual 
respect in Ukrainian society. It should also be noted that the representatives of 
ethnic communities living in Ukraine, have the opportunity to realize their 
national and cultural rights fully. They have the possibility to learn in their 
native language, to provide cultural, educational, social activities within the 
framework of national cultural societies and public organizations. 
In Bukovyna the largest ethnic groups are Moldovan and Romanian. Their 
main national-cultural needs are provided with a number of educational, cultural 
and civic institutions which are active in the Chernivtsi region.  
As for Crimea, the situation is different. The Russians, who make up the 
largest ethno-national group of the peninsula, have the best opportunities to ensure 
their national and cultural rights, while the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups 
need more attention and support from the government in this direction. 
So, today's Ukraine is actively shaping its ethnic policy based on 
international legal instruments towards wider provision of minority rights. 
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Abstract. The 1990s have witnessed a strong debate around the emergence of a new 
kind of citizenship in Europe. This paper analyses the ways in which identity and citizenship 
are being reshaped in cross border areas following the implementation of EU CBC programmes 
and civil society mobilization, with reference to the Upper Adriatic area. First, it offers a brief 
theoretical background on citizenship. Second, it investigates how different crossborder grass-
root stakeholders relate to each other in the process of implementing CBC projects, and through 
their interaction construct new meanings, interests, and values and revisit their identities. It 
concludes by arguing that the constant interaction between societal and political cross/border 
actors at the local/elite level is leading to greater mutual understanding, long-term 
transnational initiatives and an increasing emphasis on shared interests and values. 
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EMERGING IN CROSS-BORDER REGIONS? 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a sustained 
debate around the meaning of citizenship (Soysal, 1994; Shaw, 1998; Bertossi, 
2003b; Painter, 2008). After the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the end of the 
Cold War, scholars started to dissociate nationality from citizenship, leading to 
‗the new development of paradigms of membership, beyond the uniqueness of 
national identity as a resource of equality‘ (Bertossi, 2003: 5). Different 
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theoretical approaches to citizenship stressing pluralism, multiculturalism, 
ethnic and cultural hybridity, multiple and fragmented identities, spatial 
complexity and transnationalism have consequently emerged (Painter, 2008; 
Kymlicka, 1995; Meehan, 1993; 1995; Soysal, 1994). These new approaches 
seek to articulate how citizenship, and its main elements - identity, rights, and 
participation - are developing and transforming within the EU. 
The Commission (EU White Paper, 2001: 11, 18) is trying to find 
innovative ways to redefine relationships, overcoming social and cultural barriers, 
foster economic growth. Citizenship practices and identities nowadays transcend 
the narrow boundaries of the nation-state, and different channels through which 
grass-root citizens can civically, socially and politically participate within the EU 
arena are emerging (Perkmann, 2003). In this context, cross border regions 
(CBRs) which are particularly problematic in relation to citizenship because of 
the coexistence of different cultures, ethnicities, political, administrative and 
social systems, have been identified by the EU as ideal laboratories for testing the 
development of a new understanding of citizenship and cohesion (Popescu, 
2008). Indeed, as highlighted by Anderson, O‘Dowd, and Wilson (2003), very 
often citizenship issues arise specifically from these ‗hybrid‘ areas. Moreover, 
cross-border cooperation (CBC) activities have been identified by the EU as the 
channel which may help to embed systems of social protection, boost economic 
development, cultural promotion, environmental sustainability and social policy 
(Ferrera and Maino: 2010). Popescu states that when a CBR is formed a ‗new‘ 
separate territorial, social and economic space develops. It goes beyond the 
exclusive sovereignty of any single national government, and it exercises authority 
beyond state borders (Popescu, 2008: 422).  
Focusing on the Upper Adriatic region, an area which includes 
countries at different stages of EU membership (ie., Slovenia, Croatia and Italy) 
inhabited by both ‗historic‘ and ‗new‘ ethnic minorities (Faro, 2005) and which 
was marked in the past by acrimonious ethno-political divisions, the paper 
argues that it has become a laboratory where a new form of citizenship, able to 
challenge ‗long-held assumptions about the tight political link between 
citizenship and the nation state‘ (Painter, 2008: 7), is at play. Furthermore, it 
investigates the reasons behind this recent change.  
Specifically, the paper addresses the following questions: what model of 
citizenship has the EU been promoting through CBC? How have local actors 
reacted to and mobilised around CBC programmes? Are these actors 
developing new transnational forms of membership and participation which 
blur national boundaries and ‗transgress the national order of citizenship‘ 
(Soysal, 1998)?  
Drawing on two key theorists whose ideas will be contextualised in 
relation to CBC, Kimlicka‘s multiculturalism (2001, 2002, 2007) and Soysal‘s 
elaboration of post-national citizenship (Soysal, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2001), the 
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scholarly literature on the Upper Adriatic will be revisited. The paper will then 
consider the kind of citizenship that has emerged in this area and it will argue 
that it is close to Soysal‘s conceptualisation. The paper concludes with an 
analysis of the reasons why new understandings of citizenship have developed 
in the area under consideration.  
 
2. Theoretical frameworks 
 
Kymlicka‘s original multicultural approach to citizenship and 
categorization of ‗minority groups‘ defined as ‗national communities that share 
a state with one or more larger nations‘ (Kymlicka and Norman, 2001: 19), 
offers an important contextual framework for this discussion. He focuses 
mainly on two types of ethno-cultural groups and examines the ways Western 
democracies have been dealing with ethnocultural diversity in recent decades. 
One approach concerns the treatment of substate/minority nationalism (Kymlicka, 
2002: 3). The second trend concerns the treatment of indigenous people who 
should be granted the land claims, cultural protection and self-government 
rights needed to sustain themselves as distinct societies. Therefore, Kymlicka 
suggests that there has been a transition from a process of assimilation or 
indeed exclusion, to a more ‗multicultural‘ approach which accommodates 
diversity within a unitary system.  
Kymlicka argues that the consolidation of democracy may have a 
positive influence because it limits the ability of elites to crush dissenting 
movements and it increases the number of levels at which minorities can claim 
their rights (Kymlicka, 2002). He concludes that nowadays, in western liberal-
democratic states, different ethnic groups, although sharing a territory, and 
guaranteed personal freedom, democratic rights, as well as economic security 
and prosperity, ‗stand with their back to each other‘ (Kymlicka, 2002: 14; 
2007c). He stresses that what curbs the construction of a truly multicultural 
society is the fact that ‗minority groups are often seen as a kind of ―fifth 
column‖, likely to be working for a neighbouring enemy‘ (Kymlicka, 2002: 19; 
Kymlicka, 2007c). So the securitization of ethnic relations erodes both 
democratic space to voice minority demands, and the likelihood that those 
demands will be accepted. Since the dominant group feels victimized by its 
minorities acting in collaboration with foreign enemies, minorities are seen as 
allies and collaborators of external entities which have historically damaged or 
oppressed the majority group. Minorities are therefore labelled as disloyal to the 
state, and as such should be disempowered (Kymlicka, 2002: 21). 
Furthermore, although Kymlicka speaks of different institutional levels 
at which minority groups can claim their rights, he pictures mainly a top-down 
approach, where rights are guaranteed either by the state or international 
organizations. By analysing how minority groups shape a different 
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understanding of citizenship across nation-state borders through building 
relationships with other minority groups as well as with the majority, this paper 
contributes towards the understanding of a new political/social discourse of 
governance at the local and regional level. By doing so, it investigates whether 
majority and minority groups in these areas are indeed ‗parallel societies‘ where 
‗the state has become more just, inclusive and accommodating, but inter-group 
relations remain divided and strained‘ (Kymlicka, 2002: 11).  
In conceptualizing citizenship as post-national and multi-layered, 
Soysal‘s approach is both complementary to and different from Kymlicka‘s. 
Both Soysal (1994) and Kymlicka stress that there is a growing consciousness 
that the demand for equality is a ‗right‘ for all human beings; that the universal 
right of ‗one‘s own culture‘ has increasingly been legitimised at the international 
level, and particularistic individual characteristics such as culture, language, and 
standard ethnic traits have become variants of the universal core of ‗humanness 
or selfhood‘ (Soysal, 2008: 310). Furthermore, both claim that universalistic 
rules and conceptions regarding the rights of the individual have emerged in the 
post-war era and have been formalized and legitimated by a multitude of 
international codes and laws (Soysal, 1994; Kymlicka, 2007). 
However, Soysal introduces the ‗transantional principle‘ which clarifies 
why and how minority groups can ‗connect their claims to broader, 
institutionalized agendas‘ (Soysal, 1997: 515-16) and also explains how minority 
groups can simultaneously relate to members belonging to the same group, and 
develop a net of linkages with other groups. As a result, Soysal takes issue with 
Kymlicka‘s perspective when he suggests that citizens in the dominant group 
are not aware of, and are uninterested in, the internal life of minority groups, 
and vice versa (Kymlicka, 2002). Since people interact with each other, 
whatever their lineage, she argues that a new concept of membership is 
emerging within the EU (Soysal, 1994: 166).  
The post-national model suggested by Soysal implies a multiplicity of 
memberships where ‗universal personhood‘ replaces ‗nationhood‘ and 
‗universal human rights‘ replace ‗national rights‘ (Soysal, 1994: 142). 
Furthermore, although Soysal, in agreement with Kymlicka, points out that the 
nation-state remains the main agent of public functions, without questioning its 
sovereignty, she argues that the nature and parameters of these functions are 
increasingly determined at the global level (Soysal, 1994: 144-145). In this 
respect, the EU has played an important role in shaping a transnational 
understanding of citizenship, especially through European Community laws 
and treaties. ‗European citizenship‘ is then an emblematic embodiment of 
postnational membership because citizenship and its legal and normative 
aspects are based in the wider community and implemented within its member 
states. Consequently, if we apply Soysal‘s framework to CBRs and CBC 
activities, is there evidence that a different ‗multi-cultural‘ understanding of 
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citizenship has been emerging in CBRs which is transnational in its scope? If 
this is the case, what role have minority groups played in this process? Has the 
behaviour of individuals changed in response to CBC activities?  
 
3. The Case Study in Context 
 
This paper is concerned with the border territory between Italy and 
Slovenia, an area characterized by a complex ethnic composition. The 
inhabitants include Slovenophones resident in the region of Friuli-Venezia-
Giulia (FVG) (estimated numbers in 1994 varied between 80,000 and 100,000); 
an Italophone minority in Slovenia (3,064 people inhabitant, according to the 
1991 census, now separated from the 19,636 Italians living in Croatia); and a 
number of ‗new‘ ‗ethnic groups‘ which have recently emerged as minorities. 
The ‗Friulan people‘ is the majority group in the FVG, defined as an ‗ethnic 
minority‘ in 2007 in the proposed new statute of the Region 
(http://www.lucianoviolante.it/index.php?Itemid=16andid=1405andoption=c
om_contentandtask=view). There are also Italo-Istrians-Dalmatians who are 
the descendents of those Italians who left the Slovene littoral during and after 
WWII. Those organised around the ‗National Association Venetia-Giulia-
Dalmatia‘ (Associazione Nazionale Venezia Giulia-Dalmazia- ANVGD) have 
recently started to claim that they constitute a minority comparable to the 
Slovenian one in Italy. This is the case also for the inhabitants of Resia (a village 
in FVG) who do not consider themselves as Slovenes (but Slavs), although 
their commune applied in 2007 in order to be included in those municipalities 
where the Law on the Protection of the Slovene Linguistic Community (Italian 
national law 482/2001) is to be implemented. The same applies to the people 
who live in villages located in the Natison Valley and Canal Valley.  
Many scholars have shown an interest in studying this area due to its 
strategic geographical position, its important role on the European scene and its 
pluralistic ethnic composition (Bratina, 1997; Faro, 2003; Bufon, 2002). They 
have stressed that the Commission through CBC is having an impact upon 
transfrontier cooperation and socio-economic integration, and aims to ‗fuzz‘ 
the Italo-Slovene border through the construction of economic linkages, and 
the engagement of the ‗border people‘ in cross-border activities (Faro, 2003: 
121; Bufon, 1998, 2002).  
While some scholars suggest that an integrated borderland is very 
difficult to achieve in this area due to a lack of co-ordination in cross-border 
activities (Anderson and Bort, 2001), opposition by minority groups and lack of 
intergroup trust (Faro, 2003), other scholars, have focused on the role played by 
those ethnic groups who live in the area (Bufon, 2002; Warwick, 1998), without 
linking this analysis to the role of political institutions or to CBC programmes.  
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In a nutshell, the above two groups of scholars address different issues 
in relation to cross border territory. Starting from the common ground that 
borders play an important social, cultural, economic, political and geographical 
role in constructing new and different identities, the first group of scholars 
(particularly Faro, 2003), focuses primarily on institutional actors and 
transformation, while the second group focuses instead on the socio-cultural 
dimension of cross-border relations. On the other, scholars such as Bufon 
remarks that it is important to understand and analyse the role played by ethnic 
and national identities and minority groups in the border territory between Italy 
and the ex-Yugoslavia (Bufon and Minghi, 2000). However, what they have all 
in common is that they share the belief that the Upper Adriatic is a laboratory 
where a ‗new‘ model of citizenship can potentially emerge. In this paper I also 
focus on the mobilization and role of minority groups, but I seek to analyse 
how minority groups have influenced institutional change and transformation. 
The novelty of what has been happening in this area can be assessed and 
understood by linking these two dimensions.  
 
4. The Upper Adriatic Area Since 2007: Towards New Citizenship 
Practices? 
 
This section draws on 43 in-depth interviews with Slovenian and Italian 
officials, representing local (in the case of Slovenia, which is still lacking a 
regional level) and regional authorities (in the case of the FVG region); NGOs 
and cultural associations, and business organizations. There are many non-
profit voluntary associations engaged on the ground to facilitate cooperation 
and dialogue across the border. I focus here on six main voluntary associations 
which represent the Italian minority in Slovenia (Unione degli Italiani, founded in 
1944 in Čamparovica, in Croatia), the Slovenian minority in Italy (Slovenska 
kulturno-gospodarska zveza –SKGZ, founded in 1958 in Triest; Svet slovenskih 
organizacij –SSO, founded in 1976 in Triest; Euroservis-Europrogettazione e 
Collaborazione transfrontaliera, founded in 2004 in Triest; Slovensko deželno 
gospodarsko združenje-SDGZ which represents the Slovenian entrepreneurs in 
Italy; Slovene Research Institute-SLORI, founded in 1974 in Triest), and the 
associations founded by Italian-Istro-Dalmatians in FVG (Lega Nazionale Gorizia 
and Comitato Provinciale di Gorizia dell‟Associazione Nazionale Venezia Giulia e 
Dalmazia-ANVGD, founded in 1891).  
The fieldwork demonstrates that minority groups (still mainly at the 
elite level) mobilize through these associations, developing a network of 
‗friendship‘ and ‗influence‘ across the border. The implementation of European 
CBC programmes, especially the activities promoted under Interreg 2007-13, 
has led to the establishment of a remarkable net of linkages between 
associations representing Slovenes, the Slovenian minority in Italy, Italians 
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(mainly those living in FVG and Veneto regions) and the Italian minority in 
Slovenia. Cooperation is now taken for granted, so much so that all my 
interviewees remarked that ‗border people‘ are ‗geographically‘, therefore 
‗naturally‘, inclined to cooperate with each other, because they share the same 
territory and have to deal with common problems. In particular, CBC 
programmes are viewed by both minorities as vital tools which stretch social 
and political ties within and beyond national boundaries, as well as between 
ethno-national minority groups and across minority and majority groups.  
The analysis of EU Commission documentation, shows that although 
Interreg programmes did not specifically target borderland minority communities 
with their development priorities (Faro, 2005), there are objectives which have 
an implicit ‗minority‘ focus, such as cross-border cultural and vocational 
cooperation, or economic development between similar linguistic communities 
(Rigo, 2006: 93).  
The evidence collected during four years of fieldwork between 2007-
2013 shows that CBC has been beneficial to both minorities, particularly for the 
Italian minority in Slovenia. The latter is considerably smaller in size and less 
organised than the Slovenian minority in Italy. All the interviewees from both 
minority groups argued that the Slovenian minority played a key role in helping 
the Italian minority in Slovenia to be able to effectively make use of the tools 
offered by the EU and therefore to become a dynamic actor in CBC. As an 
Italian minority representative in Slovenia noted: 
 
Everything we (the people who work in the Europa office, an NGO 
Italian association in Slovenia which directly deals with CBC) have 
learnt is thanks to the Slovenians in Italy. I have built not only an 
economic relationship with them, but especially a personal 
friendship. I refer here mainly to the Society of the Euroservis, and 
its President […] who helped us enormously. He provided us with 
all his ‗know how‘ in CBC activities (interview with an Italian 
minority representative, Unione Italiana, 3.08.07). 
 
Although the above extract stresses especially the ‗utilitarian‘ 
appreciation of the other minority for practical reasons (i.e. the Slovenian 
minority group ‗has been helpful‘ to the Italian minority), recognising here only 
the important economic help provided by the Slovenian minority to the Italian 
one will lead to a restrictive interpretation of what is happening on the ground. 
The findings show that intercultural contacts are at play here as well, and a 
more open multicultural realities emerging. The same interviewee expressed the 
view of the many interviewees who highlighted the fact that minority groups 
are bound together by cultural linkages and that it is important to move in this 
direction as well: 
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There is the need to educate to a multi-cultural, multi-lingual 
society, to live together, to be integrated into society. These are the 
values promoted by the EU. Here there are different cultures: the 
Slovenian, the Italian, the Croatian, the Hungarian ones. All these 
cultures contributed to develop, to create this territory which is 
richer, and more beautiful because of them. […] Therefore, we (the 
minority groups) want all together to spread a positive vision of 
‗our‘ presence here (interview with a representative of the Italian 
minority association in Slovenia, Unione Italiana, 16.04.08). 
 
Both Slovenians and Italian minority representatives stress the 
importance of this process: 
  
We (the Italian minority in Koper and the Slovenian minority in 
FVG) worked in order that minority groups become and are 
subjects of these programmes, a target group, who should have a 
special role within EU transfrontalier programmes. The EU has 
given us the tools, but it is very important that we become skilled 
actors able to make use of them (interview with an Italian minority 
representative in Slovenia, member of staff of the ‗Europa Office‘ 
in Koper, 16.04.08). 
 
Moreover, EU projects are perceived as helping to overcome 
stereotypical prejudices rooted at the local level. The outcome is greater social 
integration and increased motivation to continue to work together. Speaking 
about the Project ‗MI.MA: Majorities know Minorities‘1 which belongs to 
                                                          
1 The project MI. MA. was carried out in 2006 and 2007 by SLORI in Italy and the 
Unione Italiana in Slovenia and Croatia. The project partners are the Coastal Self-
Governing Community of the Italian Nationality and the Italian Centre for 
Promotion, Culture, Education and Development ‗Carlo Combi‘ in Slovenia and 
the SKGZ, the SSO and the Association of the Friends of the Newspaper Isonzo 
in Italy. The project was developed in the frame of the Community Initiative 
Programme Interreg IIIA Italy-Slovenia 2000-2006 and was already carried out for 
the first time in the period 2004/2005. It arose from a very close cooperation 
between the Italian community in Slovenia and the Slovene community in Italy. 
The aim of the project was to raise awareness particularly among young people 
about the presence of the autochthonous minorities living in the border areas 
between Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. Through educational and informative activities 
the project has promoted the knowledge of the Slovenes in Italy and of the Italians 
in Slovenia and Croatia (http://www.slori.org/index.php?pag=progettiandanno= 
1andcid=12andlang=engandPHPSESSID=lzfklqlctqandPHPSESSID=lzfklqlctq).  
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Interreg III 2000-06 an Italian minority representative of the Unione Italiana 
noted that:  
 
[…] since in our cross border territory Slovenes are scornfully 
labelled as ‗sclavi‘ (slave) or ‗communists‘, and Italians as fascists 
and slaughterers of Slovenes and Croats, both the Italian and 
Slovenian minority sought a project which could help to make us be 
known by the majorities. This project has been very successful […]. 
One of the remarkable messages we have been able to deliver is 
that the two minorities can plan projects which are very useful for 
the wider society, not just for us (interview with the author, 
3.08.07). 
 
Interestingly, the analysis of official documentation shows that the 
Italian and Slovenian minorities mutually support one another in relation to 
their nation state, the Slovenian and Italian state respectively. The official 
website of the Slovenian minority in Italy, represented by the SKGZ states: 
 
The Italian Union (which represents the Italian minority in both 
Slovenia and Croatia […]) has again shown its support towards our 
minority […]. The Italian Union has approved a document with 
which it aims to put pressure upon Italian authorities in Rome to 
effectively implement the Italian national law 2001 […]. The SKGZ 
thanks and appreciates indeed the work of the Italian minority 
which is particularly attentive to our needs (http://www.skgz.org 
/tisk/ita/54, 4.07.07; translated by the author).  
 
This evidence suggests that a different mode of ‗membership‘ of 
‗minority group‘, which is not exclusive, but inclusive because anchored in the 
universalistic rights of personhood and solidarity is developing between the two 
communities (Soysal, 1994). A ‗collective‘ way of referring to two different 
minorities is emerging. It is very interesting to note that the Italian minority (in 
this case) is the channel through which the Slovenian minority is trying to 
influence the Italian state. The multiculturalism which emerges is quite different 
from that suggested by Kymlicka, who focuses on ethnocultural and religious 
diversity. Instead, we are witnessing a multiculturalism which is better 
summarised in the expression suggested by Bufon ‗unity in diversity‘ (1998).  
The fieldwork presents findings which initially appeared closer to 
Kymlicka‘s model. Two parallel societies, two ‗solitudes‘ as he called them, 
although living in peace and sharing the same territory, used to stand with their 
backs to each other. After the implementation of CBC activities however this 
picture has been revolutionised. Transnational linkages are developing and there is 
an increasing tendency to mobilize, in the ways suggested by Soysal. Accordingly, 
in line with Soysal‘s model, EU top-down programmes, together with a dynamic 
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grass-root participation in CBC activities, are leading to a mobilization which goes 
beyond the confines of national communities (Soysal, 1998: 315). 
The ‗national citizenship model‘, which ‗is normatively predicated upon 
integrity of national communities and boundaries‘ (Soysal, 1998: 307) seems 
therefore to be transcended in the Upper Adriatic. Furthermore, the kind of 
language used by these actors is highly significant. The Italian and Slovenian 
minorities mobilize around common issues, appealing to a universalistic 
language of ‗culture‘, ‗minority‘ and ‗multi-culturalism‘ to claim participation 
and recognition. Remarkably, as one interviewee put it ‗…we think that the 
only way of overcoming the scars of history is through constant dialogue, not 
through contraposition‘ (interview with a Slovenian minority representative, 
SKGZ, 17.07.08). The EU Commission has clearly played a role in shaping this 
view and in ‗initially forcing‘ different border communities to cooperate (Rigo, 
2006). It has not only favoured this reciprocal ‗cultural‘ knowledge and 
dialogue, but it has also promoted a new awareness within minority groups 
according to which they are not only objects of the programmes, but important 
dynamic subjects.  
 
5 Ties Linking Majority and Minority Groups 
 
In an effort to fully grasp the new social, economic and political 
scenario which emerges in the Upper Adriatic I will address in this section the 
issue of whether, as suggested by Kymlicka (2002), majority and minority ethnic 
groups, although respecting each other, and being guaranteed in their rights, 
remain divided. Conversely, I will explore whether a change is occurring in their 
relationships which points towards new ways of conceptualising citizenship, as 
indicated by Soysal (1998). 
As documented by Faro and Bufon in their own research and indicated 
by my interviewees, both the Slovenian and Italian minority groups have had 
difficult relationships with the Italian and Slovenian majority group2 
                                                          
2 While the Italian and Slovene minorities‘ protections within Italy and the former 
Yugoslavia were legally described in the 1975 Osimo Treaty (which fixed the border 
between the two states), the legal protection of the estimated 80-100,000 
Slovenophones in Italy continues to evolve to this day. Rights to Slovene-language 
education, public address, and toponomastic signage vary between the three 
provinces in which the Italian Slovenophones live-Udine (Videm), Gorizia (Gorica), 
and Trieste (Trst). Though the region of FVG has been officially autonomous since 
1967 due to its multicultural nature, much of the interpretation and implementation 
of the various minority protections has been left at the discretion of the municipal 
level; indeed, the Italian parliament only formally recognised the Slovenophones 
(and those of the province of Udine among them, having been resident in Italy 
since 1866) as a ‗national‘ minority in 2001. In comparison, the roughly 3,000 
Italophones of the Slovene littoral-who live within four officially bilingual 
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respectively (Faro, 2005; Bufon, 2000, 2001). Recently, however, this 
relationship has significantly improved due to three different developments. 
Firstly, at the EU level, as already discussed, CBC programmes pushed in this 
direction. Secondly, at the national level, Italy approved the national law 
38/2001, which recognises the Slovenian minority as a ‗national‘ minority. 
According to Rigo, Italy had to endorse this law protecting the Slovenophone 
minority due to Slovenia‘s accession to the EU. Indeed it would have been 
embarrassing for Italy to continue to justify such a gap in its legislation at the 
EU level. Thirdly, at the local level, civic mobilization, through economic 
minority Associations (Euroservis, SDGZ in particular) has proved vital in 
developing economic and social linkages between the minority and majority 
group.  
A Slovenian association in Italy, the already mentioned Euroservis, co-
operates with several public and private bodies, both in Italy and in Slovenia 
and, according to one of its representatives, has contributed to connecting 
different economic and social actors across the border. This interviewee 
evaluated the outcome very positively: 
 
Italy, and the FVG region in Interreg Italy-Slovenia, were 
and are more than happy to include the Slovenian community 
living in Italy, and the Republic of Slovenia as well to include the 
Italian minority living in Slovenia. This process allowed the two 
minorities to know each other better, but also to link the minorities 
to their motherland majorities […] Eventually a stronger 
integration and cohesion between the Slovenian minority with the 
Italian majority, and the Italian minority with the Slovenian 
majority can emerge (interview with a Slovenian minority 
representative of Euroservis, 10.01.08). 
 
Empirical research thus shows that a ‗quadrangular‘ partnership can 
evolve from this perspective. Let us think of four ethnic groups, A-B-C-D, 
where A and B are majority national groups, while C and D are historical ethnic 
minority groups which live respectively in X and Y territories. 
                                                                                                                                                     
municipalities, Portoroţ-Portorose, Piran-Pirano, Izola-Isola, and Koper-
Capodistria-are constitutionally guaranteed the full protection and permanent 
representation as an autochthonous minority. Having said that, all my interviewees 
agreed that, although the Italian minority were guaranteed on their rights, however 
many of these rights where just ‗on the paper‘. 
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This can be represented as follows:  
 
X       Y 
    
 
Through EC Interreg programmes, as we discussed above, cross border 
cooperation linked first historical ethnic groups (C to D) living in X and Y 
territory, second the majority and minority groups who share the same territory 
(A to C and B to D), third the minority group of X territory with the majority 
group of Y territory (C to B and D to A), and finally the two majority groups 
who live in X and Y territory (A and B).  
I put forward the argument that the Europeanization process, through 
CBC activities, in this respect is overcoming Kymlicka‘s model which suggests 
that the majority (dominant) group (eg, A) recognizes the specific rights and the 
autonomy of a minority group living in the same territory (C) but also objects 
to this same group establishing relations with the majority group of the 
neighbouring country (B). A possible outcome of this approach is that the 
ethnic minority group C is easily labelled and perceived by the majority A as the 
‗outsider‘ and the ‗other‘ (Kymlicka, 2001).  
Notably, my research clearly shows that this scenario is being 
completely transformed due to a different perception of the ‗minority group‘ 
and its dynamism in participating socially, economically and politically at the 
local level, which is viewed as an enrichment rather than a threat, as well as to 
the influence exercised by EU programmes and policies. 
Turning to the above graphics, my fieldwork has discovered that A, B, 
C, D are not autonomous from each other, but are embedded in a network of 
ties with each other. Minority and majority groups find themselves interlinked 
on the basis of a shared wider territory, the EU in general, and the border 
region in particular and ‗are better equipped to maintain social norms and social 
cohesion‘ (Fennema and Tillie, 2000: 33). I argue that Soysal‘s multi-layered 
model is hence at play in the Upper Adriatic cross border region, where 
horizontal and vertical links have developed. These minorities are now fully 
aware that networks, cooperation and joint representation, are key tools for an 
effective participation and an active mobilization both at the national and 
supranational level.  
The analysis has shown so far that thanks to a synergic combination 
between bottom up mobilization and top down recognition there is an 
increased development of intergroup linkages across the border. In fact, 
although it is generally recognised that the relationship with the majority group 
D 
B C 
A 
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is still difficult (for both Italians in Slovenia and Slovenians in Italy), alongside 
the development of socio-economic ties - especially between the Italian 
majority and the Slovenian minority in Italy - there are recent political signs of 
openness as well. As it was reported to me the year 2007 marked an important 
date in this respect:  
 
What is very important is the fact that the two minorities were 
officially recognised by the Italian state in 2007. This happened 
during the official visit of Minister D‘Alema in Nova Gorica where 
he met the Slovenian President, Mr Rupel and the President of the 
Italian Union, Mr Tremul. The official meeting gave us (the 
minorities) official recognition, and for the first time the two 
minorities were officially together (interview with a Slovenian 
representative of SKGZ, 29.01.10).  
 
The findings show that the Slovenian minority, in particular, started to 
perceive an improvement in its relations with the FVG region thanks to the 
centre-left presence at the region‘s helm, led by Riccardo Illy (Governor of the 
FVG Region, from 2003 to 2008) which favoured an institutional cooperation 
with the minority. Referring to the political climate created by Mr Illy, one 
interviewee remarked: 
 
Illy has been a great governor in relation to the Slovenian minority 
in Italy […] He increased economic funds for the minority; he was 
the one who launched and approved the regional law in favour of 
the minority and was actively engaged in implementing the national 
law 2001 (interview with a Slovenian Spokesperson, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 07.07.08). 
 
Consequently, the relationships between minority and majority groups 
are influenced by the regional-national political set up, which can either speed 
up or slow down the integration process and dampen or mobilise inter-ethnic 
tension (see also Faro; 2003; 2005). However, although the Italian minority in 
Slovenia shares the view that Mr Illy really boosted and improved the political 
and economic relationship between the two minorities and the majorities as 
well, its representatives do not have such a pessimistic view due to the change 
in the political set up. As one of them stated, although Mr Illy had been a key 
figure in backing minority groups in EU projects (i.e. I poeti delle due 
minoranze), ‗I believe that Mr Tondo like Mr Illy will go on developing the 
dialogue between the two minorities and the minorities with their majorities‘ 
(interview with a member of the Unione Italiana, 16.04.08).  
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 In this respect, it is interesting that some minority groups which are 
themselves politically right leaning, appear to have played a positive role in 
influencing right-wing political institutions in favour of CBC. One of my 
interviewees, President of the Lega Nazionale Gorizia (FVG) and the Gorizia 
provincial committee of the Associazione Nazionale Venezia Giulia e Dalmazia 
(ANVGD), claimed that: 
 
It is socially and politically relevant that in Gorizia (Itlay) there is a ‗right-
wing‘ council. This helps explain why the relationship with Nova Gorica 
(city in Slovenia) is very difficult […]. Our association has a strong 
relationship with the right-leaning electorate and interact with them 
through press releases, meetings, political demonstrations. Therefore, the 
fact that we give a positive message about cross-border cooperation and 
cross-border projects influences the way people think. They trust us, they 
share our views (interview with the author, 2.02.10). 
 
I suggest here a different picture from the pessimistic one provided by 
Faro at the beginning of the 2000s when he argued that the Upper Adriatic was 
dominated by political right-wing movements which impeded the enhancement 
of an effective and stable CBC across the borders. We can see that even ‗right-
wing‘ minority groups can influence borderland voters and political institutions 
and therefore can strengthen multicultural integration.  
 Why has this change of attitude and political climate occurred in the 
Upper Adriatic? I contend that there are two key reasons. One can again be 
drawn from Kymlicka‘s model. He argues that a working multicultural system 
has not succeeded in Western democratic countries and even less in Eastern 
countries due to their inability to create a ‗robust or constructive intercultural 
exchange‘ (Kymlicka, 2002: 11). Members of the dominant groups have not yet 
fully accepted minority groups, which are perceived as a threat to the unity and 
security of the state. I remark that in the Upper Adriatic, EU community 
Initiatives helped to overcome these fears. They represented the starting point 
of a web of relations between all groups. Interestingly thanks to CBC, 
minorities were perceived as an enrichment for border society, because of their 
knowledge of the border territory and their ability to create and reinforce bonds 
with the border country.  
This leads to the second reason, which concerns the role played by 
minority groups themselves, as they are able to ‗challenge the roles and 
meanings of boundaries‘ (Paasi, 1999: 15) with their activities and this facilitates 
coordination and cooperation in the name of the common good. In fact, 
minority groups: 
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know all these border realities and we understand how to link these 
territories and their people. We are really trying to overcome political 
barriers also because tensions between our states influence our way of 
living (interview with a Slovenian minority representative, SKGZ, 
20.01.10).  
 
These conditions therefore allow the emergence of multiculturalism, 
because, as Kymlicka himself suggests, where there are ‗increasing numbers (of 
minority group members), increasing rights-consciousness, and multiple points 
of access for safe political mobilization, I believe that the trend towards greater 
accommodation of ethnic diversity is likely to arise‘ (Kymlicka, 2002: 9).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has addressed the question of whether and why a new form 
of citizenship has emerged in the Upper Adriatic area. In answering this 
question, the theoretical framework provided by Kymlicka‘s multi-cultural 
model and Soysal‘s post-national understanding of citizenship, as well as the 
research on this area carried out by Bufon and Faro provided the starting point. 
The latter scholars asserted that European integration pushed for the 
implementation of cooperative policies with regard to neighbouring states, 
involving sub-national actors (Bufon, 2000; 2002; Faro, 2003, 2005), in order to 
overcome national borders for a more integrated Europe (top-down approach). 
However, Faro stressed that, although in the last decade the relationship 
between Italy and Slovenia had improved at a political-economic level and 
contacts had substantially increased, thanks to CBC, there was still a lack of 
inter-ethnic linkages and a limited participation of minority groups in 
transfrontalier activities, or bottom-up mobilization (Faro, 2005).  
Significantly, Faro concluded that:  
 
the Italo-Slovene borderland had not progressed beyond a state of 
interdependence […], due to the persistence of historic, intercultural 
mistrust in the borderland, local political opposition to, and subversion 
of, specific initiatives in regional economic integration which had been 
motivated by xenophobia and economic nationalism, and the more 
general failure of EU-led and coordinated national efforts to create 
sustainable institutional and person-to-person networks in the region 
(Faro 2003).  
 
Bufon, by contrast, stressed the important role minority groups 
(especially the Slovenian one) might play in order to promote greater 
integration. However, he did not investigate the nature of the ties that could 
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join different minorities together, or the impact of a joint mobilization by 
minority groups upon the national and local-regional level. 
This paper has therefore revisited the issue of citizenship in the Upper 
Adriatic area. It has taken into account both the changes brought about by the 
application of EU CBC programmes and the important role played by ethnic 
minority groups (in particular through their associations), who, in actively 
participating in cross-border activities, become subjects rather than merely 
objects of these programmes.  
My results show that especially since 2007, thanks to Interreg 2007-13, 
an innovative understanding of citizenship has emerged in the cross-border 
territory between Italy and Slovenia as a consequence of a ‗top down‘ impetus 
and, most importantly, ‗bottom up‘ responses. Top down, Interreg 2007-13 has 
been one of the main, if not ‗the‘ major instrument, through which people were 
initially forced to interact transcending national borders. Bottom up, Slovenians and 
Italians cross-border minority groups through their associations and 
representatives, and the practice of ‗learning by doing‘, have been successful in 
developing not only economic but also social and cultural ties. Old animosities are 
in the process of being overcome because these communities, having been 
‗directed‘ towards a cooperative approach, ended up knowing each other better 
and grasping the advantages of cooperation.  
Most importantly, the establishment of social trust between cross-border 
society members (Fennema and Tillie, 2001) has permitted them to both 
construct and pursue common interests. The positive mutual outcome achieved 
through cooperation thus represents an incentive to continue the cooperation 
after the funded programmes come to an end. Ethnic groups continue to 
communicate with one other through ‗informal‘ contacts and develop 
interlocking permanent channels of communication. 
The fieldwork shows notably that Kymlicka‘s model, in suggesting that 
in ‗multi-nation‘ states minorities are acting in order to sustain themselves as 
distinct and self-governing societies (Kymlicka, 2002), does not adequately 
reflect the situation on the ground. On the contrary, the role played by 
minorities who, in becoming active subjects within the programmes, are 
constructing a different consciousness of the self and the ‗other, can be better 
understood through Soysal‘s model. A more inclusive attitude towards those 
who do not belong to the same ethnic group reflects the choice of individuals 
and groups in the way they define themselves and relate to political institutions. 
The Upper Adriatic area is becoming thus more hybrid (i.e. an area no longer 
divided by a social, cultural, economic- border), plural and blurred thanks to EU cross-
border programmes and an active and dynamic sub-national mobilization which 
builds and spreads trust at the local-regional level. In other words, a more 
cohesive community has been engendered. Ethnic identities are not a limit to 
cooperation, but are an enrichment to a multi-cultural society. In the 
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construction of a hybrid territory, it is therefore impossible to categorize, or 
label minorities in the same way as in the past. The interpretation of what is 
happening on the ground suggests thus a move away from Kymlicka‘s 
particularisms, and a redefinition of ethnicity itself, no longer viewed 
uncritically as linked to the historical legacy of migration or annexation, but 
anchored to a process of redefinition and reconstruction of the self. 
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Abstract. Should we pay special attention to the relations between countries that 
have historical interethnic issues? In our century it turns out that managing interethnic 
relations between countries in the EU is an important bottleneck that can have a powerful 
impact upon the integrity of the EU. Uncertainty regarding what it is to become of the 
contemporary European Union, yet apparent certainty about the need for reconstructing 
geopolitics within the EU has rekindled interest in the field of international relations and 
interethnic cooperation. Such renewed interest of this core concept has translated into the need 
for a greater historical sensitivity to forms of geopolitical social organization that can arise 
European political structures. It is my opinion that we are going to witness a shift in the way 
ethnicity is view, a shift towards the concept of “interest”. It is now something of a bien 
pensant cliché to remark that the EU-led policy of public diplomacy and soft power did a lot 
to persuade countries into the system. This study is supported by a complex statistic data base 
that comes to support or even put forward new interpretation to this problem.  
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around the year 1960, has kept a lot of headline in many articles, it is our belief 
that the ethnic framework is changing. Understanding it by raising questions 
and by putting to examination the conceptualization of ethnicity and its allusive 
quality could account for interesting European issues, which sometimes may be 
considered only marginally. Max Weber supported the allusive quality of 
ethnicity ‗The whole conception of ethnic groups is so complex and so vague that it might be 
good to abandon it altogether.‘(Weber, 1968: 385) 
The European continent faces a challenge in dealing not with historical 
interethnic issues, but with new interethnic relations that might arise in the near 
future. In order to continue to guarantee security, development and stability the 
European Union must face a twofold challenge: internally and externally. 
Internally, the European Union will have to construct an approach towards 
new ethnic issues, the increase in the Muslim minority, which statistics show it 
will become a large percent of the population in the near future. Externally, the 
European Union will have to construct a proper approach to the neighboring 
Muslim countries, basically, really test the limits of its soft power in determining 
flows of immigration and flow of capital and exchanges with these countries. 
These new variables have rekindled new phenomena that will have to be dealt 
with such as the move towards right wing political parties, the need to 
recalibrate domestic and foreign policy. 
Gradually, it becomes more and more visible that the old ethnic issues 
pertaining to the European continent is no longer salient. On the other hand 
the old ethnic issues, even if their existence will still be acknowledged from 
time to time, their importance will be shifted gradually from the national 
domain, to the domestic realm of the European Union. No longer an ethnic 
issue will concern and involve relation of a type nation-nation, but mainly the 
entire European Union. On the other hand, in large measure, the ethnic issue 
of Muslim origin affects not only the domestic realm, perceived as everything 
within the borders of the European Union, but also the foreign policy towards 
the foreign realm. A sensitive nerve in the past, national anxiety towards old 
ethnic disputes seems to have been replaced with an exacerbating widespread 
fear of Muslim ethnicity and Europe‘s periphery. Sure, not long ago the 
perspective of changing minds on questions of old ethnic issues between 
nations on the European continent was no small task, but merely shifting the 
focus from one set of ethnic issues to another is not the answer. In such a case 
entrenchment of such an ethnic issue will not result merely in a change in 
domestic policy but also in a change in foreign policy, effectively blocking both 
inner growth and the increase in soft power outside the European Union. Being 
a twofold issue, it brings double advantages or disadvantages. Samuel  
The fact that we are perhaps witnessing a deconstruction and re-
construction of history, reinterpreted under the pressure of new circumstances 
and even interests, make me ponder about something said by Mark Twain 
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History does not repeat itself, but sometimes rhymes. If indeed we are in a clash of 
civilizations context, as Samuel P. Huntington put forward in the Clash of 
civilization and the Remaking of the World Order,  we may be privileged enough to 
capture the moment in which Islam provides the impetus for a new Europe, as 
it was the case a millennium ago. He considers that ab incunabulis, people from 
different groups, civilizations are bent on converging at some point or another.  
As the European Union celebrates its handling of ab intra traditional 
ethnic issues, it is faced with yet another paradox that sets out. Although it 
attached more weight to old traditional ethnic issues, focusing on solidarity, 
economical cooperation between fellow European countries and the defense of 
common interests it did little to create reference policy towards the new ethnic 
groups made out of Muslim citizens. However, supporting a new view on this 
issue as an objective has been increasingly been factored into Europe‘s 
policymaking. Among other impulses, origin and kinship in the conduct of ethnic 
groups are used quite often. These concepts are bound even more prominently to 
ethno nationalist movements. Yet, we are still left with one question: will 
Europe‘s system become a natural and vital component for all ethnic groups 
within its borders as many from the old continent hope? Such ethnic movements 
have been tied by W. Connor (1993, p. 373) to references regarding ideology at 
the operational level such as “fatherland‖ (Connor, 1993: 373-398). Research has 
proved that Muslim immigration and those that were born on the European 
continent have far more in common with umma (universal Muslim community) and 
the dar al-Islam (abode the peace, or Islam territory). Further, we shall highlight 
the relevance of term umma, to put it simply aligning it to a definition.  
“THE TERM ‗UMMA‘ is derived from the word „amm‟ (the root) which 
means ‗to aim at‘ or ‗to intend to‘. Hence, ordinarily, it means the people who 
‗intend to‘ follow a leader or a religion. Moreover, it is used in the sense of the 
desire ‗to belong to‘ one place or generation, and various kinds of birds.  
The Quran, however, has employed the term in a variety of meanings. These 
are: Nation. The following translations of the verses of the Quran can be 
inferred as referring to umma as nation. ―Our Lord, and make us submissive 
unto Thee and of our seed a nation submissive unto Thee.‖(Quran, II: 128)‖( 
Dr Muhammad Nazeer KakaKhel,. The author is a faculty member of the 
Qurtuba University, Peshawar, and was the chairman of the Department of 
Political Science, University of Peshawar, Pakistan.) 
Equally consequential in the reappearance of this ethnic issue was the 
extraordinary fascination of the Orient for the West. Roosens, 1968 was indeed 
convinced that once the political establishment stopped working on policies to 
better construct around the ethnic element so as to make the system fit the 
ethnic reality, ethnic-cultural differences can re-appear (Roosens, 1989). Roosens 
controversial statement seriously pressures the European continent to invest a 
lot of energy for its readiness for a new framework of ethnic cooperation. 
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Above all, it comes to correct any perspective that at one point or another, 
policy makers could shed the activist approach in pushing towards substantive 
policies in accordance with ethnic realities. Roosens, assessing the impact of 
arbitrary external circumstances and thorny conditions such as reliance on 
ideological determination, lingering political strategies and  embedded structural 
conditions concluded that ethnic identities goes beyond the groups 
involvement. Communities that have sought to preserve important pillars such 
as structural conditions or which have nurtured ideological determination know 
a greater ethnic gap. Ultimately, all of these points of divergence trace their 
roots in external circumstances. This ethnic issue has no simple solution. Yet, it 
seems that the dominant European policy towards this new ethnic issue is to 
call for patience, in the best case, perhaps leaving the impression of 
postponement to a still-distant future this important issue. The question of the 
Muslim ethnicity vis-à-vis the European mainland goes beyond homeland 
security, challenging European strategic ability. Foremost, this issue, which can 
become a vision, could hamstring relations on the ethnic level, for inner 
relations, and at the foreign policy level for outer level, on a variety of 
questions. Europe must avoid seeing this issue as a marginal one and not 
engage in a potentially unsettling unilateral policy towards this ethnic 
population. The presence of this ethnic issue speaks on the evolving nature of 
European policy and demographics. The course Europe chooses as it enters 
into this new stage will affect its homeland security commitment, soft power 
capability, economical growth planning, all of them pivotal for its existence.   
A pragmatic view on ethnicity will produce a mixed theoretical 
definition. We should not be reluctant to define ethnicity as a real fusion of 
strong cultural practices, a strong legacy of perspectives, fierce distinctions, all 
of them achieving - particularly as it relates to the outside - to reflect more or 
less an enclose arena, setting a group of individuals outside of the mainstream, 
sometimes reluctant to allow someone else ethnically distinct to be part of the 
community. Seldom, does these groups converge in political harmony other 
groups. Ethnicity has emerged, at least for the moment and for the majority 
that sought to define it as shared cultural heritage. Ethnic groups have been 
branded, sometimes willingly, through the use of emphatic ancestry, a strong 
commitment towards conventional forms of dress. Focus as we are on the 
defining of the concept of ethnicity we should not omit the investment of a 
significant energy in preserving a group language and above all the unsurprising 
proliferation of a common religion, which especially applies to our discussion. 
These factors define ethnicity and underline the rising force of an apparently 
socially and economically vulnerable and sometimes discriminated upon ethnic 
group, self-confident enough to try to even further advance on the global stage. 
Demographics, by itself can shape the continent by sheer force of inertia and 
the new ethnic reality can shape the continent by holding on to its traditional 
Differentiated Containment: Compass and Horizon in Untying Ethhnicity and Interest within EU 
 
481 
position. Increasingly, researchers have sought to support an initiative to 
promote ethnicity as not being inherited. Awareness has been steadily growing 
that ethnic differences are learnt, and ethnic differences are built around the 
idea of learning it, thus such a practice would help to differentiate the ethnic 
group for those outside, sometimes perceived as the adversaries. Yet, we are 
skeptical that such a view from the part of any ethnic group, once established, 
would benefit anyone or bring any new connection into the system. The 
European Union through continuing to promote democracy and its core values 
should support a changing in this view also in regard to this new ethnic 
background, further trying to treat as equals each citizen and applying neutrality 
in its overall system. At a minimum, the European Union is compelled to 
review yet another time the concept of ethnicity and create an offer, not 
response, to those involved. By doing this the European Union would 
demonstrate once again to the rest of the world the nature of its internal 
politics meant to serve as the primary means for its soft power.  
Thus, European analysts should focus their attention on defining a policy 
towards this new ethnic reality. I believe that it is precisely this context that has 
not been conceptualized enough on the European agenda, thus creating a power 
incentive for others to manipulate kinship and cultural symbols. This possible 
misbehavior can enforce a powerful pressure upon economic growth, critical to 
both social ethnic stability and for a future robust foreign policy. Europe‘s rising 
status and influence on the world political arena, through its dominant soft power 
component can only be preserved through a balancing strategy. On the other 
hand, this would require Europe to diverge energy and money from its already 
scarce resources, in a time of economical upheaval, to its own disadvantage. To 
avoid the treatment of ethnic groups as interests groups, as it was defined by 
Glazer & Moynihan, 1963; Yancey et al., 1976, Europe should enhance its own 
international standing by creating a more nuanced and strategic policy, rather 
than one dominated by clear-cut decisions. Ethnicity has the ability to exert 
considerable pressure and in order for the European continent not to succumb to 
this pressure it should also view that ethnicity in the long run can become a 
political resource. Europeans and Muslim ethnicity should come to an abiding 
interest in adherence to the same values. Commonality on the possible misuse of 
ethnicity as a political resource exists. This has been a concern for Cohen (1969 
who has provided us and any power-wielder with information regarding urban 
ethnicity in Nigeria (Cohen, 1969). In the long run, in other countries that have 
known current European tendencies in the broader sense of ethnic issues have 
also known the appearance of rallying cries for public resentment. Therein lies 
one of the most puzzling dilemma. In order to participate successfully in the 
globalized economy and benefit from its mechanism, Europe has to invest 
energy, but perhaps without devoting enough energy to managing the ethnic 
challenge. On the other hand Europe has to cope with this ethnic reality, 
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investing energy, but it may forgo or limit competitiveness and integrated world 
policy. Its economic base requires harmony and work force. Increased interaction 
and involvement of each European citizen may help in shifting the configuration 
of ethnic power and interest through each European citizen‘s self-regulating 
process of both live and behavior. Demographics create both challenges and 
opportunities. A future European model should take into account the essential 
demographic model and its dynamic, in order to continue to pursue power and 
wealth. Ethnic groups should be helped in discovering a common interest in 
joining the greater European cause, so as its interest won‘t seem illicit which in 
turn would lead to domestic discontent and stumbling foreign policy. Such a 
policy would be consistent with Europe‘s economic and security aspirations, thus 
any possible or explicit social discontent should be systematically dismantled.  
In the following part of the article a link between two variables shall be 
researched. In the present study the European Values Study Longitudinal Data File 
has been used.  This data set has the following features: Number of Units: 166.502, 
Number of Variables: 865, Analysis System: SPSS. On one hand we have a detailed 
outline of the percentage of Muslim individuals in several European countries. The 
hypothesis was that there is a link between the percentage of Muslim individuals 
present in a country and the way in which immigration is perceived by the 
population. It is our opinion that the majority of countries in which Muslim 
immigrants‘ cohesion is not properly managed by the government the sentiment 
towards immigrants and ethnic difference is less friendly. In the following chart the 
opinion of those who have answered regarding their outlook on immigrants has 
been statistically researched, according to their citizenship. It is visible that the 
highest positive views on immigrants are present in the countries marked with 
green, as opposed to those that are marked with the color red. 
Bona fide, significant differences are among the Nordic and central 
European states and the rest of Europe, in terms of both openness towards 
immigrants and in terms of percentage of population made out of Muslim 
individuals. The Nordic and Central Europe have in common a smaller Muslim 
community(Omer Taspinar, ―Europe‘s Muslim Street,‖ Foreign Policy, March/April 
2003; Simon Kuper, ―Political Muscle,‖ Financial Times (FT), September 27, 2003; 
Roula Khalaf, ―Urgent Challenge of Muslim Integration in Europe,‖ FT, July 14, 
2005; U.S. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, available at 
[http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_home.htm], Sebastian Rotella, ―Europe‘s Boys of 
Jihad,‖ Los Angeles Times, April 2, 2005).  It is also interesting to have a look over 
the basic principles that lie at the foundation of the European immigration policy. 
This was set in November 2004. Europe specialists and EU leaders adopted in 
2004 a set of 11 common basic principles for immigrant integration policy. The 
picture that emerges out of these common, yet basic principles are a combination 
of nationalistic pride, material self-interest, free-market mechanisms and 
democracy. These common practices rely on a two-way integration process.  
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Table 1 
 
Descriptives 
REGR factor score   1 for analysis 3 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Romania 1163 ,4699006 ,92662315 ,02717148 ,4165899 ,5232112 1,58644 2,10041 
Sweden 912 ,4206366 1,09816742 ,03636396 ,3492697 ,4920034 1,58644 2,10041 
Iceland 749 ,3737148 ,83596556 ,03054552 ,3137497 ,4336800 1,58644 2,10041 
Luxembourg 1445 ,3689120 ,90065251 ,02369318 ,3224352 ,4153887 1,58644 2,10041 
Poland 1308 ,2859417 ,82019002 ,02267831 ,2414518 ,3304315 1,58644 2,10041 
France 1462 ,2784786 ,94478968 ,02470936 ,2300090 ,3269482 1,58644 2,10041 
Spain 1312 ,2365877 ,84206131 ,02324753 ,1909812 ,2821941 1,58644 2,10041 
Denmark 1415 ,2253524 ,81715348 ,02172328 ,1827390 ,2679657 1,58644 2,10041 
Bulgaria 969 ,1946699 ,94792364 ,03045169 ,1349110 ,2544288 1,58644 2,10041 
Finland 988 ,1880944 ,91974762 ,02926107 ,1306733 ,2455154 1,58644 2,10041 
Portugal 1256 ,1484911 ,77547244 ,02188122 ,1055633 ,1914189 1,58644 2,10041 
Netherlands 1445 ,0960833 ,77128308 ,02028990 ,0562825 ,1358841 1,58644 2,10041 
Italy 1214 ,0854530 ,95786511 ,02749128 ,0315172 ,1393887 1,58644 2,10041 
Switzerland 1179 ,0693549 ,81384578 ,02370201 ,0228520 ,1158577 1,58644 2,10041 
Norway 1065 ,0457272 ,77169127 ,02364660 ,0006721 ,0921265 1,58644 2,10041 
Estonia 1356 -,0496964 ,90106143 ,02446947 ,0976985 ,0016942 1,58644 2,10041 
Slovenia 1223 -,0588894 ,91580731 ,02618731 ,1102664 ,0075123 1,58644 2,10041 
Belgium 1484 -,1211682 ,85914059 ,02230218 ,1649154 ,0774210 1,58644 2,10041 
Slovak 
Republic 
1198 -,1395619 ,78005612 ,02253707 ,1837785 ,0953454 1,58644 2,10041 
Latvia 1239 -,1546899 ,78826033 ,02239412 ,1986245 ,1107553 1,58644 2,10041 
Czech 
Republic 
1555 -,1702832 ,84091937 ,02132501 ,2121120 ,1284544 1,58644 2,10041 
Lithuania 1029 -,2015354 ,76448683 ,02383210 ,2483005 ,1547703 1,58644 2,10041 
Ireland 858 -,2191951 ,86312940 ,02946675 ,2770305 ,1613596 1,58644 2,10041 
Greece 1405 -,2231119 ,90350127 ,02410408 ,2703958 ,1758280 1,58644 2,10041 
Hungary 1430 -,2515339 ,80532880 ,02129635 ,2933094 ,2097584 1,58644 2,10041 
Germany 1949 -,2958008 ,81727473 ,01851238 ,3321069 ,2594946 1,58644 2,10041 
Austria 1436 -,3528172 ,97486292 ,02572565 ,4032811 ,3023533 1,58644 2,10041 
Great  
Britain 
1412 -,3636797 ,91828773 ,02443776 ,4116180 ,3157415 1,58644 2,10041 
Cyprus 834 -,6151881 ,75452876 ,02612719 ,6664710 ,5639052 1,58644 2,10041 
Malta 1285 -,8600570 ,63481394 ,01770903 ,8947988 ,8253152 1,58644 1,71597 
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Through this set of principles the European Union wished to support a 
mutual accommodation process. The nexus between all immigrants and 
residents of member states focuses on respect for the basic values of the EU. 
The list of 11 EU common basic principles on integration may be found in a 
European Commission press release, ―Integration of Third Country Nationals,‖ 
September 1, 2005, available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/press_room/ 
index_en.htm]; also see ―Handbook on Integrating Immigrants Unveiled by 
Commission,‖ European Report, November 13, 2004. In figure 2 we have kept 
the countries situated at the two poles, in order to better see the percentage of 
Muslim population. 
 
Table 2 
 
Europe‘s over all ethnic atmosphere has been further poisoned by the 
ignoring of this growing ethnic group; a critical appraisal of this apparent 
indifference to the growing number of new ethnic issues  and the publicly 
announced support for military actions against countries with Muslim majority, 
not long thereafter followed by actual shocking military action may lead to 
troublesome future developments. The method employed by the majority of 
European countries of focusing in their national surveys on citizenship not on 
ethnic background suggests a deliberate effort to further deviate from old 
ethnic issues, while also ignoring a fact, the growing ethnic issue of Muslim 
Romania 0.3%< Turkish, Tatar 
Sweden 3.9% Yugoslav, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Bosnia 
Iceland 0,1%<  
Luxembourg 
No recent data is 
stored. 
Montenegro, Yugoslavia 
Poland 0,1< Tatar 
Bulgaria 12% Turkish, Pomak, Tatar 
Netherlands 5.5% Turkey, Morocco 
Germany 15% Turkey and Yugoslav 
Austria 4.2%  
Great Britain 
In 2001  3%, but it 
increase 10 times in 
the last 10 years 
Contact with Muslim identity is 
increased because they represent an 
important percentage of the urban 
population. Recent statistics show 
variable of 8%-125 for cities such as 
London, Birmingham, Bradford, 
Leicester. 
Cyprus 26% Turkish Cypriot/ Turkey 
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population, in need of another type of reaction and method. The fact that this 
method worked with most old ethnic issues testifies to the degree of 
involvement to the cause of equality and strength of European core values, but 
leaves untouched another reality, the new ethnic reality, which has undergone a 
significant transformation over the last couple of decades. In the next image it 
is obvious the gap between the central and northern Europe and west Europe 
in terms of Muslim population.  
 
Some make the case that the suspension of old ethnic issues and the 
reversal of old ethnic stereotypes in Europe have been instrumental in bringing 
politically significant changes that allow the creation of an European 
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citizenship, with which everyone can identify. It is also important to note that 
indeed this cumulative result of this approach to the ethnic issue and enhance 
over-all cooperation and interlinking economies, heading towards multi-level 
cohesion triggered the emergence of a political system that imitates former 
systems, nor contemporary ones. It is clear that although it only now starts to 
perceive the need for an approach towards the new ethnic reality, it is not 
asserting pervasive social control, nor does it engage in a mass programatic 
design of its society. Politically significant remains the European democratic 
system of values which leaves room for future critically assertive political 
consciousness to this issue. In any case, Europe continues to remain relatively 
open towards this issue, especially as long as it can afford it. Ultimately, 
Europe‘s political strength is derivative of and dependent on the system‘s 
powerful, yet possibly transient, in lack of proper political, economic and social 
measures, soft power. We are used that European soft power is used to yield 
passive consent from the part of Europe‘s ethnically different population, more 
positive focus from outside countries, yet the growing dependence on foreign 
workforce, often of Muslim origin, inflow derived from an aging population 
needs to be properly managed so as to defer social restlessness.  
Eventually, if not the proper quantity and quality of policy changes are 
not being made towards this new ethnic issue, it could become a fertile soil for 
unrest. Immigrants, although increasingly identify with the socio-cultural 
lifestyle of the West, still preserves ethnic identity. We should expect that in the 
future Muslim population may bring a stronger contribution to the public and 
political life, through an increase consciousness. Till now, the European policy 
towards this new ethnic reality can be characterized as sometimes erratic, most 
of the times contradictory, even with conflicting policies which did little to 
improving circumstances, while consolidating a stumbling approach to the 
ethnic realm. In brief, Europe should manage both its inner and outer 
difficulties out of pure choice, not out of necessity. To strengthen the union it 
should not ignore striking facts and should attempt a symbiosis of inner policy 
and foreign policy towards the Muslim communities. The absence of a truly 
ambitious program to shape a symbiotic policy towards this new ethnic issue 
may lead to stifling innovative and growth enticing policies. Given the 
potentially threatening prospect of an aging population and the fact that 
Europe‘s closes neighbors have an ethnically Muslim population a policy not 
taking into account this potentially unstable and volatile situation would be self-
defeating. Quid nunc? (What now?) 
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Abstract. In the context of the 2004, 2007 EU enlargement and the increased 
Roma mobility that followed, the EU should be the natural choice to lead policy developments 
to tackle the anti-Roma sentiment and discrimination. It is argued in this paper that this 
debate reflects a much larger political discussion about EU responsibility and identity. The 
failure of the EU's reform process over the past ten years highlights a crisis of identity for the 
EU. The security dimension of Roma migration issue is one case which has the potential to 
force researchers to think afresh and confirm the social responsibilities of the EU. This is 
important because until the EU clarifies its position as a 'social' regional actor it will never be 
in a position to play an active role in the relation with other regional organizations or states.  
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―I have a dream, that in one day this nation will rise up and live 
according to the true meaning of his beliefs, this truth is self-evident for us: all 
people are equal ... I have a dream that my four little children will one day live 
in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by their 
character. I have a dream today.‖ (Martin Luther King, 28 august 1963) Starting 
from this motto, we see that almost 50 years later, the situation has little 
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improved, the differences are still cause for stigma - women walk, in some 
countries, behind men, the Roma are lower class citizens, without a state of 
their own, embassies or consulates to protect their rights.  
 The fall of communist regimes in 1989 and the rise in attacks on Roma 
during the subsequent economic liberalization and restructuring process 
prompted many Roma to seek asylum in western European states. 
Opportunities for movement of Roma across Europe were further enhanced 
with the 2004/2007 enlargements of the EU which provided free movement 
for Roma, as EU citizens. However, high profile cases (e.g. Italy 2008, 
Northern Ireland 2009 and France 2010) provide evidence of increased 
tensions within host communities and heightened levels of general intolerance 
towards migrant populations (Cashman, Butler, 2010: 7). Since the enlargement, 
however, the Roma are more clearly than ever a subject of internal EU policy. 
Although there is still concern about the Roma as migrants, they are now 
primarily viewed as Europe‘s largest transnational minority faced with the 
problem of socio-economic exclusion – a problem that, according to the 
emerging consensus, the EU should help to address. 
 
The Roma minority in the European Union-a problem or a threat  
 
We choose to analyze the Roma problem do to is complexity, 
stakeholders, social and political stakes that surround it but also because the 
subject is apparently an exotic one, unique, in fact, extremely useful for 
understanding, acceptance and the process of social integration. The freedom 
and beauty of nomadic life are tales, myth, the brutal reality means poverty, 
deprivation, stereotypes, social exclusion, rejection, the state initiatives are 
stopping at the institutions gates and money is spent on posters, workshops and 
speeches about social integration and positive discrimination (Marinescu, 2010).  
The actual means of intervention, in the light of the recent events from Italy 
(2007) and France (2010), are the brutal force, the excavator, or rattles 
statements with political taste. 
With a population in Europe estimated at eight to 12 million, the Roma 
population can be found everywhere from Finland to Greece and from Ireland 
to Russia, but they have no "homeland"(Tanner, 2005). The greatest number 
live in Central Eastern Europe: Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary. 
According to official sources, in these 4 countries the numbers are: 
 Romania (2001 census)-409.723, other sources claim up to 1,8-2,3 
million (Minority Right Group, The Life Quality Research Institute) 
  Slovakia- (2001)-89,920 persons counted as Roma, around 1.7% of the 
population. Other sources claim up to 10% of Slovakian (520,000 
people) may be Roma. They are the second largest ethnic minority in 
Slovakia after Hungarians.  
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 Hungary–(2001) -190.046 (1,9%), (according to the Open Society 
Institute) between 500.000 and 600.000 (6%).  
 Bulgaria - (2001) - other sources claim up to 370.908 (4,7%) (Cahn, 
Guild, 2010: 78).  
Even thou the numbers are higher in these countries, the Roma 
population is facing problems almost in all the EU countries, if they are not 
social problems, they are economic, security, illegal migration, discrimination on 
labour market, education or access to public services. Because of the higher 
number in these 4 countries the problems are more visible than in others that 
are far more developed (like Germany, England or Slovenia). 
Roma in Europe, like any other ethnic group, they are no monolith. 
They include rich and poor, success stories and failures, the talented, 
scroungers, and those unsuited for life in a modern society. In certain areas, 
they have become well integrated, living among and working with the local 
population, speaking the local language, and achieving higher levels of 
education. More often, however, they live apart from the native population, and 
are under-employed and poorly educated (The Economist, 2010: 46). Indeed, 
although they sometimes received gracious welcomes, Roma have historically 
been marginalized in every European country where they have settled. To make 
matters even more complex, a number of European states – including EU 
Member States such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland – 
have become both countries of migrant origin and countries of emigration for 
Roma. Roma from the Czech Republic, for example, continue to migrate 
particularly to the United Kingdom, while Roma from Romania and Slovakia – 
also EU Member States – migrate to, among other places, for example-the 
Czech Republic (Cahn, Guild, 2010: 17).  
The Roma that have exercised their right to free movement under 
European law by migrating to other parts of Europe are faced with difficulties 
in accessing national health systems, public housing and the labor market. 
There is a culture of open hostility and discrimination toward the Roma and 
they are often singled out. Being politically disorganized and lacking political 
representation, they do not have a strong lobby. The European Union 
Minorities and Discrimination survey reported that 47% of Roma maintained 
that they had been a victim of ethnically-based discrimination in the past 12 
months and 32% said they were victims of crime, making it clear that the Roma 
needs assistance and support (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009: 
9-12). Few measures for integration have been forthcoming, and often the 
solution is instead to send them back to their country of origin, like it happened 
in the France and Italian case. This is not a solution, but being a vulnerable 
trans-national minority, less visible in cases of human rights violation, without 
the help of embassies or national states, they are an easy target in the problem 
of illegal immigration.  
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From case to case, the Roma minority is being used as political stake, 
scapegoat in security problems (especially societal security) or a mean of 
attracting millions of Euros from the UE for developing social integration. In 
this conditions they have limited access to education, healthcare, public 
services, housing, labour market, that‘s why their life expectancy is lower (10 
years less according to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination 
survey), they have lower levels of educational attainment and unemployment 
rates about thrice the average. In this situation they are pursuing informal 
economic activities for survival, including begging and petty crime.  
However, it is also important to note that many Roma are also 
completely integrated into society, benefitting from the process of 
democratisation that has occurred in many member states as a part of 
European integration, as well as enjoying the benefits of the welfare system and 
social protection afforded by citizenship that has occurred alongside their 
incorporation into the Union (Cahn, Guild, 2010: 19). 
When we refer to Roma minority we need to talk about the economic 
cost of their social exclusion. The long tradition of discrimination, indignity and 
stigma associated with the Roma population is translated in economic losses, 
millions of Euros annually in productivity and in fiscal contributions to the 
governments.  
 The challenges posed by the economic and fiscal cost of Roma 
exclusion are particularly acute in light of the declining and quickly aging 
populations (World Bank, 2007:3). For example, only in Romania, between 
2000 and 2025, the national population is expected to decline by as much as 
10%, meanwhile experiencing a substantial increase in the proportion of elderly 
people (65+ years).The Roma population represents already a sizeable share of 
the working age population in many European countries and this share will 
continue to increase given the relatively younger age profile of the Roma 
community. As such, substantially increasing the participation and productivity 
of Roma is an economic necessity for everyone (de Laat, 2010: 2). Full 
economic participation will not be achieved if the current status quo is 
maintained. Apart from barriers such as labour market discrimination, the 
problems are the lack of education-only 1 of 6 working age Roma from an EU 
member state has the necessary education skill level.  
The potential gains of social inclusion far exceed the necessary 
investment costs of the process of education and training. According to a 
recent research by the World Bank, for instance, full Roma integration on the 
labour market could bring economic benefits estimated to be around € 0.5 
billion annually for some countries (de Laat, 2010: 4), especially the ones with 
important number of Roma population, such as Romania, Bulgaria or the 
Czech Republic.  
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In this situation it is very interesting to see what the European Union is 
doing to solve the situation, taking into consideration the discrimination 
problem and the social integration solution throw educational, economic and 
social programmes.  
 
What is being done? 
 
The Roma problem needs a complex action plan, that‘s why it has both 
a national and a European dimension, involving the national stakeholders, 
NGO‘s and the European Union institutions, like the Commission, the 
European Parliament, the European Council, the EU Council, the Committee 
of the Regions and the European Social an Economic Committee. For over a 
decade, the EU institutions have been regularly calling on Member States and 
candidate countries to improve the social and economic integration of Roma. 
From 2000 till now a lot of national integration strategies, international 
integration and mobility programs, action plans have been proposed in order to 
solve the Roma migration issue followed by social integration. Till now little has 
been achieved, but there are some programs and actions taken by the EU that 
deserve to be mentioned here. The initial steps have been done.  
The EU program of Roma integration is covering 4 four crucial areas: 
access to education, employment, healthcare and housing. 
A Pan-European initiative is the Decade for Roma Inclusion 2005-
2015, a program started in 2004 by eight Central Eastern European countries 
with the World Bank and Open Society Institute, Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, European Commission, so on. The program represents 
an effort to combat discrimination and to close the gap in welfare and living 
conditions between the Roma and the non-Roma, in order to break the 
discrimination and exclusion circle. 
Four fields of intervention, namely: education, employment, health, and 
housing and three cross-cutting fields of intervention: combating poverty and 
discrimination, and the gender issue represent are stipulated. The instruments 
used by the Decade are inspired by the European ―working style‖ in the 
programming documents: the Terms of Reference and the National Plans of Actions 
(Decade for Roma Inclusion, 2007: 34). Romania was the first country to secure 
the Decade presidency between 2005 and 2006. 
If we are talking about National Action Plans, it worth mention the 
Spain case, the ACCEDER Program, managed by the Fundación Secretariado 
Gitano, which has been very successful in providing training and in securing 
work contracts for participants. In 2007 the National Agency for Roma 
(Romania) decided to copy the ACCEDER Program and adjust it to the needs 
of the Romanian Roma population. Following the ACCEDER pattern, in 2008, 
the Agency won a social inclusion project for Roma minority, called ―Together 
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on the labour market (Impreuna pe piata muncii)‖. Throw this project, 250 
Roma people were qualified and inserted on the Romanian labour market. 
At national level we have the National Anti-Poverty and Social Inclusion 
Plan, elaborated and developed under the coordination of the Governmental 
Anti-Poverty and promotion of Social Inclusion Commission and endorsed by 
G.D. 829/2002. It is a complex document conceived at its time to anticipate 
the Lisbon Agenda and a ―program of social construction for a European 
society‖. Its entire Chapter XIV is dedicated to reduction of poverty and of 
social inclusion of Roma (Ionescu, Cace, 206: 61). 
The EU's Europe 2020 strategy for a new growth path – smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth – leaves no room for the persistent economic 
and social marginalization of what constitutes Europe's largest minority. The 
Europe 2020 strategy sets a headline target of 75% of the population aged 20-
64 to be employed (on average, the employment rate in the EU amounts to 
68.8%) (COM 2011: 11). 
The  European Network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds 
(EU Roma), provides the opportunity for joining forces at all levels (EU, 
national, regional) and with all stakeholders, including the Roma, to address one 
of the most serious social challenges in Europe: putting an end to the exclusion 
of Roma. EU funding alone can certainly not solve the situation of Roma, but 
the Commission recalls that up to € 26.5 billion of EU funding is currently 
programmed to support Member States' efforts in the field of social inclusion, 
including to support efforts to help the Roma ( COM 2011: 13). 
 Is a commitment by European governments to improve the socio-
economic status and increase social integration of the Roma, this includes 
bringing together Roma civil society, governments, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations and European institutions.  
 
  
To-date, migration (especially Roma migration) is considered as a 
strategic matter for Europe, meaning that it can have an impact on economy, 
stability and security. Even so, migration cannot be fully controlled and zero 
migration within the Roma population is neither feasible nor desirable in the 
European Union member states. 
In spite of some progress achieved both in the Member States and at 
European Union level over the past years, little has changed in the day-to-day 
situation of most of the Roma. According to the Commission's Roma Task 
Force findings, strong and proportionate measures are still not yet in place to 
tackle the social and economic problems of a large part of the EU's Roma 
population. For over a decade, the European Union institutions have been 
regularly calling on Member States and candidate countries to improve the 
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social and economic integration of Roma. Now is the time to change good 
intentions into more concrete actions. 
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Abstract. The practice of post-modernity revived in the concept of devolution as the 
best referential to local governence as compared  to the permanent structure of federalism. As a 
result of almost continuos state reform in the last 40 years, Belgium has both systems, but also 
no full-fledged government. Divided in a complicated array of linguistic-based communities and 
regions boasting large competencies from education to fiscality and voting rights, the kingdom 
faces not only the fluctuant political choices of its citizens (as shown by the modern tool of 
manipulation, namely the polls), but also the specter of dissolution - due to the political 
deadlock of defining a common functional governing agenda, and to a sort of reciprocal ethno-
linguistic cleansing. 
 
 
 
 
 
THE BELGIAN DILEMMA OF PARTITION. A 
PATTERN STUDY FOR THE EAST 
 
 
 
George ANGLIŢOIU* 
 
 
 
The Kingdom of Belgium is the 9th EU member state in terms of 
population (10.8 million estimation for the year 2010 – 2.1% of the EU 
population) (Eurostat, 2010), the 22th in size (area of 30.528 square km – 2% 
of the EU territory) and the 7th in wealth (GDP/capita – 43.794 USD) (CIA, 
2010). The European statistics show higher living standards, life expectancy 
among the highest in the EU, good governance practices and functional 
decentralization. Despite all these arguments, the dissolution of Belgium is one 
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of the most popularized scenarios in recent years with hard-to-predict 
consequences on the EU and the state organization patterns from within. 
Is Belgium a failed state? The constitutional, economic and 
International Relations theories could offer both pro and con arguments.  
History continues to be a hard reference for the European Union of 27 
sovereign states. The theory of the nation state, founding people, basic language 
and defining borders does not apply to the case of Belgium. 
Located between de current Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Duchy 
of Luxembourg in the geopolitical space of the Low Countries, the Kingdom of 
Belgium represents a diplomatic compromise between the European great 
powers of the first half of the XIXth Century. The absence of a unified and 
centralized state meant the existence of several medieval formations of variable 
frontiers and power with the most notable cases of the Duchy of Brabant, the 
County of Flanders and the Archbishopric of Liège. The collapse of the 
ambitious Duchy of Burgundy (the most significant medieval power ever to 
attend the unification of the formations located between France and the Holy 
Roman Empire) after the final defeat and death in combat of Charles the Bold in 
the battle of Nancy (1477) emphasized the uncertainty and insecurity of these 
hard-fought territories located at the crossroads of the commercial highways of 
Western Europe. Both Brabant (with Brussels as capital) and Flanders (with 
Bruges as capital and Ghent afterwards) were highly developed from the 
economic point of view. The prominence of such urban centres of intense 
merchant, banking, cloth fabrication or rare metals refining activities (Anvers for 
instance) was a constant cause and stake for France and the Imperial House of 
Habsburg for making war and peace between them at the end of the Middle Age 
and during the Modern History. The 80 Years‘ War marked the political and 
religious breakdown in relations between the North and the South of the Low 
Countries. The first bourgeois revolution saw the creation of the protestant 
Netherlands while the loyal Catholics of the future to be Belgium ―betrayed‖ the 
cause and stayed within the Habsburg Empire. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) 
consecrated the demise of the Duchy of Brabant whose territories were annexed 
to the Habsburg Empire. A century and a half later on, the French and 
Napoleonic rule over the Low Countries (1794-1815) was followed by the 
creation by the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) of the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, a short lived state dissoluted by the Revolution of 1830 – celebrated 
by the Belgian patriots as the founding event of their country (Fridl, 2005). 
Taking into account the fact that Flanders had belonged for centuries to the 
French monarchy, there was a strong feeling among the French political elites for 
this county to be annexed.1 But in the end, despite the diplomatic endeavors of 
                                                          
1 The Wallon Revolution of august-october 1830 was highly influenced by the success 
of the French Revolution of July which marked the fall of the King Charles X.  
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the French former foreign minister Talleyrand2, the concert of European great 
powers decided to create Belgium -a buffer state- in order to contain the 
resurgence of French hegemonic ambitions. (Thomas, 1983) 
Promoter of the Industrial Revolution facilitated by a vanguard political 
regime of liberal democracy, Belgium founded its security policy on the 
principle of perpetual neutrality (Palo, 2000: 227-304) imposed by the quintet of 
European great powers in the Treaty of 1839 (Fuehr, 1915). But this status 
would not benefit Belgium, exposed to German military aggression and 
occupation both in WWI and WWII, all of these committed in order to achieve 
a quick and surprising invasion of France from the least expected flank. 
The post-war founding member status of WEU and NATO offered 
Belgium the necessary security umbrella at last. The decisions taken by the 
French president Charles de Gaulle in the mid ‗60s out of grandeur foreign 
policy caused the relocation of both NATO and main EEC institution 
headquarters from Paris to Brussels which will backfire and facilitate in return 
great visibility and soft power to Belgium and its stance in the world.  
During this time, the domestic politics have been dominated by the 
complicated geometry of keeping together the ethnic and linguistic mosaic, the 
balance of power between its main Walloon and Flemish components 
contributing to the 180 years of existence of the Belgian state. Drawing a 
parallel to Germany, one could conclude that the latter has only 20 years of 
unified existence to which could be added the periods of the II and III Reich 
(1871-1918 / 1933-1945) and the Weimar Republic (1919-1933). 
Same History, however, gives us more episodes of societal fractures 
between the Walloon and Flemish communities starting with the Revolution of 
1830 whose main goal was to put to an end the political domination of the 
southern Francophone community by the Netherlands. In response, the 
Walloons strongly supported by the industrial centers of the South dominated 
the politics of the new state. Flemish became an official language only in 1896, 
following pressure and militancy of the Flemish Movement, an organization 
initially cultural, then political. The first official version in Flemish of the 
Belgian Constitution will not be issued until 1967. 
Belgian statehood dichotomy is perhaps best described by two 
representative historians, Henri Pirenne and Hervé Hasquin. If the first author, 
a Belgian renowned academic figure, defined over a century ago the Belgian 
identity to be based on the common civilization of the Belgian people and not on 
the core ethnological elements: race, language, borders (Pirenne, 1899)3, the 
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latter, otherwise a well-known Walloon liberal politician, depicted Belgium‘s 
monarchy of German origin as an overnight erected tent which will not endure after the 
storm is over. (Hasquin, 1996: 22) The reason behind such prediction was the 
nationless of the Belgian Kingdom despite the existence of provinces and 
political parties.  
Moreover, is mandatory finding the answer to the question whether the 
Belgian monarchy is the main bond and guarantor of statehood and union 
between Flemish and Walloons. Chronologically speaking, the continuity of the 
House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha as opposed to the Bourbons of Spain, for 
example, may represent a logical argument for the scenario to maintain the 
kingdom and the federal coexistence. A constitutional monarchy, Belgium has 
no special enshrined powers for the sovereign, different to other similar forms 
of states such as the Netherlands or the Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. The functional symbolism of powers and the protocol 
displayed at the royal house‘s major events represent legitimizing elements for 
the Belgian political imaginary. A monarchy of foreign origin, the House of 
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha is now the highest common political denominator for the 
two ethnic and linguistic communities. Rebranded nationally as the National 
House of Belgium it follows the pattern of other branches of the royal house of 
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, namely the House of Windsor (United Kingdom) or the 
House of Bragança (Portugal). 
The Philosophy of History gives us many arguments based on the 
success of succession to the throne as a precondition for the sustainability of 
monarchy. The incumbent monarch Albert II is reigning Belgium since 1993 
and the presumed successor is his eldest son, the Duke of Brabant, Prince 
Philip. The latter is married since 1999 with a descendant of an old Walloon 
noble family, Ghislaine Mathilde d'Udekem d'Acoz, presumably the first queen 
of Belgian origin. The Crown Princely couple has four children, and if the line 
of succession will not be altered by unexpected events, the crown of the 
kingdom would be taken forward and for the first time in the Belgian history by 
a woman, Princess Elizabeth. A general of the Air Force and a graduate of the 
famous Oxford and Stanford universities, the Crown Prince is characterized by 
the Belgian public opinion as a conservative, not at all inclined towards liberal 
political innovations. 
 His brother, Prince Laurent, is portrayed especially by the Flemish 
media in the recent years as the black sheep of the royal house. Involved in 
2006-07 in an extensive corruption scandal concerning the embezzlement of 2.2 
million Euros of the Navy budget, including the renovation of his official 
residence at Tervuren (Villa Clémentine), Prince Laurent4 (Castle, 2007) was 
                                                          
4 He is provided annually from the state budget with the sum of 295.000 euros for his 
princely status. For a picaresque characterization of the prince see Stephen Castle, 
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forced by royal decree to be the first royal family member ever to be questioned 
by police and court as a witness. Although the prince has escaped prosecution, 
the leaks to the media of allegations against him formulated by the indicted 
former officials or about the deteriorating relations between King Albert II and 
his son contributed to the erosion of the royal image. 
The basic counter-argument could be that this episode of corruption, or 
the libertine life of king's step-sister, Princess Maria-Cristina (Daphné), or the 
public criticism against the Crown Prince about his perceived political stiffness 
/ lack of expert advisers fit the pattern of attrition by the media of the image of 
the European royal houses seen by a part of the electorate as anachronistic. The 
aforementioned royal houses draw back their origins to the beginning of pan-
European feudalism and they have benefited for centuries especially due to the 
image of the coronation rite of the sacred anointing. To these were added both 
the strict control of the security forces and the absence of the media scrutiny 
and public transparency about the state of health or morals of the monarchs 
and other members of the royal houses. 
The contemporaneity brought pressure on the everyday political 
relevance and actions of the monarchic elite. Their privileges (including fiscal) 
generated numerous and varied forms of opposition and criticism5 that 
culminated in several European countries with coups against the monarchy and 
the establishment of republican regimes. While not the near future scenario in 
Belgium, it should, however, be emphasized the reliance of the Belgian state-
building on the royal house's ability to demonstrate its necessity and meaning. 
  The post-Cold War brought forth the dissolution of states which like the 
Belgian one had decided in a (con) federal way to bringing together two or more 
peoples with origins more or less common, including linguistic. I were the cases 
of the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the Czechoslovak Republic or the independence of 
Montenegro. The secession of Kosovo is recognized only by a fraction of the 
international community. Five European Union member states, in turn 
confronted with the specter of ethnic separatism, are under increasing pressure 
both from others EU countries and the United States to accept this unilateral act 
of will of the Albanian community holding the majority in the southern parts of 
                                                                                                                                                     
High-living in the Low Countries: Belgium's blue-blooded bad boy, The Independent, Friday, 
12 January 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/highliving-
in-the-low-countries-belgiums-blueblooded-bad-boy-431787.html 
5 See for instance the popular interest reflected by the various blogs dedicated to the 
European royal houses and aristocratic elites. - ***, Prince Laurent accused of Fraud, 
http://www.theroyalforums.com/forums/f123/prince-laurent-accused-of-fraud-
13706.html. The website of the Belgian royal house makes no reference to the 
judicial problems of prince Laurent while the princess Marie-Christine is not even 
mentioned. http://www.monarchie.be/royal-family. 
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old Serbia. On the other hand, Russia and China, out of fear of secession in the 
forms of Chechnya or Tibet, will use their permanent UN Security Council status 
and vetoing rights to oppose the deepening of such developments.  
But, the recent decision of the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague for the recognition of the legitimacy of Kosovo's declaration of 
independence may be referential in the hypothetical case of a unilateral action 
of one of the two Belgian main communities. No genocide or ethnic hatred and 
distrust would be the raison behind it (as it is the case for the latest-born state, 
South Sudan) but a national will to renew the foundations and to eliminate the 
otherness, ―guilty‖ of impeding growth and civilizational advance. Creating new 
frontiers within the Economic and Monetary Union and the EU area of security 
and freedom can be justified because ultimately everything boils down to 
majority rule of the elections and referendums. The resurgence of nationalist 
parties in the last decade at the forefront of political life in Western Europe is a 
certainty and the monarchs of Europe can be removed once they have 
exhausted or prove only a limited constitutional charisma. 
In fact, the democratic Belgium has already experienced a showcase of 
royal controversy and public contestation during the WWII and postwar years 
of reign of King Leopold III. The referendum of 1950 was organised in order 
for the Belgians to vote on the issue of allowing the king in exile to come back 
and undisputedly resume his royal prerogatives. The electoral campaign and the 
official result deepened the gap between the Flemish (70 percent in favor) and 
the Walloons (only 42 percent for), and their main political options Christian-
democracy and socialism respectively. Despite de fact that a majority of 57 
percent voted for the king, the ensuing general strike caused by the socialists 
and the increasing risk of civil war forced the king to abdicated in favor of his 
son, future to be King Baudoin. Symbolically enough, one of the most relevant 
displays of Belgian-less happened in Wallonia during the crisis with banners of 
the Gallic coq replacing the official state flags.  
The latest elections of 2010 marked the increase in relevance of the 
Flemish separatist movement, its main party, the New Flemish Alliance (NV-
A), managing to surpasse the Christian Democrats (CD&V) for the first time in 
history and win the scrutiny (27.8 percent of the general vote and 27 seats in 
the Chamber of Representatives). Promoter of the so-called Maddens Doctrine 
(the continuation of the devolution despite its five phases of state reform since 
1970), the Flemish separatists failed to agree in October 2010 over a 
government formula with the French-speaking Socialist party (the victor in 
Wallonia with 26 seats in the Belgian Parliament). This event made futile the 
elections called by the King in order to give Belgians a regular government after 
third successive resignations of Prime Minister Yves Leterme, the winner of the 
2007 elections. The break-up of negotiations aggravated also the rift between 
Flanders and Wallonia, the leader of the Socialist Party Elio di Rupo publicly 
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invoking the necessity to activate Plan B6, the first public announcement on 
behalf of the leading party of the French-speaking community of the will to 
split the country as the only viable solution to end the political deadlock which 
has made Belgium to hold a strange 4-year world record of governmentlessness.  
The former Flemish Prime Minister and current ad-hoc caretaker Yves 
Leterme has not only coined Belgium as ―an accident of history‖7 (Quatremer, 
2007) but he is also representative for the failure of the cohabitation between 
Flemish and Wallons. Born in a mixt family (father – french-speaker / mother 
– Flemish), the controversial leader of an electoral coalition between CD&A 
and NV-A failed to ensure during his tenures as prime minister the 
continuation of devolution to the benefit of Flanders and a radical solution to 
the BHV (Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde) issue. Commented by the foreign media as 
―a polite form of ethnic cleansing‖ (The Economist, 2007), the scenario of 
abolishment of the bilingual political and judicial rights of aproximetely 150,000 
French-speakers residents of the Flemish suburbs of Brussels failed to get the 
parlamentarian approval, but fueled once more the distrust between North and 
South. 
Using the SWOT analysis methodology, the next logical step should be 
finding response less to the question whether secession is feasible (even from a 
unilateral side) and a lot more on the net benefits of such strategic decisions. 
The strengths and opportunities of the secession should rely on the very 
existence of the Belgians in three linguistic communities (including a slim 
German-speaking one within the Francophone region), which means an already 
existing division for decades. Mutual accusations of burdening the state budget 
were fueled by the dynamics of progress and regress between the Flemish north 
and Walloon south. This could be replaced by what is mentioned above, namely 
the absence of otherness, thus focusing on developing their own unrestricted 
economic growth. The political parties would be forced to have natural 
doctrinal stance and positive action in the absence of abnormal left-right, 
                                                          
6 See ***, Le Plan B de di Rupo: “Une Belgique composée de la Wallonie et de Bruxelles”, 
L‘Avenir,  dimanche 10 octobre 2010, http://www.lavenir.net/article/detail. 
aspx?articleid=DMF20101010_017 
7 The interview which he gave to the French newspaper Liberation is very indicative of the 
ethnic frailties of Belgium: “La Belgique n'est pas une valeur en soi, ce sont des institutions au 
service d'une population. Si les institutions n'évoluent pas pour s'adapter aux désirs des citoyens, ce pays 
n'a pas d'avenir. Je veux être clair : mon parti ne participera pas à un gouvernement, après les élections 
de 2007, s'il n'y a pas de nouveaux transferts de compétences vers les régions. La nécessité d'avoir un 
gouvernement fédéral passe au second plan par rapport aux intérêts de la Flandre. Vous savez, des gens 
ont vécu ici depuis des siècles et des siècles sans être Belges… Que reste-t-il en commun ? Le roi, l'équipe 
de foot, certaines bières.” – Jean Quatremer, Leterme à la tête d'un «accident de l'histoire», 
Liberation, Le 12 juin 2007, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/0101104777-leterme-a-
la-tete-d-un-accident-de-l-histoire 
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Flemish-Walloon alliances lately in the kingdom, and the competitiveness policy 
should prevail over nationalist agendas already fallen into disuse with the 
ultimate goal already reached. 
 But the weaknesses, risks and threats are not at all negligible. In an 
independent existence, both Flanders and Wallonia would be much less 
important in the absence of the integrator and capacitator pattern named 
Belgium. Of course, the European Union and the map of Europe itself contain 
small states like Luxembourg, Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino and the 
Baltic states. Even in the scenario of a shrewd and balanced partition (including 
a hard-to-reach solution for the creation of a free metropolitan region of 
Brussels), the weight dilemma in the European and international power balance 
remains. Antwerp was the capital of banking, gems and cloth markets in 
Europe prior to the three days of Spanish Fury in 1576, then lost 
prominence. Antwerp of the year 1944 was the most important port of the 
second front both for the Americans (in order to secure the success of post-
landing operations in Normandie) and the German counteroffensive in the 
Ardennes. Flanders alone will be weaker in military terms than Belgium - an 
influential member of both NATO and the EU. Wallonia, by contrast, will lose 
the exit to sea - a vital geopolitical asset. The lack of Brussels would be very 
counterproductive for both entities since either symbolically or strategically, 
whoever controls the capital of Europe‘s diplomatic community can possess 
major influence. Completly divided, the two communities would have on the 
long term mainly the scenario of belonging to the Netherlands or France 
respectively, meaning the dependence on already established and consolidated 
majorities regardless of the rethoric and imaginary of the same blood and 
language roots.  
A paradoxical argument to continuity of the Belgian monarchy and 
State in the nineteenth century was the fact that King Leopold II had managed 
through perseverence and diplomatic wit to claim and get as a personal domain 
Congo, one of the largest and richest in natural resources African 
colony. Pompously called the Congo Free State (1884-1908), this private domain 
generated by the brutal exploitation of indigenous labor tremendous benefits 
both for the monarchy and the Belgian State - a creditor of the colonial 
ambitions of Leopold II. The scandal and international pressure ignated by the 
revelations on the grim fate of the exploited natives will generate the only 
solution that allowed the colony to remain under the control of Belgium, 
namely its annexation by the government. What initially sounded like a crazy 
and expensive initiative on the part of the monarch of a small country, 
incapable of great geopolitical ambitions, became a significant asset in the 
European balance of power, dominated by the theme of colonialism. Belgium‘s 
ambitions and postwar recoveries were fueled by the resources of Congo and 
based on the joint Wallon and Flemish continuos enterprise in colonial industry 
The Belgian Dilemma of Partition. a Pattern Study for the East 
 
505 
and trade. Not accidentally, Belgian population (mainly Flanders) in the Belgian 
Congo increased from more than 1,100 in 1900 to nearly 90,000 in the year of 
the Congolese independence (1960). 
The recent Wikileaks scandal showed the interest of the United States in 
fuelling the Belgian political imaginary and diplomatic assets as an emerging 
European power in return for help in accepting Guantanamo inmates and the 
continuos presence of US nuclear weapons.8 Washington‘s goal to boost Brussels 
at the EU level as a counterweigth to Paris and Berlin could facilitate a new Congo 
for Belgium. The head of the European Council is the former Belgian prime 
minister Herman van Rompuy, the most important school in European Affairs is 
the College of Europe in the Belgian Bruges and the Belgian diplomacy played 
important roles in crafting the EU Treaties and secondary pieces of legislation by 
merely hosting the majority of EU summits of the last decade. In times of global 
financial crisis, the governmentlessness of Belgium could prove to be a 
paradoxical asset of laissez-faire politics, very beneficial to the Belgian located 
business, Wallon, Flemish and international alike, while the Belgian bureacracy 
could influence the dynamics of European Union to its interest. 
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